


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AND  
AFTER 1914

ANTON NYSTRÖM



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21 BEDFORD STREET, LONDON, W.C.

# BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER 1914

BY  
**ANTON NYSTRÖM**

TRANSLATED BY  
**H. G. DE WALTERSTORFF**

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY  
**EDMUND GOSSE, C.B. LL.D.**



LONDON  
**WILLIAM HEINEMANN**

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## INTRODUCTION

MUCH has been said about the delicacy of Sweden's political disposition, and the outpourings of such Swedish activists as the egregious Sven Hedin have had enough, and more than enough, notice given them by English journalists. The pro-German opinions of this small class of Swedish militarists and meddlers are not those of the vast majority of the inhabitants of eastern Scandinavia. Too little has been said in any of the Allied countries of the existence of a consistent and powerful literature in which some of the foremost intellects of Sweden protest against the crimes of Germany. If we desire to know the real views of the best minds in Sweden, we ought to make acquaintance, not with the violent propaganda of a noisy court clique, but with the volumes of Professor Ernst Wigforss and of Herr C. N. Carleson, the remarkable *Black Week* of Herr Anton Karlsgren, the essays of Professor N. Edén, the leading articles in the principal Swedish newspapers, *Dagens Nyheter*, *Stockholmstidningen*, *Göteborgsposten*, *Karlstadstidningen*, and many others. If further evidence were needed that Sweden, as a whole, is not pro-German, it is found in the constant flow of speeches by the leader of the Social Democratic Party, Herr Hjalmar Branting, and by the late Liberal Prime Minister, Herr Karl Staaff.

The very fact that an admiration of German methods and an indulgence for German *kultur* have been more widely spread in Sweden than anywhere else outside the borders of the Central Empires gives a special value to the opinion of those Swedes who have had the courage to oppose the

stream of lying literature steadily flowing from Berlin. More and more, as the truth has filtered through to Scandinavia, honourable and able writers in Sweden have weighed the issues in the balance, and have decided in favour of the Allies. But it must never be forgotten that German propaganda is not merely untiring, it is protean. At every turn of the war it takes new shapes, and baffles the uninformed by its ingenuity and its impudence. The judgment which survives its attacks in a friendly neutral country is healthy indeed, and a peculiar value attaches to the exposures made by Swedish writers of authority, in which the guilt of bloodshed is brought home to Germany with overwhelming force. But among the protagonists whom we have mentioned, none carries more weight or speaks from a riper experience of men and affairs than Herr Nyström, whose views are presented to the English public.

Some notion of the career and activity of so remarkable a writer may be welcome to his English readers. Anton Nyström was born at Gothenburg on February 15, 1842. He studied medicine at Upsala and at Stockholm, and with a Thesis—the title of which betrays his lifelong interest in practical matters, *The Foot and the Right Shape of the Shoe*—he began his long literary career in 1867. He spent two years in visits to foreign medical schools, successively making himself at home in Copenhagen, Berlin, Vienna, Paris, and London, and then, in 1869, he settled down to be a practising physician in Stockholm. He had, however, from early youth combined with scientific investigation a passion for philosophical speculation, and this found its earliest expression in 1873, in a volume entitled *Jesus and Christianity viewed from a Scientific Standpoint*. In London and in Paris he had become acquainted with the views and writings of Auguste Comte, to which he was instantly attracted, and in 1875 he made a profession of the Comtist faith. He introduced Positivism into Sweden, founded a journal, was recognized by Pierre Lafitte as a mainstay

of the movement, and lectured through Sweden on the philosophy of Comte. This exposition of Positivism was Dr. Nyström's principal occupation until after 1879.

In 1880 he started the practical work by which he is doubtless most widely known in his native country. This was a far-reaching effort to raise the intellectual level of the working classes of Sweden. He founded the Working Man's Institute in Stockholm, with courses of popular lectures on almost every branch of scientific knowledge. Here he developed a system of education, by means of evening courses, completed in a period of eight months in the year. The scheme was conceived in a manner extremely adaptable to the habits of the Swedish artisan, and it enjoyed a surprising success. In its second year the Institute was subventioned by the city and later by the State, and it branched out into similar bodies formed in all the principal towns of Sweden. Dr. Nyström remained director of the whole enterprise, and when, in 1894, the Institute was able to build itself a fine hall in Stockholm, he received an ovation from a huge assembly. He himself lectured here regularly on anatomy, physiology, and the history of civilization. The results of his meditations on the last-mentioned theme were given to the public in what is the most important of his numerous literary works, his *Allmän kulturhistoria* (General History of Civilization), which appeared in six volumes between 1886 and 1892. This work the author designed as a sort of "systematic encyclopædia or a circle of scientific information." He seeks in it to bring all the natural sciences into relation with sociology. No other work of the kind, executed with anything like the same fullness, exists in the Swedish language.

In more recent years Dr. Nyström has extended his labours in the direction of political history, and has published a series of volumes in which contemporary problems are carefully examined. In *The Main Political Danger for Scandinavia* (1901) he faced the situation in which the North, and particularly Sweden, finds herself

in relation to her powerful neighbours. In *The Wars of Eastern Europe between Russia, Poland, and Sweden* (1903) he went still more deeply into this inquiry. In the preceding year Dr. Nyström had visited Alsace-Lorraine, and he recounted his impressions in a volume which was published simultaneously in Swedish, French (with a preface by M. Millerand), and German. He proposed the return of the provinces to France in exchange for the cession to Germany of some of the French colonies, a solution of the difficulty which he fancied might lead to a settled peace. In the course of the present work it will be noted that Herr Nyström has not yet abandoned some hope of a restoration of European balance by means of an interchange of colonies.

Of the medical theories of Dr. Nyström, exposed with great frankness and sometimes with a certain audacity, it is not necessary to speak here. Nor of his valuable contributions to pure sociology, such as his *Christianity and Free Thought* (1908) and his essay on the protection of the children of the poor (1911). Enough has been said to show how multifarious have been his intellectual activities, and it will easily be recognized how valuable the opinions of such a man must become when they deal with questions of the moment on which his vast range of experience has given him authority to speak. That Dr. Nyström, after full reflection, has so unhesitatingly pronounced in favour of the Entente Allies must be a matter of sincere pleasure to all patriotic Englishmen.

EDMUND GOSSE.

## AUTHOR'S PREFACE

IT is after a certain amount of hesitation that I have made up my mind to publish this work. Perhaps it will meet with disapproval, seeing that it is not only a reiteration of the notes exchanged between the Powers before the outbreak of the World War and of their leading features, but an attempt as well to inquire into the causes of the war, and must therefore grapple with the question of responsibility.

In all neutral countries the citizens have been exhorted to maintain a neutral attitude in their discussions concerning the nations at war, and to refrain from expressions of opinion in favour of this country or that. I have seen recently in an Italian paper warnings to this effect, but these warnings had, it seemed, chiefly the object of warding off enemies from Italy, and Maeterlinck's propaganda on behalf of Belgium was looked upon there with some alarm, as it might tend to arouse popular indignation against Germany and thus jeopardize an unbiased judgment.

On this point there is much to be said. I admit that general expressions of opinion and demonstrations are improper and may prove harmful in a country which has affirmed its neutrality; but that individuals could be absolutely neutral in discussing one or other of the belligerent Powers in this the vastest war in the history of man, is unthinkable. We hear in Sweden, in private circles, the most diverse views based on ancient sympathies for this country or that, on personal relations, faith in the

opinions of a certain newspaper, more or less veracious information, etc.

Sweden, like the other Scandinavian countries, has officially declared her neutrality in this World War, and rightly so. On this point public opinion in Sweden is really at one. Apart from a few solitary voices, the Swedes will not hear of actual participation on the plea that the interests of the country demand action on one side or the other.

But, however strictly we may adhere to the declaration of our Government in this matter, we need not on this ground consider that our lips are sealed when contemplating the policies of the warring nations, the causes which gave rise to the war, and the acts and deeds committed therein. Anyone who conscientiously and in the interests of truth and justice studies the course of events must be entitled to express his opinion, even if such expression of opinion involves severe criticism. If this were not so, silence in the name of neutrality would be synonymous with cowardice, want of character, or indifference; it might give other nations entirely untrue conceptions of the prevailing opinion and thus create distrust.

If people in other countries, and particularly those at war, are interested in learning the Swedish attitude—as seems to be the case—it may therefore serve a useful purpose if persons who have made a conscientious study of the world conflict express their views thereon.

More than ever before do we now stand in the need of utterly independent historians and political authors capable of objective, conscientious, and unimpassioned criticism, able to keep their own leanings in check and disregard political parties and the claims of diverse nations when they do not coincide with what is right. It is on account of the need of these qualifications that warlike complications can often best be unravelled by observers belonging to a neutral State.

The confusion is general and boundless, the highest moral principles are at stake, and normal development is

arrested. It has long been found necessary for the advancement of science, art, industry, commerce, and morality that different nations should co-operate therein, and for this purpose settled international relations have been established, whilst an understanding between races and nationalities has been arrived at. All this is now as if it had never been. The World War has almost entirely destroyed the sense of justice, and all codes of right and wrong were upset when brutal force became the dominant principle. The law of nations no longer exists, all passions have been unchained, hate prevents the exercise of reason, nations live that they may kill and plunge one another into distress and misery, the foremost inventions deal out death and destruction, humaneness is a mockery, truth is withheld and falsehood organized, the future is wrapt in gloom, the brotherhood of nations is made impossible, the brute in us is brought to the fore, and peace will be but a transient truce to be observed until the nations, with their souls black with hatred, once more fly at each other's throats.

This state will inevitably follow if the nations are not called to their senses and enlightened on *the real causes of the World War*, and if open and serious criticism is not brought to bear on the faults committed by leading statesmen when the war was in the making. That faults of the gravest kind have been committed is indisputable.

To endeavour to unravel the causes of the war, in order thereby first and foremost to prepare the way for a fresh understanding between the nations and prevent new motives for war, has to me become a necessity which, in common with others eager to advance the cause of culture, I feel most keenly. We have been tormented long enough—but oh! how little compared with the victims of the war—we wish to hear no more. May it not excite surprise if a person outside the orbit of events and politics, after many months of melancholy depression—I might almost say of cultural torment—and urged on by his convictions,

studies, and meditations, feels impelled to open his heart on the subject of the fateful conflict.

To understand the origin of this war it is necessary to go far back into the past, and the more I have meditated upon its causes, the firmer has become my conviction that these are wrapt up primarily with Germany's history from the earliest ages to our time, and particularly with the appearance of Prussia as a military State. In this connexion it becomes essential to inquire into the origin of the Dano-German War of 1864, the German War of 1866, and the Franco-German War of 1870. But this is not enough ; the development of Germanism since the beginning of the nineteenth century must also be gone into in order that the inner causation of events may be revealed. Furthermore, we must recall the general features of the German wars of the seventeenth century and of the Middle Ages ; nay, we must carry our minds back to the first appearance of the Germanic race in antiquity and the great migration of nations.

Whilst for more than fifty years back, ever since the Dano-German War—which attracted me and many other Swedish volunteers under the Danish banners—I have been opposed to the political system, with its oppression and militarism, which Bismarck introduced into Germany, I have never shut my eyes to Germany's cultural greatness and influence. Even though I may have been still more deeply impressed by certain English and French thinkers and politicians, to name but J. Stuart Mill, Gladstone, Diderot, Comte, Gambetta, Jules Ferry, I have always felt admiration for many representatives of German culture, such as Frederick the Great, Kant, Goethe, and many others. I realize to the full the great achievements of the thinkers of Germany and other civilized countries, and have no cause to side with any one nation in the great struggle. But, for that matter, the nations themselves did not want the war. It is deplorable that at the very time when old national antipathies were on the verge of disappearing, mistrust and hatred should have come into their own—not

through the nations themselves, but through a mistaken policy dictated by a few individual statesmen, mostly actuated by chauvinistic conceptions.

The French philosopher P. Bayle, in his celebrated work *Dictionnaire historique et critique* (1697), held that a historian should possess the following qualifications : “A historian who would faithfully fulfil his function must, in so far as stands in his power, transpose his mind to the attitude of a stoic who is not influenced by any passion. He must, insensible to all else, think of naught but the *interests of truth*. He must forget that he belongs to a certain country, that he was reared in a certain faith, that he has this or that individual to thank for his worldly possessions, and that this or that person is his relation and his friend. If he be asked, ‘Where are you from ?’ he must answer, ‘*I am neither a Frenchman, nor a German, nor an Englishman, nor a Spaniard, etc. ; I am a denizen of the world. I am in the service of truth alone.*’” I have identified myself with these reflections of Bayle’s in dealing with the World War and the causes which led up to it.

Whilst engaged in scientific, social, and political studies I have during the past half-century often and for long periods visited Germany, England, France, and other countries, conversed with eminent personalities, made myself familiar with current opinions and customs, and collected pertinent literature. I have thus, whilst honestly seeking the truth in European politics, had access to the channels for finding it, and I think that in my writings on the subject—*General History of Civilization, Alsace-Lorraine, etc.*—I have hitherto always manifested my earnest desire to be impartial and objective.

ANTON NYSTRÖM.

STOCKHOLM, *March 1915.*



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# I

## ON WAR AND MILITARY HISTORY

### SOME APHORISMS WHICH PROVIDE FOOD FOR REFLECTION

WAR is appropriate only in primitive stages of development, or when civilized States have to deal with uncivilized peoples disturbing or injuring them and whose barbaric acts compel war in the name of civilization, or as a means of defence against aggression.

Amongst civilized nations war is otherwise devoid of all sense. To settle disputes between them by murdering and destroying—in other words, by exercising brute force when justice could have been done by mediation and arbitration, is a mockery of culture and common sense.

It is in truth deplorable, and a disgrace to civilization, that the fate of human beings, the weal or woe of their country, should be determined, in the last resort, if disputes arise between the States, by violence and devastation, victory resting with the side in possession of the best—that is to say, the most devilish—weapons of destruction. Well may we endorse the sentiments of Gibbon in discussing the employment of gunpowder: “If we contrast the rapid progress of this mischievous discovery with the slow and laborious advances of reason, science, and the arts of peace, a philosopher, according to his temper, will laugh or weep at the folly of mankind.”

Mature reflection must lead to the conclusion that war, like most phenomena of human life—sickness and other human suffering, etc.—may, as a rule, be ascribed to two kinds of causes: *Causæ proximæ*, immediate, more or less

incidental causes, and *causæ remotæ*, deeper-lying and remoter, predisposing causes. A *causa proxima* is often but an insignificant reason or a pretext on the part of a State which desires war, but which does not wish to appear to be the aggressive party—a provocation, an accusation of violated national honour, an election of a ruler, an altered form of government, or internal disturbances in a neighbouring country, etc. A *causa remota* is generally of a more serious kind—a reasonable fear for the welfare of the State, anxiety for its commerce in the markets of the world, fear of undue predominance or hegemony, the suspicion of preparations for a war of revenge and plans for retaking conquered provinces, the need of new provinces or possessions in distant parts of the world for the exigencies of a growing population, etc. The predisposing and real causes are frequently concealed, and the arts of diplomacy thus often seek by pretexts, such as the bringing forward of an incidental reason—mobilization, etc.—to make it appear as if a State which clearly has been the aggressor were in reality the assailed party.

The objects of war and the question of how war should be conducted in our era by civilized nations are matters which have been set forth by all authorities on international law. In *Das Europäische Völkerrecht*, by Heffter, eighth edition, prepared by Geffcken (1888), we read for instance: “Civilized nations recognize in war but an extremity, an inevitable evil which must not be carried further than the *necessity demands*. Hence its highest principle, hallowed as much by reason and by love of humanity as by self-interest, is: Do your enemy, even in war, *no more harm than is unavoidable* for the attainment of the purpose; whilst the old code of war, on the other hand, followed the principle: Do your enemy as much harm as you can and find useful. The ethics of war prescribe the permissible means and the utmost limits; they forbid, and threaten with the curse of history, inhumanity and barbarism.”

Unfortunately this is still but a theory, for the World

War which began in 1914 has proved both inhuman and barbarous, and often certain belligerents have endeavoured to harm the enemy as much as possible and used proscribed methods.

Frederick the Great, himself an eminent warrior, said that “the world would be happy if there were no other means than *negotiation* to maintain justice and restore peace and harmony among the nations. The *force of reason, not of arms*, should be employed. Yet a sad necessity impels princes to resort to cruel means, and there are occasions when one must defend by the force of arms the freedom of a people threatened with the oppression of injustice, or when princes must submit the fate of their people to the test of battle. It is the *purpose* of a war which makes it just or unjust. The passions and ambition of princes often distort their vision and paint the most violent acts in pleasing colours. War is an extreme measure, and therefore it should only be resorted to after deliberation, in desperate emergencies, and after weighing carefully whether one be driven to it by the illusion of pride or by serious and compelling reasons.

“ War, as a rule, is so full of misery, the issue is so uncertain, and the consequences are so ruinous to a country, that princes cannot too deeply reflect before plunging into it. I am convinced that if the minds of kings could conceive a true and faithful picture of the misery which a single declaration of war brings upon their people, they would not be insensible. But their imagination is not vivid enough to give them a real picture of sufferings which they do not feel, and from which their position shields them. How are they to understand these burdens which oppress the people? The privations which the country’s young recruits must undergo? The contagious pestilences which ravage their armies? The horrors of battle and the still more murderous sieges? The despair of the wounded who have lost a limb? The distress of the fatherless who have lost their sole supporter?

The loss of so many men useful to the State, whom death gathers all too soon ? ”

On the whole, Frederick found man despicable ; he once remarked to the philosopher, Professor Sulzer of Berlin : “ You do not understand sufficiently this accursed race to which we belong.”

Frederick the Great belonged to the remarkable group of authors who in the eighteenth century represented the objective and pragmatic school of historians. He wrote, when he was still Crown Prince, his famous *l'Antimachiavel*, and published later *The History of my Time* and *The History of the Seven Years War*, etc., and all these works denote a clear understanding of the causes of events, a rare impartiality in judging his own acts, and a philosophic trend of thought. He considered most historical works to be “ lies, adorned by a few truths ” ; that the prejudices of authors, their blind partiality for the country of their birth and their hatred of foreign nations, so distorted facts and events that it was hardly possible to penetrate the veil which covered them.

“ I shall,” he wrote, “ dare to utter outright and aloud what is otherwise silently admitted. I shall describe princes such as they are, without bias in favour of those who are my allies and without hatred of those who are my enemies. One must,” he continued, “ be impartial, write with discrimination, and rely on none but fully reliable evidence : truthful persons, authentic documents, concordant reports from different sources,” etc.

The French writer L. Bourdeau, in his work entitled *L'histoire et les historiens* (1888), pronounced upon historical writings a learned and valuable criticism, and indicated the qualities which the historian should possess. He shows, among other things, how personal interests and passions, different political systems and parties have always exerted the most deleterious influence on historical records, which thus have often become positive falsifications.

“ Truth has,” he says, “ no greater enemy than passion ;

wherever passion appears there is ground for distrust. The study of science demands complete detachment from personal interest. The only passion for which there is room in such study is the wish to *find and utter the truth*, whatever it may be. Therefore history needs to enlist minds which are free from extraneous ties, for one cannot serve two masters at a time.” But this ideal is very difficult of attainment, and Bourdeau says outright that “entire impartiality, which can readily be found in those who study the abstract sciences, is impracticable in history, a concrete science, in which the acts of men, the work of passion, are observed and rendered with passion.”

*Patriotism*, despite its virtues, has a certain tendency on some minds to create and aggravate prejudices, so that it becomes *Chauvinism*, or the notion that one’s own country must be superior to all others. Especially in wartime this national feeling becomes exacerbated, and under its influences some writers, historians, and politicians transgress all bounds in their accounts of their own country’s excellence and the enemy’s inferiority, the justice of their country’s cause in making war and the deplorable injustice of the enemy’s. Under this influence they do not stop at distortions of facts, nay, actual lies, partly to appear in a favourable light to foreign countries, and partly to stimulate patriotism in their own countrymen and spur them to devoted defence against the enemy. Facts are given an entirely different complexion in the different countries to attain this object, and truth is thrown to the winds ; it practically ceases to have anything to do with the argument, the only vital point being to discredit the opponent and to give those in authority, who helped to bring about the war, the blindest support and thus secure the co-operation of the people.

We cannot but deplore with Bourdeau the difficulty with which the historian is confronted in endeavouring to reconcile patriotism with truth. “The more they love their country the less can one rely on their impartiality.

Has one not good reason for serious misgivings when one considers that most histories are the work of ardent patriots?"

Of the learned Florentine Poggio (d. 1459) it was said, when he had written *The History of Florence*: "Good patriot, bad historian."

## II

### ON RACIALISM, ITS SHORTCOMINGS AND DANGERS

VAST and far-reaching movements have in recent times arisen around the subject of racialism, movements which in reality denote a tendency in international politics inimical to civilization. The terms Germanism, Latinism, and Slavism have come to be used as political constructions designating rival and hostile racial groups, and this in an era when the nations should instead have realized the need for pacific mutual relations and enlightened understanding.

How meaningless the race question is in Europe from a scientific point of view is evident from the fact that all the races of which the European nations consist are in reality *closely related* to one another, *i.e.* sister races belonging to the Indo-European family, albeit with an admixture of earlier, prehistoric races, and in certain localities of Turanian, and more especially Finnish, elements.

Certain writers in Germany have, however, become scientific agitators ; they have enlisted themselves in the service of national egoism or chauvinism and sought to furnish evidence of the superiority of the Germanic over the Latin or Slav races.

The Germans long thought that a certain formation of the skull was characteristic of them all, that they were dolichocephalic, or long-skulled, in contrast to the French, who were normally brachycephalic, or short-skulled. Exhaustive investigation has shown, however, that in many

German countries, as, for instance, Hesse, Swabia, and Bavaria, the shape of the cranium is brachycephalic as in France, and that the most typical German skull, the Teutonic, varies much in shape and may be either dolichcephalic, mesocephalic, or brachycephalic.

Anatomically, therefore, the German racial theory is false, and if we look back into history we find that the French, even if of Latin origin, by no means lack Germanic elements, for the Franks and the Normans were Germanic peoples.

If this racial theory were true, the elemental principle of the law of nations would be false ; the law of nations would then be a mere collection of declamatory rules and phrases naively strung together. Why respect a nation which with an assumed scientific right one has already condemned to death to serve the ends of a policy of brute force ? Besides, of late, even in Germany voices have been raised which denounce this racial theory.

Friedrich Hertz, one of the shrewdest students of the race question in recent times, observes in his great work *Moderne Rassentheorien* (1904) : " Both the magnitude and the permanence of the race factors have been exaggerated in an incredible degree and their rôle in historical exposition must be regarded as secondary." He also points out that the greatest authorities on anthropology disparage the historical significance of " noble " and " ignoble " races. Thus Kollmann writes : " All European races, in so far as we have hitherto penetrated into the mysteries of race, are equally competent to grapple with any civilizatory task."

" The race theory in the traditional sense," says Hertz, " may in our time more rightly be called a playground for politicians and dilettanti than a sphere for exact investigators." Hertz declares that nothing is more false than the view that national consciousness implies race and that the race theory supplies the fundamental explanation of national tendencies. " There is no principle more provocative of hostility than that of race and nationality. The

race theory teaches contempt for the foreign race, its hopeless inferiority, the danger of its intermixture with the 'noble' race. All nations are composed of the most varied races, and we see, in point of fact, that those very nations which are made up of the most varied elements stand highest in the civilized world."

What little importance must be attached to the shape of the skull in determining the race I have shown in my work on *The Origin of Brachycephali and Dolichocephali* (1903),\* in which I pointed out that both long and short skulls as well as intermediate variations, are to be found amongst most races both in ancient and modern times, and that the shape of the skull is not an invariable mark of race, but varies according to cultural influences, the carriage of the body, etc., and that one and the same people may in earlier stages be mainly composed of dolichocephali, but later largely of brachycephali. I have also found by examination of the heads of 500 living Swedes that the brachycephali are more numerous among the upper classes, but that among the peasantry the dolichocephali predominate.

Eminent anthropologists have accepted my proofs as conclusive, and my craniological theory seems to have been generally adopted.

Apart from theoretical research, my investigations have served one positive purpose: they must tend to counteract race hatred and chauvinism, inasmuch as the theory of distinct racial characteristics has led some writers to proclaim that the dolichocephalic nations in Europe were superior to the brachycephalic, and therefore destined to rule and to conquer.

As a rule, accuracy has not been a feature of the attempts to fix the nationality of the different peoples; in fact, there has been a tendency to let the *ruling element*, the *language*, etc., determine the nationality of the people. Thus the French have been classed as of "Latin," the Germans

\* First published in Ranke's *Archiv für Anthropologie*, 1901, under the title *Ueber die Formveränderungen des menschlichen Schädels*.

of "Germanic," and the Russians of "Slav" origin, although all these peoples are of very mixed origin. It is quite insufficient, in deciding the question of nationality, to know that a certain stock has during long ages ruled in a certain area or occupied a country. It is necessary to know in what measure it has expelled, or extirpated, or absorbed, an earlier population of the area where it has become the ruling element.

Although in rare instances the inhabitants of a conquered country have been exterminated, if they were relatively few, there is no doubt that in most cases where a foreign people has conquered a country, the greater part of the old inhabitants—at all events, the women and children—have by no means been exterminated, but have remained as serfs or retained certain liberties and privileges. In time a fusion of the ruling with the conquered people has as a rule taken place, the latter element having often been predominant and thus ethnographically determined the nationality in a larger measure than the former, although generally the ruling element has given its name to the nation after the conquest.

Nowhere in Europe is there a nation of unmixed race; even where political and social unity exists and seems complete, the nation is composed of several racial elements. The French nation, which seems so homogeneous, is thus made up of prehistoric unknown races, Celts, Romans, Germans—in the Middle Ages called Bretons—Normans (Scandinavians), Gascons, Provençals, etc., who have been fused together, regard themselves all as Frenchmen, and speak the same language, although certain provinces have their own dialects.

The English and the Scotch also form a fairly homogeneous nation, but comprise many different racial elements descended from the Celts, Germans, etc.—those Gaels, Picts, Scots, Angles, Saxons, and Scandinavians who in the Middle Ages contended for the mastery of the country.

The German nation is made up of Celts, Germans, and Slavs, besides unknown prehistoric races. Pan-Germanism

should therefore, if it were consistent, expel the Celtic elements in South Germany and the Slav elements in North Germany—for example, the Prussians !

The Italian nation consists of Celtic and Germanic elements and the descendants of the old Romans, who themselves were a mixture of earlier Italian, Etrusean, and other peoples.

The Danish people is also very mixed, though distinguished by strong national unity and feeling ; yet it is composed of Celtic, old Germanic as well as modern German elements, Slavs, etc.

The Swedish nation issued originally from a mixture of unknown prehistoric peoples with Celts and Germans, who at an early stage became the ruling stock. But throughout the historical era, until our time, foreign racial elements have been absorbed into it. I have found by inquiry into the descent of 500 living Swedes that 67, or 14.4 per cent., had foreign blood ; nearly half of these had German blood, and next in order came those with Scottish, Frankish, and Walloon blood in their veins.\*

In Russia it has long been generally held that *the German is the enemy*. The Russian General Skobeleff, in 1882, gave vent to the following utterance to Slav students in Paris : “ In our country the stranger has penetrated everywhere—we have become the victims of his intrigues, enslaved by his power. The German is that stranger ! The German is the enemy ! The struggle between Slavs and Teutons is inevitable ! ”

In Germany, on the other hand, it has been contended that Russia has much to thank Germany for on account of the vast immigration from that country, that most industrial establishments in Russia owe their existence to German initiative, that even the leading positions in the country’s Government and Army have been entrusted to

\* The author, for instance, is descended from very ancient Swedish stock on his father’s as well as his mother’s side ; but on both sides he has inherited Scottish, German, and Frankish blood.

individuals of German descent, albeit they have since become Russians.

Racial hatred *per se*, or the hatred between races *as such*, without a political background, without antagonisms between the States, is in civilized countries an anomaly, a folly, the sheerest madness. It is in reality an artificially fostered sentiment, often founded on ignorance or on distorted history under the influence of warlike happenings or exaggerated nationalism—that is to say, chauvinism.

It is not racial antagonism that brought about the great war of 1914. It is State rearing itself against State. It is not only Slavs who are fighting in the East against Teutons, and Teutons who are fighting against Slavs, for there is no lack of Slavs in the German and Austrian armies, and in the West we see the Germanic State of Great Britain fighting against the Germans of Germany.

Racial hatred exists, however, as a background to the war—of that there can be no doubt—and is not difficult to understand, seeing that the Germans have since the Middle Ages actually ousted the Slavs from Central Europe and conquered several Slavonic countries. German politicians, moreover, never tire of pointing out that among the Slavs the hatred of Germany is in the blood.

In Russia there is more than a tendency to regard the World War as a struggle of Slavism against Germanism, and in Germany it has been declared to be the struggle of Germanism against Slavism.

According to the German White Book, the Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, declared at the beginning of the war: “The subjugation of all Slavs under the Russian sceptre through Austria’s complete downfall would make the position of the Germanic race in Europe untenable.” Therefore Germany could not do otherwise than give Austria her support in the Serbian conflict.

Dr. S. Hedin, after his return home from the front (in the *Dagens Nyheter* interview), laid down the following dictum: “It is the rise of Germanism in the guise of Germany which brought the Allies together. Hence the

Germans' intense resentment against Great Britain, as they regard her participation in the war as racial treason. This makes our responsibility all the greater. We have the purest blood of all Germanic peoples; this carries its duties with it."

The tension between Russia and Germany, which, on the outbreak of war, manifested itself once more by its appeal to racial animosities, demands a closer elucidation of the position and ethnographical conditions of Slavs and Germans.

### III

## THE SLAVS AND THEIR EARLIER DISTRIBUTION : THE MODERN SLAVS : PAN-SLAVISM : SLAV CIVILIZATION

THE early diffusion of the Slavs in Europe, about which hitherto not enough has been known, was originally far greater than is generally credited. This is clearly shown by a remarkable work published by the Academy of Sciences at Cracow, from the pen of a Polish savant, Dr. W. Ketrzynski, *The East Rhenish Slavs (O Slowianach mieszkajacych nigdys miedzy renem, a Laba, Sala i Czeska, Granica, 1899)*.

The Germanist Müllenhoff had already pointed out that all the old names of localities between the Rhine and the Elbe are not German and that the Germans were not the original inhabitants of those localities, but migrated thither as conquerors. He contended that the earlier inhabitants had been Celts; but now Ketrzynski shows that these original inhabitants were Slavs, for the names recur in the present-day Slav countries. He bases his case on names which even German writers acknowledge to be Slavonic, and instances the terminations *itz* and *gast* and the names *Wind*, *Wend*, and their combinations; he shows that there are about 800 such names of localities between the Rhine and the later Slav boundary in Eastern Europe. The most convincing are the names of mountains and rivers, such as *Rhein*, *Lippe*, *Saale*, *Oder*, etc., all Slavonic names.

Ketrzynski also shows that these Slavonic names cannot

be claimed to indicate colonies of Slav prisoners of war, but clearly point to descendants of an earlier Slavonic population gave their names to these localities before the Germanic occupation.

German runic records also denote the presence of Slavs as late as the ninth century on the banks of the Rhine, Fulda, etc., and give us the names of over a hundred localities previously occupied by Slavs.

In most cases, however, the Germans on conquering a new area are likely to have given it a new name, so that the retention of the Slav designation would seem to indicate that the Slav population was only Germanized by degrees and thus preserved the name.

The Greeks and Romans of antiquity doubtless were acquainted with the Slavs, although for a long time they made no distinction between them and the Germans; just as at first they did not differentiate between Celts and Germans. Ketrzynski points out that in antiquity the Slavs were known by the name of Suevians, but that the Greeks and Romans did not know how to pronounce the crossed Slav letter *l*, and therefore altered the name. But that the terms "Slavs" and "Suevi" represent the same race was long ago acknowledged by Grimm and other philologists.

Cæsar's Suevi, moreover, occupied the regions which, according to the work in question, they held in Western Europe.

It is important to recognize that the "Germania" of antiquity was merely a geographical expression and had no ethnographical significance. Cæsar's Germania was inhabited by Germans, Suevi, and Celts, and Germans likewise inhabited Gaul.

Tacitus in his work on the customs of the Germans describes German and Suevian tribes as belonging to different nations, and Ketrzynski points out that Tacitus' description of the religious ceremonies of the Suevian Semnones and the Herta cult of the Muithonians and others, with their blood sacrifices, corresponds in all

essential particulars with the accounts given by Adam of Bremen and Helmold in the eleventh and twelfth centuries of the Radigast and Svantewitz cults among the Pomeranian Slavs. Tacitus' Suevi were the Western Slavs, and his Venedi were the Russians and other Eastern Slavs.

The Gothic historian Jordanes wrote in the sixth century that Scandinavia was a "factory of nations" (*officina gentium, vagina nationum*); according to Ketrzynski, nearly all the Germanic peoples of the Continent came from Scandinavia, whence as conquerors, or, in other words, as pirates, they occupied the native lands of the Celts and Slavs in Germany. They possessed a military organization, and hence were able to conquer the latter races, who lacked such organization. It is a significant fact, moreover, that certain of the Germanic peoples in Middle Europe, such as the Goths, German Longobards, and Saxons, had inherited traditions of Scandinavian descent, and that others, such as the Franks and Alemanni, at all events spoke of having come from a strange country.

Even the Danes said that they came from Scandinavia. In Schleswig traces have been found of Slav colonies as far as Aabenraa. If it was the plundering incursions of the Scandinavians and their colonization at the mouths of the Rhine that gave rise to the migrations of the Celts, the former must have settled in those parts as early as the sixth or seventh century B.C. By degrees they penetrated further into the country, and in Cæsar's time a couple of their tribes, the Vangiones and Triboci, were settled permanently in the region of Worms and Strasburg. When Drusus in the year 9 B.C. crossed the Rhine he found the Germanic Chatti in the parts inhabited in Cæsar's time by Suevi; thus the latter had in the meantime succumbed in the struggle with the Germans.

At the time of Tacitus, or at the end of the first century after Christ, the country west of the Elbe was only inhabited by Longobards and Hermunduri as independent

Slav tribes; but towards the end of the fourth century came the Scandinavians, who partly subjugated and partly allied themselves to the Longobards, whereupon the name passed to the conquering people, which became a Slavo-Germanic race. These Longobards were later driven south by the Angles and Varini, who occupied the country of the Hermunduri; their mastery was brought to an end in 531 by the Franks, who now became the ruling people on the Lower Saale and Middle Elbe.

At that time German tribes were almost everywhere in possession of the Western Slav regions, and free Slavs only existed in the angle between the Main, Regnitz, the Danube, and Bohemia. Here arose in 623 the kingdom of Samo, which by the victory at Mogast (near Bayreuth) he protected against the supremacy of the Franks.

A Serbian Prince, Dervan, whose people had long acknowledged the suzerainty of the Franks, seceded from them and made common cause with Samo; Dervan's country probably lay between the Saale, the Ilm, and the Main.

After Samo's death (658) his kingdom was divided between his many sons and thus lost all its importance, to be merged finally into the empire of Charlemagne (805).

The Germanic incursion brought about a general upheaval of the conditions in the Slav countries. The possessions of the nobles fell into the hands of the German masters. Colonists holding the estates of others on lease were reckoned personally "free," as were a number of military on the Church lands. The great mass of Slav peasants became, after the occupation, the serfs of the secular or ecclesiastical masters or of the imperial crown lands, although they were allowed to retain certain rights. They were simply called Selavi.

After the heathen Slav kingdoms in Northern Germany had long been in a state of ferment and at war with one another, Henry I defeated the Slav tribe of the Hevelli and took possession of their capital, Brandenburg (928). The sphere of dominion of his empire was widened

considerably, whilst at the same time the German national interests were furthered, having been seriously jeopardized by the Slav unrest. The Germanizing of these Slavs was bound to follow soon, for the masters would not condescend to learn the language of their subjects and the ecclesiastics showed a horror of everything Slavonic. The consequence was that the Slav languages were bound sooner or later to die out in Germany. When this did not come to pass fast enough, their use was simply prohibited, as took place in 985 by means of the decree "*Exterminentur*" ("They shall be exterminated").

The fact of the Slav nations having, generally speaking, for so long been dominated by the Germanic element was by no means due to inferior intellectual equipment, for this has proved to be as generous as that of the Germans; the reason is rather to be sought in the *geographical situation* and the *political conditions* in their countries.

Some Slavs have been exposed to *Asiatic invasions*, which prevented the development of their State organization and progress in culture, whilst the Germans were able to follow a more independent course of development and were preserved from foreign oppression.

In contrast to the slower and more dour Germanic temperament, the Slavs have always shown themselves livelier, brisker, and more sensitive.

Love of liberty has also from the remotest ages been characteristic of the Slavs, and they have therefore been less amenable to discipline and to the submission required by modern State organization, to which the Germans have better adapted themselves.

Where despotism has had time to develop, as in Russia, the Slav love of liberty has, however, in the course of centuries been suppressed among the masses, though it persisted in a minority and found expression in more or less revolutionary movements.

The Slavs, who since earliest antiquity have occupied the major portion of Eastern Europe and gradually split up into several tribes, may be divided according to

language into three large groups: The Eastern, the Southern, and the Western. The Eastern group consists of:

(1) *Great Russians* or *Muscovites*, for the greater part a mixture of Slavonic and Finnish tribes, and in a lesser measure of Mongolian, Gothic, and other racial elements.

(2) *Ruthenes* or *Ukrainians*—so-called “Little Russians”—inhabiting Ukraine, Eastern Galicia, Volhynia, and Podolia.

The Southern group consists of:

(1) *Bulgarians*, a mixture of Slavs and the earlier Finnish Bulgarians, Goths, and others.

(2) *Serbians*, in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Styria, Carinthia, etc.

(3) *Slovenes*, in Southern Austria.

Western Slavs are:

(1) *Poles*, in Poland, Posen, Galicia, and Silesia.

(2) *Slovaks*, in Moravia and Hungary.

(3) *Czechs*, in Bohemia, Moravia, Hungary, and Silesia.

(4) *Wends* (who call themselves *Sorbs*), in the two Lausitz provinces (Southern Brandenburg and Northern Saxony); now numbering about 120,000. In the oldest historical period they were spread over a far wider area, as far as the rivers Saale and Havel.

(5) *Lettic* and *Lithuanian* Slavs, in Lithuania, Courland, and other areas. Prussia was inhabited at an early period by Slav tribes closely related to the Letts and Lithuanians. They sometimes came in contact with Goths and other Teutonic tribes before the great migration of nations. They first appeared in history in the tenth century under the name of *Borussians* or *Prussians*, who spoke Borussian or Prussian. The name of Prussia is thus of Slav origin. By degrees the Borussians became Germanized both in customs and language, as did a great part of the Wends, with the result that in the Middle Ages they could only be traced in certain villages. It may be of interest to note that it is from the Lithuanian that the most characteristic forms of the German language

are derived, viz. the *s* sounds, the *z* sound, and the multiple consonant sounds such as *tsch*, as in the word “Deutsch.”

Looking at all these Slav peoples, one may well wonder what Pan-Slavism means and what can be expected of it.

Pan-Slavism, or an endeavour to bring about a close union of all Slav peoples, is twofold: *Political Pan-Slavism*, or a political union under Russia’s guidance; and *Cultural Pan-Slavism*, or a community of interests founded on racial pride and sentiments in the domains of literature, language, etc.

The first impetus to this movement was given by a literary intellectual society in the forties of last century, which held its first Slav Congress in Prague in the year 1848. The Pan-Slavonic ideas were subsequently fostered in Austria and Russia, where the Slavophiles Aksakow, Katkow, and others propagated them with great assiduity. Russia, then the only independent Slav State, constituted herself—at first only through newspapers and societies—the Protector of all Slavs, and was acclaimed as such by Slav deputations at the Ethnographical Exhibition of Moscow in 1867. The Poles alone abstained.

Pan-Slavism in Russia is connected with the Russian Slavophiles’ nationally exalted teaching which claims the Slavs to be “The Chosen People” called upon to create a new civilization.

After 1867 the Pan-Slavonic movement was more and more directed towards a *political union of the Slavs under Russia’s leadership*. In the so-called Eastern question—concerning the Balkan States—Russia, too, has wanted to make herself not only the protectress of the Orthodox Greek Christians but also the guardian of the Slav States politically, thus giving rise to serious tension between Austria and Russia.

Russia’s Pan-Slav mission had, of course, to be abandoned long ago. Although Russia has attempted to assist, now one, now another Slav nation, she has, on

the other hand, oppressed other Slav peoples, especially the Poles and the Ukrainians.

Moreover, in our own time, we have seen the Bulgarians make a stand against Russia's Pan-Slavonic efforts. On the outbreak of the World War a member of the Slavonic Society at Sofia wrote an article in the *Volya* newspaper in which he criticized Russia's veiled Pan-Slavonic threats, for "Russia does not contend for the supremacy of the Slavs, but for the conquest of the smaller Slav peoples—and is the worst enemy of the Slav idea."

There can therefore be no question of a "Pan-Slavonic" danger to Germany from the East.

Pan-Slavism, on the other hand, might, if it were consistent, demand the reunion of the Prussians with the Slavs, and the expulsion of all German, Estonian, Finnish, Tartar, and Circassian elements in Russia !

Cultural Slavism is, moreover, nowadays, hardly Pan-Slavonic, even though literary federations and congresses between Slav peoples have taken place. But, in any case, these are of a pacific nature. Slavism is, in this respect, no enemy of Germanism, even if it attempts to safeguard the unhampered development of the Slav peoples and to combat opposition on the part of the Germans.

Is it really fair, apart from *economical* and *political* interests, to see in the cultural leanings of the Slav peoples elements of danger to European civilization and humanity ? Have not the Slavs produced great minds and been of some use to humanity ?

Let us cast a cursory glance over Slav culture.

John Huss, the head of the University of Prague, who attempted to bring about the reform of his Church a century before Luther and was condemned to be burnt at the stake in 1415, was a *Czech*, born in Bohemia, as was his disciple and collaborator Hieronymus, sentenced to the same death. Huss inaugurated a new era in Czech literature, further encouraged by the Hussites ; this literature had its golden age in the sixteenth and at the beginning of the seventeenth centuries, when arts and

sciences were freely cultivated. The Czech progress was, however, arrested in 1774 by an Imperial decree, which ordained that the German language alone should be used in the higher education, whereupon long and bitter internal struggles were waged by the Czechs against the Germans. After 1818 the Czechs began to gain for themselves a stronger national position, and a number of poets—Czelokowsky, Kollar, Holly, and others—as well as historians, archæologists, and naturalists, now made their appearance. A society for Czech literature was formed in conjunction with the Bohemian Museum, which magnificent building was completed in 1893. Since 1882 the University of Prague has had a Czech and a German section.

*Poland* gave birth to the celebrated astronomer Copernicus. That country has also produced a large number of eminent writers widely known and admired—Niemcewicz, Mickiewicz, Slowacki, Goszczynski, Krasinski, Felinski, Krazewski, Sienkiewicz, and others—in addition to many historians, such as Lelevel, Chodzko, Soltyk, Rezozowski, Mieroslavski, Dembrinski, Waliszewski, etc.

The University of Warsaw was long maintained by Polish savants, but Russian oppression gradually drove them away. The Universities of Cracow and Lemberg, which formerly only had German professors, have now for several decades been staffed solely with Poles, and many of these have been eminent scientists of European fame, such as the anatomist Kadyi and the bacteriologist Buivid, etc.

Archæology has had a famous representative in Majewski.

*Russia* in the nineteenth century produced a large number of authors of high rank : among the Great-Russians Pushkin, Lermontoff, Bestucheff, Herzen, Dostoyevski, Turgeniev, Alexei Tolstoi, Leo Tolstoi, and others, and among Ukrainians Kotlarevski, Gogol, Kvitko, Gulak, Sjevtjenko. As eminent historians and archæologists, among the Great-Russians we have Bogdanoff, Baer,

Zagoskine, Klineewski, Platonoff, Vinogradoff, Kunik Schachmatoff, Kondakoff, J. Tolstoi, and others, and among the Ukrainians Duchinski, Kostomarov, Kulisj, Hrusevski, Antonovitch, etc.

Among the many Russian natural scientists are numerous famous men: the bacteriologist Metchnikoff, head of the Pasteur Institute in Paris; the chemist Mendelejew, famous for his researches in the domain of physical chemistry; the physiologist Pawlow, who some years ago was awarded the Nobel prize for epoch-making research, etc.

Russia is, moreover, distinguished by a large number of scientific institutions and museums, where many learned men are working.

Scientific education among the *Ruthenes* is provided for by fourteen Ruthenian professors and lecturers at Lemberg University.

Among painters, sculptors, and musicians the Slav peoples also have a number of eminent representatives.

As regards the Balkan Slav nations, it is only in recent times, after they had thrown off the Turkish yoke, that they have been able to attain a high stage of culture. Among these peoples the *Bulgarians* are more particularly deserving of attention on account of their quick perception and anxiety for advancement. All Bulgarians receive school education and love their studies. A University exists in Sofia, where humanistic, juridical, and scientific subjects are taught. Bulgarian poetical art bears a humanistic and social stamp, and keeps to realities. Its foremost exponent and the most modern representative of South Slavonic culture is Ivan Vazov, who took part in the revolutionary movements against Turkey and described these with poetic fervour in many of his writings.

The *Serians* have also reached a higher stage of education since the wars of liberation. A University has been instituted at Belgrade. Several poets and novelists of high rank have appeared, among them Katjanski, Raditjevitj, and Lazarevitj.

## IV

### GERMANY'S ANCIENT GERMANS : THEIR EARLY DISTRIBUTION AND RAVAGES : THE GREAT MIGRATION OF NATIONS AND THE GERMAN WARS OF THE MIDDLE AGES : THE THIRTY YEARS WAR : THE PRUSSIAN STATE AND THE PARTITIONS OF POLAND

AT an early period, about five hundred years B.C., or perhaps as early as the sixth or seventh century B.C., Scandinavia and the other Baltic countries were the home of the Germanic tribes, who gradually spread further south and east. The earliest movements amongst them of which we have any record seem to have been directed not to the west, but to the south and east, Celts and Slavs being driven out or absorbed by them in the process.

The name of Germans is Celtic and, originally, probably meant “neighbours”; it was given by the Celts in Gaul to a couple of small Celtic frontier tribes and to the peoples inhabiting the other side of the Rhine. At the beginning of the last century B.C. this was probably what the Romans meant to convey by it; the Greeks did not know the Germans as a separate stock, and called them Celts or Scythians. Cæsar was the first to distinguish them, as regards language and customs, from the Celts. Recent philological research has shown that the language of the ancient Germans was related to, but different from, that of the Celts; both peoples, like the Greeks, Romans, Slavs, etc., belonged to the Indo-European family of languages.

In Germany the ancient Celts inhabited the country eastward as far as the Elbe, and were called Belgians in North Germany, Walchians in Middle and South Germany. Partly by voluntary emigration, partly by the pressure of the arms of the advancing Germans, they left the region east of the Rhine in the latter half of the last century B.C. Only a few remnants remained, which were Germanized. Considerably greater was the intermixture of the Celtic element with the South German tribes. The Celts west of the Rhine, who spoke a Romance language, were also Germanized in due course.

The Germans of antiquity were exceedingly uncultured barbarians, with no civilization whatever, when the Romans first became acquainted with them, and they did not even live in organized communities, but in a number of tribal aggregations—some forty altogether—which were frequently split up still further, but sometimes combined for joint warlike enterprises. When they were not fighting they lived in idleness and indolence, letting the old men, women, and slaves attend to the cattle and cultivation of the soil. As Tacitus says in his *Germania*, they could sometimes be the idlest and sometimes the most turbulent of human beings ; war and dangers were their only real pastime ; in the intervals of peace they were immeasurably addicted to gambling and drink, and the blood of friends and kindred often sullied their noisy revels.

“ Their boundless forests were devoted by the Germans to the pleasures of the chase, and the greater part of the country was used as pasture ; they cultivated carelessly an inconsiderable portion of it, and then complained of the infertile soil of their native land, which could not maintain its inhabitants. When now and again the horrors of famine reminded them of the uses of industry, the national distress was sometimes relieved by a third or a fourth part of the country’s youth quitting it ” (Paulus Diaconus, according to Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*).

Cæsar in his *Gallie War* states that the foremost nations

of "Germania" were desirous of surrounding their boundaries with uninhabited and devastated regions, and that these terrible border lands bore ghastly evidence of the power of their arms and shielded them from the danger of surprise attacks. According to Tacitus, "The Bructerian tribe was exterminated by its neighbours the Chatti, who were incensed at their arrogance and tempted by their own rapacity, and 60,000 barbarians succumbed, not to Roman arms, but before our eyes and to our advantage."

It was futile for strangers to put their trust in these barbarians. Of the Franks, the Alemanni, and others it was said that their character was distinguished by rapacity and by contempt for the most solemn treaties, and that it was useless to try to bind them by any pact.

Frederick the Great in *l'Antimachiavel* has supplied us with an interesting description of the migrations of the northern peoples: "I have always held the conviction that the absence of industries in a large measure brought about these gigantic migrations from the northern countries of these Goths, these Vandals, who so often swept over the southern countries. In that remote epoch agriculture and hunting were the sole industries known to the inhabitants of Sweden, Denmark, and the greater part of Germany. The areas capable of cultivation were divided between a certain number of landowners, who cultivated them and thus obtained their sustenance from the soil. But as the human race in these cold climates has always been very prolific, a country often contained twice as many people as it could support by work, and the younger members of well-to-do families then formed warlike bands; they were notorious robbers by stress of circumstance, they ravaged other countries and deposed their rulers. We have seen in the Eastern and Western Roman Empires that these barbarians usually only demanded land to cultivate and give them sustenance. The northern countries are not less inhabited than they were then, but as luxurious habits have multiplied our needs, they have given rise to many arts and industries, which support

entire nations that would otherwise be compelled to seek their sustenance elsewhere."

The Roman Empire made its first acquaintance with the northern barbarians when Teutons and Cimbri, occupying the present Mecklenburg and Holstein, began (113 B.C.) to move southward owing to the overflowing of the Baltic ; they were defeated, however, as were further invasions of France and Italy in 102 and 101 B.C. Shortly before the beginning of the Christian era the Germans once more sought to penetrate into the Roman Empire, but were defeated by Julius Cæsar and Augustus, whereupon a part of Germany was made a Roman province. The Germans, however, won several decisive battles, as in the Teutoburger Wald in A.D. 9. By degrees intercourse between Germans and Romans began to develop through trade, and by taking service with Romans the Germans, whose migratory instinct never quite left them, obtained early knowledge of the Roman Empire and a strong inclination to possess themselves of a part thereof. In the reigns of Tiberius, Vespasian, and Domitian the Romans had many a hard tussle with them, and for centuries after the struggles with the invading Germans from the north and the east continued. At the beginning of the third century the Alemanni under Caracalla appeared for the first time and looted Italian and Gallic territory, but were defeated in 213 on the Main. Shortly afterwards fresh hordes of Germans crossed the Rhine and Danube, but were thrown back in 235 by Septimius Severus. Gallienus (253-268) formed an alliance with them, married Pipa, a king's daughter, and gave her father extensive possessions in Hungary. Under this emperor the Goths invaded the Roman Empire and ravaged Gaul, Greece, and the East. Trebizond, a rich colony with magnificent buildings and art treasures, was stormed, and the population put to the sword without mercy ; the most sacred temples and the most superb architectural monuments were levelled to the ground, and the destructive ferocity of the Goths knew no limits. Nicomedia, Prusa, Cicus,

and other superb cities in Bithynia subsequently shared the same fate, and several were burnt to the ground. After the ancient and venerable city on the island of Cyzicus had been laid waste, a similar fate befell Piræus and Athens, which were also destroyed to a great extent, and soon after Thebes, Argos, Corinth, Sparta, and other towns were visited, the wars raging throughout the whole of Greece. In the end Ephesus fell a victim to the destructiveness of the Goths, and Diana's famous temple was burnt and destroyed with all its precious sculptures by Praxiteles and other ancient masters who made the temple one of the wonders of the world.

During the centuries which followed, the incursions into the Roman Empire by Germans and other barbarians became more and more frequent, although they were most strenuously opposed by Constantine the Great, Julian, and other emperors. The Great Migration of Nations—fourth to sixth century—was doubtless primarily brought about by the pressure of the terrible Huns, who about 376 drove out the Germans ; the latter in turn penetrated deeper into the Roman Empire, which was now more and more threatened by them.

The Huns were a nomad people from the Ural and Altai mountains, who originally shared with Mongols, Turks, Tunguses, and other races the steppes of Central Asia. Long before the Christian era they were a powerful tribe of nomad hunters and shepherds, who did not practise agriculture, and if their herds no longer found sufficient sustenance in the region which they occupied, they wandered off in search of fresh pastures. This often brought them into conflict with other peoples, and at an early stage of their history they became known in China as a fierce and warlike race. They were doubtless tempted by the wealth of the country, and their incursions became so dangerous that China was obliged for protection to erect the Great Wall along the whole northern boundary (from 214 B.C.). In spite of this obstacle the Huns continued their raids into China and were not expelled until A.D. 90.

Owing to wars, internal unrest, and a devastating famine, the Huns were compelled, at the beginning of the fourth century, to abandon the steppes of Tartary and migrate in a westerly direction. They split up into two main bodies, of which one settled east of the Caspian Sea whilst the remainder marched onward to the Ural mountains, from which they descended towards the Caucasus and the Black Sea. Here they attacked the warlike Alans, a Sarmato-Gothic people who lived between the Caspian and the Black Sea, whereupon, making common cause with them, they penetrated into Europe and subjugated a part of the Goths who lived north of the Black Sea on both sides of the Dnieper, whilst another part were forced across the Danube into Roman territory. The Emperor Theodosius was compelled by Attila, king of the Huns, to purchase peace, and a number of peoples in Central Europe had to acknowledge the dominion of the Huns, whose empire thus extended from the Caspian Sea to the Rhine. Attila crossed that river in 451, destroyed a number of towns in Gaul, and finally threatened Paris, though the onslaught was averted. When he attacked Orleans the Romans, joining hands with the Visigoths, came to the rescue, whereupon a terrible battle ensued on the Catalaunian Fields, near Châlons-sur-Marne (451). Attila had Germanic tribes fighting for him, and thus brother fought against brother. Attila's army was defeated, and he withdrew to Italy, burning and sacking its cities. On his death, soon after, there was a great battle between the Huns and Germans in Pannonia (south of the Middle Danube), as a result of which the Huns withdrew to South Russia, whence their descendants, under the names of Avars and Hungarians, from time to time broke forth and inspired terror among the neighbouring peoples.

The Ostrogoths, after they had been expelled by the Huns, made themselves masters of Pannonia, and another Germanic tribe, the Gepidæ, settled in Dacia (Hungary). Fresh Germanic peoples constantly appeared on the scene: no sooner had one been defeated than another turned up

and threatened the Romans with unsapped vigour. The Vandals, under Genserik, plundered Rome and sailed across to Carthage, devastating the coasts. The Franks and Alemanni burst into Roman territory in another direction, the Saxons attacked the coasts, and the Goths sought to subdue a part of the country.

In the internal struggles in Rome during the fifth century Germanic chieftains and leaders assisted the various parties, and at times even nominated the emperors. The Burgundians took possession of several southern provinces in Gaul, and the Visigoths became masters of Spain.

Rome's last emperor, Romulus Augustulus, was chosen by the barbarians, who demanded that he should act as they thought fit and give them a third of Italy's soil. When this demand was rejected, one of their chieftains, Odoacer, placed himself at the head of a general rising ; immense levies of Germans assembled under his banner, and he deposed the emperor without difficulty in 476. Odoacer became Rome's master, abolished the imperial title, and called himself King of Italy. He thereupon gave a third of the conquered country, which in many parts was quite denuded of its population, to his companions in arms, and proved himself a wise and capable regent.

The powerful Ostrogoth King Theodoric the Great, however, yielded to the lure of Italy, which he conquered ; he defeated Odoacer in 489 and 490, and subsequently caused his assassination (493) in order that he might rule alone.

The Germans had now assumed possession of the Western Roman Empire. They were surprised at its organized civilization, its magnificent buildings, aqueducts, etc., and gradually adapted themselves as permanent occupiers to settled conditions and the more advanced civilization, and went so far as to adopt many Roman institutions, availing themselves of Roman experience and largely adopting Roman laws.

When the Germans invaded the Roman Empire its vitality was sapped by extravagant living, vice, and

much misery ; heathendom no longer had any hold on the minds of the people, and Christianity had not yet leavened its customs and morals. To their own vices the Germans added those of the vanquished : deceit, cunning, and refined vice on the one hand, coarseness, rapacity, and ferocity on the other.

Throughout the Middle Ages the Germans remained the same and repeated time and again the campaigns of loot and plunder of the migration epoch. They did not know the meaning of intertribal loyalty ; the love of fighting was in the blood, and they retained uncivilized customs longer than their neighbours the Italians and French. For many centuries, from the twelfth onward, the party names of Guelph and Ghibelline were associated with incessant civil wars for the possession of the German Imperial crown. During “the Great Interregnum,” for twenty-two years (from 1250), general lawlessness prevailed, and no one could claim to be in possession of the throne. Throughout Germany there was the greatest misery, and the throne was offered to the highest bidder amongst the vassals. Club-law flourished everywhere, and there was no one to protect the people against the arrogant feudal barons. The aristocrats were mostly predatory knights ; their castles were robbers’ dens, and to plunder the travellers was their sole profession. Rudolph of Hapsburg, however, managed to subdue the most powerful vassals, and destroyed some seventy of the castles of these predatory aristocrats.

Many attempts were made to curb the pugnacious spirit of the Germans. The Emperor Wenceslaus proclaimed in 1389 a general truce for six years, and a ten years’ truce was decreed in 1486 by the Diet, whilst in 1495 the Diet of Worms proclaimed that perpetual peace should thenceforward reign in the German Empire. But it did not prove of long duration. The Protestant revolution brought about political disruptions which continued for a whole century, bringing devastation and chaos in their train.

The Thirty Years War was brought about originally by religious differences, but had also another and far more important cause, namely, politics and State intrigue. The princes fought in self-defence or for conquest, whilst the people only knew of the religious incentive, which was exploited by the former to gain the support of the masses. The world's history hardly records a more barbarous war ; there was scarcely a province in Germany which was not laid waste, and bestial ferocity usurped the place of civilization—this a century after Luther and contemporaneously with Descartes, Bacon, Grotius, and other master-minds of other countries. I will quote here what an eminent German historian, Professor M. Philippson, wrote about the Thirty Years War in his *Geschichte der neueren Zeit* (vol. viii of *Allgemeine Weltgeschichte*, by Th. Flathe and others) : “ Soon the soldiery looted, plundered, burnt, tortured, and murdered as a matter of course, for the sheer pleasure of the thing. Friend and enemy was all the same to them ; their own country, under whose banners they fought, was spared as little as a foreign land. . . . They fell like beasts of prey upon peaceful regions, stole what there was of value and demolished the rest, destroyed the crops, tortured the inhabitants to elicit where they kept their treasures, and ravished wives and girls. If resistance was offered, murder was done on principle, and neither children in arms nor old men were spared. It was a favourite sport among these creatures to impale little children on the points of their lances, dash them against walls, or roast them in the ovens. . . . All crafts died out, villages were deserted ; those who could fly hid themselves in woods and caves. Houses were sacked, fields were laid waste, and the destitute inhabitants in their dire extremity ate the bodies of their dead ; nay, worse things happened : human beings, even defenceless children, were slaughtered for food. These horrors are no fables ; they were related, not once, but hundreds of times, by eye-witnesses. . . . Spotted typhus and other contagious diseases were the inevitable con-

sequence of famine and finished those who were spared by the sword. . . .

“No wonder that a formidable *depopulation* took place in Germany. It is computed that in 1648 the country had but a *third* of the population of 1618. . . . In Franconia the depopulation was so great that every man was allowed to have two wives. . . . Trade and handierrafts were dead ; the German *bourgeoisie* lost all power, courage, and initiative. Germany’s material decline was sad enough, but still sadder was the moral and intellectual decay, and even now the injury done to the psychology of the German people by the Thirty Years War has hardly been repaired. A savage and coarse spirit pervaded all classes of the nation. . . . The crassest superstition reigned, and the atmosphere of terror and bloodthirstiness in which every one lived, the latitude given to base propensities, were bound to dull the spirit even of the better among the people and turn them from the beautiful and noble to the black snares of soreery. The soldiers thought that they could be shielded from the enemy’s weapons by all sorts of witchcraft, and never and nowhere has the faith in soreery, with all its appalling and deadly consequences, been so general as in Germany during the Thirty Years War. A whole literature sprang up about witchcraft, which was supposed to be inspired by the devil. Countless human beings, especially women, fell victims to suspieon of witchcraft. The long civil war smothered the last remnants of national sentiment. The idea of a common country was meaningless to these Germans, who for thirty years had butchered one another in the most revolting manner.

“The religious character of the war was lost sight of by degrees and was replaced by the most shameless and self-seeking scheming amongst those in power. . . . An appalling apathy stole over the entire German people. Such things as loyalty and pride were dead. Foreigners bore themselves like arrogant conquerors ; they felt that they were more brilliant, richer, and happier, and everything

foreign was admired and imitated. National productions of any kind were derided and despised as being vulgar. . . . The spirit of flattery and toadyism was rampant; every one cringed before his superior, but treated his subordinates with insolence and contempt. It is supposed that this repulsive combination of abject servility and arrogance still survives in many parts of Germany. The princes saw in their subjects naught but a flock existing that it might be shorn. . . . The nobility fawned upon the princes, and the *bourgeoisie* on the nobility, the princes, the officers, and civil officials, and those who did not succeed in getting ennobled sought some honorary title. No branch of activity fell into greater neglect than that of the learned professions; masters and students fled before the wild clash of arms, or the students fell victims to the lure of fighting. At Helmstädt in 1624 there were 400 students, but two years later all lecture-halls stood empty and only one professor remained. Save for a few exceptions, the Germans, impoverished, coarsened, and debased by the war, were unable to keep pace with the striking and flourishing advance of the exact sciences in Italy, France, the Netherlands, and England. German scholars were obliged to go to foreign universities. . . . It needed the effort of two centuries to heal these wounds inflicted on the German people, to replace the weeds by a fruitful growth. Yet the effort has not quite succeeded, and many of the faults and shortcomings here touched upon remain to this day, though in diminished measure."

I would point out that it is a *German* historian who has supplied this description.

By the Peace of Westphalia, which to this day has been the bedrock of Germany's political organization, the German confederacy received a more definite constitution; a real confederation was formed which maintained an internal equilibrium; the princes of the Empire were to be independent and the Imperial authority became merely formal, with the result that the country's unity was destroyed. The old German Empire was dissolved by Napoleon in 1806.

Germany's population fell through the Thirty Years War from about sixteen or seventeen millions to about five millions, so that for a couple of centuries there was no lack of space for the rapid growth of the population. In order to further this growth the Franconian Diet held at Nuremberg in 1650 actually legalized bigamy.

Prussia, which under the "Great Elector," Frederick William, became an altogether independent State (1657), had through the ravages of the Thirty Years War sunk into a state of the profoundest misery, but soon revived under the influence of this resourceful monarch. Under his son, Frederick I, the kingdom of Prussia was recognized by the Peace of Utrecht in 1713. Under this king, as well as under his successor, Frederick William I, the country continued to prosper, the neglected soil was cultivated by a number of settlers, and about 1740 the population amounted to two and a quarter millions. Frederick the Great, by his victories and wise administration, raised Prussia to the dignity of a Great Power, and during his reign the population rose to nearly five and a half millions.

In conjunction with Catherine II of Russia and Maria Theresa of Austria, Frederick the Great undertook in 1772 the *first partition of Poland*, on his part a measure of protection against the threat of Russia's growing power. Had he not consented to this partition of Poland, Russia would have taken an even larger slice, having previously by force and treachery hastened the internal dissolution of the country. The Prussian State now regained West Prussia, which the German Order had ceded to Poland in the year 1466.

This encroachment on the life of another nation cannot be condoned from our modern point of view, but it should be remembered that such acts were less reprehensible in the eighteenth century than now, as the principles of the rights of nations were then not so widely accepted, and the question of nationality did not weigh against the exigencies of the State. The only one of the three States which could

plead the stress of self-preservation was Prussia. East Prussia was separated from the kingdom by West Prussia (then a part of Poland) and practically defenceless. Although Frederick the Great now proposed the partition of Poland, it was nevertheless the Russian Minister Panin who, in 1763, first suggested the idea in a communication to the Prussian Ambassador Salms, when Frederick at first recoiled from it.

Of Poland it can be said that she almost deserved the calamity of 1772, having regard to the appalling disorder within the country and the internal squabbles which let in Russia as the dominant Power; but nevertheless the second partition of Poland, in 1793, as well as the third, in 1795, was an infamy, a diabolical murder of a nation, which must for ever be deplored by history. Frederick the Great was not then alive; he would certainly never have consented to these crimes, whilst his feeble successor, Frederick William II, was only too willing to support Russia's nefarious plottings against regenerated Poland and to lay hands on further slices of the unhappy country.

The conduct of the three Great Powers towards Poland had a very deleterious effect on the public morality of Europe. People accustomed themselves to acquiescence in acts of violence which were never righted or atoned for and thus served as encouragement to others. Ever since that revolting murder of a State to our time, Russia, Austria and Prussia have, however, become a prey to anxiety and have sought to preserve a certain understanding in international complications, for they have never felt quite sure of the Polish nation. By constant diplomatic sleights-of-hand it has been sought to repair what was at the same time a folly and a crime. For it was doubtless foolish and thoughtless of Prussia and Austria, at any rate since Poland's regeneration after 1772, not to seek by all possible means *to maintain an independent Poland as the best bulwark against advancing Muscovitism*. Poland's final dissolution made Russia a direct neighbour, and the latter Power has thus gained the influence over

European affairs which Prussia and Austria sought to prevent, whilst their Polish prey was but an illusory gain which often became an oppressive burden. Moreover, the two German Empires have never succeeded in Germanizing their Polish subjects, but tormented them instead and tried to keep them under, thus fanning the national hatred on both sides.

Silesia was also brought by Frederick the Great under the Prussian Crown. This land received, in the Middle Ages, after the great migration of nations, a mixed population of Slavs and Germans, part of the country coming under Poland, part under Bohemia, and part under German dominion. In the course of a long series of internal dissensions the population was augmented by German settlers and became in 1327 a Bohemian dependency, but came later under the German Emperor, and, in 1720, Maria Theresa was proclaimed its ruler. Frederick II laid claim to certain Silesian duchies in 1740, and this gave rise to the Seven Years War, which ended with the cession of Silesia to Prussia in 1763.

Of the four and a half million inhabitants, about a million are Poles and a hundred thousand Czechs, Moravians, and Wends.

Altogether Prussia has something over three million Polish subjects in West Prussia, Posen, and Silesia, and in Posen they constitute a majority and number about two-thirds of the population.

## V

RISE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF GERMANISM :  
GERMANISTIC DREAMS OF GREATNESS

NAPOLEON'S victories, after he had formed the Rhine Confederacy and dissolved the old German Empire (1806), turned out in the end to be of the greatest significance to Prussia, which under Frederick William, in alliance with Russia, England and Sweden, formed the fourth coalition against Napoleon. The immediate sequel, however, was the defeats of Jena and Austerlitz, where the Prussian army was destroyed, whereupon Napoleon made his entry into Berlin and imposed on Prussia a war indemnity of 159,000,000 francs. After he had beaten the Russians at Eylau and Friedland, he made the Peace of Tilsit (1807) with Alexander I, by which Prussia lost half her territory and was in addition forbidden to keep an army of more than 35,000 men.

The ferment against Napoleon in Europe became general, and in Germany there had existed since the Peace of Tilsit a vast secret society called the Tugendbund, having the liberation of the country for its aim. Its founder was M. Arndt, professor of history, who soon received the support of several ex-Ministers, highly placed officers, Dr. Gahn, etc., and Fichte, the philosopher, also contributed in a large measure to rousing the national feeling and strengthening the society by his *Message to the German Nation* (1808).

This brings us to the birth of *Germanism*, or the *Germanistic Ideas*. Germanism is usually in Germany

a linguistic term, associated with peculiarities of the German language, of expression and phrasing, noticeable in the use of foreign tongues, and the term "Germanist" has currently been applied to scholars engaged in German philological and antiquarian research.

But Germanism has also received another meaning, and has become a *national* or *race term* brought into being by the modern nationalist aspirations, so that the word has come to stand for interest in the racial unity of Germanic peoples, in the course of which movement the Germanophils have often been guilty of somewhat remarkable exaggerations.

By the term "Pan-Germanism" is meant a striving for a closer union of all Germanic peoples: Germans, British, Dutch, Scandinavians, without regard to historical antecedents or admixture of races amongst all these peoples. The term is particularly intended to denote a partly existent, but partly non-existent, kinship in characteristics and culture, and in reality Pan-Germanism has no meaning at all, is a pure fiction.

In a quite distinctive sense, mostly outside Germany, Germanism has been interpreted to mean *the Germans' systematic endeavour to become predominant in Europe*.

The Pan-Germanistic idea of peace and alliance between Germany and neighbouring Germanic countries, more especially Scandinavia, has therefore, with few exceptions, never commended itself to the Germans.

The specific Germanism arose through Napoleon's policy of conquest and his attempt to create a universal monarchy which pressed on Germany with iron weight and had for its object the partition of the old German Empire and the obliteration of its nationality. This state of things gave rise to a very deep-rooted movement in which national consciousness learnt to seek fresh strength in the recollection of former history and in the faith in the future destinies of the nation. Originally this national movement was quite natural and justified; but it was soon entrusted with a far bigger mission than the protection of the country

against conquest and the rousing of the national spirit : it was to become a civilizing movement in a wider sense ; it was, in time, *to put other nations in the shade*, or, in some way or other, under the German nation. To civilize the world was to be synonymous with *Germanizing* it !

To strengthen the national spirit it was important to endeavour to prove the superiority of the Germans in the realm of intellect and thus pave the way for their material power. By his *Message to the German Nation* Fichte wished to rouse the people from its despondency to a proud consciousness of self and to the struggle for its existence, and he extolled "the deep sincerity and moral purity of the German spirit" in contrast to "the Roman degeneracy." He spoke of "German fidelity and honour," "German profundity," etc., which flattered the nation and has since become an axiom, nay, a dogma, among the Germans. By degrees they accustomed themselves to believing in the superior nature and loftier destiny of the German people, and in 1812 they were ripe to hear from the writer Eggo that "in the German people the whole essence of humanity has, so to speak, rallied to a centre and taken definite shape ; in every German's soul the human genius has been integrally realized."

In truth, one stands aghast at the mental arrogance which finds expression in such terms. It is noteworthy that the great German poets and thinkers who preceded that chauvinistic era—Kant, Goethe, Schiller, Herder, Lessing, Klopstock, Wieland, etc.—did not take up this one-sided national standpoint, but were universal and humanistic in their trend of thought.

During the reaction which followed Napoleon's fall in 1815 there arose a new important factor in the German national movement—to wit, the Christian factor—and the upshot was a *Christian Germanism*, which emanated from the Universities. The student element which took part in the War of Liberation was now to be placed on a loftier plane than the old coarse and licentious academic life. New societies, "Burschenschaften," were recruited

from "Christian Germanic youths" who were to guide the country towards a greater future. Germany's civilizing world-mission was identified with the future of the Christian religion, whereby chauvinism and militarism were placed on a religious basis and a real fanaticism could be engendered.

In view of this incredible exaltation of German culture by the Germanists, it may be fitting to call to mind what the great men of other nations had done for culture in the modern epoch. I will mention but a few of the most famous names :

*Italy* : Dante, Ariosto, Tasso, Petrarch, Boccacio, L. and F. Socino, Gentili, Bruno, Savonarola, Galileo.

*Spain* : M. Serveto, Calderon, Lope de Vega, Tirso.

*France* : Lefèvre d'Étaples, Forel, Corneille, Molière, Racine, Descartes, Pascal, P. Bayle, Voltaire, Diderot, Condorcet, A. Comte.

*England* : Wycliffe, Francis Bacon, Locke, Hume, Milton, Shakespeare, Newton.

We have also to remember that the German nation is far from being a pure Germanic race, but has since ancient and mediæval times been mixed with other races, Celts and, more especially, Slavs. Many who think themselves typical Germans are just as much Slavs.

Luther was of Wendish origin ; his father came from a peasant stock in Möhre, in the Thüringerwald, and was called Luder, a name which Luther originally bore.

The philosopher Leibnitz was not altogether German ; his father was a Czech and emigrated to Germany ; the family name was Lubinieczii or Leubnizii.

Kant's ancestors emigrated to Germany from Scotland.

Dr. Gall, the father of phrenology, the founder of the study of the functions of the brain, was descended from a Lombard family of the name of Gallo.

Rudolf Virchow, Germany's foremost representative in pathological research, came from Further Pomerania and was descended from a Slav family.

Prince Bismarck, as he himself declared, was of Wendish descent, and was not always willing to be called a German, as may be gathered from a frank talk which he had in 1866 with Napoleon III's cousin, Prince Napoleon, reproduced in the *Figaro* in 1891. In the course of their chat about common political interests and the acquisition of land, etc., in which Bismarck, despite German opinion, showed his indifference about the Rhine frontier, he let fall the remark: "I am not German; I am a Prussian, a Wend."

Neither was the philosopher Nietzsche a pure-bred German, as he had Slav blood in his veins. The founder of his family was a Polish nobleman who about 1716 fled with wife and children to Germany. Nietzsche's whole tendency, too, was anything but German.

The historian Treitschke was of Slav descent.

Liszt, the composer and pianist, was a Hungarian, descended from an aristocratic family of old nobility; he was born at Raiding, in Hungary.

It should also be noted that a very great number of Germany's most famous men in the realms of culture were Jews.

Among the musicians we may mention Meyerbeer, Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, and Richard Wagner. The latter's father was an actor named Geyer, a name which frequently occurs among the Jews in Germany.

H. Heine, the poet, was a Jew.

Among philosophers the following are famous: Moses Mendelssohn, M. Hertz, M. Lazarus, professor of racial psychology, Professor H. Cohn, and Steynthal, professor of philology, etc.

Among botanists F. G. Cohn and N. Pringsheim were famous, and as inventor in the field of electricity and magnetism H. Hertz bears a celebrated name.

In medicine we have a long list of Jews who have achieved distinction: T. Henle, professor of anatomy; L. Traube, professor in experimental pathology; I. Rosenthal, nerve physiologist; A. Eulenburg, nerve pathologist; the Nobel

Prize winner Professor Ehrlich, bacteriologist, the inventor of Salvarsan, the most effective remedy against syphilis ; Neisser, the discoverer of the vehicle of infection of gonorrhœa ; Lesser, Flesch, Blaschko, Wechselmann, etc., and other famous venereologists.

Theories soon arose as to Germany's destiny and cultural mission, and a feeling was created that Germany should assume the mastery of—not only an understanding with—all nations related to the Germans, without regard to material and historical factors. That these theories have borne fruit is evident from the fate of Schleswig and Alsace-Lorraine in our own time.

A remarkable influence was exercised by the philosopher Hegel's peculiar speculations on the history of the world. When the "world-spirit" has attained one of its higher phases of development, it exercises absolute power : the people which then represents the world-spirit dominates all others through the irresistible force of the mind. In the face of this absolute right, the other nations are "*rechilos*." The world's history has been passing through four stages of development : the Oriental, the Greek, the Roman, and the Germanic. In the last-named phase all peoples meet their ultimate destiny, and in it the world-spirit is unified !

The godlike glory of the German nation was thus demonstrated by Hegel in a fantastic philosophical system, and it cannot fail to have been very flattering to the Germans that the evolution of the world's history should culminate in the Germanic World Empire to which all other nations must bow.

Hegel's successors, in an orgy of chauvinism, carried these ideas still further, and their influence on German policy to this very day is obvious.

The *Staatslexicon* (1846) contains the following statement : "No people in the world has been favoured by Providence with a nobler ancestry, a more glorious historical record, a loftier destiny than the German !"

Rotteck wrote his celebrated *History of the World* in the same vein of specious pleading, and on this basis of sententious, chauvinistic historiography innumerable German authors have since aspired to impress these teachings on the German people.

The central idea of Germanism, Germany's civilizing world-mission, has gained an enormous vogue in popular literature. That it is the Germanic race which has civilized the whole of the modern world has in most historical works become a fundamental axiom. Usually the appellation "Germanic" is made to include all peoples allied to the Germans by kinship in language, such as the Scandinavians, the British, the Dutch, the North Americans, etc., and everything that can be said for the Germanic peoples in general has unhesitatingly been transferred by the Germanists to the Germans and is cited as a proof of the German world-mission. In this way they have attempted to identify with Germany the culture, literature, and history of the leading European States.

Thus, for instance, the celebrated Danish physicist, H. C. Ørsted, is referred to in a popular encyclopædia as *ein geborenen Deutscher*, although he was born at Rudkjöbing, in Langeland (Denmark).

In his work on *The Spirit of the German Stock* (1859) Nagler said: "The Germanic part of the world represents the bright side of history, the non-Germanic part the night of barbarism. The spiritual nature of Germanism has made it the standard-bearer of Christianity. European morality depends on the preservation of the Christian-Germanic spirit and on the *political power of Germany*." Kirchhoff declared in a lecture (1859) that "civilization and Christianity are unthinkable without the Germans." Thus it is Germanism which, as the *Lord's chosen instrument*, is to save the decadent world.

Of course, many thinking Germans have opposed the chauvinistic and militaristic development in Germany, and have, like Kant, advocated a liberal and pacific

policy and been animated with humane and international ideas.

From its very inception the ruthless policy represented by Bismarck met with opposition from many eminent and enlightened men. There was formed in 1861 a Progressive Party consisting of members of the Prussian Diet, a "Fortschrittspartei," which emancipated itself from the old liberal Party in the Diet and joined the Democratic Party, offering persistent and strong opposition to Bismarck and his foreign policy. Amongst the foremost leaders of this party were R. Virchow, Germany's greatest pathologist, and Eugen Richter, who in the name of liberty combated the endeavour to form a strong—that is to say, a despotic—power of government. Richter was all his life extraordinarily active in the propagation of his liberal and democratic policy, in support of which he founded the *Freisinnige Zeitung*. He was the most pronounced and consistent of Bismarck's opponents, and often proclaimed that the fall of Bismarck was his aim. The Conservative chauvinists, the Germanists, accused him of allying himself with all anti-national elements, a common accusation against all who entertain democratic and cosmopolitan ideas. The celebrated German writer and historian Professor G. Kinkel (sentenced in 1848 for republican and seditious propaganda to lifelong imprisonment, but who succeeded in escaping after a couple of years) wrote in 1869: "The German people resembles a youth who is still far from having completed his self-education, and at that age it is particularly useful to learn and thoroughly take to heart foreign opinions of ourselves." Kinkel endorsed to the full the comment of the French historian H. Martin as to "what every honest man thinks of the miserable jealousy between France and Germany," the obstacle to a general European confederacy for protection against the Eastern peril, or for the thrusting back of the Asiatics across their natural frontiers.

Kinkel further declared: "The Germans, and more especially our patriotic blusterers, should take it to heart

when a calm and able Frenchman shows them how ill this greed of conquest, as exercised against Italy, Poland, and Denmark, becomes a people which has not even secured the right to call its own Ministers to account. Germans of common sense and education enough to see the ludicrous aspect of a campaign of political trumpetings will enjoy this French criticism, which nevertheless acknowledges in a friendly spirit the virtues of our nation and our national temperament."

Nietzsche, at the time of his severe criticism of Richard Wagner in "the Wagner affair," observed that "we live in a reaction *within* the reaction" from "a certain catholicity of sentiment and a mania for everything ultra-German, the so-called 'national' cult." He satirized "Wagner's weakness for old tales and songs in which learned prejudice has discovered something Germanic *par excellence*—we laugh at it to-day—the reincarnation of these Scandinavian monsters with a thirst for exalted sensuality," etc. He looked forward, however, to the end of the era of national wars and ultra-montane martyrdom.

Modern German historians have elaborated the Germanistic ideas. The most famous of them is Treitschke, professor and editor of *Preussische Jahrbücher*, and historiographer to the State of Prussia; he showed himself to be an ardent champion of the strengthening of Germany's unity (although himself of Slav origin) and of a powerful Government. He was a passionate patriot, or, in other words, a specific Prussian chauvinist and opponent of Liberalism. He created a school of German world-power policy (*Machtpolitik*) and gained many adherents, through whom he has exercised a sinister influence on present-day thought.

According to Treitschke, "The State is paramount in the community; outside it nothing exists in the world's history." The State must be exclusive, self-contained, and "this exclusive State is, as Machiavelli was the first

to recognize, in its innermost essence, *power*. To safeguard its power is the highest moral duty of the State."

According to this dictum, international treaties are not binding longer than the State finds convenient, and the *binding nature of international laws is not admitted*; the State cannot bind itself to abide by them. The law of nations is thus set aside by Treitschke, as well as by the German Empire if its statesmen agree with Treitschke—as they seem to do. This carries us back to the point of view of the ancient Germans: to disregard and to disown the binding nature of treaties (*cf. p. 26*).

One of Treitschke's most celebrated pupils, General Bernhardi, in his work entitled *Germany and the Next War* (1911), expresses the same views regarding Germany's cultural superiority and world-mission as the earlier Germanists. Thus he says: "We now claim our share of the riches of this world, having for centuries *reigned in the domain of the mind alone*." He speaks of "*the future which Providence has intended for the German people* as being the foremost cultural nation in history." And he adds, as an incentive to war, that defeat in war "would throw us back for centuries and would shake to its very foundations the influence of the German mind in the world of culture, and thus hamper the progress of humanity in its healthy development, for *which the German element is a necessity*."

Again, in recent years, the Germanistic ethnographers have taken up arms to proclaim the superiority of the Germans. In an article on *Die Urheimat der Indogermanen* ("The Cradle of the Indo-Germans") in the *Mannus*, 1914, Dr. K. F. Wolff extols "the nationally (völkisch) minded who gladly strive for the coming period of greatness and believe in *the world-dominating future of the Germanic race*" in contrast to "the cosmopolitans of golden or red internationalism who, enfeebled by materialism, long for eternal peace and universal equality and detest nothing so much as the race-conscious German, filled with the ideals of the ancient Germans' epic period."

The nationally minded (the chauvinists) rejoice in the "martial ideals of supremacy of the Indo-Germans and hope with exultant hearts, eager for the fight, that the mantle of *Germanentum* will fall on the shoulders of *Deutschdtum*, when in time the racial pulse of two thousand years ago will once more throb through Europe from the over-populated shores washed by the North Sea. They regard northern Europe as the only possible home of this race of *blonde patricians*."

"The cosmopolitans," says Wolff, "shudder at the mere mention of the word 'race' and know not whether they are to threaten or to fear, to deride or to abuse." "To them there is no race, no people, nothing but human creatures." Wolff further says that "Among thinking people political conviction must rest on a scientific basis—that is to say, above all, on knowledge of the history of civilization and racial theory; and the North-European origin of the Indo-Germans, the favoured Indo-Germanentum of the Germanic race, and the independent growth and development of North-European culture occupy the foremost place in the minds of all nationally thinking Germans."

These high-flown and boastful effusions of Wolff's were inspired by his having read a work of quite the opposite tone by Dr. S. Feist entitled *Kultur, Ausbreitung und Herkunft der Indogermanen* (1913), in which the latter, unhampered by all these Germanistic conceits, supported the view taken by so many historians, that the cradle of the Indo-European race lay somewhere in Central Asia. In my own *History of Civilization* I have also advanced the reasons which support this view.

Feist and others having attributed the assumption of the northern origin of the Indo-Germans to *national vanity*, Wolff calls this an unworthy reproach, and couples his comment with the surprising declaration that the enthusiasm for the above theory had sprung from a *longing for a new conception of the world*—that is to say, something quite foreign to scientific ethnographic research.

This mundane theory is by no means new—it is the old chauvinistic Germanism of Hegel: “The theory of European origin helps us nationally minded Germans to realize that we are blood of their blood, over whom, as Alexander v. Puz said, ‘lay the dewy freshness of Paradise.’ It promises us on the threshold of the next double millennium a new epoch dimly discernible behind a lowering war cloud: *the German era!*”

“*Der schrecklichste der Schrecken ist der Mensch in seinem Wahn,*” said Schiller.

There is something utterly senseless in certain Germanists’ conception of Germany’s influence on culture and the legitimacy of her striving after power. The Germans have become “God’s chosen people,” are better than all the other nations, are more worthy to live and propagate than others. It is a chauvinism without parallel in the world’s history. It is a collective megalomania of a certain section of the German nation, particularly of some of the patriots. This *Wahn* has often been exploited to distort the truth, to organize falsehood, and to legitimize the insolent breaking of treaties—the foundation on which rest the laws of nations and peace—as soon as the interests of the German Empire demand it, and in dutiful obedience to the teachings of the modern Germanistic masters: Bismarck, Treitschke, Bernhardi, and others. It is on these grounds that Germany is feared and has so many enemies among other nations, who by no means shut their eyes to the real merits of the Germans, and admire Germany’s great thinkers, scientists, composers, etc.

Germany’s quantitative greatness is claimed as synonymous with superiority in all spheres. “Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles” has been sung so long that the people believe that no country can compete with Germany and that the Germans are the foremost people on earth—God’s chosen people—and that therefore they will be allowed to rule the world, to oust other peoples from their inheritance, to conquer and absorb as many adjoining regions as possible.

It follows inevitably that a people taught assiduously, decade after decade, by its philosophers and teachers that the Germans are the climax of history and the greatest of human races, must strive to occupy in the political and economic world the rôle to which it is entitled—to wit, that of teachers and leaders of the less gifted or degenerate nations. The quest of widened power by conquest of their smaller or weaker neighbours is a corollary of the fundamental idea of Germanism. Out of it arose the desire for unity and a strong world-compelling Empire binding all German peoples together. In this wise European supremacy was also destined to pass to Germany, and by the logic of events Prussia was the State pre-ordained to realize the Germanistic dreams of greatness.

It is a pity that the far-sighted Kant, who died in 1804, did not live a few decades later. With his principles of equity and his broad humanistic outlook, he would certainly have checked Germanism with its chauvinism. Kant supported enthusiastically the principles of the French Revolution, extolled republicanism, and disapproved of the alienation of the peoples from one another into a narrow nationalism, pleading, on the contrary, their union into a world-embracing commonwealth. In the middle of the Great Revolution he published a remarkable work, *Philosophic Argument for Perpetual Peace* (1795), and showed how peace might rest on a *union of free States* embracing the whole of Europe and represented by a *permanent Congress*. The first condition was, however, that all States should be republican, for whilst a king has little hesitation in declaring war, a democracy will go to great lengths to avoid it, knowing the burdens and the suffering to which it will be exposed.

Not until the striving for right and justice has welded the nations together will a real equilibrium make its entry in international politics and replace crafty calculation and the principle of balance of power established by alliances and counter-alliances.

Patriotism was too narrow a conception for Kant ; he wanted to embrace all humanity in a living sympathy. But this did not make him a naive, optimistic dreamer. On the contrary, he knew only too well the weaknesses of man, and might rather be called a pessimist ; in fact, he went so far as to attribute to the human race “ Thorheit mit einem Lineamente von Bosheit verbunden.” Kant contemplated with sadness the world’s history, in which he found no method or goodwill, in spite of apparent method of detail here and there : “ all is on the whole a tissue of folly, puerile vanity, often childish malice and destructiveness.” He also pointed out that the ends for which human beings strove and which they often regarded so essential are in themselves mean enough. Worse than that : in pleading these aims and in the effort to attain them they try to do each other every conceivable injury.

To Kant war was a blot on the human race, and he declared that the greatest misfortunes which befell civilized nations had their origin in war.

No German philosopher was less accessible to the Germanistic militarist cult ; it was entirely opposed to his view of life and irreconcilable with his ethical principles.

Goethe, Germany’s most versatile genius, would never have countenanced the German war policy and chauvinism, which, in point of fact, are Prussian. He had a predilection for Shakespeare, for everything French, for the classical era, for Italy and the East. He was a naturalist as much as a poet, and “ the great heathen ” who was so deeply influenced by Bruno and Spinoza could not be a party to the Christian Germanism. He admired Napoleon, who visited Goethe, of whom he uttered the famous words, “ Behold a man ! ” and presented him with the Legion of Honour. Goethe, whom the Dutch struggle for liberty and the Duke of Alba’s appalling persecution inspired to write the drama *Egmont*, would probably, had he now been living, have written a new Netherland drama after the German ravages in Belgium, although it would long have remained unprinted despite his glorious name. He would

not have found favour with the mighty ones of present-day Germany, although hundreds of thousands of Germans every year make a pilgrimage to his famous home in Weimar. If only he had been alive now! The Great War might not then have turned Europe into a hell.

Neither would Schiller, author of *Revolt of the Netherlands*, *Don Carlos*, *The Maid of Orleans*, *Wilhelm Tell*, and other masterpieces, have approved of Germany's chauvinistic degeneracy and policy of violence. His whole character would have revolted against it. He was always the apostle of liberty and human rights, endorsed republicanism and was elected a French citizen by the *Convention Nationale*. Schiller would probably in these days have written another drama on *The Robbers*. The story of this his *primum opus* is peculiar. The young Count Carl v. Moor, a well-meaning and industrious, but impetuous and forceful character, who in his brother had a cruel enemy, was driven by the latter's base machinations to take refuge in the Bohemian forests with a band of followers, where they led the life of "noble robbers."

As an historian Schiller, with his noble enthusiasm for right and truth in the lives of all nations, would have opposed Treitschke. In his splendid essay of *Was heisst und zu welchem Ende studiert man Universalgeschichte?* (1789) he shows how human progress has depended on the long co-operation of many different factors, and that a just acknowledgment of the merits of others, as accorded by a philosophical mind, is essential. He believed in the pacific collaboration of the different nations in an attained *human period*: "All preceding epochs have laboured to bring into being our *human century*. . . . The barriers which sundered States and nations have been demolished . . . A cosmopolitan bond of brotherhood now unites all thinking minds. . . . The European community seems transformed to one great family."

## VI

### PRUSSIA'S OPPRESSION OF HER POLISH SUBJECTS

WHAT degeneracy have we not witnessed in German polities since Bismarek's triumphs and since the Bismarekian system became more generally endorsed by the ruling classes and literally dogmatized !

Before Bismarek's time opinion in regard to the Poles was quite different from now. For instance, the German Diet held in Frankfort in the year 1848 ruled that the only solution of the Polish question consistent with the dignity of the German people and its real interests, was to proclaim Poland an independent State ! The German poet Herwegh appealed to all German peoples to combine in a war against Russia, and declared that " there could be no free Germany without a free Poland, and no free Poland without a free Germany."

Bureaucratic and Bismarekian Prussia has since severely censured this appeal for liberty and insistence on the rights of nations as a fantastic folly.

Prussia's Polish subjects proved themselves in the war with France in 1870-71 to be brave and loyal soldiers, but no reward came their way (save orders and medals to sundry individuals). It seems, on the contrary, as if Prussia had become still more overbearing towards them after the joint victories over the French, and the persecution has increased rather than otherwise.

" You Polish swine ! " " You Polish ass ! " have been common appellations in the Polish provinces, and if an

incensed peasant resented such treatment from a person in authority, be he but an elementary school teacher, the severe penalties of the law were promptly visited upon him. In such cases Prussian newspapers are not slow to relate how the peaceable German population are exposed to the persecution of a coarse and ignorant mob, inflamed by Catholic fanatics and mutinous agitators ! But if a Polish deputy rises in the Prussian Diet to protest against the treatment of the Poles by the authorities, no one listens to the "Polish wailings," and the House proceeds to the order of the day.

The authorities long exercised shameless pressure at the political elections and terrorized the peasants still of military age into voting for German candidates. H. Sienkiewicz's peasant tale *Bartek the Triumphant* gives a harrowing account of these outrages.

The wholesale expulsion of Polish subjects from Prussia in 1886 was a tyrannical and unjustifiable act, and eminent German jurists, Geffeken amongst others, expressed their disapproval. There were no valid reasons. Even if the intention had been to prevent the Polish element from gaining an ascendancy, this could have been effected by prohibiting immigration, but could not possibly justify *expatriation* of Poles after they had been allowed to live in Prussia and had, in fact, long been domiciled there.

Russia in turn did not fail to visit her anger on Prussians in Russia, who were shortly afterwards expelled in large numbers.

"Hakatism" ("H.K.T."-ism) is the appellation—derived from the initials of the names of its founders, Hansmann, Kennemann, and Tiedemann—given to a large ultra-patriotic society, the "Ostmarken-Verein," described as a society for promoting a German spirit in the Eastern provinces. This society has for its object to urge the Prussian Government (as if it were necessary !) to persecute Prussia's Polish subjects, to injure them in every way by depriving them of work, to close to them all avenues of

economic activity, to wrest their native soil from them by purchase, etc.

The chief founder of the society, Hansemann, had previously been a poor official in Posen, but had there amassed an enormous fortune. In return it seems to have been his aim to reduce the Poles to destitution.

Hakatism, or the H.K.T. Society, was founded in 1892 after Bismarck's retirement and when Caprivi had become Chancellor. This change had brought about some improvement in the condition of the Poles, and their relations with the Germans had been rendered less unbearable. The Hakatists, however, went on a pilgrimage to Bismarck, at Varzin, and at once received his blessing. They tried to make their countrymen believe that the Poles oppressed the Germans in the Eastern provinces, and that the Polish representatives in the Reichstag, who had become increasingly loyal and often voted in favour of the Government proposals, did so designedly, in order to gain advantages for the Poles, etc. This incensed the Prussians greatly, a feeling of renewed animosity was created against the Poles, and the object of the new society was declared to be "to prevent Polish acts of aggressiveness"! As if they had power to commit such acts! By "aggressiveness" no doubt was meant that in spite of all difficulties they refused to be annihilated and had instead progressed in all directions, thus retaining their status and preserving their nationality. This was looked upon in Prussia with much disfavour, especially as the Polish population—numbering nearly three millions—presented a serious obstacle to the desired complete Germanization of the Provinces of Posen and East and West Prussia.

Hakatism thus became a State within the State, and did not shrink from exercising a literal terrorism, partly in order to pick quarrels with the Poles and create grievances against them, and partly to intimidate such Prussian officials as wished to do justice to the Poles and who were therefore branded as enemies of the Prussian State!

Everything, literally *everything*, has been done to uproot

the Polish element in these provinces. *No public offices are ever given to Poles*: they are excluded from the Courts of Justice, the postal service, the schools, etc. Polish jurists, who have practised for decades, can no longer occupy any official positions. All public offices are filled by Germans only, and railway officials must also be Germans.

To Germanize the Poles the Government has now made German instruction *compulsory* in the schools. Formerly school instruction was given in Polish in all subjects, but the use of the Polish language was gradually restricted by fresh decrees, until at last it was only permitted for *religious instruction*. But finally (1901) the Polish language was *proscribed entirely*, and the children had to learn even their prayers in German. Thereupon a curious movement arose: the children struck, they refused to answer questions from the catechism and to read their prayers in German. This strike became general and comprised nearly a hundred thousand children throughout Posen. The children were punished not only by being "kept in" but also with corporal chastisement, which roused intense indignation throughout Europe. The "Wreschen affair" (1901) was especially notorious. After barbarous castigation of a crowd of children at the elementary school at Wreschen, a number of mothers forced their way into the school premises to protect them; the police were called in and arrests were made, many mothers receiving very harsh sentences, up to two and a half years' penal servitude! Prince Radzivill interpellated the Chancellor, Prince Buelow, in the German Reichstag upon the subject, but the latter treated the matter lightly, declaring that "the country's reputation had not suffered by the measures of the Wreschen officials," and Count Limburg-Stirum defended the flogging method of the German school-masters.

In 1902 the Chancellor, von Buelow, introduced in the Prussian Diet a tyrannical Bill for *compulsory expropriation* in order to deprive the Poles of their holdings, on the plea

that "the Polish question is the question on the solution of which our country's near future depends." This pronouncement was held by *Die Post* to be a very just one, as demonstrated by the uneasing fervour with which the "Polish danger" was emphasized and discussed on all sides. This fervour, the paper wrote, must not be abated until the Polish danger has ceased to be. But it will take a long time, and "particularly ominous for 'Deutschum' do the conditions in the East appear. Germany's colonizing power is not allowed to display itself there and passes more and more from the offensive to the defensive."

Some—Dr. K. Busse among others—wanted at one time to found a university in Posen, but others—including Dr. E. Stumpfe—opposed it, as they feared that the Poles would soon become a majority and create a fresh arena for national unrest. Stumpfe declared (in his *Polenfrage und Ansiedlungskommission*, 1902) that the "Prussian schoolmaster will not succeed in overcoming the 'Polentum,' but will instead place it in a position to combat the 'Deutschum.'" The more we promote education and culture amongst the Poles, the more difficult will our struggle against them become. We must *Germanize* by a continued *wholesale German immigration*, otherwise we shall achieve nothing against the Poles."

Just as a thousand years ago! (cf. p. 18).

"By German wholesale immigration we must make ourselves the real masters of the country; we must extirpate the Poles in the frontier districts which they inhabit."

The Germans in Posen lead an isolated existence; they are cut off from Germany and live in a foreign country where they are not liked. Hence they are far from eager to go to Posen. There is no upper *bourgeoisie* and no opportunity for animated cultural intercourse. Those who might exercise a refining influence on the province hasten away as quickly as possible.

Prussia has gained little by her attempts to Germanize Posen, in spite of the many hundred million marks expended on German colonization. The Poles are regarded as

enemies, and have literally been converted into such by the brutal treatment of these Prussian subjects.

Is it to be wondered at, then, that the whole of the civilized world outside Prussia was indignant at this treatment of Posen's Polish population? The great Polish writer H. Sienkiewicz, to whom Sweden awarded the Nobel Prize, has appealed to the forum of European opinion in the matter of Prussia's treatment of her Polish subjects, and received replies of varying length from 254 well-known persons in all countries of Europe, who may be said to stand for humaneness, education, justice, and truth. All expressed their abhorrence of Prussia's conduct, and the replies fill an enormous volume of 282 pages, which Sienkiewicz published under the title *Prusse et Pologne, enquête internationale* (1909). "This is now," he comments, "no longer a dispute between the Prussian idea and a few million Poles, but between that idea and the outraged conscience of all humanity. The noblest representatives of all nations have given their verdict in the first instance, and the future must pronounce judgment in the higher instances!"

## VII

### THE DANO-GERMAN WAR OF 1864 : BISMARCK'S MACHIAVELLISM : PRUSSIAN OPPRESSION IN SCHLESWIG

CONFUSION reigned throughout the German states in the middle of the nineteenth century.

It was the untenable condition of Austria's internal situation which determined the German policy of that country. The Germanizing centralization system, which had long been applied, could not hope to overcome the resistance of the other nationalities, more especially of the Hungarians, without a very close understanding with, but a decided hegemony over, Germany.

It is a remarkable thing that we now hear so much in Germany of Germany's "organizing power," of Germany having "discovered the fact of organization and her consequent right to Germanize the world" (Professor Ostwald); yet it is only quite recently that Germany has displayed this organizing ability. During the greater part of the nineteenth century literal chaos reigned in Germany. The spirit of strife—just as it had done among the Gothic peoples of antiquity when they sought fresh homes in Roman territory—divided the people, the States were unable to agree, the old German Empire tottered on its foundations, and the princes, like the people, strove as effectively as possible to frustrate all efforts towards unity and freedom. The antagonism between Austria and Prussia was particularly marked, both striving for hegemony, and the tension between them grew until well on in

the sixties, when the confusion reached its climax. Then at last came the Schleswig-Holstein troubles, which gave Prussia an opportunity for the active intervention, whereby she hoped to gain the upper hand.

The long struggle for Schleswig-Holstein—the *bête-noire* of statesmen and publicists—which was due to complicated questions of succession and the different nationalities of the inhabitants, led after Frederick VII's accession to the Danish throne (January 1848) to the formation of an insurrectionist party with the Prince of Augustenborg-Noer at its head. His brother, the Duke of Augustenborg, directed the whole enterprise from Berlin and received support from the King of Prussia. The party wanted to detach the Duchies from Denmark, and succeeded in bringing a deputation before the German Diet at Frankfort, demanding that Schleswig should be incorporated in the German Confederacy, *to which it had never belonged*, as had been the case with Holstein. The Germanists in Germany were at this time busy addressing so-called claims of justice to other nations in order to enforce their being accepted by the Frankfort Diet. To Schleswig, *which had always been a Danish country*, Germany had no claim, but nevertheless it was attempted—by the philologist Grimm—to justify the agitation for annexation on ancient historical grounds. Thus it was pointed out that 1400 years previously Jutland had a population of Goths, Angles, and Suitans, which had been driven out by the Danes, who had attacked them from the north !

Frederick VII of Denmark thereupon decreed that Holstein should receive a separate Government as an independent State forming part of the German Confederacy, but that Schleswig should be inseparably united with Denmark. In 1848 the dispute culminated in a war—which lasted two years—with the insurrectionist party in the Duchy, assisted by Prussian and other German troops, whilst Sweden and Norway sent an army to Denmark's assistance and an Austrian army likewise supported the Danes. After varying fortunes the Danes

finally proved victorious in the battles of Isted, Mysunde, and Fredriksstad (1850).

At a conference in London in 1852 the Great Powers, joined by Sweden and Norway, thereupon settled the succession question by granting Prince Christian of Glücksborg (who became Christian IX) the right of succession to the entire Danish monarchy, whereby the union of the Duchies with Denmark was definitely ratified.

The year before, the Duke of Augustenborg had, on his word of honour, *formally renounced, on behalf of himself and his family, all claims to the duchies*, and by way of compensation for this, as well as for his estates forfeited by his treason of 1848, he received from Denmark an indemnity of six and a half million kroner.

When in 1857 the Danish Government, in order to make an end of the disputes regarding the administration of the Duchies, agreed to the only right solution, namely, that *Holstein should be detached, and Schleswig should be more closely incorporated with Denmark*, the German Confederacy threatened "military execution" in order to maintain the union between Schleswig and Holstein, and renewed threats to the same effect were uttered in 1860 by the German Powers.

To create a new and separate buffer-State, the fictitious State of Schleswig-Holstein, which was to belong to the German Confederacy, was the real object in view; but this was an unjust and unreasonable claim, having regard to the great political principle of the nineteenth century, nationality, for the contemplated State would be one consisting of two distinct nationalities.

By degrees Prussia had become better and better equipped for the realization of the ideal of *German unity*, and became about the beginning of the sixties a military State in which consideration for the rights of nations was practically a dead letter. This degeneration was due in the first place to the ruthless "Blood and Iron Chancellor," Bismarck. By trickery and despotism he overcame his opponents in the Diet, and proclaimed, in

accordance with his principle, that *might goes before right*, that “Germany’s unity cannot be founded with phrases and majorities, but only with *blood and iron*.”

This German Machiavelli thus introduced a new phase into the political development of the country. Germanism became anything but Christian; in fact, it may be said to have been a diabolical Germanism which was now inaugurated.

Denmark was the first country destined to spill its blood that German unity might be encompassed and that Prussia might become the ruling State in Germany.

When on the death of Frederick VII the disputes concerning the succession in Schleswig and Holstein were revived, the question of a reconstitution of Germany likewise came to the fore, and there is not the slightest doubt but that the crafty and unscrupulous Bismarck interfered with Schleswig and Holstein’s affairs so as, by an easy victory, to bring the *Duchies under Prussian rule*, and thus gain the prestige which he lacked in the Prussian Diet: here the liberal Progressive Party, which represented the humane tendencies of that time, enjoyed at the beginning of the sixties a decided ascendancy and opposed the enormous Army budget of the war party as unnecessary.

The Hall Ministry of 1863 thought it might achieve a happy solution of the Schleswig question as the outcome of an alliance with Sweden and Norway, which Charles XV concluded with Frederick VII. A new constitution was ratified on November 13, 1863, under which the joint affairs of the monarchy and of Schleswig were to be handed over to a Diet of two Chambers, whilst it was left to the future to decide whether Holstein should join the union, and this new Act was passed by *Danes and Schleswigers jointly*.

When Christian IX shortly afterwards ascended the throne he gave his assent to the Constitutional Act, and it was accordingly called the *November Constitution*.

Bismarck, in his *Reflections and Reminiscences*, published by his secretary, Herr Busch, himself explained his

Machiavellian policy towards Schleswig-Holstein. He remarks amongst other things : “ In my opinion the definitive solution of the Danish question had to be sought in the *acquisition of the Duchies by Prussia*. I said so at a Cabinet meeting directly after Frederick VII’s death. I reminded King William that every one of his immediate predecessors had *extended the boundaries of the State*. I invited him now to do the same.

“ This pronouncement of mine was omitted from the protocol. When I asked Geheimrat Costenoble, who was in charge of the protocol, why he had omitted this statement, he replied that the King was of opinion that *I myself would prefer to see my remarks omitted from the protocol*. His Majesty seemed to have thought that I had spoken under the Bacchic influences of a *déjeuner* and that I would be glad to hear no more of it. But I insisted that my words should be put in, and they were. *The Crown Prince* (the subsequent Emperor Frederick) *raised his hands towards heaven whilst I was speaking*, as if he doubted my sanity. My colleagues remained silent.”

With his characteristic lack of moral sense, Prussia’s greatest Machiavellist failed to see that his proposals were so at variance with all international law and with a humane and enlightened policy that his hearers could not but think that he was drunk or momentarily out of his mind ! His mania for power had quite blinded him, and he seems to have regarded with contempt the Crown Prince’s appeal to heaven in this unrighteous matter.

But what is the good of talking about the perplexing quarrels over the succession to the Duchies ? Their conquest had been decided upon by the Blood and Iron Chancellor, and he skilfully exploited Duke Frederick of Augustenborg’s conduct when the latter broke his pledged word to Denmark and claimed the ducal crown.

It is curious to note that the Germans, in dealing with the Schleswig-Holstein question, obstinately pleaded certain old clauses when they were to their apparent advantage—even if they were unlawful—but ignored others which

controverted their contentions and which were in accordance with laws and treaties. Although the Danish Government had been guilty of grave mistakes and omissions, occasionally giving rise to misunderstandings and complications, it cannot be denied that the German views with regard to the Duchies, especially Schleswig, were founded in the main on fictions of legal casuistry.

Among the German States there was no unity regarding Schleswig-Holstein. They were divided into two camps. One, to which the central States belonged, wanted to acknowledge Prince Frederick of Augustenborg as Duke of Schleswig-Holstein in spite of his father's renunciation, and to create a new buffer-State. Finally it was decided by the German Confederation to occupy Holstein by an executive force, and an army of 12,000 Saxons and Hanoverians accordingly invaded the country without meeting with resistance.

But it was quite contrary to Bismarck's plans that a new buffer-State should be created, and he accordingly induced Austria to combine with Prussia in order to prevent this, and instead to *attack* Denmark. Austria, however, assented to the proposal in order to keep a check on Prussia rather than to support her. Thus both States broke the federal law which decreed that the minority should follow the majority, and they resolved to take the matter in hand without considering the views of the other States. Shortly afterwards (January 20, 1864) an army of 39,000 Prussians and 21,000 Austrians entered Holstein.

The confusion amongst the Germans in their attempt to reconcile their various interests now became greater than ever. What were the Saxons and Hanoverians to do? Their commanders found it necessary to evacuate the eastern part of Holstein in favour of the Prussians and Austrians, and otherwise to take up a waiting position.

On being challenged to evacuate Schleswig—a Danish province!—the Danes refused to do so, whereupon the Prussians and Austrians took the offensive. The Danish army of 38,500 men now withdrew to Dybböl and the

island of Alsen. The Danes defended the Dybböl fortifications very pluckily for a long time, but they were finally stormed (April 18) by the Prussians, who were now for the first time equipped with breech-loaders and rifled ordnance which could be mounted out of range of the old Danish smooth-bores.

An armistice was agreed upon, and a conference of the great Powers and Sweden and Norway was held in London. Finally it was decided to divide Schleswig, the purely Danish part of which, as outlined by the line of Flensburg-Höjer, was to belong to Denmark. But by an inconceivable act of short-sightedness the Danish Government did not accept this proposal, and as the conference thus failed in its object, the war broke out afresh. A few days later the island of Alsen was evacuated by the Danes and taken. This brought the war to an end, and Denmark had to accept the Peace of Vienna (October 1864), by which Holstein and Schleswig were handed over to Prussia and Austria.

In Germany, where the principle of nationality had been held inviolable as long as it concerned Germans under Danish rule, and where it had been proclaimed that the war was waged to liberate the "German brethren," it was now found quite in order that 200,000 Danes in Schleswig should be compelled to become German subjects. Bismarck, in order to devise some semblance of a right, directed Prussia's Crown jurists to express their views on the question of the Duchies, and received the farcical answer that their rightful ruler was the King of Denmark, but that as he had (by his peace terms) "*relinquished his rights to Prussia and Austria*," the latter were thenceforward the rightful masters of the Duchies!

Protests soon arose in Germany. The National Society, at a meeting at Eibach (October 1864) stigmatized the surrender of the Duchies to the tyrannical governmental system of Prussia, and shortly afterwards a committee of thirty-six members of the Prussian Diet issued a rousing protest against the annexation. But it was no use;

might had to go before right, and the old German sense of justice had to go by the board.

In Sweden, as in Norway, the sympathy for Denmark's cause had been very marked ever since the beginning of the war, and the resentment against Bismarck and Prussia was general. Charles XV wanted an alliance with Denmark for the protection of Schleswig and did all he could to involve Sweden in the war. But he met with opposition from the majority of his Ministers, who from motives of prudence opposed his efforts. The Prime Minister, Louis de Geer, a man of high integrity, has given us some interesting particulars of this period in his *Memoirs* (1892). The Foreign Minister, Manderström, had for several years espoused Denmark's cause and seems to have wanted Sweden and Norway to enter the lists as Denmark's ally, since Charles XV in July 1863 promised Frederick VII in Hall's presence a treaty of alliance. This treaty was duly drafted, and Charles XV discussed it in September 1863 with several of his Ministers. But he met with considerable opposition. Gripenstedt emphasized with great eloquence the danger to Sweden of a war with Germany, and "the King was so eager to contradict him that it was difficult for the others to get a word in."

De Geer and the Norwegian Prime Minister opposed the treaty unless we obtained the assistance of at least one of the Great Powers. In the end England, France, and Russia were invoked to come to Denmark's assistance and were promised Sweden and Norway's co-operation if they did so. Charles XV would not give way, however, but wanted to redeem his promise, and tried, though unsuccessfully, to form a new Ministry.

De Geer was of opinion that, whatever happened in the quarrels between Denmark and the German states regarding Schleswig-Holstein, nothing could be done from our side. He wrote: "Germany's real reason for going to war was *lust of conquest* pure and simple, and all other pretexts were nothing but evasions of the issue. As for

myself, I still believe that Sweden's intervention would not have averted the war or given it a European character, and that it would have ended in precisely the same way, only with the difference that we should have been beaten as well as the Danes, as our army at that time was very indifferently equipped."

The adherents of Scandinavism, who had hoped for participation in the war, were very bitter against the Ministry, and at the beginning of March 1864 this resentment took shape in riots and window-smashing, especially at Manderström's residence. In Norway the Scandinavists tried to induce the Storthing to pass a vote of sympathy for Denmark.

The popular sympathy for Denmark in the other two Scandinavian countries took tangible shape in the dispatch of a number of *volunteers*, including some ninety officers and twenty doctors from Sweden, I being one of the latter. I was then an undergraduate of twenty-two, and I think that the other volunteers were fired by the same conviction as myself, namely, that the Germans had no right to start the war and that the Danes were in the right. Personally, I felt it a duty to help my injured brethren in a struggle into which they had been forced by violence and injustice.

I was stationed for some time at Augustenborg Palace, then converted into a base hospital, and was posted at the first-aid dressing-station at Sønderborg, right opposite the Dybbøl fortifications, the day before they were stormed, April 18. The scene was one of utter desolation—battered and smoking houses everywhere, relief parties hurrying to and from the fortifications with stretchers and wagon-loads of wounded; in the dressing-stations white faces and blue lips, in the operating-theatres a literal carnage, buckets full of blood, amputated limbs lying about, gaping wounds, and through it all the thunder of the Prussian guns and the vicious hissing of the shells overhead. This sort of thing one never forgets, and it makes one think of polities, of the instigators of it all.

The Dano-German War was not calculated to strengthen the Scandinavian feeling of kinship with the Germanic cousins of Germany. On the contrary, a deep antipathy grew up against Germany, or rather Prussia—that is to say, against her policy, and more especially against her real leader, Bismarck, who has always been disliked, nay, hated, throughout Scandinavia on account of his doctrine of brute force.

It is a remarkable and paradoxical fact that the German Empire, founded on the systematic growth of Germanism and thus resting on the principle of nationality, has itself violated the rights of other nations ; and the expositions of many of its learned chauvinists have been a mockery of history.

#### PRUSSIA'S OPPRESSION OF THE SCHLESWIGERS

When the German fratricidal war of 1866 was ended by the Peace of Prague, with Napoleon III as mediator, it was decided that Austria should surrender her rights in Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia. At the same time, there was added to Article 5 of the Peace Treaty a clause to the effect that "*the population of the northern district of Schleswig, when by a plebiscite it shall have expressed its wish to be incorporated with Denmark, shall be surrendered to that country.*"

Prussia shortly afterwards (December 1866) proclaimed the incorporation of the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein in her realm, and the Danes in North Schleswig were thus forced to become Prussian subjects.

The *Kölnische Zeitung*, in 1866, espoused the cause of the North Schleswigers very energetically, and strongly urged that Article 5 of the Peace of Prague should be carried out. It wrote amongst other things that "it would be a wise and statesmanlike act to renounce North Schleswig voluntarily," and pointed out that "Prussia promised to do so by the Peace of Prague," adding : "We cannot conceive how anyone *dare believe* that Prussia will

leave the most advantageous peace which was ever concluded unconsummated by *not redeeming a solemn undertaking entered into under the eyes of the whole of Europe!*"

When the Prussian Diet had to deal in December 1886 with the question of the incorporation of Schleswig and Holstein with Prussia, and when a committee expressed the hope that Article 5 of the Peace of Prague would be deleted, Bismarck made the following statement : " I have always been of opinion that a population *which does not wish to be Prussian or German*, and which has unequivocally expressed its desire to belong to an adjacent State of its own nationality, does not *conduce to the strengthening of the Power* from which it is striving to be separated. . . . I consider it necessary to point out that *we cannot possibly regard ourselves as released from obligations entered into* by the resolution of the Committee and of the Diet ; we must *honour these obligations*, but we will do so in such a way that in the voting which is to decide our course there can be no doubt of its *voluntary and independent* nature, and as to its expressing the will which it is its purpose to elicit."

Bismarck's organ, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, declared in an article respecting Article 5, which appeared in the spring of 1867 and which was assumed to express the intentions of the Prussian Government, that Prussia would allow the vote to be taken, *but not until* the population *at the end of a considerable lapse of time* had become familiar with Prussian rule, as until then they could not vote without bias.

What Bismarck and his organ meant was that " after a considerable lapse of time " a large number of Danes would have been driven out of Schleswig and replaced by Germans, so as to obtain a satisfactory result from the voting. But events turned out otherwise.

Article 5 of the Treaty of Prague was deleted purely and simply at the end of twelve years, during which time no offer had been made to carry out its terms, whilst nothing happened in Schleswig or Denmark which could

justify its abrogation. The promise of a plebiscite was withdrawn in a convention dated Vienna, October 1878, between the German and the Austrian Emperors, and this astounding breach of a treaty was officially given the inoffensive name of "revision." This act of releasing William I from his obligations is considered by political authors of Bismarck's school, such as Professor W. Müller, etc., to have been Austria's *quid pro quo* for the services which the German Government rendered that country during the Oriental crisis and at the Berlin Congress of 1878.

In the above mentioned "revision" it is stated that "The stipulation in this treaty [Treaty of Prague] concerning the possibility (Modalität) of the return of Schleswig's northern districts to Denmark has not yet been carried out." It is made clear that *The German Emperor attaches importance to the removal of this possibility*, and it is further explained that "the Emperor of Austria realizes the *difficulties* which stand in the way of carrying out this fifth article." What these difficulties were is not explained, and could hardly be explained, inasmuch as they did not exist—unless they consisted in the mortification over the failure during a period of twelve years to Germanize North Schleswig in spite of all stratagems, such as school coercion, language coercion, etc.

The "revision" in question of the Prague Treaty was of truly laconic brevity and consisted in Article 5 being declared *null and void (ausser Giltigkeit gesetzt)*!

Such "revisions," in the vocabulary of other European nations, are called *despotism* and *brute force*, and it is certain that Article 5 of the Treaty of Prague would long since have been carried out had there existed in Europe a powerful State which could enforce the claims of political morality and watch over the rights of the smaller nations. But France was vanquished, and Prussia had gained in strength during the past twelve years and knew that no other nation would dare, for the sake of the "revision" of the Prague Treaty, to challenge this overbearing

military State. The convention of October 11, 1878, destroyed any lingering illusions as to the return of Schleswig to Denmark. It ratified the annexation as a conquest in the spirit of ancient times—that is to say, without regard for the rights of nations, nationality, or historical progress.

Bismarckian publicists and historians have vainly sought to make the world believe that “great joy prevailed in the North Schleswig districts on publication of the convention,” etc. (W. Müller). The Danish Schleswigers have always been, and are still, dissatisfied with the annexation, as shown by their always sending Danish deputies to the Reichstag in Berlin.

When William II visited Christian IX in 1888 newspapers threw out hints as to the fulfilment of the treaty. But the whole German Press, including even the Liberal and independent papers, in touching upon this question voiced the opinion that “Article 5 of the Peace of Prague may now, both from a *political* and *juridical* point of view, be regarded as dead and done with (*Vossische Zeitung*).

It is surprising to see otherwise sound political authors, such as Dr. K. Baumbach, member of the Reichstag, (in his *Staatslexicon*, 1882), speak of the deletion of this clause “by agreement between Prussia and Austria,” as an *accomplished fact* without commenting on the obvious injustice done.

When an address concerning the Schleswig question was presented in 1889 to the Liberal members of the German Reichstag by the Positivist Society at Stockholm through the present author, the *Freisinnige Zeitung* wrote as follows: “This document contains an appeal to the Liberal members of the Reichstag to agitate in order that the German language may be abolished in the Danish Schleswig Primary Schools, and that the northern districts of Schleswig may be ceded to Denmark. These gentlemen might have spared themselves their trouble and printing expenses.”

The *Kölnische Zeitung*, in reproducing the above, added the following comment: "This presumptuous demand from foreign peace league members would hardly have been submitted to the German Liberals had not their repeated fraternizing with Poles, Guelphs, and Social Democrats, their hostile attitude towards colonial policy, and their quarrels with Bismarck created abroad a mistaken notion as to the aim and nature of the German Liberal Party. The German Liberals must once and for all make it their rule not to let their opposition to the policy of the Government degenerate into a struggle against the vital interests of our country; they will not then in the future have to face the *disgrace* of being taken by *foreign enemies of the German Empire* for opponents on principle to *Germanism*."

This approval of Germany's ruthless treatment of a couple of hundred thousand Danes, whose right to a plebiscite on a question of nationality was acknowledged during many years, and of the Prussian annexation of North Schleswig without a shadow of historical justification, but merely in the alleged vital interests of the German Fatherland, only illustrates the degeneration which follows in the wake of a traditional policy of violence.

Protests against the Schleswig-Holstein annexation were not altogether lacking in Germany, although they were few. Thus Dr. F. H. Geffken, diplomatist and professor of international law, tried to prevent this incorporation, just as after the Dano-German War he opposed Bismarck in London on the Luxemburg question. No wonder, therefore, that when Bismarck sought (in 1888) to institute proceedings against him for his publication of an extract from the Emperor Frederick's Diary, showing the latter's share in bringing about Germany's unity, his (Bismarck's) judgment completely forsook him and he tried first to brand the extract as a forgery and afterwards, when he failed in this attempt, declared it to be a *punishable offence*! He wanted to crush his old opponent, who had stood up for right against might. Geffken was most

barbarously lodged in goal pending prosecution for *lèse majesté*, but was acquitted by the court.

The Prussian Government has ever since the annexation of Schleswig attempted a systematic and ruthless suppression of the Danish language amongst the Danish Schleswigers and has persecuted them for any tokens of affection for their old country, Denmark. Many of them have, therefore, by degrees emigrated from Schleswig to Denmark or to America, whereby their number has decreased somewhat since 1864, when there were about 200,000 of them. According to official data, there were in 1890 about 135,000 Danes in Schleswig who were subjects of Prussia, and in addition about 30,000 so-called "foreign" Danes.

The German language was introduced into the Schleswig schools in 1889 and made compulsory for all subjects; occasionally, however, exceptions were made in favour of religious instruction. But the Danish language is not allowed to be taught. There must be no Danish masters, no families must engage tutors—as they would probably be Danes—and *parents must not themselves instruct their children!* If they do, they are prosecuted and punished (with a fine to begin with) pursuant to a law which says that no one must teach who lacks "moral competency"—and this competency is supposed to be lacking in Danish parents when they are not good Prussian subjects!

The Prussian Government has further forbidden parents to send their children to school in Denmark. Guardians sending children to Danish schools after they have been confirmed are punished.

A German song-book (*Liederbuch*) was introduced in 1884 into Schleswig schools by an order of the Government, and it was directed that the school-children should learn at least twenty of its songs by heart. Of these twenty songs, twelve are German national or war songs, and it may be of interest to note that amongst them is the famous *Preussenlied* "ich bin ein Preusse." But this historical inexactitude was not enough. The song

consisted originally of five verses, but for the benefit of the Schleswigers a sixth verse, by Privy Councillor Schneider (a German immigrant), was added in 1869. This verse runs as follows :

Und wir, die wir am Ost- und Nordensee als Wacht gestellt,  
gestählt von Wog und Wind, wir, die *Seit Düppel* durch des *Blutes Bande* an Preussens Thron und Volk gekettet sind, wir woll'n nicht  
rückwärts schauen, nein vorwärts mit Vertrauen ! Wir rufen's  
laut in alle Welt hinein : “*Auch wir sind Preussen, wollen Preussen  
sein !*”

The following is a literal prose translation of this verse :

“ And we, posted as sentinels on Baltic and North Sea, hardened by wave and wind, we who since the *Düppel fight* have been tied by *bonds of blood* to Prussia's throne and people, we will not look back, nay, forward, and with confidence ! We cry aloud that all the world may hear : ‘ *We too are Prussians, and Prussians want to be !* ’ ”

It is not only by the introduction of the German language that the schools in Schleswig are used as a means of destroying the national spirit of the population ; instruction in history has also been directed to this end.

In *Heimatkunde* (subjects relating to one's own country) the children are taught nothing of Schleswig's history prior to 1864—that is to say, that the province has been Danish from time immemorial, that it had always had Danish laws, etc. ; on the contrary, Denmark is spoken of as a totally foreign or hostile country, to which the Duchy had been tied, but from which it has now been happily liberated !

The instruction in “ national history ” describes Germany's greatness in the Middle Ages and her subsequent decline, until the time when Prussia appeared on the scene. The policy of her rulers has been patriotically self-sacrificing and loyal without parallel, whilst that of their neighbours was made up of intrigue and violence ; that is why Prussia has been rewarded ! The conquest of

Silesia, the partition of Poland, the annexation of Hanover, etc., are signs of God's wondrous guidance of His chosen people, the great nation which is considered to have dimmed the lustre of all others. By the side of all this glory, Denmark's history and culture are rarely mentioned, and then usually with pity or irritation.

*Children have been punished when they have spoken Danish* in the school or in the playground ! In some places as, for instance, at Aabenraa, a system of fines was introduced some time ago, the school-children being fined for every Danish word they uttered ; but later on the punishment was changed to "staying-in." It is not unusual to subject to corporal punishment any children who are unable to repeat their German lessons, and a certain headmaster named Blohm, of Haderslev, was particularly notorious in the eighties as being one of Schleswig's worst school tyrants in this respect.

But all this Germanization has been in vain. The Schleswigers have remained as Danish as before and look to Denmark as their mother-country, continuing to cherish Danish culture. The greater part are well-to-do peasants, and, as I had occasion to note some years ago during a journey in Schleswig, they are highly educated.

It was really a feeling of impotence in the matter of the Germanization of North Schleswig which caused Governor Kölle in the autumn of 1898 to issue the revolting decree ordering the expulsion of Danes from Schleswig. This measure caused the deepest indignation throughout the civilized world and gave rise in Germany to energetic protests, amongst others by the Reichstag members E. Riehler and Vollmar, Professor H. Delbrück (Conservative, professor of history at the Berlin University), Professor Kaftan, the *Münchener Allg. Zeitung*, and other organs representing cultured opinion in Germany. The Government prosecution against Professor Delbrück for his attitude over the deportations deepened the anger throughout Europe and lessened the hopes of a pacific solution of the Schleswig question.

It will be of interest to note what a German in an official position, Pastor O. Gleisz, of Holstein, had to say on the subject of Schleswig's national cause after a trip in the Scandinavian countries in 1884. The following passage occurs in one of his letters written when on his travels : " I cannot help stating as my firm conviction that the return of the northern Danish-speaking portion of Schleswig would not be too heavy a price to pay for a real and sincere friendship with Denmark and the North."

In a remarkable work by a German, Theodor Brix, entitled *Nord-Schleswig und die Selbsterneidigung Deutschlands* (Berlin, 1902), we have the gratification of noting another German protest against the Prussian policy of tyranny in Schleswig.

He shows how the North Schleswig policy is but a counterpart of German policy as a whole. The former, like the latter, is a sign of "the decline (*Niedergang*) of political life in Germany. The leading circles in Germany, having wholly abandoned themselves to worship of power, to flattery and adulation of individuals, of monarchs, now demand from others the same readiness to sacrifice every independent political conviction. The spirit of liberty in Germany has taken refuge among the lower classes, who are inaccessible to Court and Government influences. . . . By tormenting and wearing out the spirit of the champions of the political aspirations of the Danes, by criminal prosecutions and sentences, or by deporting their adherents and thus injuring them economically, no doubt the end can be gained of stifling the political life of the Danes outwardly, and many a supporter who lacks material or moral power of resistance against such weapons may fall away from the party and 'keep quiet.' But real chauvinism is needed to see in the effects of such methods a conversion to the German spirit."

" I well know," writes the author, " that every appeal to the sense of justice of the German people is useless. But surely an enlightened nation may reasonably be credited with so much understanding of the interests of

its own State as to make it realize the disastrous elements of the Kölle method of 'quieting' the people. A public agitation is far less dangerous than one carried on in secret beneath the surface. And the 'quiet' is the ashes under which the fire of the hatred of the Germans is smouldering."

## VIII

### THE GERMAN FRATRICIDAL WAR OF 1866

PRUSSIA, having gained in importance since the war with Denmark, was bound sooner or later to fight Austria, a war which, as both parties were well aware, would settle the question of German hegemony. This question had hitherto formed a persistent obstacle to the unity of Germany.

The two countries soon came to loggerheads over the administration of Schleswig-Holstein; the Notes exchanged between them became more and more provocative in tone, and the interjacent States showed themselves increasingly hostile to Prussia. Bismarck then turned to Italy to obtain an ally against Austria, holding out Venetia as a reward. He also visited Napoleon III at Biarritz (September 1865), and their negotiations resulted in Napoleon promising neutrality in the struggle which Bismarck meant to provoke between Germany and Austria. There is no doubt that the Imperial adventurer was won over by crafty promises of conquest on the part of him whom he merely regarded as a desperado and whom he hoped to outwit.

Austria and Prussia began in March 1866 to mass troops, each ascribing the initiative to the other, whilst Prussia and Italy entered into an offensive and defensive alliance against Austria.

Bismarck, however, found in King William and his immediate entourage a very serious obstacle to the prose-

cution of his war plans. William was perturbed at the thought of a rupture with the old ally and of a war between German nations, and Queen Augusta, the Queen-Dowager, the Crown Prince Frederick, and the Crown Princess supported him in this view. Bismarck, whom sound German opinion regarded as William's evil genius, was so incensed by this opposition to his boundless ambitions that he fell ill. However, William's view underwent a change after Bismarck had escaped assassination at the hands of a fanatical young champion of liberty named Cohen, who had been overwrought by the general indignation against the Iron Chancellor. His escape was regarded as an *interposition of Providence*, and the following day William issued an order for the mobilization of the entire Prussian Army !

The immediate cause of the rupture was the dispute over the administration of Schleswig-Holstein, which Austria wanted to refer to the Federal Diet, summoning for this purpose a sitting of the Provincial Estates of Holstein. Bismarck declared at once that this would be tantamount to a withdrawal from the convention which the Monarchs of Austria and Prussia concluded at Gastein in 1865, to the effect that Prussia alone should administer Schleswig, and Austria Holstein.

To be on the safe side, and in order to settle the dispute by a war—Bismarck's favourite method—he sent a Prussian army into Holstein (June 7, 1866), which the Austrians evacuated without fighting. Prussia now submitted to the Federal Diet an ultimatum, demanding reforms in the German Federation with the exclusion of Austria. The President of the Federation, however, declared that Prussia's conduct constituted a *breach of treaty*, and ordered the mobilization of the whole of the forces of the Federation with the exception of the Prussians (June 11). Three days later the majority of the States, among them Bavaria, Würtemberg, Saxony, Hanover, and Nassau, voted for Austria, whilst only a few minor North German States sided with Prussia. The Prussian envoy

thereupon announced that the Treaty of Federation was to be considered broken and no longer binding.

When Saxony, Hanover, and the Electorate of Hesse rejected Prussia's reform proposals, Prussia declared war on these States, and immediately after followed the declarations of war between Austria on the one side, and Prussia and Italy on the other.

It will be plain to every one that this war came about without any real—that is to say, legitimate and compelling—cause, and contrary to all law of nations. The victory rested with Prussia and proved “brilliant,” as we used to say; and the battle of Königgrätz (or Sadowa), one of the greatest and bloodiest in our era, ended in the hautboy players striking up the hymn, “Now thank we all our God.”

In fact, God was thanked for His wondrous interposition in letting 720,000 well-armed Germans butcher one another in a barbarous fratricidal contest according to the laws of “military science,” but letting the Prussians butcher best!

The Peace of Prague, which followed upon this conflict, was concluded with the assistance of Napoleon—that is to say, of a *foreign Power*, without which seemingly these representatives of the Germanic race were unable mutually to adjust their differences.

By this peace Austria had to acknowledge the dissolution of the German Federation and countenance a new German Federation, of which Austria would not be a member. Thus Prussia obtained the longed-for hegemony in Germany.

At the Prussian headquarters the intention was to occupy Vienna—when peace was concluded the army was at the gates—and large territorial gains from Austria were anticipated, apart from the kingdom of Hanover, which was simply annexed by Prussia; but fear of war with France induced the Government to accept the terms of peace.

Austria had to cede Venetia to Italy and make over her

rights in Schleswig-Holstein to Prussia. It was stipulated, however, that the population of Venetia should express its wish for incorporation with Italy by a plebiscite, and (Art. 5) that the inhabitants of the northern or Danish part of Schleswig should settle by the same means whether they wanted to return to Danish rule.

Outside Germany there was general consternation, not to say contempt, at this scandal of European civilization, and Prussia gained no admirers, unless among soldiers on technical grounds ; on the contrary, her martial progress was watched with general anxiety.

This German war had its origin in the brutal obtrusion of a new military State in the midst of Europe, which might be expected to await suitable opportunities for attacking other nations and had most clearly shown that *its own power, its own advantage*, were its only considerations in its dealings with other States, and that the *rights of nations did not enter at all into its policy*.

## IX

### THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG

BELGIUM, which in the eighteenth century belonged to Austria, passed into the hands of France after the war of 1792 and the French victory at Jemappes ; it remained French until 1815, when at the Vienna Congress the kingdom of the United Netherlands was formed, consisting of Belgium and Holland. The new State, with its different nationalities, customs, religions, etc., proved very unwieldy ; dissensions soon arose, and in the end the Belgians, in 1830, broke into open rebellion, which ended with the declaration of Belgium's independence. England and France sympathized with Belgium, and induced Austria, Prussia, and Russia to join them in acknowledging the new kingdom as an *independent and neutral* State in accordance with the "Treaty of the Twenty-four Articles" of 1831.

Fresh quarrels with Holland soon arose, however, and the Belgians were beaten, but were saved by a French army. After renewed fighting Belgium had to abandon her claims to Maastricht and parts of Luxemburg and Limburg. Finally, by the treaty of London (1839), England, France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia definitely ratified Belgium's international position and guaranteed the neutrality of the country.

According to Art. 7, Belgium was to constitute an independent State in perpetuity, subject to the limitations specified in Arts. 1, 2, and 4. Belgium was bound to observe the same neutrality in its relations with other States.

Whilst the Powers thus undertook *to respect Belgium's neutrality and protect her from any infringement thereof*, Belgium, on the other hand, undertook in case of hostilities *not to favour any one State*, and accordingly to abide by the old-established rule of refusing permission to the armies of a belligerent country to march through her territory.

This treaty has never ceased to have a binding effect.

Whilst the peace negotiations between Prussia and Austria were going on in August 1866 Bismarek and France's ambassador, Benedetti, discussed the territorial gains which Napoleon hoped to make in return for his neutrality, and on that occasion Bismarek (according to Benedetti) gave him to understand that *Belgium and Luxemburg* would form a suitable compensation, whereupon Napoleon desisted from his claims to German territory. This ruthless proposal to seize countries which had not taken part in the war and had given no cause for attack was, of course, contrary to the principle of nationality previously proclaimed by Napoleon; but this violation troubled the usurper as little as it did the "Blood and Iron Chancellor." A proposal for an alliance between France and Prussia was now drafted, providing that Napoleon should recognize Prussia's acquisitions as well as the steps which this country might take for the formation of a new German Federation, whilst the King of Prussia promised to facilitate France's acquisition of Luxemburg and, if the Emperor should find it desirable to *conquer Belgium*, to "assist with an armed force"!

This treacherous proposal of August 20, 1866, outraging all principles of modern statecraft, was written down by Benedetti in the course of the negotiations on the subject with Bismarek, and practically at the latter's dictation. Subsequently neither Napoleon's Government nor Bismarek was prepared to admit the responsibility for having initiated this proposal.

The Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, which was annexed

by France in 1795 and ceded to that country by the Peace of Campo Formio in 1797, was constituted at the Vienna Congress of 1815 a separate State within the German Federation, although awarded to the King of the Netherlands. On the outbreak of the Belgian revolution in 1830 Luxemburg attached itself to Belgium, whose provisional Government declared the country to be a Belgian province. Subsequently it was settled by the Treaty of London in 1839 that only the western part should belong to Belgium, whilst the remaining part was to be administered as a separate State, acknowledging the sovereignty of the King of the Netherlands, but still belonging to the German Federation. On the dissolution of the latter through the war of 1866, Luxemburg became an independent State. It was therefore unreasonable to argue, as the Germans did, that, Luxemburg, "as an old German country," should not be separated from "what is called Germany." "Germany" was not a national unit, but a confederation of a number of German States. Bismarck admitted, in fact, in the North German Diet on April 1, 1867, that by the dissolution of the German Federation Luxemburg, like other members, regained its full sovereign rights. That being so, obviously the fortress of Luxemburg no longer remained an allied fortress, and Prussia had therefore no right to keep it occupied.

When suggestions were made on behalf of the French as to the cession of Luxemburg to France subject to an indemnity and to the approval of the King of the Netherlands and of the population, warlike threats were uttered in the North German Diet in the name of the "joint Fatherland," whereupon the French Government withdrew its proposals provided that the Prussian garrison were removed. Through the mediation of the Great Powers a treaty was then made in London on May 11, 1867, whereby the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg was declared a *neutral State* "under the collective guarantee of the Powers."

This neutrality had therefore to be respected in case of hostilities between neighbouring countries.

## X

### THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF 1870 : HOW IT WAS CAUSED BY BISMARCK

FROM the time when Prussia, by defeating Austria, had secured the hegemony in Germany, it was generally thought that war between France and Prussia for the hegemony in Europe was inevitable. Both countries were merely waiting for the moment when they should resort to arms. It was the object of Bismarck's diplomatic art to bring about the war while at the same time goading France into declaring it.\*

Bismarck's aim was to extend Prussia's power, to bring all German States under her leadership, and thus to prepare *Germany's unity*—that is to say, *Germany's identification with Prussia*. For welding Germany together there could be no better means than *tension with France* and consequent *fear of attack* from that quarter.

Napoleon's insecure position in France at that time helped to further Bismarck's plans. The Emperor's military and diplomatic failures had created a strong opposition

\* Among the numerous works written on the Franco-German War, I wish to draw attention more especially to that by the French historian H. Welschinger, "*La Guerre de 1870, Causes et Responsabilités*" (1910) in two volumes. This author was secretary and archivist to the Legislative and National Assembly in 1868-76; he was present at all debates on the war, recorded all important events, copied all important documents, and conversed with most of the leading men of that period, thus acquiring extraordinarily ample and detailed materials which were duly published in this very unique work.

against him. Accordingly he found it necessary to concede modifications of his power, with a proportionate strengthening of the Senate and Legislative Assembly. But it was too late ; the protests in pamphlets and newspapers against the muddle in the administration, the appalling State expenditure, the loans, etc., became louder and louder. After the political elections of 1869, which sent a number of talented oppositionists into Parliament, the Usurper found himself no longer secure on his throne, and he therefore pretended to turn Liberal and restored, in 1870, more or less the old parliamentary system of Government. The nation was now invited by means of a plebiscite to declare that it “approved the liberal changes introduced into the Constitution,” but admittedly it was understood that whoever voted in the affirmative also approved of the Empire, its institution and its corollaries, and gave the Imperial Prince a lawful title to the crown. By enormous pressure on the part of the Government the plebiscite resulted in a big majority for Napoleon, but the minority was nevertheless a great danger, as a number of the military clement voted against him, and it was unanimously agreed in the Imperial councils that a war was necessary to save Napoleon’s throne !

In France the opinion had grown that a strong and united Germany constituted a danger to France, whilst the Germans regarded the French as opponents to their strivings for unification. The warlike feeling against France in Germany may be gathered, *inter alia*, from a report sent in 1868 by the French military attaché, Colonel Stoffel, in which he spoke of the constant accusations against France and the continued arming of Prussia, and declared that the position was such that it must “*inevitably lead to war.*”

That Bismarck long contemplated war with France for the conquest of Alsace and Lorraine may be gathered, apart from other indications, from his *Memoirs*, published by his secretary, Moritz Busch, in which he says that in 1866, before the German war of that year, he mooted an

amicable settlement between Prussia and Austria, whereupon the two Powers would jointly make *war on France in order to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine*.

This was confirmed by the leader of the German Centre Party, Franckenstein, who published a note from his diary recording a conversation with Bismarck on the subject.

We know also from a letter of October 28, 1868, written by General Ducrot, that the Prussian Countess Pourtalès, after her arrival in Paris from Berlin, informed him of a statement made by Schleinitz, minister of the Royal House, respecting Prussia's impending acquisition of Alsace.

That the Germanists in Berlin were thinking in the sixties of the conquest of Alsace and Luxemburg, as well as of Schleswig-Holstein, is shown by the following incident :

When in 1867 the Luxemburg question at one moment threatened to develop into an armed conflict between France and Prussia, the students of Strasburg sent a fraternal and pacific address to the students of Berlin. The latter answered with a long address published in the *Strassburger Courier*, which contained the following pronouncement : "To us, as to all honest men who know how to distinguish between *mine* and *thine*, there exists no question as to whether the Grand Duchy of *Luxemburg*, or *Schleswig-Holstein*, or *Alsace* are *German countries*, the inalienable property of the German nation. . . . We Germans are a *peaceful people* and not a people eager for conquest, but we wish to keep what *belongs to us* and preserve it from *thieves*. We regard as traitors to our country and to the German nation those who, in order to escape a *defensive war* waged to reject shameless claims, are willing to surrender a German country by urging a dishonourable peace. . . . You, inhabitants of Alsace, speak to us as Frenchmen, but most of you bear German names, you are of German race. You wish at all costs to be Frenchmen and you sing to your shame 'O France, ô ma patrie !' instead of intoning our 'Deutschland, Deutsch-

land über Alles, über Alles in der Welt.' We say to you, 'know yourselves ! ' "

A war waged to obtain Alsace was thus regarded not as a war of aggression, but as a *war of defence*—defence of all the alleged right of the German nation !

The French ambassador at Berlin, Benedetti, had ever since 1866 furnished detailed particulars of the views held in Prussia and of the probable plans of that country, its preparations for war, etc.

In the end a *casus belli* between France and Prussia arose in a quarter from which it was least expected.

Spain, which by the revolution of 1868 had shattered the fetters of the Bourbon throne, already weakened by decay from within, and deposed the dissolute Queen Isabella, wanted a new monarch. Marshal Prim thereupon induced the Cortes to offer the Spanish crown to a Prussian prince, Leopold of Hohenzollern, a relative of King William.

Benedetti had reported as early as March 1869 from Berlin that the Spanish ambassador, Rancès, had arrived on what was said to be an unimportant errand, but that he himself suspected that it had to do with Prince Leopold's candidature, and he had questioned him on the matter, but received an evasive answer. Benedetti spoke about the candidature to the Prussian Under-Secretary of State, Thile, who pretended to know nothing about it, and to Bismarck, who feigned indifference and inferred that he did not think Prince Leopold would be able to retain the Spanish throne for very long, and that his father, Prince Anton, was therefore disinclined to help him. The possibility of a Hohenzollern prince on the Spanish throne was, however, admitted by Bismarck, and everything points to his having stood behind this plan, by which France was to be goaded into war. He clearly intended at a propitious moment to bring about an armed conflict with France. From the military point of view Germany was ready. The armies were excellently organized and trained and could pass from a peace to a war footing in a very few days.

Moltke had prepared everything, and shared Bismarck's wish to bring about a war with France before long. They were well aware, through spies, that the military organization in that country was very faulty and that mobilization would take a comparatively long time.

In France a new *régime* was to be inaugurated at the beginning of 1870 by the so-called Liberal Ministry of Émile Olliviers, but, unfortunately, the task was beyond his powers ; and what was still worse, the future Foreign Minister, the Duc de Gramont, lacked all the subtler qualities required of a diplomat. He became the chief cause in France of that country's misfortune through the conflict over the aspirations of the Hohenzollern prince to the Spanish throne, which Bismarck wanted to bring about. He was overbearing and shortsighted, ruthless and deceitful, both towards Napoleon and his colleagues and towards the Parliament. Bismarck, who had met him before, once said in his coarse, jesting way, that Gramont was "the greatest fool in Europe" ; in fact, he called him "a blockhead." In Welschinger's opinion this was one of the secret causes which aggravated the dispute between Prussia and France, for Gramont had felt deeply offended and had sworn to avenge himself on Bismarck sooner or later.

After Gramont, the Empress Eugénie, the beautiful Spaniard, who led the world of fashion and also aspired to political influence, was the chief cause of France's humiliation, as she wanted war on dynastic grounds.

Napoleon III was at this time in indifferent health and irresolute in mind, and had less influence on the trend of affairs. He allowed himself to be led by the Empress and Gramont, although he held back occasionally and tried to prevent an armed conflict.

That King William and his whole Government were anxious to secure Prince Leopold's nomination to the Spanish throne is now well known. The question was debated in a Cabinet Council on March 15, 1870, over which the King presided and at which the Princes Anton

and Leopold of Hohenzollern, Bismarck, Thile, Moltke, Roon (the Minister of War), and others were present. Bismarck said to Prince Leopold: "It is a Prussian patriot's duty." The Prince refused. Bismarck said: "It is a political necessity." But the Prince persisted in his refusal. Bismarck, later on in the spring, appealed to Prince Anton to induce his son to accept the candidature in *Germany's interest*. At length Prince Leopold yielded to the pressure and obeyed the call on June 4, because the "interests of the State demanded it," whereupon King William gave his consent as the head of the House.

In spite of all this the King persisted throughout that he was ignorant of all these intrigues.\*

Time was soon ripe for Bismarck to intervene more actively. On July 3 Gramont learnt that Prim had offered the Spanish throne to Prince Leopold and that the latter had signified his acceptance. When this became known in Paris all the newspapers beat the alarm and declared that a Hohenzollern on the Spanish throne would be a serious menace. The leading English newspapers expressed themselves in the same strain, and it was pointed out how secretly the negotiations had been conducted and how this implied hostility to France. Gramont declared to Prussia's ambassador in Paris, Werther, that France could not tolerate a Prussian prince on the Spanish throne. Thile, Under-Secretary of State, declared on July 4 to France's representative in Berlin, Le Sourd, in Benedetti's absence, that "the Government were quite ignorant of the matter, which to them did not exist."

The news that Prince Leopold had been invited to occupy the throne of Spain drove the Paris public opinion into a ferment of excitement, and the greatest commotion reigned in the Legislative Assembly. On July 6 Gramont issued a statement from the Government in which it was said that "we do not believe that respect for the rights of a neigh-

\* Cf. Welschinger, *La Guerre de 1870*, vol. I, p. 40. He refers here to the German author of *Unser Helden-Kaiser*, Dr. Oncken, amongst whose authorities are the records of the Imperial archive.

bouring nation compels us to permit that a foreign Power shall be enabled, by placing one of its prinees on the throne of Charles V, *to disturb to our detriment the present balance of power* in Europe and place the interests and honour of France in jeopardy. If it be otherwise, we, strong in your support and the nation's, shall know how to *fulfil our duty without hesitation and weakness.*" The pronouement was received with extraordinary enthusiasm by the Legislative Assembly majority.

Gramont thereupon directed Benedetti to proeess to Ems, where King William was staying, in order to ask the King to revoke the Prinee of Hohenzollern's aeeeptance of the Spanish crown. Benedetti, on requesting the honour of an audience, was invited to dine with the King on July 9, and carried out his delicate task with skill and moderation, but could achieve nothing. The King declared that the matter had not been discussed by the Prussian Government and that, whilst he had by no means eneouraged the Prince to aeept the proposal of the Spanish Cabinet, he had not wished to placee any obstacles in the way.

It seems fairly certain that King William did not want war with Franee, and that he had different views from Bismarek on the achievement of German unity. When Prince Leopold, on July 11, expressed his wish to abandon his candidature for the Spanish crown and the King heard of this, he wrote to Queen Augusta that he joyfully approved of the decision. When the British ambassador, Lord Lyons, heard of Prince Leopold's withdrawal, he asked Gramont to proeess cautiously so as to save France from war and not to yield to a passing wave of opinion. The Cabinet was irresolute, but the majority of the Ministers were inclined for peace. Napoleon, who was suffering from his usual complaint (gout), was not inclined to commit himself to a campaign, but his entourage were more warlike. Gramont tried to curb the bellicose spirit in the Legislative Assembly, but was reeived coldly, whereupon he telegraphed to Benedetti to urge King William still more strongly to forbid Prinee Leopold's

candidature and to give an early answer. The King declared—on July 11—that there was no harm in waiting and that he wanted ample time. Benedetti repeated that a delay would imperil the maintenance of peace. Benedetti made it clear, however, that if Prince Leopold withdrew from the candidature, this decision would have his approval.

The Spanish ambassador in Paris notified Napoleon on July 12 that *Prince Anton had in his son's name withdrawn the candidature for the Spanish throne* on account of the complications which it seemed to create. The matter should have stopped here, for the danger of Prussian influence in Spain was thereby averted and France had no longer any cause to feel affronted.

¶ Bismarck regarded the matter as a personal defeat and wanted to resign at once his office of Prime Minister and Chancellor. Unfortunately, Paris did not understand how to take advantage of the new situation, now so favourable to France.

The Empress and the Bonapartists, who wanted war, as they hoped for victory and for the removal thereby of the Liberal Party from office, scoffed at “Father Anton’s telegram” and pretended that the Empire was tottering. The Legislative Assembly loudly condemned Ollivier’s credulity when he expressed his joy at Prince Leopold’s withdrawal. The Extreme Right presented through Duvernois (who had been jostled out of the Government by Ollivier) an interpellation demanding to know whether the Government proposed to *procure guarantees* for the warding off of Prussia’s influence. Ollivier and the majority of his colleagues in the Government wanted to be able to avoid war, and the ambassadors of the Great Powers intimated to the Government the desirability of contenting itself with the withdrawal of the Prince of Hohenzollern. Lord Lyons had received special instructions from his Government on the subject and represented to Gramont in a letter “the immeasurable responsibility of the French Government if he were to widen the range of the dispute.” Supported by Ollivier, who, however,

lacked the requisite firmness, Gramont tried to induce the Prussian ambassador in Paris, Werther, to prevail upon King William to give a declaration as to guarantees and to express his desire that all misunderstandings should now be considered at an end. This message displeased the King—according to Benedetti—and he recalled Werther. When Gramont informed Napoleon of the situation in order to discuss the measures the Government should take, and when he told him of the dissatisfaction among the Deputies and Senators who demanded Prussia's complete humiliation, the Emperor was so swayed by what he heard, as well as by the Empress and the Court, that he authorized Gramont to direct Benedetti to demand an assurance from William that he would not allow any renewal of Prince Leopold's candidature.

Instead of dissuading Napoleon from this course, which was the worst possible, Gramont encouraged him in it, clearly influenced by his desire to humble Bismarck, and disregarding more prudent counsels. But by acting thus he gave the crafty Bismarck a new and unexpected opportunity of attaining his object and bringing about the war by provoking France.

Without consulting Ollivier and the other Ministers, of whom several were determined to preserve peace, the arrogant Gramont took upon himself to send at once (evening of July 12) a telegram to Benedetti instructing him to demand from King William a declaration that *he would not permit the revival* of Prince Leopold's candidature.

The King had promised Benedetti to send for him, but in order to avoid a fresh discussion of the subject he told his adjutant, Prince Radziwill, to inform him that Prince Leopold had withdrawn his candidature and that he *considered the incident closed*. Benedetti nevertheless asked Radziwill to obtain an assurance that the King would not permit a renewal of Prince Leopold's aspirations in the future, whereupon the Prince gave him the following official answer: “*The King has consented to express his*

*full approval of the withdrawal of the Prince of Hohenzollern. He cannot do more.*"

On the renewal of the request for an audience, the King answered through the same adjutant that he must definitely decline to enter into any further discussions on the subject of an assurance which was to bind him for the future, and that *he had said his last word in this matter*. "For this reason," says Radziwill's official report, "the King refused to grant a fresh audience, as he had no other answer to give and as any further negotiations *must be conducted through the Ministers*." The King granted Count Benedetti's wish to be allowed to bid him good-bye on his departure by meeting the Minister at the railway station as he was about to proceed to Coblenz. A Frenchman, who was present, M. A. Mezières, agrees with Benedetti's emphatic declaration that on this occasion "no one took or gave offence," and that the relations between the King and the ambassador up to the last moment were marked by the utmost courtesy.

### BISMARCK'S FORGERY OF THE EMS TELEGRAM

On July 14 a dispatch arrived from the French Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin, Le Sourd, quoting a telegram from Ems which had appeared in the *Norddeutsche Zeitung* and which was of the following tenor: "After the news of the renunciation of the hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern had been officially notified to the Imperial French Government by the Royal Spanish Government, the French ambassador at Ems further demanded of His Majesty the King that he should authorize him to telegraph to Paris that H.M. the King bound himself for the future never again to give his consent if the Hohenzollerns should renew their candidature. H.M. the King thereupon decided not to receive the French ambassador again, and left word through an adjutant that His Majesty had nothing further to tell him."

This telegram was sent by Bismarck to the *Norddeutsche Zeitung* and other papers, after receiving a telegram which King William had sent him from Ems through his Minister Abeken on July 13. This telegram of 232 words was reduced by Bismarck by sundry deletions to one of 100 words, whereby the meaning was appreciably altered. The real telegram did not say that King William refused to receive Benedetti, but merely that he declined to give any assurances as to guarantees for the future, and further stated that "as the ambassador had been advised of the withdrawal of the Prince of Hohenzollern before the King, he must realize that His Majesty's Government had no hand in the matter," and further that after receiving the Prince's confirmation "he had nothing to say to the ambassador."

The real telegram was anything but an affront to the French ambassador or an insult to France; it merely showed the conciliatory nature of the King's last conversation with Benedetti. Bismarck's abridged (falsified) telegram, on the other hand, implied an affront: Benedetti had been ignominiously rebuffed, a rupture had taken place.

Bismarck was beside himself with anger when he saw from the telegram which the King had sent him from Ems through Abeken that the whole question of the Spanish candidature had been dropped. His hope that it would goad France into war was now dashed to the ground, but he soon devised another trick to attain his aim, which, with cynical frankness, he revealed to a correspondent of the Vienna *Neue Freie Presse* on November 20, 1892, when he was no longer Imperial Chancellor.

When Bismarck heard of the withdrawal of the Prince of Hohenzollern he was—the correspondent quotes Bismarck's own words—"quite surprised at this unexpected termination, for I asked myself, Will such a favourable opportunity ever occur again? . . . I sent a telegram to His Majesty at Ems resigning my offices of Prime Minister and Chancellor. In reply I was asked by the

King to go to Ems. But I thought to myself: If I go to Ems, all is up. In the most favourable circumstances we shall merely arrive at some petty compromise, and we shall then miss the only honourable, the only great solution.

"I had invited Moltke and Roon to dine with me on July 13, and we were discussing all kinds of contingencies. We were still seated at table when a telegram arrived from Ems. I sat down at a little round marble table standing beside the dining-table. I read the telegram carefully, took up my pen and *crossed out intentionally* the whole passage where Benedetti asked for a new audience, etc. I only let the beginning and the end remain."

"Success," he said, "depends above all on the impressions which the beginnings of war make on us and others. *It is necessary that we should be the attacked party.* Gallic susceptibility will invest us with this rôle if we announce before Europe that we do not fear France's official threats." These fine words had a cheering influence on his guests, Roon and Moltke, whom the reading of Abeken's telegram had visibly depressed, and their spirits now rose to a pitch which surprised the Chancellor himself. "*They had suddenly recovered their pleasure in eating and drinking and spoke in a more cheerful vein.*" They awaited with calm confidence the effect of the telegram which had thus been so cleverly patched up. "It fell like a thunderbolt," said Bismarck. "When our King had received a humiliating telegram, the Ems telegram made the French believe that their representative had been insulted by the King. The boulevard loafers decided that this sort of thing could not be tolerated. 'A Berlin! A Berlin!' shouted the rabble. *Here was the effect we sought for.* It was the same at home as in France." . . . It was this development that surprised Gramont. He did not understand how, after things had taken a peaceful turn, this war feeling suddenly rose up. "Some sinister spirit has intervened," he said. "What has happened?" "I," said Bismarck, "was that sinister spirit."

The reason why Bismarck so frankly related how he had falsified the Ems telegram is easy to understand. In his resentment at having fallen into disgrace in 1890 he wanted to revenge himself on William II by letting the whole world know that *it was he and not King William who had welded Germany together*, and that he had done so *by bringing about the war of 1870*, despite the resistance of Court and Parliament. He considered that he was entitled to perpetual gratitude, but found that he had been guilty of a miscalculation when William II, contrary to his expectation, accepted his resignation of the post of Imperial Chancellor. The fallen despot then tried to vent his boundless fury by embittered opposition.

Many of Bismarck's adherents did all they could to shield him.

The German historian, Horst-Kohl, in his criticism of Bismarck's *Reflections and Reminiscences*, speaks with regret of "Social Democrats who have no patriotism and show incredible effrontery in speaking of the forgery of the Ems telegram, whilst Bismarck, with Moltke's and Roon's approval, *only strove to carry out a royal order* under the strong influence of an overwrought sense of honour. . . . Instead of thanking the guardian of our national honour, *who courageously took upon himself the responsibility which his office placed on his shoulders*, we allow him to be insulted by knaves and windbags." Bismarck's organ, the *Hamburger Nachrichten*, asserted that Bismarck, by modifying the telegram, forced *France to take the initiative and the responsibility for the war* and that therefore *he deserved well of his country*. Had he acted otherwise the war would not have come about. This war was *necessary for cementing German unity*."

Such pronouncements leave one speechless with amazement. When German unity, which seems to have been the goal which took precedence over all European interests, could not be attained by the mutual efforts of the German States, it was deemed right and just to reach this goal

by provoking war with other States—Denmark in 1864, Austria in 1866, and France in 1870 !

There were, however, many people in Germany who censured Bismarck for the forgery of the Ems telegram. The *Germania* wrote as follows : “ Every German must blush with shame on realizing from the testimony of the late Chancellor himself that *Germany was unworthily deceived* in the matter of the war of 1870, which Bismarck not only wanted, but shunned no means of provoking. The good Germans went out to battle, spurred on by the conviction that they were fighting a sacred, patriotic defensive war against the contemptible and unrighteous attack of the French, and that they were defending the honour of King William, who had been grievously affronted by France. All these good Germans were but *puppets in the hands of the Man of Blood and Iron.*”

The *Vossische Zeitung* could not conceal its indignation when it learned with what cynicism Bismarck dared to applaud his own action. “ Even if we assume that Germany’s unity could not be encompassed without the war, this does not justify a re-editing of the royal telegram which comes terribly near to a *forgery.*”

Liebknecht, ever since the article in the *Neue Freie Presse*, never failed to denounce Bismarck’s admitted forgery and defied the threats of prosecution to which his fearless denunciation gave rise. He could not understand how the “ forger ” had dared to make such a confession. Liebknecht dissected the telegram word for word and commented on it as follows : “ This forgery, this false news, this conversion of peace into war, is acclaimed by Bismarck’s panegyrists as a stroke of genius. . . . Common human morality condemns the crime and brands the criminal.” He added the reflection that Germany’s unity and the German Empire are founded on a forgery.

The resentment which Bismarck’s forgery aroused in Europe may be gathered from an article in the *Daily News* to the following effect : “ Nothing has so isolated France as the general belief that she helped to bring

about the war for paltry reasons. This declaration of war was like a bolt from the blue, for there was no cloud on the horizon. It was thought that the French in their incurable vanity insisted on fighting, and that after the withdrawal of the Hohenzollern candidature they wanted a fresh excuse. It is deplorable to learn that the moral responsibility for the greatest crime of history has so long been ascribed to those with whom it did not rest."

The calculated effect of the forged Ems telegram did not fail to assert itself. The public were informed by all the newspapers and by prominently exhibited placards of the sensational news, which created a strong wave of feeling in Prussia in favour of war.

Bismarck's telegram deceived both the Germans and the French.

It should be noted that the forged dispatch was a *private telegram* from Wolff's Bureau, not an official communication from the Prussian Government.

If the French Government had ascertained the real facts, it would not have attached the same importance to the telegram.

But Bismarck was cunning enough to issue Wolff's telegram in such a way as to make it appear to be an official communication.

When the news of the Ems telegram reached Paris it caused an extraordinary commotion, and the Government used the newspapers in its pay to stir up the war feeling to a still greater pitch. The streets of Paris resounded with cries of "Vive la guerre! À Berlin! À Berlin!" It was a terrific orgy of the maddest chauvinism. As for the Government, it was now able to shelter itself behind "irresistible public opinion."

The majority of the deputies thought that the Government had acted wisely, that King William had rejected all advances, that France went to war with the right entirely on her side, that the preparations for war were complete—for the War Minister, Le Boeuf, had given every

assurance to this effect—and that France had reliable allies—for Gramont, contrary to the truth, had given them to understand that this was so.

But the people knew nothing further about the events at Ems and were unaware that there was discord in the Government, that Napoleon changed his mind about mobilization several times a day, and that several of the Ministers were opposed to war. No thought was given to the fact that the rejection of the Army Estimates a short time previously had weakened the country's military efficiency. To the Opposition, which assented, must be ascribed a large share in the responsibility.

Napoleon and his Ministers were but puppets in Bismarck's hands, and with their, especially Gramont's, political incapacity and reckless and foolish actions, they were no match for the Chancellor's trickery. This—the forgery of the Ems telegram—was, however, so clumsy and foolhardy a stratagem that it would only have needed a day's postponement of the Government's declaration of war to ascertain more accurately what had really passed between King William and Benedetti at the last conversation at Ems. This would have been the easiest thing in the world, had Benedetti's return to Paris, which took place in the morning of July 15, been awaited.

Gramont declared at the Cabinet Council on July 14 that war was unavoidable and that, if it were declined after the telegram in the *Norddeutsche Zeitung*, he would not for a moment retain his portfolio. Le Bœuf supported him and urged immediate mobilization.

A proposal to refer the matter to a Congress was approved by Napoleon, but the Empress opposed it as being ignominious, and under her influence the Council soon resolved on the fatal step: a declaration of war. She had been led to believe by certain ambitious generals that France was stronger than Prussia; she feared the Opposition and hoped that a successful war would consolidate the dynasty. Over Napoleon she had the strongest influence, and Gramont and several other Ministers were always

ready to give way to her. However, the Emperor was by no means so eager for the war as the Empress and had repeatedly remarked to Ollivier that he was determined to do nothing. Furthermore, he was depressed and enfeebled by his complaint ; he wanted to promote his Liberal projects in peace, and laid his plans before the Council accordingly. When he had finished and when the Ministers were about to vote on the subject, he was suddenly taken ill and had to retire for about half an hour, and when he returned the Empress had so wrought her will on the Ministers, aided by the telegrams from Ems and Berlin, that the voting showed a majority of four in favour of the war. The Emperor had to give way, and on July 15 the Council ratified the declaration of war on Prussia drawn up by Ollivier and Gramont.\*

Among other reasons it was urged that Prussia's King had formally refused to forbid Prince Leopold's Spanish candidature for the future, and had rudely declined to grant the French ambassador an audience, etc.

It is a remarkable thing that when Benedetti, a few hours later on the same day, July 15, met Ollivier and Gramont he, according to Ollivier, " did not tell them any news of what had happened at Ems and noted, without comment, the details of the telegrams and reports. He knew absolutely nothing of what had taken place in Berlin and of Bismarck's machinations."

Benedetti cannot possibly have failed to state that he had by no means been insulted by King William or cavalierly dismissed and that the German newspapers had misstated the facts. Here was another distortion of facts. But war had been decided upon, Benedetti's presence was found inconvenient, and this he was given to understand. Hence he was not heard at the Council.

Ollivier declared in the Legislative Assembly that the King of Prussia had " insulted our ambassador by declining to grant him an audience " as set forth in " a diplomatic dispatch from Prussia," etc. Benedetti heard this, but

\* Cf. Welschinger, *La Guerre de 1870*, vol. i, pp. 146-157.

was seated in the gallery and was powerless to enlighten the House as to the facts.

Thiers, Gambetta, Jules Favre, Buffet, and other members of the Opposition demanded the production of the dispatch on which the Government based its action. But this was impossible. Ollivier merely repeated the Government's complaints about King William's refusal to furnish guarantees for the future, that the notification to Europe of the refusal to receive France's ambassador was a thing not to be tolerated, etc. But he did not say that the King had pointed out that the negotiations could be continued in Berlin with his Ministers. The leaders of the Left entered a strong and courageous *protest against the war as fully unjustified*, whereupon they were greeted by the Right with all sorts of vituperations, such as "Anti-patriots," "Traitors," "Prussians," etc.

Gambetta criticized very severely the whole conduct of the Government on account of its "lack of political honesty," and on account of its attempt to shift the responsibility for the war on to the Chamber. He pointed out that the Ems telegram, which had so perturbed the Government, had been made known to Benedetti without his having felt offended thereby.

The Government wanted to force France to be content with unproved assertions, and, deplorably enough, 159 deputies, as against 84 of the Opposition, voted against the demand for the production of the telegram said to convey the insult to France's honour. The Budget Committee had only seen the earlier telegrams, and Gramont had not told them everything, but only what he thought suitable, and his word was believed without demur. It is very regrettable that the Committee did not insist on Benedetti being heard.

According to Welschinger, who was present at the debates in the Chamber during that turbulent time, Gramont's whole conduct was dictated "by the awkward situation in which he was placed ; in the face of the threats of the Extremists and of the anger of the Opposition he

had no alternative *but to seek war*. . . . Otherwise he would have had to admit that he had '*begun badly and finished badly*' . . . and that he had clumsily fallen into the trap set by Bismarck through the fault of an unbalanced party and the will of an Empress who blindly trusted to our strength and our resources."

No fact is better authenticated in history, as shown by the documents referred to, than that the war with France was sought by Bismarck, that he brought it about by trickery and fraud, although, by wounding France's honour, he made her appear the attacking party.

The forged telegram, having, in point of fact, led to the War of 1870 with all its consequences, felt up to this very day, up to the World War of 1914, constitutes *one of the most terrible crimes of history*.

#### THE WAR OF 1870-71 AND THE PEACE OF FRANKFORT

The war so fervently desired by Bismarck, Moltke, Roon, and other representatives of the war party in Prussia now came to pass and France was beaten. No wonder! The whole of Germany supported Prussia, and not only the North German Federation, but also the South German States of Bavaria, Würtemberg, Baden, and Hesse took part, pursuant to the alliance of 1866. All the armies were excellently equipped, and Prussia especially, who had long been preparing for this war, possessed a superb military organization and skilful leaders.

France, on the other hand, was without allies and badly equipped, her supply of armaments had in a large measure been exhausted by the Mexican campaigns of 1862-67, her armies were inferior to those of the Germans in numbers, and several of her generals lacked ability.

The best proof of the fact that France and her Government wanted peace and did not contemplate any attack on other countries was the *complete absence of preparations* and the deficient military preparedness. There had even been a reduction in the Army Estimates. The Minister

of War, Le Bœuf, had, a few days before the dispute about the Spanish candidature, consented to a retrenchment of thirteen million francs on his budget. Later on pitiful proofs were forthcoming of the defective military organization and the inadequate supplies of munitions, clothes, food, etc., on the outbreak of war.

France launched her declaration of war on Prussia on July 19. The North German Diet, which was quickly convened, and the South German Diets, imbued with national fervour, granted all the demands of the Government. It soon became clearly evident that Benedetti's and Stoffel's reports in 1868 as to Prussia's extensive armaments were true. Moltke now submitted to King William a plan of campaign against France, prepared by the Prussian General Staff, and asked that the German forces be mobilized and distributed accordingly, everything having been worked out in the minutest detail. This plan of Moltke's was duly carried out. July 16 (when the news of the decision of the French Government came to hand) was the day entered on each mobilization order; eleven days later the entire mobilization was completed, and on August 2 all the armies stood posted between the Rhine and the Saar, King William assuming supreme command. The German forces totalled about 400,000 men, against whom Napoleon could only put 200,000 men in the field.

In the course of a few weeks the French were defeated in a number of actions. They lost the first battle on August 4 at Weissenburg, in Alsace, where the Crown Prince Frederick was in command on the German side. Then followed in rapid succession the battles of Wörth, Saarbrücken, Metz, Reichshofen, Forbach, Gravelotte, St. Privas, etc., where the French were defeated despite heroic exertions, whilst an entire army under Marshal Bazaine was compelled to take refuge in Metz. A new army was collected in all haste and commanded by Napoleon and Marshal MacMahon, but was beaten in the battle of Sedan on September 1, whereupon the fortress, with the invested army of 83,000 men, capitulated and the Emperor sur-

rendered his sword to King William (September 2). He was immediately conducted to the castle of Wilhelmshöhe (near Cassel), where he was kept a prisoner until the conclusion of peace (whereupon he took refuge in England, where he died in 1873).

When General Wimpffen, on September 2, negotiated with Bismarck at Sedan for peace, the latter deported himself with brutal arrogance and assumed an offensive and braggart manner, as if he were intoxicated. The incredible success of the last six weeks which followed upon the Ems telegram had gone to his head. "You shall never," he said, "forget Sedan. If we make peace now, you will begin war again in five or ten years. *We, in contrast to you, are an honourable nation*, who have never coveted conquest and only ask to be left in peace, if you will but cease disturbing us with your quarrelsome disposition. Now we have had enough of it. *France must be punished* for her arrogance, her aggressive temper, and her vanity. We must have territory, fortresses, and frontiers which will safeguard us from further attacks on your part. *The party in France which engineered the war* is the same party that makes and unmakes Governments : it is the *populace*, the *journalists* ; it is them whom we want to punish. It is on this account that we must *march on Paris*." He declared further that Prussia would demand an indemnity of 4000 *million francs* in addition to *Alsace* and *German Lorraine* as her price of peace.

The fact alone that Count Bismarck Bohlen on August 14 was appointed Governor-General of Alsace shows that Prussia regarded this province as a permanent possession.

The annexation of Alsace and German Lorraine by Germany was at this time being urged with great insistence by the German newspapers and by public meetings.

That the war would be continued until Germany reached the desired goal, was obvious. On September 3 orders were issued from the German headquarters that two armies were to march on Paris, and on September 19 the city was invested on all sides.

On September 4 the Empire collapsed under the weight of popular indignation, Napoleon was deposed, and a Republic was proclaimed by the people from the Hôtel de Ville in Paris. A Government for National Defence was organized under General Trochu, comprising the following deputies for Paris: Jules Favre, Jules Ferry, Gambetta, Arago, Crémieux, Picard, Rochefort, and others.

The Government decided to try to induce foreign Powers to mediate for peace with Germany and elected Thiers, who in spite of his seventy-three years possessed more spirit and energy than most, as its representative. On September 12 he started on a journey to London, St. Petersburg, Vienna, and Florence, and made the best of his powers of eloquence, adducing the most cogent reasons in long conversations with the Foreign Ministers in those capitals. But all, regarding intervention useless, declined to mediate, and France was left to her own devices. It was known at the German headquarters that the Great Powers would not give effect to their friendly counsel by force of arms, and the war was accordingly continued pursuant to the prearranged plan of crushing France. Jules Favre, the Foreign Minister, visited Bismarck (September 19 and 20) to negotiate for peace.

He who had brought about the war now said with his usual masterly hypocrisy: "*All I want is peace. It is not Germany who disturbed it. You have without cause declared war on us with the sole object of depriving us of part of our country. . . . We know that you will never relinquish your policy, that you will regain strength solely that you may attack us once more. Germany has not sought this opportunity; she availed herself of it for her own safety, and this safety cannot be assured without cession of territory.*"

Favre, whose Government could not consent to the cession of territory, thus gained nothing by his visit to the implacable Chancellor.

Whilst France was straining every nerve to secure by negotiation an armistice and the support of the neutral

Great Powers, the German armies continued their irresistible advance. Toul fell on September 20, Strasburg on the 27th after a resistance which even the enemy characterized as honourable and heroic. On October 5 King William moved his headquarters to Versailles. Orleans was taken on October 11, and Soissons capitulated on October 15.

The army shut up in Metz, under the command of the incompetent Bazaine, was compelled, vanquished by hunger and without making any serious attempt to drive the enemy away, to capitulate on October 27.

On his return from his journey, Thiers was instructed by his Government to approach Bismarck with a view to an armistice. Several meetings took place during the early days of November, but Bismarck's conditions were such that the Government could not accede to them.

Gambetta, Minister of the Home Department, accompanied by his collaborator Spuller, left the besieged city on October 7 in a balloon, and organized the defence in the provinces as a sort of voluntary dictator. He engaged the assistance of the engineer Freycinet, and between them they did wonders. Their improvised armies rehabilitated France's military honour, sullied by unworthy capitulations. Although these armies could not in the long run resist the enemy, they earned world-wide admiration, and even Moltke could but acknowledge his respect for their ability to defend their country for several months and win several victories. Generals Paladines and Faidherbe were victorious at Coulmiers and Bapaume, but the Paris army, under General Duerot, fought the bloody but indecisive battle of Champigny. Mans had to be evacuated (January 12, 1871), and the northern army was beaten at St. Quentin (January 19). Belfort was defended by Colonel Densert. Bourbaki gained a victory at Ville-sexle, but did not succeed in raising the siege of Belfort. He tried to reach Lyons, but was finally forced by the enemy against the Swiss frontier, over which his army was finally driven, and it was thereupon disarmed.

The excitement in Paris grew day by day, especially after the Germans began on January 5 to bombard the city. A number of houses were destroyed, food became scarce, famine and sickness began to assert themselves and caused great mortality. Attempts were made to wrest the power from the Provisional Government and place it in the hands of the Socialist parties.

The Government decided that Favre should once more negotiate with Bismarck for an armistice (January 23), and in the end orders were given to suspend the bombardment (January 26). On January 28 a three weeks' armistice was signed and the capitulation of Paris was discussed, a newly elected National Assembly being convened at Bordeaux to decide about peace or war.

The National Assembly on February 12 elected Thiers as chief of the executive power, and instructed him and the Ministers Favre and Picard, to open peace negotiations at Versailles.

After six days' negotiations the peace preliminaries were signed on February 26 by the plenipotentiaries ; the National Assembly ratified them on March 1. One of the conditions was that a part of Paris should be occupied by German troops (30,000 men).

The principal peace conditions were : *Cession of Alsace and German Lorraine* and payment of 5000 million francs as war indemnity.

The final peace conditions were to be discussed in Brussels. After an abortive conference in that city, a meeting was arranged at Frankfort between Bismarck and Favre, etc., when peace was finally concluded ; this was the Peace of Frankfort (May 10, 1871), which confirmed the preliminaries of Versailles and determined sundry details in connexion therewith.

Prussia having received the support of all the German States in the war, the task remained of accomplishing Germany's unity, which offered the best guarantees for Germany's safety and greatness. On Bismarck's initia-

tive representative Ministers of the four South German States visited Versailles and discussed the terms for joining the North German Federation, it being finally agreed that all the States jointly should constitute the German Empire (November 1870). Thus was created a *new German Imperial realm*, and on the proposal of Ludwig II of Bavaria the German princes and free cities conjointly conferred upon William I the dignity of Emperor, a ceremony which took place at Versailles during the siege of Paris on January 18, 1871.

When I was in Germany and France in February and March 1871 I had the opportunity of seeing and hearing much about the war and its termination, and I relate below a few incidents and experiences which throw a light on the great struggle.\*

I reached Paris, after having stayed with the besiegers, on the day that the capitulation took place and remained until the outbreak of the Commune (March 18). It was surprising to see how resigned the French can be. They spoke openly of their own faults and generally blamed France herself in a large measure for the misfortune, Napoleon and his Government having allowed the country to drift into war, but having entirely neglected to prepare for it. Every one tried to envisage calmly and sensibly what had happened. The superior discipline and ability of the Prussians were praised, and yet people asked themselves if the French would have been beaten had not the Germans for many years past, everywhere and among all classes of the community in France, *instituted a highly organized system of espionage*. It was known that no fewer than seventy-two Germans had been employed in the Government Departments—many in the War Office—that they had been in correspondence with General Blumenthal, and that Marshal Bazaine had long had a Prussian officer as

\* I wrote at the time three war letters to *Aftonbladet* (March 15, 17, and 20, 1871), which I will refer to in the course of my narrative.

his servant ! Prussian officers had also been employed in many very modest situations in Paris.

In this way the Germans had obtained a thorough insight into France's defences and their shortcomings. When their armies stood ready on the frontier, all officers and non-commissioned officers had special maps of the localities where the war was to be fought. These maps had not been prepared in a week, or after the declaration of war. Many were found on killed and wounded.

I was further informed that young Germans who had been in Paris in offices, or for linguistic studies, etc., had always industriously devoted their Sundays to excursions in all possible directions ; these young men, who later formed part of the invading forces, doubtless knew the country better than many a Frenchman.

It may be mentioned that in 1869 no fewer than 120,000 Germans resided in Paris for varying lengths of time.

I spoke to several Prussian soldiers (Brandenburgers) stationed outside Paris during the armistice, just before the signature of the peace preliminaries ; they were in a very pacific mood and told me that the opposing outposts had with the utmost friendliness exchanged articles of food, drank out of one another's bottles, etc. Had it depended on them, they said, there would have been no war with France.

“ No doubt it was Bismarck,” I remarked, “ who wanted it.”

“ *Ja, gewiss ! Ja, der Bismarck, der ist ein Teufels Kerl !* ” (“Ah, yes, Bismarck ! He's a devil of a fellow ! ”) they replied.

I also spoke to many persons of education in Germany and found that the people of Hanover, Baden, and Württemberg hated Prussia and her policy most cordially, although they considered Bismarck a giant amongst statesmen. They regarded it as an *outrage* on the part of Prussia to have literally *forced* the other German states to take part in the war. In Hanover, in January, literal

demonstrations took place against the new Emperor, and the civic magistrates refused to sign the address to the Emperor which the Prussian officials there had drawn up.

Many titled Prussians were differently disposed and expressed themselves with supine arrogance on the Parisians' defence of their capital. They assured me that it was only through the Emperor William's extraordinary forbearance that the bombardment was deferred; it might have taken place many months earlier, but the same spirit of clemency found it more humane to reduce the city by starvation. They asserted that the Germans had taken several forts and that it was quite proper that they should march in triumph into Paris as into a conquered city. "The defence was not such as to deserve any consideration, for the resistance had really been quite chimerical." I was able to inform them, however, that the Germans had not taken a single one of the forts, and I took it for granted that untrue reports had been circulated in order to justify the desired triumphal entry into Paris.

Parisians described to me the horrors of famine and told me that for the last five weeks they had never ceased to be hungry, and that during the last two weeks they had eaten hardly anything but the inadequate and horrible black bread. Everything edible had been consumed, the rats in the sewers, the dogs, the animals in the *Jardin d'Aeclimatation*, etc. The sick did not recover, there was a lack of medicaments at the hospitals, the mortality rose and amounted towards the end to more than 5000 weekly.

To the famine and its ravages were added the terrors of the bombardment, which kept the population in a perpetual state of nerves. The inhabitants were particularly incensed at the Prussian guns being trained on the *Panthéon* and *Saint Sulpice* churches and on the *Val-de-Grâce* Hospital, all of which were hit during the bombardment, until General Trochu threatened to lodge the Prussian

prisoners in the Val-de-Grâce if the bombardment of such buildings did not cease.

Although Paris was not taken, Bismarck demanded in the Emperor's name as part of the terms of capitulation that a German army of 30,000 men should march into Paris and that they should be allowed to visit the galleries at the Louvre and the Hôtel des Invalides. Instead of honouring a brave opponent, it was intended that the Parisians should be humbled on account of their patriotism and their valiant resistance. Thiers and Favre expressed their disgust and their fears that the sight of the enemy would exasperate the population to the point of fighting when Paris was to open her gates which the enemy could not break down. But it was no use ; the Prussians were so eager for this triumph that Bismarck agreed in return to France's retention of the fortress of Belfort—which had not been taken either—and in the end the protests were overridden. Bismarck had reckoned on lengthy deliberations in the National Assembly, so that the German army corps might relieve one another in Paris and all might thus have the pleasure of inspecting the wonderful city. But the National Assembly found it necessary to accept the peace terms immediately, so that the German stay in Paris only lasted a couple of days.

I was a witness of this remarkable event and was in the Place de la Concorde and the Champs Elysées when the German regiments made their entry on March 1, 1871. Beyond this area they could not penetrate, as the rest of the city was completely shut off by barricades and sentries at the entrances to all streets. On the recommendation of the authorities the population absented themselves completely and remained indifferent and calm. Only a few foreigners and some hooligans and other persons of the lower classes showed themselves in the streets through which the Germans were to pass. Everything was quiet, except for a couple of ladies of a certain class (evidently Germans) who took it upon themselves to pay deference to some German officers, whereupon they were hustled

aside into a side street by an enraged mob, who punished them for their impudence by beating them and tearing off their clothes.

Practically all the inhabitants remained indoors and put on mourning, which, as a matter of fact, many had worn ever since the capitulation, and black flags were exhibited from many houses. Crêpe had also been tied over the faces of the statues in the Place de la Concorde, and the impression taken away by the Germans must on the whole have been rather melancholy. Strasburg's statue was covered with wreaths and French flags to commemorate the heroic defence of the city.

It had been intended that the German army should on the occasion of this triumphal entry march through the magnificent Arc de Triomphe (erected in memory of France's innumerable victories), but this plan was foiled by a dense mass of *gamins* who completely blocked the passage and would not yield an inch, so that the army was obliged in order to avoid violence and possibly bloodshed, to march past by the side of the monument. Besides, it did not witness the triumphal procession in its usual state, having been covered over with boarding in order to protect the sculptures from the bombardment. But what the conquering army did see was the word VENGEANCE ! traced in letters half a yard deep on one wall of the monument.

Yes, vengeance was at that time the order of the day throughout France. All, young and old, men and women, retained this feeling for many years. How could it be otherwise ? How unjust had been the conduct of Prussia's dictator, Bismarck, when France ever since the disaster of Sedan and Napoleon's capture, time after time asked for peace on the plea that it was the Emperor and his Government who had issued the declaration of war, and that those who after Sedan had been at the head of the Republic—Thiers, Jules Favre, Gambetta, Jules Ferry, and others—had *protested against the war* !

Besides, had not the just and righteous Crown Prince

Frederick declared in his proclamation to the inhabitants of Lorraine at the beginning of the war that "Germany is waging war against the Emperor, not against the French nation?"

But the "Blood and Iron Chancellor" thought otherwise and wanted to crush France and humble the French people to the dust.

## XI

### ANNEXATION OF ALSACE-LORRAINE THE CAUSE OF THE FRANCO-RUSSIAN ALLIANCE AND THE MONSTROUS SPREAD OF MILITARISM IN EUROPE, AND ONE OF THE CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR OF 1914

THE civilization of an enlightened era demands that policy should be founded on the *rights of nations* and their *free will*, not on racial considerations, which, as I have pointed out earlier in this work (pp. 7-13), are, moreover, exceedingly obscure and often based on the purest fictions.

The Alsatians had during the union with France become a part of the French nation, accepted French culture, and felt themselves to be Frenchmen, although they spoke the German language.

The word "nation" cannot cursorily be dismissed as meaning race or descent; it is a gradually developed cultural conception with many contributory elements. In certain countries, it is true, the term "nationality" has been identified with the term "State," and other countries have become in the course of centuries a *melting-pot of different nationalities* which have become a concordant whole with *common traditions, a common history, and common interests*.

Although the term "nation" is primarily associated with common descent, it is often characterized by a consciousness of affinity in matters of polities and language, when in the course of development an intimate coalescence

has taken place in the public mind and produced a real feeling of nationality.

Many Frenchmen are of foreign descent, but have nevertheless allowed themselves to be absorbed into the French nation and feel themselves to be Frenchmen. Thus the famous statesman E. Spuller, Minister of Education in Gambetta's Cabinet, and an ardent patriot, had German blood in his veins, his father having come from Baden.

It would be unfair to plead what has happened in the past, under other political conditions, in proceeding in a more recent era to exact retribution. Conquest and annexation are not undertaken by a civilized State in our time without incurring the severe indictment of public opinion and the hatred and revengeful feelings of the injured peoples.

If Germany were to demand the subjugation of all states and provinces which formerly belonged to the old German Empire on the plea of "old proprietorship"—although the Germany of 1870 was by no means the same as the old Empire—the whole of Lorraine, Holland, Switzerland, Italy, etc., might be coveted with equal justice. Nay, more than that, the Germanic conquests of the fifth century might also be pleaded, for the Visigoths took Spain, the Burgundians Southern France, and the Ostrogoths under Theodoric took Italy, so that Germany might, with Germanistic logic, lay claim to these ancient Germanic possessions as well!

As regards Alsace, this province, although Germanic in race and language, might equally well be considered as belonging to France, seeing that, before it was taken by peoples of the Germanic race, it was Celtic.

It was a somewhat precarious policy which Germany embarked upon when pleading Germanism as a reason for claiming certain provinces, for in that case the Slavs might on the plea of Slavism demand certain countries and provinces which formerly were Slav but have been occupied by peoples of German race. On this principle

Prussia must not be surprised if Posen attempts to emancipate herself, and Austria will have to put up with Galicia and several other Slav provinces detaching themselves from the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Bismarck might well be congratulated and might well be proud of being the prime creator of Germany's unity through the war with France, and Germany might well feel conscious pride in the magnificent peace terms which she extracted from the defeated side. But the Peace of Frankfort was no guarantee for the future; on the contrary, it caused the deepest resentment in France against the Germans, or rather against the Prussians. At that time, and long before, it was the fashion in the German Press to call the French *der alte Erbfeind der deutschen Nation* (the old hereditary foe of the German nation). Did not Bismarck realize that the war which he called into being and the harsh peace terms laid down by him would heighten the animosities of the French and inspire them with the hope of vengeance? The peace brought about no reconciliation, as Bismarck was soon to realize. He wrote on February 2, 1874, to Arnim, the German ambassador in Paris: "The openness with which the *national hatred against the Germans* has been fanned and expressed by all parties in France since the Peace of Frankfort permits no doubt but that every Government, to whatever party it may belong, will regard *vengeance* as its principal *raison d'être*. The only point in doubt is the time that the French will need to restore their armies and prepare alliances which, in their view, will enable them to *renew the fight*."

It was thought in the time of the Emperor Frederick (1888) that this humane monarch desired a peaceful settlement regarding Alsace-Lorraine whereby friendly relations between France and Germany might be brought about. Ribot, who was at that time Foreign Minister in France, stated, in fact, that a step in this direction had actually been taken during Frederick's reign. A suggestion

had been made to let Alsace-Lorraine become a *neutral country*—this plan had many adherents in France—and it had also been proposed not to touch upon the Alsace question, but only to let Lorraine, which is a French country, be returned to France—a plan which Gambetta supported and which later on was mooted by J. Lemaître. In return Germany was to receive some colonial possession.

Bismarck rejected with great emphasis the idea of Alsace-Lorraine becoming a neutral State like Switzerland and Belgium and thus creating a sort of buffer stretching from the Alps to the North Sea. Such an arrangement would, in his opinion, be effective in preventing Germany from attacking France, but would not stop France from attacking Germany by sea. Bismarck's most important reason was, however, that the very principle of neutrality is only tenable provided that the population is prepared in an emergency to defend it by force of arms. “But in a country whose sympathies and traditions are bound up with France, neutrality would be an illusion, useful to France, but to us quite the reverse.” However decisive and amazing the success of Bismarck's policy may seem to have been, it has nevertheless in many cases been but incidental and illusory; sundry consequences have sprung from it of which he would never have dreamt. Thus, for instance, he is really the person who, by his uncouth treatment of Russia and France, may be said to have created the Franco-Russian Alliance.

After Prussia's war with Austria-Hungary in 1866 Bismarck skilfully contrived to bring about an alliance between those countries and Germany, the mainspring of which was the fear of Pan-Slavism as represented by Russia. Bismarck had been unable, except to a very limited extent, to curb the policy of that country, and Russia had sometimes been surprisingly successful in thwarting the plans of the “Blood and Iron Chancellor.” Not content with having defeated France in 1870–71, Bismarck, on witnessing the regeneration of that rich country, wanted to crush it entirely and had the intention

in 1875 of attacking it without any reason whatever. But the Tsar, Alexander II, or rather his Foreign Minister, Prince Gortchakoff, Bismarck's antagonist, prevented on that occasion the contemplated assault.

In order to strengthen Prussia's position—in other words, her supremacy—Bismarck thereupon created the “alliance of the Three Emperors” of Germany, Austria, and Russia, still in pursuance of the same object, the isolation of France. His tactics were to reiterate constantly that the French, by their thoughts of revenge, were a constant threat to the peace of Europe, and to represent the republican institutions of France as being a menace to all monarchs and an encouragement to Revolutionaries, Socialists, and Nihilists. Alexander II joined the alliance in the hope that it would procure him Prussia's support for his plans in Turkey. But when Russia had defeated Turkey in 1878 and the Berlin Congress was to decide the conditions of peace, Bismarck managed to restrict the advantages at first conceded to Russia. “I have been deceived,” said Alexander II after reading the Treaty of Berlin, and from that moment the “Three Emperors' Alliance” ceased to be. When Russia had withdrawn from it and had gone so far as secretly to prepare for war in 1879, as shown by documentary evidence published by Bismarck, he had to devise a fresh grouping of power, and in 1882 he created the Triple Alliance, or, as Bismarck's organ called it, “The League of Peace,” between Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy. Its object was to isolate France and to keep Russia in check.

Russia had ever since 1813 been allied to Germany, but from her point of view there was one condition to the friendship: the limitation of Prussia's military ascendancy. By that country's victories over Austria and France this condition was no longer operative, and by the accomplishment of German unity Russia's influence over the small German states, founded on family alliances, disappeared. Actual conflict between Russia and Germany was, however, prevented by the friendship which united Alexander II

with his uncle William I. The constantly growing military strength of Russia and France, which Bismarck declared to be directed against Prussia, gave rise to a great strengthening of the Prussian army, which took place in 1880. Shortly after the assassination of Alexander (1881) serious movements arose which deepened the antagonism between Russians and Germans. The Pan-Slavists, who dreamt of the emancipation of all Slav nations under Russia's protection, accused Austria-Hungary of oppressing the Slavs under her rule and of harbouring the plan of bringing the entire Balkan peninsula under her influence, and also gave expression to the suspicion that Germany contemplated the annexation of Russia's Baltic provinces. Frequent demonstrations against the Germans took place. It seemed as if the two States were preparing for a coming struggle, for which it was necessary to both parties to create a homogeneous nation and weed out foreign elements from the frontier districts. Hence the Russification of the Baltic provinces and the driving out of the Germans, and hence Prussia's expulsion from her Eastern provinces of Russia's Polish subjects in 1885.

There is much evidence to show that, although the French brooded over the loss of Alsace-Lorraine, the thoughts of revenge soon gave way to a quieter spirit, notwithstanding that the French have frequently been provoked and goaded by Germany. Germany, or, in other words, Bismarck, managed in 1887 to create a dangerous crisis by inducing the German Reichstag to accept the "Septennate," or the seven years' increase of the Military Estimates and the augmentation of the army. He wanted thereby to prepare the German people for a life-and-death struggle with France if that country could be induced to show more active sympathy for the oppressed Alsace-Lorrainers or to give way to demonstrations against provocative acts. One such act of the most blatant kind was the arrest of the French police

commissary Schnäbele on a false charge of high treason by espionage.

But no *casus belli* arose, and France remained quiet and self-possessed. However, Bismarck's evil conscience and constant anticipation of revenge gave him no peace, and he must needs work upon the feelings of the people to pave the way for the "Septennate." Sensational articles and disquieting rumours appeared daily in the Press, and fresh acts of chicanery were organized in Alsace. "If you do not vote for candidates supporting the 'Septennate' there will be war!" "If we do not succeed in Germanising Alsace-Lorraine there will be war!" This was the constantly repeated cry of the newspapers.

Field-Marshal Moltke said in the Reichstag on January 11, 1887: "If the proposal of the Government is rejected, I firmly believe that we shall have war."

Bismarck thereupon declared: "We shall endeavour to put it out of the power of France to attack us for another thirty years. *The War of 1870 will be child's play by the side of that of 1890 or of I know not when* as regards its effect on France." His promise that the French should be "*bled white*" was punctuated by the Reichstag with an enthusiastic "Bravo!"

Lieut.-Colonel Kötschau published about this time a work entitled *Der nächste Krieg*, which was a brutal threat against France and was intended to influence the Reichstag in favour of the "Septennate."

In March 1887 Major H. von Pfister published a book in which he urged that France should be dismembered, and declared that "the German people has been chosen by the Almighty for the inheritance of the Roman Empire." The German Empire was to annex Western Lorraine and Franche-Comté, and the Nord and Ardennes Departments were to be given to Belgium, which, together with Holland, was to become a vassal State of the German Empire. Switzerland and the Italian Tyrol were also to be annexed by Germany.

The war agitation having resulted in the acceptance of

the “Septennate” by the Reichstag, its realization was at once proceeded to; movements of troops took place in all garrison towns and large forces were collected in Alsace-Lorraine. Constant articles appeared in the Berlin Press about French war preparations (= manœuvres), about French espionage, about the doings of the League of Patriots, etc., until every one began to believe in the imminence of a conflict. Suddenly, in April, the sensational news was spread abroad that the universally respected police commissary Schnäbele, of the frontier town of Pugny, had been arrested in German territory and thrown into prison at Metz. It turned out, however, that he had been requested by the ill-famed German police commissary—a renegade—of the Alsatian frontier town of Noveant to visit him on a matter of business, but that he had been lured into an ambush. He was attacked, according to the testimony of two witnesses (unseen labourers in a vineyard), by two disguised policemen, but ran back across the frontier; he was pursued, knocked down, handcuffed, and dragged across into German territory. A prosecution followed, and this *cause célèbre*, which filled five hundred pages, was tried by the High Court at Leipzig; at the same time the case was submitted to the Emperor William, who found, however, that an act of chicanery had been committed, and ordered that Schnäbele should be at once released from prison and allowed to return home. That Bismarck had a hand in this contemptible affair is but too obvious. He lived in a maze of political intrigue and trickery.

France, her Government and Press maintained a dignified, immovable composure throughout this affair in spite of the grave provocation, for she wanted no breach of the peace. Thus it came about that Germany’s warlike designs were thwarted.

Bismarck now hit upon a new scheme for compromising France. Having induced that country to occupy Tunis, where the French had a vast sphere of interests, he stirred

up Italian feeling against France on the pretext that Italian interests were being threatened. He excited the ire of the Italian chauvinists, who naively aimed at nothing less than the exclusive right to occupy the whole of North Africa as being an old Roman province, and finally managed to convince Italy that the country had been the victim of a foreign State's pretensions, to which an end must now be made.

The Italian Premier Crispi, who was not distinguished by firmness or integrity of character, allowed himself to be persuaded by Bismarck of the necessity for renewing the Triple Alliance (1887) and of embarking on a policy hostile to France. Crispi clearly hoped that this alliance, thanks to certain conventions, would enable Italy to take possession of a part of the African coast-line. Despite Italy's challenges, which for a long time seemed likely to make war unavoidable, peace was maintained, thanks to the calm demeanour of the French Government.

These renewed attempts to injure and irritate France gradually led to a *rapprochement* with Russia.

Russia on her part had begun to make overtures to France in the eighties. At the coronation festivities at Moscow in 1883 the French ambassador was made the subject of demonstrations of the strongest sympathy, and from that time the friendly relations between the French and the Russians became more and more marked.

In their fear of the ascendancy of the German element in Russia, the Russian Slavophiles began to interest themselves in French culture, whilst the French, even those holding the most advanced political views, began to conceive a liking for Russia and to forget the old antipathies. Poland's fate, which had long caused heart-burnings in France, had constituted an obstacle to a *rapprochement* with Russia, but new conditions demanded a suppression of the old sympathies. The fears for France's independence, if the country were utterly isolated, became the determining factor of French opinion. French

hopes soon turned in the direction of Russia, and presently the “Boye tsaria khrani” (“God save the Tsar”), the Russian National Anthem, became a familiar and popular melody in Paris.

We know that Gambetta had hopes of an alliance with Russia and discussed the subject with General Skobeleff in 1881 in Paris.

When Flourens was President of the Council (1886–88) he tried to bring about a closer understanding between France and Russia. Jules Grévy declared in 1887, in an interview with the Danish Legation Councillor, J. Hansen, that “Russia and France have a great interest in common, namely, to prevent the further growth of German power : it threatens Russia as it does France. These two countries must, therefore, support one another in a mutual and pacific spirit.”

For a long time the French Republic had inspired scant sympathy at the Winter Palace, but by degrees its growing internal stability attracted Russia’s attention, and it was realized that to abandon France to the tender mercies of her enemies would mean that Russia would have to face the Triple Alliance alone.

Thus it came about that Alexander III, in 1891, decorated Carnot with the insignia of the Order of St. Andrew and conveyed his cordial sentiments, whilst the same year saw the momentous visit of the French squadron to Cronstadt. Shortly afterwards a rumour—sounding like a fairy tale from the *Arabian Nights*—was spread abroad that a Franco-Russian Alliance was in contemplation ! An alliance between Russia and France, those opposite poles of Despotism and Republicanism, how preposterous it appeared ! What a danger it seemed to the unhampered spread of Western culture ! The explanation was a simple one : the alliance had its roots in the common *external interests* of both allied States—the necessity for checking the growth of German power and for creating a counterpoise to the Triple Alliance for the maintenance of peace. It is clear that the contrast in the systems of

government and social conditions of the two allied States had no bearing on this need. The internal institutions and conditions of a country are predetermined by its historical development and are national in character; its alliances, on the other hand, are determined by external conditions and are international in character. The Treaty of Alliance between Russia and France was signed in August 1891.

This sequel to Germany's militarism and unwise conduct towards France in 1870, when she had sought peace after the fall of Napoleon, had not been dreamt of by Bismarck. His arrogance blinded him to realities and rendered him incapable of drawing other political inferences than those inspired by his own illusions intensified by success. It is obvious that France, even if nothing else was gained by the alliance, was justified in seeing therein an *end of the hegemony* which Germany since the Franco-German War had asserted in Europe.

In spite of Prussia's victories in the wars provoked by Bismarck, he nevertheless was filled with anxiety for the preservation of Prussia's power, which he constantly saw threatened, and hence he was always seeking to form alliances and perpetually increasing the military burden. Well he might, to impress the world with the armed might of Germany, exclaim in one of his "grand speeches" in the Reichstag (1888): "We Germans fear God and naught else in the world!" But of this there is no doubt, that there was one thing Bismarck feared more than God, and that was—France and Russia! This grand speech of his presaged vaster armaments, and to obtain them he drew, with indifferent logic, a perfectly harrowing picture of the dangers which threatened Germany. He unctuously exclaimed: "God has placed us in a position in which we are prevented by our neighbours from ever sinking into a state of decrepitude and sloth. He has placed the most warlike and turbulent nation, the French, by our side, and has permitted the growth of Russia's bellicose

propensities to a degree unparalleled in past centuries. Thus we feel, as it were, the pressure of the spur on both sides, and are *forced* into exertions which otherwise perhaps we should not make."

Germany thereupon increased her enormous peace strength by more than half a million soldiers, and she could now place over a million men in the field and yet have half a million in reserve.

A study of the European wars of the sixties and seventies of last century cannot but show that Bismarck was their main cause and that it was he who in the first place revived *militarism* in Europe and prevented the growth of a friendly policy between the States; it is, thanks to him, that suspicion, diplomatic intrigues, and equivocal alliances—so-called peace leagues armed to the teeth—have been the main preoccupation of European statecraft in recent decades. What a parody of civilized polities! The continuous armaments, the appalling military burdens rendered all demonstrations of friendship between the Powers utterly illusory. The perpetual increase in military strength, the principal concern of all Governments and Parliaments ever since Prussia's victories, has precluded all real pacific international progress.

Ever since the Franco-German War, militarism has developed throughout Europe at an appalling rate; everywhere there has been nothing but war preparations, larger armies, added armaments, more warships and fortresses, enormous and wanton expenditure: all in order to be prepared—prepared to meet an enemy. No reliance could be placed on composing differences amicably. It had been all too easy to set afoot, without any real cause, the war with France in 1870 as well as the wars of 1864 and 1866.

Germany has never ceased to arm, and has strengthened her military system in so astounding a fashion that one should have thought a new war was ever imminent. Yet peace has been preserved for forty-three years, and Germany takes the chief credit, for Germany, it is claimed,

has only lived for peace and peaceful interests, for her internal culture, her material needs, the welfare of her people, etc.

Why, then, has Germany never ceased to arm? To this the answer is that she has ever been fully conscious of the perilous geographical situation of the country and the dangers underlying the enmity and armaments of other Powers, and that she has found that other nations begrudge Germany her extraordinary industrial and commercial development and will not willingly permit her to seek an outlet in other continents. Open and secret hostility has been the lot of Germany from East and West and from across the oceans. Hence, it is argued, Germany could not but hold herself prepared for war.

It seems to have been forgotten that one of the chief causes of German anxiety was the war with France, the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine, and Bismarck's repeated threats against France in the seventies and eighties, all of which contributed to bring about France's alliance with Russia.

Whilst the Triple Alliance, or the so-called "League of Peace," had for its object to isolate France and to force Russia to give up the fruits of her victories on the Danube and in the Balkan peninsula, Germany has striven to strengthen her hold on her own conquests in the West and North. These conquests were the real cause of the "armed peace." Had that country's Government obeyed the dictates of prudence and humanity and either returned Alsace-Lorraine to France or made those provinces into a State enjoying the same neutrality as Switzerland, and had the Danish-speaking Schleswig been restored to Denmark, Germany would have been in a far stronger position and her people would have been relieved of at least half of their enormous burden of military expenditure. But this was not to be; the Government has always made it clear that the Alsace-Lorrainers must make up their minds that they are for ever united to the German Empire, and as regards the Schleswig question, it is looked upon as dead and buried.

The “Peace League,” therefore, has in reality been a war league, which gave rise to the creation of another war league, although that, too, is a “peace league.”

The whole system of equilibrium which in the last few decades has constituted the real pivot of European politics, the Triple Alliance and the Franco-Russian Alliance, was *a result of the tension between France and Germany due to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine under the Peace of Frankfort*. But it is quite evident that this system of equilibrium has been of no benefit to the cause of peace ; on the contrary, it has meant a *latent state of war* or an armed truce pending a fresh war between the two enemies of 1870-71.

“By taking Alsace-Lorraine,” a Russian diplomat once remarked, “Bismarck is working for us. Strasburg and Metz in German hands means in a coming war France’s devotion to Russia.”

Now, at last, the Great War which was considered by many to be inevitable, has come to pass. When Russia became involved in Austria’s war with Serbia, and Germany joined Austria, France, as Russia’s ally, had to be drawn into the war, which, by England’s participation on account of the German violation of Belgian neutrality and the menace to France, became a world-wide conflict. But this conflict would not have come to pass *had not Germany annexed Alsace-Lorraine*, and thereby created the main incentive to the Franco-Russian Alliance.

## XII

### THE WORLD WAR OF 1914

#### PART I

##### A. RELATIONS BETWEEN GERMANY AND ENGLAND : GERMANY'S COLONIAL POLICY AND OVER-POPULATION ONE OF THE CAUSES OF THE WAR.

TIME and again it has been said that the causes of the World War cannot be unravelled with the aid of the materials now at our disposal, that we cannot at present view in a right perspective the forces and events which led to the kindling of the spark of war, and that years of calm and unimpassioned research are needed to place this epoch of history in its right light. I do not share this view, but find at the time of writing—eight months after the outbreak of war—that we possess in well-known incidents of the last few decades, in the official documents of the warring Powers—their White, Red, Yellow, etc., Books—in authentic utterances and the various parliamentary records, etc., very ample material for an objective and authoritative exposition of all the causes of the war, and that on the evidence thus obtained we can express impartial opinions on the value or otherwise of the publications of the belligerent nations purporting to show who is responsible for the war. Were we to wait for years in order to collect better materials on which to base our judgment, the only result would probably be the accumulation of other documents which would merely repeat what is now extant with the same positive assertions, for the leading statesmen

of the various nations would hardly be likely to change their point of view or give the lie to their original utterances.

Germany's colonial policy is of recent growth, but has achieved remarkable results. It was inaugurated on August 7, 1884, when the world was surprised by the announcement that Germany had taken possession of Angra Pequeña, in South-West Africa, by an agreement with a commercial house in Hamburg, which previously owned the region.

There had already existed, in German towns, private societies with colonial aspirations, the chief of which was the *Deutscher Kolonial-Verein*, founded in 1882. The object of these societies was to interest the German mind in the study of colonial problems and to give an impetus to the *emigration question on lines of national development*, so that emigrated Germans would remain Germans and not be absorbed in foreign nationalities, thus counteracting the threatened growth of other nations at the expense of German capital and German labour.

The acquisition of colonies soon followed. In Africa Germany has German South-West Africa, German East Africa, Kamerun and Togoland; in the Pacific, New Guinea, the Caroline Islands, the Marianne Islands, the Pelew Islands, the Marshall Islands, and the Samoan Islands. These colonies have an aggregate population of 12,589,000, and cover an area of 2,658,548 square kilometres, or five times the area of the German Empire in Europe.\* Germany occupies third place—after England and France—among Colonial Powers.

England was the first State of modern times to acquire colonies, and the British have proved very able and successful colonizers. France followed in England's footsteps as a colonizing nation and obtained some valuable possessions. Germany, like Italy, came a century too late for colonial expansion on a large scale and had not the

\* From *Statist. Handbuch f. d. Deutsche Reich*, 1907.

same advantages as England and France. Nobody must begrudge Germany her belated wish, nay, her necessity, for expansion in order to find room for her overflowing population and a market for her growing industry. But Germany, on the other hand, must not allow herself to be ruffled by England's and France's colonial successes and say that these countries begrudge Germany a place in the sun, or colonial and commercial advantages throughout the wide world.

The great obstacle to Germany's colonial policy is that the best places were long since taken by the earlier Colonial Powers and that the unappropriated spaces were coming to an end when Germany decided on colonial expansion.

Germany also possessed a so-called "protectorate" in the Far East, to wit, Kiao-Chau, in the Chinese province of Shantung, occupied in November 1897 by a squadron after a couple of German missionaries had been murdered in China (the full details never really came to light). By way of redress Germany was granted the "lease" of Kiao-Chau for ninety-nine years, whereupon the possession was strengthened by powerful fortifications.

As the Chinese offered no resistance to this act of usurpation, Russia followed suit by seizing Port Arthur (since taken by Japan), England occupied Wei-hai-Wei and France Hai-Choau.

The altered situation in the Far East since the beginning of the World-War—Japan having taken Kiao-Chau and now seeking to make China a protectorate in order, for self-preservation, to prevent the further penetration and influence of the white race—seems to mark the end for all time of Germany's colonial ambitions in China.

It must not be forgotten that Bismarck never gave a thought to a German colonial empire, Germany being in his opinion "satiated," and that in 1884 he encouraged France to pursue colonial conquests in order thus to divert her attention from Alsace-Lorraine. As already pointed

out he also hoped by this means to set Italy against France (p. 123).

New factors began to make their appearance about this time, which gave birth to the expansionist movement. Germany had, in the great Westphalian coalfields and the industrial region on the banks of the Ruhr, rendered so famous by Krupp's ironworks, created a world-wide industry which rivalled that of England and America, and she had also in other directions—in Silesia, Berlin, etc.—attained an enormous industrial development which needed an outlet in foreign countries. To this end a German mercantile marine was necessary, and soon there arose in Hamburg and Bremen mighty shipping concerns with vast fleets of ships for trans-oceanic trade.\*

The great manufacturers and shipowners now pointed out the necessity of a navy to defend, if necessary, the mercantile marine and the commercial interests in foreign countries, and to protect the German colonies. The Emperor William realized this need and furthered the plan with his accustomed energy, and his words, "Germany's future lies upon the water," soon became a corner stone in Germany's new policy.

The building of a large navy now became the main pre-occupation of the Government, and in 1900 the Reichstag passed the desired vote in the face of strenuous opposition from the Liberals and Social Democrats, to whom a big navy meant warlike complications, and who pointed out that the best areas outside Europe had already been occupied and that the political situation in Europe, being full of dangers, did not justify splitting up the country's resources, etc.

\* Among the many works dealing with this subject I may mention : G. Schmoller, M. Sering, A. Wagner, *Handels- u. Machtpolitik* (1900) ; D. Schäfer, *Die Bedeutung der Seemacht* (1900) ; G. A. Erdmann, *Nun aber weiter* (1900) ; Dr. A. Nossig, *Die deutsch-französische Annäherung* (1900) ; P. Meinhardt, *Kann Deutschland Weltpolitik treiben ?* (1903) ; Dr. Vosberg-Rekow, *Der Grundgedanke der deutschen Kolonialpolitik* (1908) ; Baron von Falkenegg, *Was wird aus unseren Kolonien ?* (1903).

It was openly urged that, to be a Great Power, Germany must show herself to be an industrial Power of the first rank, for the yearly addition of 800,000 souls made it necessary to divert them to the factories, seeing that there was no room for them in agriculture. Now, as these products of industry could not all find a market in Germany, they had to be exported, and this meant the need of colonies and commercial houses, etc., in all parts of the world, which in turn required for their protection a powerful navy.

By degrees it became clear to all that a large navy for the protection of trade and colonies was a matter of life and death. The workmen realized that Germany's colossal industry demanded an export trade, and that this export trade must be protected overseas by warships. If exports were stopped the factories would have to shut down, and this would mean loss of wages to millions of workers, who would then be given over to the stress of starvation.

Apart from American trade rivalry, against which all European countries have to contend, it is chiefly England's trade that Germany fears, although she has successfully stood the test of competition. The Germans have gone so far as to call England the "hereditary enemy," and England, on the other hand, has become concerned over the German competition.

The *Saturday Review*, in 1897, tried to set the British against the Germans, and published an article declaring *Germaniam esse delendam* (Germany must be destroyed).

In his pamphlet, *The Meaning of Sea-power to Germany* (1900), Professor D. Schäffer described "the energy and ruthlessness which the British have shown in their craving for colonies and their quest of oversea trade," and proceeded to show how, since the inception of the German colonial policy, "England has with feverish haste laid hands on all that could be taken, mostly for no other reason than to prevent others from settling there." He wanted the threat in the *Saturday Review* to be taken to heart, and it was long repeated everywhere. It was, of course, only in certain circles in England that this view was held, and the

threat must not, therefore, be taken as an expression of public opinion.

For many years numerous German national economists, such as Hasse, member of the Reichstag, Professor Stengel, and Dr. G. A. Erdmann, have declared that the enormous growth of Germany's population—over 800,000 annually—furnishes the mainspring of the colonial policy. In a short time a great part of German industry might be threatened with ruin were it not for this policy, and the whole German Empire might become the scene of a social revolution—this is a perspective with which the Germans are familiar.

Hitherto, in German official circles, it has been regarded as an axiom that the power of a State depends on the *number* of its inhabitants and that Germany can maintain her position among the Great Powers only by the constant and untrammelled growth of her population. But for many years notes of warning from persons of weight have been sounded against this view in Germany. Thus G. Schmoller wrote in 1882 in *Landwirtschaftl. Jahrbücher*:

“ As regards the number of children, I do not wish to commend the French ‘ two-children system ’; but neither do I think it wise on our part to adhere blindly to the old dogma of the blessings of unlimited families—a dogma which rightly belongs to an epoch of semi-civilization. If we could only clear the German nation of the stigma of the greatest child mortality in the world, which is but a consequence of our excessive birth-rate, much would be gained.”

In his *Politik* Treitschke declared in 1895: “ In the division of the extra-European world among the European nations Germany has always received the smallest share.” This sounds like an accusation against other Powers. But Treitschke must have known that before 1884 Germany never sought to secure any colonies. He goes on: “ And yet our very existence as a Great Power depends on whether we can become an overseas Power. Otherwise we shall be

reduced to seeing England and Russia dividing up the world between them."

Speaking of the start which certain Powers have had in the division of the earth, G. A. Erdmann wrote in his pamphlet *Nun aber weiter* (1900), in support of Treitschke's theory of might : " In moulding the fate of nations *might and right are synonymous*. He who has the greatest might must also have the greatest right—that is to say, must seize the best and largest inheritance. This is a political moral principle (!) with which the German nation must make itself familiar, for fear that its philosophic morality may bring about its bankruptcy." And to prove that Germany needs *new territory* Erdmann wrote : " Germany is faced with *an all-compelling 'must'* ; any shirking of this duty of world-policy will enormously weaken her position, or probably destroy it for ever. Those who speak of the 'colonial adventures' of our Government merely show their narrowness of vision, for the time might come when Germany would have to *pour out rivers of blood* for the possession of a strip of land claimed by another State. The establishment of close economic bonds with the aid of *colonies of her own* would be to Germany merely a safeguard against such cupidity on the part of other States."

G. Schmoller wrote in *Handels- u. Machtpolitik* (1900) : " *Our existence will be threatened* if we have no sea-power and do not permanently keep open the maritime routes on which the grain-exporting States may in certain circumstances bring their forces to bear." This work, in which several political economists collaborated, was intended as a note of alarm over the *desperate position* in which Germany would be placed without a strong navy to support the country's colonial policy.

During my several visits to Germany in the years 1899–1903, when the debates on colonial policy and the increase of the navy were going on, I became convinced of Germany's need of important colonies for her home and export trade

—then representing a sum of 10,000 million marks—and of the urgent necessity under which she laboured to provide a livelihood for many million workers. A. Lalance, the eminent Reichstag member from Alsace, had suggested in 1888 that Germany should endeavour, by amicable negotiations with France, to acquire a favourably situated French colony. After I had studied the conditions in Alsace-Lorraine I felt I was able to suggest a transaction which would make an end of the old animosity between Frenchmen and Germans which had prevailed since the annexation of the provinces, and at the same time would promote Germany's colonial policy; this suggestion consisted in taking up Lalance's idea as to the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France against a suitable colony. In addition to this, Germany should enter into a Tariff Union with France, which might be expected soon to develop into a *defensive alliance*. Thus the peace of Europe would be assured and the colossal sums expended by Germany and France, and, in fact, by all other European countries, on war preparations, might be reduced to an insignificant figure.

I presented and elaborated this suggestion in a work entitled *Alsace-Lorraine*,\* to which the French deputy A. Millerand, now French War Minister, wrote an introduction. My suggestion, however, met with no success in Germany, being rejected with the greatest emphasis both in the Press and in private utterances in letters and conversations. The retrocession of Alsace-Lorraine could never be *thought of*.

That being so, I confess I viewed the future with considerable pessimism, for, although I had every reason to think that France would never make war on Germany for the sake of Alsace-Lorraine, I became more and more convinced that Germany's *over-population* and her consequent *colonial policy* would become a *cause of war with England*, an opinion which I also expressed in the above-named

\* A. Nyström, *L'Alsace-Lorraine*, Paris, 1903; *Elsass-Lothringen und die Möglichkeit einer deutsch-französischen Allianz*, Berlin, 1904.

work. The War of 1914 is, in fact, essentially attributable to these factors in the economic life of Germany.

That England, in view of her insular position and her colonies, must have a large navy is obvious ; without it the country could be starved in a very short time in case of war, and her trade would be entirely at the mercy of an enemy Power. Thus when Germany suddenly appears with a powerful navy, it is plain that England must increase hers, especially as German trade has become a dangerous competitor to England's. In these circumstances the British Government and Press have repeatedly attempted to persuade Germany not to accelerate her naval programme, making it clear that England would also moderate hers if the suggestion were accepted. But Germany would not fall in with this proposal, and continued year after year to build more and more warships, until at last an absolute panic arose in England.

There can be no doubt that the enormous growth of the German navy was a deciding factor in England's *rapprochement* with France, which came to pass after Edward VII's visit to President Loubet in 1903, and by which a safeguard against the German danger was contemplated.

The necessity for England to increase her Navy, since the German navy was continuously being added to, was emphasized by the Prime Minister, Mr. Asquith, in a speech in Parliament in 1909.

The tension between Germany and England turned chiefly upon their African interests, England's plan to link up Cape Colony with Egypt clashing with Germany's plan of connecting Kamerun and the East African colony. There has also been antagonism between the two countries in Asia, where the German Bagdad railway was an obstacle to England's plan of establishing railway connexion between Egypt and India.

But there was no reason why these plans should lead to war, and before the conflict of 1914 there was every ground

for hoping that the two countries would be able to settle their differences amicably.

At the beginning of the war Dr. A. Zimmermann, Imperial Legation Councillor, in an article on "Why England Makes War" (in *Die Woche*, August 22, 1914), wrote as follows: "The more our indignation and surprise at the vile attack of the *Triple Entente* gives way to calm reflection, the more obvious it becomes that the *war forced upon Germany* was unfortunately inevitable." It was France's schemes of revenge, Russia's rapacity, and, first and last, England's treacherous commercial policy that brought about the World War:

"In Germany we should never have decided for war had not our most sacred possessions—liberty and honour, hearth and home—been at stake. In England war has always been a business like any other. Other nations have regarded war, even if successful, as a *judgment of God*, a terrible visitation, whilst to the British it has always meant a good opportunity of enriching themselves by *piracy and the like*. They have more than once in the course of history indignantly rejected any pacific effort. More than one British Government has been overthrown by the anger of the British commercial interests at the prospect of being deprived of their opportunities for trade robbery by a premature peace. . . . It is significant that the Liberals have taken over from the Tories the chief representatives of the anti-German policy, Sir Edward Grey and Churchill."

If there is anything as certain as that Sir Edward Grey's efforts to prevent the war must be regarded as absolutely sincere, it is that earlier British statesmen have energetically sought to preserve peace. H. Richard in 1873 brought forward a Bill for the organization of peace, which was passed by the House of Commons. Gladstone identified himself with the Peace Congress at Naples in 1880 and tried to promote the idea of disarmament. Richard, Bright, and other leaders of the Manchester School pub-

lished writings on the same subject. Courtney in 1881 made a proposal for simultaneous general disarmament which was approved by the House of Commons.

About the same time Moltke was declaring in the German Reichstag that Germany must stand armed for another fifty years and saw to it that the armaments were pushed on with the utmost activity.

The British have long looked with disfavour on the Germans on account of the competition occasioned by the flourishing growth of German commerce and industry, and this broadened into alarm on witnessing Germany's preparations on land and sea.

But then there appeared on the scene pacifists of varying shades who sought to prove that it was absurd to worry on account of Germany, who could not possibly have any intention of injuring England. Persons in high places, representative corporations—merchants, officials, journalists, etc.—paid and returned visits to Berlin and London in order to establish and assure friendly relations between Germans and Englishmen. Thus, in recent years, an improvement had taken place in Anglo-German relations, and it was found that in many spheres the two countries could work side by side and that in many respects their interests were not antagonistic. Germany has been England's largest customer, and in many respects England has been dependent on German industry.

But once more a nervous feeling arose in England on account of the colossal armaments, the huge sea-ports, and the great fleet which Germany was building, for it was evident that she contemplated an extension of her power and *armed competition* in the world's markets.

A sensational Army Bill was presented in Germany in 1912, and in the same year the Government asked for an enormous vote for the navy.

That there has been a fear in many quarters in England of Germany's competition in trade is not to be denied. But there is no reason to suppose that England, or rather her Government, contemplated seizing some favourable

opportunity to strike at German competition in the world's markets by seeking an excuse to destroy the German navy. This belief has been universally cultivated in Germany, where it has been laid down that *England is the arch-enemy*.

Yet we have been assured that the Imperial Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg eagerly strove to *improve German relations with England* and to bring about a *friendly feeling with France*. No doubt it has always been the aim of all Governments to maintain friendly relations with other Powers. But why was not this effort persevered in? Other points of view arose and all the good intentions suddenly collapsed.

It may be true enough—as the authorities say, to hypnotize the German people—that the Germans are waging war “as a matter of life and death, for their very existence,” for they must expand and acquire colonies in order to live; but they have by no means been *attacked* by other countries and their existence has not been threatened,

In Germany it has been the fashion to cast the blame for the war on England, on the plea, amongst others, that King Edward VII introduced, and King George V and Sir Edward Grey continued, the encircling policy which through the Entente with France and Russia is intended to prevent German expansion. There is, of course, a certain amount of truth in this, but it does not follow that England is to blame for the war, because the reasons for the “encircling policy” are just as much to be sought in the conduct of Germany herself. If the Germans find it necessary for their existence to procure new territory for their commerce and surplus population, other nations find it equally necessary to safeguard themselves against encroachments.

Bernhardi declares in *Germany and the Next War* that “war is first and foremost a *biological necessity*, a regulator in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with.” He further says that “in nature the *struggle for existence*

is also at the root of all sound development—that everywhere we find that the *right of the stronger* prevails, that the weaker goes to the wall. This struggle is regulated and controlled by biological laws and by the interplay of opposing forces. In the vegetable and animal world this process is worked out in unconscious tragedy."

That is so, no doubt, if we place ourselves on a level with animals and savages and barbarians. This reflection carries the mind back to the early migration of the Germans forced upon them by famine and the necessity of finding food and pastures, and it reminds us also of the migration of certain animals for a like purpose—all biological necessities.

Bernhardi recognizes that Germany's growth of population calls for *colonies*, and he considers it quite in order that these colonies should be *taken by force of arms*. He remarks in the same book: "Strong, healthy, and flourishing nations show increasing figures of population; \* they need from a certain moment onward a constant expansion of their boundaries; they must have *new territory* in order to *make room for their surplus population*. But as nearly every part of the globe is inhabited, new territory can, as a rule, only be obtained at the expense of the occupants—that is to say, by *conquest*, which thus becomes a law of necessity. The *right of conquest* is universally acknowledged."

This utterance by a leader of the German war-policy shows that Germany was preparing to act as aggressor whenever she found it necessary or desirable for the acquisition of fresh territory.

Far from constituting Germany's strength, her enormous increase of population has been harmful to the nation. The birth to the country of many million potential soldiers is only a *temporary source of strength*, enabling Germany

\* I may add: So do weak nations; and I may point out that a small increase of population is primarily attributable to other causes than the quality of the race or intentional limitation of births. This is known to all students of the subject.

by having prepared for the great war in every detail, to keep the enemy at arm's length. But what colossal sums it has cost ! What suffering, what a loss of human life it has brought about ! For it is plain that this great growth of population has been *one of the principal causes of the war of 1914.*

#### B. THE SITUATION IN REGARD TO THE BRITISH AND FRENCH POSSESSIONS IN NORTH AFRICA. THE MOROCCO DISPUTE WITH GERMANY.

In Egypt, owing to financial conditions, France and England have in recent times had legitimate interests to safeguard, mainly in connexion with the building of the Suez Canal. The Khedive, Ismail Pasha, supported with vigour and with considerable sums the gigantic enterprise of the Suez Canal, carried out under the supervision of the French engineer Lesseps with the aid of Napoleon III and with French capital ; it was opened in 1869. Internal conditions in Egypt became shortly afterwards anything but reassuring for the success of the enterprise ; the Khedive's costly administration and appalling extravagance, in conjunction with an unsuccessful war against Abyssinia, brought about a hopeless muddle in the finances ; and in order to obtain funds the Khedive in 1875 sold his shares in the Suez Canal to England for £4,000,000. The prodigality continued, and soon it was found impossible to pay the interest on the debts, so that England had to advance the interest on the Canal shares. The war with Abyssinia, coupled with a revolt at home, added to the financial chaos, and the European creditors were confronted with the risk of losing their money ; after a vigorous protest from England and France, demanding reforms, Ismail had to abdicate and the country was placed under the financial control of an Englishman and a Frenchman, who put the finances in order, a British fleet being at the same time sent, in support, to Alexandria. The Minister of War, Arabi Pasha, now organized a revolt and demanded

the abolition of European financial control. The population of Alexandria was incited against the foreigners, and the British Fleet therefore bombarded the forts of the town ; after a terrible massacre of Europeans had taken place, the British occupied the city and defeated Arabi's army at Tel-el-Kebir (July 1882). The British troops remained in occupation of the country, and the financial administration was entrusted by Tewfik, the Khedive, to Englishmen, who organized the finances with such skill and economy that there was soon a surplus.

England had invited France to join her in quelling the revolt, but France declined and thus lost her influence, England obtaining the ascendancy in Egypt. Thus, by force of circumstances, and not without legitimate claim, England became the real mistress of Egypt. The occupation of the country was followed by the struggles with the Mahdi in the Sudan, in the course of which General Gordon lost his life (1885). The British took Dongola in 1896, and thereupon, in 1898, embarked on a new expedition under General Kitchener, to reconquer the Sudan ; a large army of Dervishes under the Mahdi was beaten, whereupon Kitchener marched up the Nile to Fashoda. In the meantime the plucky French Major Marchand, at the head of an expedition, had marched right across Africa from the Congo and arrived at Fashoda, where he planted the French flag. He was now compelled by the menacing attitude of England to haul it down and to evacuate the place (December 1898). This humiliation, which nearly led to war, was, however, atoned for shortly afterwards by a treaty with England (March 1899), by which the 23rd degree of latitude was fixed as the dividing line of the spheres of interest of France and England in Central Africa.

The great agreement, the Entente of 1904 between England and France, obliterated all remembrance of the Fashoda episode and marked the inception of the friendship between these two countries. In a secret clause of the agreement England guaranteed France the possession

of Morocco by way of compensation for her lost position in Egypt.

France, which had long had colonies—Algeria dated from 1830 and was constantly being augmented—embarked in the seventies on a new colonial policy. This policy encountered many serious obstacles and soon met with determined opposition from leading politicians and public opinion, it being feared that it would weaken France's position in Europe and prove disastrous to the country. Nevertheless the policy of colonial development has been followed by all Governments. Jules Ferry, as Foreign Minister, in the middle of the eighties pursued it with great vigour and obeyed the prudent maxim of maintaining friendly relations with Germany, whom he joined in safeguarding European interests in Egypt and West Africa. He utilized France's power to acquire Farther India, and thus to obtain possession of Annam and Tonkin.

Until 1898 Ferry's successors pursued the same tactics, which brought them the possessions of Tunis, Sudan, the French Congo, Madagascar, and Indo-China, without France having to give any compensation to other countries. But in that year a serious change took place, Delcassé, on becoming Foreign Minister, abandoning the friendly attitude towards Germany. He obtained Morocco for France by giving considerable compensations to England, Spain, and Italy, whilst Germany, in spite of acknowledged interests in Morocco, got nothing—a dangerous and unwise policy. Ultimately Delcassé's anti-German policy led to Germany demanding his dismissal (1905).

Like a bolt from the blue came the news (July 1911) that a small warship dispatched by Germany, the *Panther*, had arrived at Agadir, a seaport in Southern Morocco. This caused the greatest sensation, and formed the subject of lively debates in German, English, and French newspapers. Some English papers took the line that Germany had the same right to a special mission as France, and

that the latter country ought to act in concert with Germany. Others could not understand how a German warship could be sent to Agadir, which was closed to foreigners and to foreign trade, and that Germany's conduct was inconsistent with the terms of the Algeciras Convention regarding the settlement of Moroccan affairs, and with the Franco-German Agreement of 1909.

Germany's Morocco Note to the Powers contained a statement to the effect that "German firms in Southern Morocco, especially in Agadir and neighbourhood, *had been rendered uneasy by certain disturbances* in other parts of the country and had therefore applied to the Government asking for *protection of life and property*. For this reason a warship was sent to Agadir, in order, if necessary, to afford the desired protection. As soon as peace and order were restored the ship would leave Agadir."

Negotiations now took place between the German and French Governments, the Germans disclaiming all territorial ambitions in Morocco, but demanding compensation in the Congo and the "open door" in Morocco. The French Government accepted (in September) the first condition, and shortly afterwards the position in Morocco was defined by a treaty (November) between the two Governments. Under this treaty the French Government undertook to preserve the economic equality of the different nations and declared that the principle of the "open door" would be respected. The German Government, on the other hand, conceded to the French Government full liberty of action for the maintenance of order in Morocco and for the carrying out of needful reforms.

By these prudent arrangements the possible causes of a conflict were removed and a fresh colony was secured for Germany. This ought to have satisfied the German nation. But the nascent chauvinistic current of opinion which had hoped for the acquisition of a part of Morocco received an added impetus through the Agadir affair, and the newspapers expressed themselves in very heated tones.

“Germany has never hitherto,” they said, “asserted any claims in regard to Morocco, although her interests there were considerable, and we cannot look on with equanimity whilst France and Spain share the plunder.” Many deplored the passive policy of the Government and that it had done nothing to protect German interests, and pointed to the increased French activity in Morocco as obstructing German interests.

The *Rhein.-Westfäl. Zeitung* wrote (September 11) that “There is nothing left for us but either to relinquish all political rights in Morocco by an ignominious retreat and to acquiesce in France’s political and economic protectorate, or to demand political rights in Morocco and, on the basis of these, economic rights. We had hoped that the Government would realize its mistake after the affair at Agadir.”

Wolff’s Telegram Bureau declared on November 3 that, according to the Algeciras Convention, no single Power had a right to establish order in Morocco. As France had asserted this right, the German Government reminded her of the provisions of the Algeciras Convention and pointed out that Germany was as much entitled, by sending a warship, to safeguard her rights as France was to protect hers.

The Morocco dispute was bound up with the secret clause in the agreement of 1904 between England and France, in which France was guaranteed the possession of Morocco as compensation for her withdrawal from Egypt.

By this dispute Germany secured a considerable gain, and the territory in the Congo was surely more valuable than a strip of land in Morocco, as it adjoins an existing German colony. The dispute could never, in the minds of thinking people, have become a pretext for war, and yet, as mentioned above, it gave rise to a heated agitation among Germany’s dissatisfied chauvinists, and General Bernhardi made it his war-cry in the preface (dated October 1911) of his book *Germany and the Next War*.

The author, who, by his work, desired to stimulate the warlike spirit of the Germans and spur them on to fresh conquests, writes here with arrogant pathos :

“ All the patriotic sections of the German people were deeply stirred during the summer and autumn of 1911. The conviction lay heavy on all hearts that the settlement of the Morocco dispute involved no mere commercial or colonial questions of minor importance, but that the *honour and future* of the German nation were at stake. A deep rift has opened between the feeling of the nation and the diplomacy of the Government. Public opinion seems to have a clearer conception of its will to assert the status of the nation than of the dangers of the political position and the sacrifices which a boldly outlined policy must demand. . . . Petty bargaining is as pronounced a characteristic in our Berlin of the present day as it was in the Regensburg of old.”

### C. THE PEACEABLE FEELING IN FRANCE TOWARDS GERMANY

Dr. A. Zimmermann, Imperial Legation Councillor, published at the beginning of the World War in *Die Woche* (August 22, 1914) the following indictment of France : “ France’s old, irrepressible *thirst for vengeance* has, of course, in no small measure contributed towards bringing about the World War. All Germany’s friendly overtures have been in vain, as has been the creation of strong common interests between the two neighbours, so closely dependent on one another. The great colonial empire created with Germany’s help has not enabled leading circles in France to forget the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. As it turns out, the republican form of government is no better able than the old monarchical system to curb the *turbulent passion for adventure which has so often made France the disturber of the world’s peace.*”

But I think that the following statement describes more truly the state of feeling in France in recent times : The

thought of vengeance *per se* was by degrees forgotten, although the hope of a revision concerning Alsace-Lorraine was general. But it may truly be said that a war on account of these provinces was contemplated by no one at the beginning of this century, unless by a handful of senseless fanatics, too few to influence public opinion. France has seen too much of war to desire more of it.

The French nation, according to competent foreign judges who have known France intimately for decades, was overwhelmingly in favour of peace, a statement which is confirmed by the ardent efforts which so many Frenchmen have put forth for the cause of peace, both in peace societies and at peace congresses. I can testify that at the World's Peace Congress at Hamburg in 1897 many French representatives displayed the utmost cordiality towards Germany.

With a view to ascertaining French opinion regarding the relations with Germany, the review *Mercure de France* sent out, in the autumn of 1897, a list of questions to eminent Frenchmen, and received 140 answers, the majority of which were for reconciliation and peace. It was curious to find that the older Frenchmen were the more chauvinistic and either made emphatic reservations or expressed themselves strongly against the surrender of patriotic aspirations ; in doing so they were not inspired by hatred of Germany, but by concern for the future of the French race, nor did they contemplate any French hegemony, but expressed the fear that by a complete reconciliation with Germany the French spirit might become less influential than the German spirit. Some, again, contended that the relinquishment for good and all of Alsace-Lorraine would destroy the national backbone.

Most of the younger Frenchmen were in favour of unconditional reconciliation with Germany ; some explained their attitude solely by their disapproval of war, others by the desire for solidarity among the leading civilized nations in general, and others, again, by philosophic contemplation of historical and social factors ;

several of them exhibited genuine admiration and appreciation of German civilization, which forms a natural complement to the Latin and Celtic civilization represented by France, but a few displayed concern at and antipathy against, Slavism, and above all against the British.

In general they seemed to dwell upon the inalienable love of France in the lost provinces. Some of the younger men proclaimed the union of Alsace and the greater part of Lorraine with Germany as an historical and ethnological necessity, a view which *already before the war* had many champions among the population of those provinces. Some declared that the alleged decline of France is altogether superficial and that the spirit of the nation would, when an emergency arose, assert itself with the same irresistible *élan* as of old. On the whole, even the most sanguine patriots had to admit that a *war with Germany would find few sympathizers in France*. In the first place, the French people detests war, and any incitement of the national spirit would be impotent in the face of the growing scepticism of the people; moreover, one would have to reckon with the *solidarity among the workers* of different nations.

How the cause of peace had progressed and the idea of revenge had receded in France by the end of the nineties may be gathered from the many proposals made for a settlement of the Alsace-Lorraine question and a permanent reconciliation with Germany. The French Admiral Reveillère proposed in 1899 that Alsace-Lorraine should be declared *neutral* and placed under Germany's military protection and continue to form part of the German Zollverein, a view which was shared by Leroy-Beaulieu. Gaston Moch, the author, made an equally conciliatory proposal (1899), which was as follows:

“(1) Alsace-Lorraine, to be declared *independent* and *neutral*, shall be called the Rhine Republic. Germany shall receive a suitable compensation for the territory she now owns in Alsace-Lorraine, and for the work she has carried out there.

“(2) The Rhine Republic shall be *disarmed*, besides which France and Germany shall undertake to create a neutral zone between their armies and the boundaries of the new State.

“(3) Germany, France, and the Rhine Republic shall conclude a mutual ‘Treaty of Friendship.’ The main features of this treaty shall be as follows :

“(a) An agreement for the institution of a permanent Arbitration Tribunal.

“(b) A complete Economic Alliance.

“(c) A military Defensive Alliance which shall imply no threat to other States.

“(d) The establishment of a Franco-German Model University at Strasburg, the main mission of which shall be to assist Alsace-Lorraine in accomplishing the attractive task of forming a *connecting link* between the leading cultured nations of Central Europe.”

H. Fernau, a German who had lived in France for ten years, expressed, in his book *Die französische Demokratie* (1914), the firm conviction that the vast majority of the French people are peace-loving and by no means want a war of revenge on account of Alsace-Lorraine. He denounces certain chauvinists who have been shouting for revenge and writes : “ In spite of all efforts by the good patriots, there exists *no general opinion in favour of revenge against Germany*, but, at the most, a patriotic willingness to *wage a defensive war.*”

According to Fernau, the war traditions in France are thoroughly undermined. A striking proof hereof is furnished by the fact that a large number of primary-school teachers have joined the anti-militarist propaganda of the workmen. When the patriotic Press in 1912 reproached them on this account, the committee of the non-political Union of Teachers, which consists of 98,000 members, issued an explanation in which they said : “ Inasmuch as the teachers must reaffirm their pacifist tendencies and their belief in the realization of the idea of international arbitration, they desire to point out that they teach their

pupils a *patriotism* which is based on a *sense of justice* and a respect for the *rights of others*. . . . They condemn emphatically the short-sighted, jealous, and aggressive chauvinism as a danger to the safety of the nation."

What a contrast between this French patriotism and the degeneration of the German patriotism of Germanistic teachers—after the defeats in Napoleon's wars—into a policy of brute force and of utter disregard for the rights of nations!

No, in France those who in chauvinistic delirium shouted for revenge are, indeed, but a small minority. The people have long ago ceased to believe in its possibility, and most of them have urged a friendly policy towards Germany. A. Guérard, a Frenchman, writing on "France and the War of Revenge" in the *Contemporary Review* for September 1914, has ably dealt with this subject.

A promising *rapprochement* between Germany and France was inaugurated by the Interparliamentary Conferences, the initiative of which was taken in 1913 by a German Reichstag member, the Social Democrat Dr. Franck, who has been killed in the war by an enemy bullet. The other Franco-German Conference was held in the spring of 1914 at Bâle, and the delegates assembled therein represented a majority of the Parliaments of both countries. It was resolved to hold a similar peace conference in September 1914, but at that time the war was already raging. The chief item on its agenda was to be the reconciliation of France and Germany. The movers of the resolutions were to be deputies belonging to the popular parties of both countries.

In the spring of 1914 the French deputy Sembat, now a member of the Government, published a book in which he advised France definitely to relinquish the idea of revenge, and went so far as to suggest that France should abandon the alliance with Russia and England and, instead, join the Triple Alliance. The majority of the Chamber of Deputies were in favour of reconciliation with Germany.

## D. GERMANY HAS NOT BEEN THREATENED BY RUSSIA

That the pacific sentiments which had gradually gained ground in Europe, and which found expression in the Interparliamentary Conferences, were not allowed to bear fruit was due, in the opinion of many, to the "war agitators," and the German parliamentarian Gotheim (in *Berliner Tageblatt*, December 1914), in speaking of the Russians, said: "That is why the Great-Serbian agitators incited to the plot (against the Austrian heir apparent), and that is the cause of the *intrigues in connexion with the St. Petersburg visit of the French President and the President of the Council*, both of whom were worked upon without their colleagues in the Government, who were anything but bellicose, having anything to say."

Thus in a few words Gotheim dismisses the Serbian conflict and impudently imputes to the French President and the President of the Council the plan of having, by intrigues with the Russian Government, brought about this World War, "the greatest crime ever committed against humanity."

According to him, Germany and Austria have no share in it. "We have," he says, "striven up to the last to *maintain peace* and have only taken up arms to *defend our existence*."

It has also been said in Germany that the Germanic race was menaced by Pan-Slavism and that the whole Slavonic world was threatened with subjection to Russian rule because Russia supported Serbia. This is utterly unreasonable. Political Pan-Slavism, as I have already pointed out (p. 20), is impossible for several reasons. But even if it could be realized, it by no means follows that this implies the subjugation of all Slav nations under Russia, which in that case would certainly gain some dangerous allies, nor would it mean the downfall of the Germanic world. Both groups of nations may very

well lead an independent existence and learn to respect one another.

No, the talk of the Slav menace against the position of the Germanic race is nothing but a phrase, an equivocation with which to rouse German opinion and create general patriotic enthusiasm for the defence of the country against a suppositious enemy. It is a deliberate "suggestion," and the intention is clearly to show how Germany has been *compelled* by an overhanging menace to wage war against Russia.

Germany has seldom had Russia for an enemy; on the contrary, she has usually been her Ally. It is true that in the Seven Years War (1756-63) Elizabeth had an alliance with Maria Theresa directed against Frederick the Great, but after her death Peter III contracted an alliance with Frederick. The latter also made an alliance with Catherine II in 1764. In a couple of coalitions against France during the Revolution Russia acted jointly with Austria and Prussia, and after the dissolution of the alliance with Napoleon, entered into by Alexander I at Tilsit in 1807, Russia once more (1813) joined Austria and Prussia to liberate them from the Napoleonic yoke. Ever since that time friendly relations have subsisted between Russia and Germany. In fact, it was Russia's benevolent neutrality in 1870 which shielded Germany from an attack by her opponents of Sadowa. It is true that the friendship has always been subject to Prussia's military predominance being kept within certain limits. By the victories of the latter over Austria and France this condition ceased to be, and by the accomplishment of German unity in 1871 Russia's influence over the small German states, founded on family alliances, disappeared. Every conflict between Russia and Germany was prevented by the friendship which united Alexander II with his uncle William I, and the last advice the latter gave his grandson on his deathbed was to keep on good terms with Russia.

Soon after the assassination of Alexander II (1881),

however, serious agitations arose which fostered the antagonism between Russians and Germans. In Russia, Austria-Hungary was accused of oppressing the Slavs in that monarchy and of harbouring the ambition of subduing the whole Balkan peninsula, and the suspicion was also expressed that Germany contemplated the annexation of Russian Baltic provinces. Numerous demonstrations against the Germans took place in Russia, and it seemed in the middle of the eighties as if the two States were preparing for an inevitable war. It was at that time that Russia expelled the Germans from the Baltic provinces, and Germany expelled Russia's Polish subjects from her Eastern provinces.

In the end, however, the tension relaxed, and notwithstanding the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance (1891), the good relations between Russia and Germany remained undisturbed until 1914.

William II visited Nicholas II at St. Petersburg in 1897, and their relations were most cordial, the two monarchs emphasizing in their speeches "the traditional bonds which united them" and "the traditional, concordant, and unalterably harmonious relations between their countries." They met at Fredrikshamn, in the Gulf of Finland, in 1909, at Potsdam in 1910, and again at Baltischport in 1912, on which occasion they were accompanied by their Ministers with a view to discussing political questions. Moreover, the German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg visited St. Petersburg in 1912. All these meetings, which took place during the Balkan conflicts, were distinguished by the same friendly spirit as in 1897, and the speeches emphasized the "mutual trust between the monarchs" and the "good relations between their countries." It was put on record at the meetings of the Ministers that "there was no discord on current questions" and that the two States would "co-operate towards finding a peaceful solution for every political question which might arise."

In 1914 all this was changed. The very Russia who

had never threatened Germany and had been her friend and ally for a century was now declared to be her enemy, a barbarous country polluted by Muscovitism and Tartardom, and the very Tsar who had so recently been Emperor William's friend was now (unjustly) branded as having acted the part of a liar in the telegraphic correspondence between them.

## XII—*continued*

### THE WORLD WAR OF 1914

#### PART II

##### A. IMMEDIATE CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR : TURKEY'S OPPRESSION OF THE BALKAN PROVINCES, REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS, RUSSIA'S PROTECTION, THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR : THE BERLIN CONGRESS OF 1878 : AUSTRIA'S ANNEXATION OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA : THE GREAT-SERBIAN MOVEMENT : THE MURDER OF THE CROWN PRINCE FRANCIS FERDINAND : AUSTRIA'S NOTE TO SERBIA.

THE immediate cause of the World War of 1914 was the *murder of the Austrian heir apparent Francis Ferdinand* and his consort, committed on June 28 in Bosnia's capital, Serajevo, by the twenty-year-old Bosnian student Princip. The murder was connected with a strong Serbian agitation, and as Austria was of the opinion that the Serbian Government was responsible for it, she made war on Serbia, with the result that other Powers were drawn in.

Behind this proximate cause of the Austro-Serbian conflict lay another cause of the greatest significance, which explains the murder at Serajevo, namely, *Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina*.

Bosnia and Herzegovina, whose population is mainly of Serbo-Croatian nationality, had belonged at different times either to Hungary or to the old kingdom of Serbia, or had

been an independent kingdom, but came by conquest, in 1463, under Turkish rule.\*

The defective administration and shaky finances of Turkey, the absence of discipline amongst officials, the tyranny of taxes, the persecution of the Christians—all these factors combined to weaken the position of the country more and more during the seventies and to create dissatisfaction among the European tributary States : Rumania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Herzegovina, etc. The unsettlement was universal, and they were all merely waiting for an opportunity to throw off the yoke. The signal for the revolt was given in 1875 in Herzegovina, where the Christians had been incensed by a long succession of atrocities committed by Turkish tax-collectors supported by soldiery, and finally resorted to arms. Volunteers from Serbia and Montenegro came to their assistance, and all capable of bearing arms took part in this war of liberation and retribution. The ambassadors of the Powers at Constantinople deemed it their duty to intervene to help the oppressed, and the insurgents declared that they would not lay down arms unless the Great Powers guaranteed certain reforms, which, however, they were unable to do. The fanaticism among the Turks made matters worse in the Balkan States ; the German and French Consuls at Salonica were murdered, and revolting massacres took place in Bulgaria. In that country a general revolt broke out in 1875, which was more than justified by the long-borne oppression ; but as it was inadequately prepared and arms were lacking (the Christians were not allowed to bear arms in the Turkish provinces), it

\* The population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was in 1879, 1,158,114 ; in 1910, 1,898,122—made up as follows :

			In 1879		In 1910
Greek Catholics . . . . .			496,485	..	833,648
Roman Catholics . . . . .			209,341	..	434,190
Mohammedans . . . . .			448,613	..	612,090
Jews . . . . .			3,426	..	11,857
Protestants . . . . .			249	..	6,337

ended in defeat. The most appalling atrocities were committed by the Turks in 1876 in suppressing the revolt, 15,000 persons being murdered. The whole of Europe was horrified, and Gladstone flung out a withering protest against these Bulgarian massacres.\*

Serbians and Montenegrins continued the insurrection and attacked the Turks in May 1876; soon after the insurgents in Bosnia proclaimed Milan, the Prince of Serbia, their ruler, whilst the Herzegovinians acknowledged the overlordship of Prince Nikita of Montenegro (June 1876). Bosnia's union with Serbia and Herzegovina's union with Montenegro thus became a *sine quâ non* of peace with Turkey. When Turkey refused to accept this condition war was declared by Serbia and Montenegro (July 1876).

The diplomatists of the Great Powers once more set to work and the antagonism between Russia and Austria now began to be widely realized. The Slavonic Balkan peoples who had risen against Turkey were Russia's kinsmen, and she could not regard their subjugation with indifference. Russia armed the Serbians and provided them with officers and men, money, and hospital supplies, and Russian doctors and ladies went to Serbia and Montenegro to render aid.

From Austria-Hungary, unfortunately, the oppressed Slav peoples of the Balkans did not receive the same sympathy as from the Russians, and especially in Hungary, sad to relate, there was far more sympathy for the Turks than for the insurgents. The Government assumed a waiting attitude, and the Press urged that Austria should *occupy* Bosnia on the collapse of the Turkish rule, which now seemed imminent.

The anti-Prussian policy of the Prime Minister Beust (a Saxon) was replaced in 1871 by a friendly policy under the leadership of Andrassy (a Hungarian), and Francis Joseph's meeting with William I and Alexander II in Berlin in 1872 had led to the "Alliance of the Three Emperors"

\* These events have been described by one who took part in the revolt, J. Vazow, Bulgaria's foremost poet, in the historical novel *Under the Yoke*.

and marked a new epoch in Austria's policy, which was thenceforward supported by Germany. Austria's relations with Russia also remained cordial for many years.

At a meeting at Reichstadt on July 8, 1876, between Alexander II and Francis Joseph and their Prime Ministers Gortchakoff and Andrassy, they agreed not to intervene and to consult one another as matters progressed. If war should ensue between Russia and Turkey, Austria undertook to remain neutral, and in return Russia consented to permit Austria to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to preserve order on her frontiers. This arrangement was confirmed in 1877, but was never carried into effect.

Serbia and Montenegro's war against Turkey, which lasted nearly four months, underwent many fluctuations, The Russian General Tchernayeff, who had entered Serbian service, commanded the Serbian main army and was largely instrumental in securing the ascendancy of the Serbian arms in the early stages ; yet, in spite of their bravery, both the Serbians and the Montenegrins suffered many defeats, and in the end they were forced to sue for help from Russia. Thereupon General Ignatieff, under threat of Russia's armed intervention, obtained an armistice, and a conference of the Great Powers took place at Constantinople.

The reforms and concessions proposed at this conference, as well as a later suggestion by the Powers, were declined by Turkey. Thereupon the Russian Premier Gortchakoff, as the Powers seemed disinclined for joint action against Turkey, in order to enforce the demands presented to her, declared that since the Turkish Government had declined all suggestions for the amelioration of the disturbed conditions among the Balkan peoples, which inconvenienced the neighbouring States, the Tsar had no alternative but to intervene by force of arms. This gave rise to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877, in which Russia had Rumania, Montenegro, and Serbia for her Allies and was assisted by Bulgarian bands of volunteers. After severe defeats on both sides the Russians won the decisive battles of Kars, Plevna, and Chipka, took Adrianople, and marched on Constantinople.

The Sultan now sued for peace, an armistice followed, and peace preliminaries were signed at Adrianople. The Russian successes gave rise to anxiety in England, who had large interests to protect in the Turkish Empire (Egypt, etc.), and to safeguard these she sent a fleet to the Dardanelles to support the Turks and declared that she could not consent to a separate settlement between Russia and Turkey, but would insist on the terms of peace being settled by a European Congress, wherein Austria concurred. When thereupon Turkey became less tractable over the peace negotiations, the Russians threatened to occupy Constantinople, and shifted their headquarters to San Stefano, near by, where the peace was signed on March 3, 1878. By the terms of this peace Bulgaria was to receive an outlet on the *Æ*gean and become a principality, tributary to Turkey, but remaining for the time being a Russian protectorate; whilst Rumania, Serbia, and Montenegro were to become independent. Bosnia and Herzegovina were still to belong to Turkey, but the reforms voted at the first conference at Constantinople were to be carried out. Russia received Kars, Batoum, and Bajazid in Asia Minor.

This treaty, which deprived Turkey of the rank of a Great Power, to the advantage of Russia, created dissatisfaction in England and Austria. England armed and was on the verge of going to war with Russia. Austria, which could not acquiesce in the new distribution of power among the Balkan peoples, reverted to the plan of arranging a Congress of the Great Powers, hoping to get the peace of San Stefano revised to her advantage. She wanted, above all, to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had become a factor of the utmost importance in the policy of Francis Joseph, although Austria had never had any rights in this direction, and the danger of further Slav elements in this heterogeneous monarchy ought to have been realized.

Austria accordingly made representations to the other Great Powers with a view to a Congress, and on Russia also agreeing to the plan, to avert war with England, the Congress was ultimately opened at Berlin on June 13, 1878.

Prior to that date, on June 4, England had concluded a treaty with Turkey, by which she undertook the protection of Turkey's Asiatic possessions and received in return Cyprus, subject to an annual tribute. This treaty was produced at the Berlin Congress, not as a subject for discussion, but as a *fait accompli*.

The Berlin Treaty of July 13, 1878, diminished in some respects the advantages which Russia had gained at San Stefano, and favoured Austria instead.

Bulgaria was to be an independent principality, though tributary to Turkey; its prince was to be elected by the unconstrained will of the people, subject to Turkey's sanction. Bulgaria's Government was to be provisionally entrusted to a Turkish and a Russian Commissary, and Consuls appointed by the Powers. The Russian army of occupation was not to remain in the country longer than nine months. The territory previously allotted to Bulgaria was to be restricted so as not to extend to the *Ægean* Sea.

Russia was to return Bajazid to Turkey and was not to fortify Batoum, which place, together with Kars, she was to retain.

Serbia, Montenegro, and Rumania were to be self-governing States, quite independent of Turkey. The most important measure passed by the Congress was the mandate granted to Austria, on the proposal of England, for the *occupation and administration of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina*. These countries, however, were to remain under the suzerainty of the Turkish Sultan.

An agreement was thereupon concluded (1879) between Austria and Turkey expressly acknowledging the Sultan's suzerainty in respect of the two provinces.

Austria had now attained her object; but dangerous consequences were to follow. The Berlin Treaty did not definitively solve the Eastern question: it merely shelved it for the time being and averted the danger of a big Balkan war or a general European conflagration.

Austria, having by the Berlin Treaty of 1878 been

permitted, with Bismarck's help, to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, thereby aggravated the tension of her relations with Russia. To balance this antagonism Austria in 1879 entered into a formal alliance with Germany, and with the accession of Italy in 1882, this developed into the Triple Alliance.

Alexander II considered he had been cheated by Andrassy and Bismarck through the Berlin Treaty, and in Russia it was universally considered that Germany had robbed her of the fruits of her victory against Turkey. Alexander now withdrew from the "Alliance of the Three Emperors" and instead made overtures to France, which culminated in the alliance with the Republic.

Ever since 1875 it had been Francis Joseph's aim, by gains in the south-west, to recoup himself for the losses in the west—Venetia, 1866. This was also the policy pursued by the Prime Minister Andrassy, and at the Berlin Congress he strove very hard to obtain the ratification of Austria's occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Nevertheless Austrian opinion was by no means unanimous; the majority of the so-called Constitutional Party were against Andrassy's occupation policy—for fear of a still larger Slav element in the population of the Empire—and it was only with the support of the Opposition parties that the Government succeeded in giving effect to the ruling of the Berlin Congress.

Professor L. v. Thallóczy (a Hungarian), at the Consular Academy in Vienna, had long defended this policy of Andrassy's and had laid down that "the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina can only be judged correctly from an historical point of view. The Habsburg dynasty has merely pursued consistently the natural extension of the monarchy south-westward—that is to say, the acquisition of the 'Adriatic triangle.' This aim has been the central principle of our foreign policy since the Peace of Passarowitz" (1718), when Serbia for a short time came under Austrian rule.

Again : “Bosnia and Herzegovina were brought under the Habsburg sphere of influence in 1878 *in pursuance of a settled policy.*” \*

Austria has long needed a policy of concentration, of internal consolidation, not of external expansion. Her statesmen should have remembered the words of Montesquieu : “Monarchs should have the wisdom to keep their power within bounds and to bear in mind the snares of greatness ; they should remember that all greatness, all power is relative, so that in seeking to enhance the outward greatness one must not lessen the inner.”

However, Austria’s political system has always been based on historical traditions of dynasty and annexation. National unity, which constitutes the strength of every modern State, is unattainable on account of the many nationalities—eight in number—who generally regard one another with rancour and suspicion, and in consequence the very existence of the Austrian State may easily be threatened at times of great political conflicts. Its leaders must act with the utmost prudence and must cautiously consider the aims and wishes of the various nationalities. The real bond of unity in this abnormal State, so torn by strife and dissensions, is the Crown, the Habsburg dynasty, which constitutes the virtual guarantee of the continuance of the monarchy. How much more imperative is it not, then, in view of the dangerous forces at work within the monarchy and on its boundaries, that it should undertake nothing which may foment disquiet and dissatisfaction !

Unfortunately the country has long been without a great statesman. Its preposterous system of Government, with its mixture of absolutism and parliamentarianism, permits the most autocratic acts. For instance, the Foreign Minister is not responsible to Parliament. Dr. A. Jensen, who has studied Austria so thoroughly, has declared that there “everything incredible is credible,” and that the

\* Cf. Thallóczy, *Austria-Hungary and the Balkan States* (1901), and *Bosnia and Herzegovina* (1900).

“dilemma of Austrian statecraft” is the natural result of the stupidity, clumsiness, and falseness of centuries, and more especially of the last decades (in *Habsburg*, 1899).

The occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria was demanded at the Berlin Congress by the monarch’s representatives on the plea that it was the only means of maintaining order in the provinces, from which 150,000 refugees had fled into Austrian territory and could not be induced to return as long as the country remained under Turkish rule. Austria received her chief support from the British envoys, who considered that the occupation would help to restore order in the provinces.

Although the Austrians “came as friends,” to quote the words of a proclamation, the occupation was vigorously opposed by the population, who had never been consulted and had no feelings of sympathy towards Austria. For nearly three months three army corps had to contend against the population, who in several engagements were supported by Albanians and some Turkish troops. This deplorable peace mission reminds one of the “jackbooting mission” and “dragonades” of Louis XIV, whereby the Huguenots were to be converted to the Catholic faith by muscular force. After a fight at Stolatz, Herzegovina’s capital, Mostar, was occupied, and after the capture of the town of Trebinje and the fortress of Klobuk, the resistance in this province broke down. In Bosnia many sanguinary encounters took place before Serajevo was taken by storm and the Austrians were defeated at Tusla and Bibatch before they finally managed to quell all resistance after taking the fortresses of Behac and Kladus.

Thereupon the two provinces were literally turned into colossal camps with armies, fortresses, barracks, etc.

The “pacification” took a long time to carry out. Hostilities were continued by guerrilla bands, and when conscription was introduced in 1881 a revolt broke out, which was quelled by force of arms in 1882. Bosnia became the scene of yet another uprising in 1888.

By degrees things became quieter, and under Austrian

administration the provinces made considerable progress. Order has been maintained; the economic conditions have improved; bridges, roads, and railways have been built; public baths, secondary schools, etc., have been instituted; and religious toleration and social consideration have been shown to the people.

Affection for Austria there has been none, for the people have felt oppressed by the introduction of conscription and the heavy taxation. Officially it has always been promised that the army of occupation should be withdrawn as soon as the internal administration was organized on a proper basis; but in reality the occupation was clearly permanent.

“The occupied provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina,” as they have been called officially, were in the end unceremoniously *annexed* in 1908, in contravention of the treaty of 1879 with Turkey stipulating the suzerainty of the Sultan, and without consulting the people at all. With absolutistic autocracy Francis Joseph announced the annexation by a rescript of October 5, 1908, to his Foreign Minister Aehrenthal—indisputably a very remarkable mode of procedure in our time, reminding one of Louis XIV’s “*L’état c’est moi*”—in which he declared that, “in view of the high cultural and political purpose for which the monarchy undertook the administration of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the results, which were only attained with great sacrifices, and realizing, moreover, that a ‘clear and unequivocal legal position’ of the two countries is absolutely essential for the maintenance of their constitutional institutions, *I extend my sovereign rights to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and decree that the succession of my House shall also embrace these countries.*”

To Turkey the Austro-Hungarian Government on October 7 sent a Note relating to the annexation, reminding her of the tokens of friendship which the Emperor had given, declaring that law and order now reigned in Bosnia and Herzegovina under the Austrian administration, and stating that, as Turkey had now (after the revolution)

received a new Government which could maintain order, the Imperial and Royal Government, to show its conciliatory spirit, would evacuate the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar and restore that province to Turkey.

“As Bosnia and Herzegovina,” it proceeded, “have now reached a high level of material and intellectual culture, the moment seems opportune to complete the good work by bestowing on these provinces the benefits of the autonomy and constitutional regime desired by the population. Austria-Hungary must, however, in order to realize this lofty aim, conscientiously regulate the situation in the two provinces and provide for an effective guarantee against the dangers to which a continuance of the regime introduced in 1878 might give rise. Austria-Hungary is thus confronted with the *imperative necessity of releasing herself from the reservations of the Constantinople agreement, and, as regards Bosnia and Herzegovina, of regaining her former liberty of action.* (*Oesterreich-Ungarn sieht sich daher vor der gebieterischen Notwendigkeit, sich der in der Konstantinopeler Konvention enthaltenen Vorbehalte zu entledigen und, was Bosnien und die Herzegovina betrifft, seine frühere Aktionsfreiheit wiederzuerlangen.*)”

The Foreign Minister made a statement to the Austrian Delegation for Foreign Affairs respecting the annexation, explaining that it had become necessary to introduce constitutional institutions in the provinces, the chief of which was a Diet whose duty it was to examine and sanction the Budget. “This,” he said, “has placed us *under the necessity of definitely settling the question of the ownership of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of recouping ourselves for the definitive surrender of our rights in the Sanjak of Novi-Bazar under Art. 25 of the Treaty of Berlin by the formal annexation of the two provinces* (*Die unerlässlich gewordene Einführung verfassungsmässiger Einrichtungen in Bosnien hat uns in die Zwangslage versetzt, die definitive Klärung der Frage der Zugehörigkeit Bosniens und der Herzegovina in Angriff zu nehmen und das endgültige Aufgeben unserer aus Art. 25 des Berliner Vertrages flies-*

senden Rechte im Sandschak (Novibazar) mit der formellen Annexion der beiden Provinzen zu kompensieren).” \*

Russia, supported by England, protested against the annexation, whilst Germany, “in shining armour,” encouraged Austria in this contravention of treaties and the law of nations. Thus was paid the debt of gratitude for the agreement of 1878 between the German and Austrian Emperors, whereby, through the annulment of Article 5 of the Prague Treaty, Schleswig definitely became a Prussian province, whilst at the same time Austria was compensated for the loss of Venetia in 1866.

It was officially intimated that the annexation, generally speaking, caused lively satisfaction among the peasant population, but, however this may be, it is a fact that it gave rise to a fierce agitation among other classes of the community. We are reminded very forcibly of Louis XV’s comment on the condition of France in his time : “*Après nous le déluge.*”

Although the Serbian Government lodged no protest against the annexation, protests were expressed both in the Skupshtina and in the declarations and acts of the responsible representatives of the State. Thereupon, following the advice of the Powers, the Government closed the incident by a declaration on March 31, 1909, to the Austrian Government in which “Serbia recognizes that her rights have not been affected by the *fait accompli* regarding Bosnia and Herzegovina, and consequently she will conform to the decision that the Powers may take in conformity with Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. In deference to the advice of the Great Powers, Serbia undertakes to renounce henceforth the attitude of protest and opposition which since last autumn she has adopted with regard to the annexation, and undertakes, moreover, to modify the direction of her present policy with regard to Austria-Hungary and live in future on good neighbourly terms with that country.”

The Foreign Minister Aehrenthal declared on the annexa-

\* Cf. Schulthe’s *Europäischer Geschichtskalender* for 1908.

tion of Bosnia and Herzegovina : "The essential purpose of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin was to *create stable conditions* in Bosnia and Herzegovina with the aid of a Power strong enough to *quell every uprising* (*Auflehnung*) on its inception. This was the reason which led the British statesmen Beaconsfield and Salisbury at Berlin to offer the mandate of occupation to Austria-Hungary."

This mandate thus did not imply the ownership of the provinces ; its alleged object, *to quell every uprising*, was exceedingly vague, and it might well be asked what was meant by it.

For instance, did the mandate refer to uprisings against Turkey or against Austria ?

In reality the occupied provinces became a *conquered country*. Their inhabitants were vanquished, and nourished feelings of resentment, not of friendship, towards the Austrian victors.

However, Austria had received her mandate to quell every uprising, and it mattered little that the Berlin Congress had no right to give it.

It is not enough, in moulding a State, to consider the supposititious requirements of political power, which, moreover, may vary according to the composition of the Government. One must also look upon the matter from the point of view of the psychology of the people. No absorption of a country into a larger State without the *consent of the people* is in accordance with the rights of nationalities. Every nation incorporated by force becomes an enemy of the ruling State.

The Berlin Treaty, as far as Bosnia and Herzegovina are concerned, constituted a violation of the principle of nationality, and the Serbian population was deeply incensed.

The Slavs of the Dual Monarchy have not forgotten how for a long time back Austria has sought by methods of violence or despotism to *Germanize the Slav possessions of the monarchy* and to favour the Germanic element in every way at the expense of the Slavs.

Thus, in Bohemia, the Czechs became the victims of an Imperial decree (1774) which proclaimed without ceremony that *only the German language* might be used in the schools, in spite of the fact that Czech literature had long thriven and flourished.

After protracted and very bitter struggles between Czechs and Germans, due to Austria's policy of forcible Germanization, the former finally succeeded in asserting their cultural independence (*cf. pp. 21 and 22*).

The same kind of thing happened in Galicia, an entirely Slav country peopled by Poles and Ruthenes. When the country after the partitions of Poland came under Austrian rule, it was to be *Germanized*, and the Polish and Ruthenian languages were no longer used in the higher education. The Universities at Cracow and Lemberg had none but German professors. After Austria's defeat at Sadowa in 1866 she found it necessary to grant Galicia a fairly comprehensive autonomy, and, strange to say, its Polish representatives in Parliament, the "Polenklub," have long exercised a large amount of influence. The Polish language ousted the German at the Universities as early as the eighties of last century, after a Polish professor had boldly begun to lecture in Polish, and Polish culture has since then enjoyed unhampered freedom in Galicia.

The Austrian Government has long been to blame for a great part of its troubles with the Slav elements in the monarchy by looking down on them and favouring the *German element*. By degrees the Germans have entered into a bitter contest with the Slavs for the retention of their predominance in Government and administration, though by no means for the protection of their culture. Thus there is no longer any question of the struggle of Germanism against Slavism in the accepted sense; it is merely a social party struggle, and the Germans reap what they have sown, seeing that they monopolized all lucrative posts and sources of income and have sought to oust any but the Germanic culture, pretending to regard the Slavs as an inferior element. Germanism has been

the same everywhere. If Slavism plays any part in Austria's present war, it is merely as a *reaction against Germanic oppression*.

Austria has always, in spite of the numerous Slavs and Hungarians in the monarchy, pursued a *German* policy, and would pay no attention to national claims. The system of Germanizing centralization which has been in operation ever since the time of the absolutistic and ruthless Premier Schwarzenberg (1848-52) has had to be maintained by the Government by the closest understanding with Germany in order that the opposition of the other nationalities, especially of the Hungarians, might be overcome.

For many years back there has been a "Great-Serbian" propaganda with the object of uniting all Serbians in the Balkan peninsula, and Serbian agitators have travelled far afield to win over the Bosniaks to their scheme. At one time a union with Serbia was held to be the proper goal, but her monarchs inspired little confidence and in the end the Prince of Montenegro, Nikita, who enjoyed the support of Alexander III of Russia, became the head of the agitation and dreamt of becoming king of a Greater Serbia. To realize his ambition it was necessary to detach Bosnia and Herzegovina from Austria. Deputations were sent to Vienna to complain to the Emperor and the Bosnian Minister about their grievances, and thence they proceeded to Belgrade, where they waited upon the Russian Minister. The hopes of the Prince of Montenegro were based on the impression that the Serbian monarchy was nearing its dissolution and on the provisional nature of the relations of the occupied provinces with Austria.

But the kingdom of Serbia did not collapse, and its King, Milan, looked to Austria for support, as did his son Alexander. This led to the assassination of the latter and his consort, whereupon the old and exiled Peter Karageorgievitch was called to the throne in his stead.

Peter embraced the opposite policy and turned instead to Russia for support.

The Great-Serbian idea is a national movement which in itself is not to be wondered at, for nationalist aspirations have made themselves felt in Europe for the past hundred years. The Germans, least of all, considering their Germanistic strivings, are entitled to find fault with Serbism. But under the political conditions which have prevailed in the Balkan peninsula, and seeing that the Serbs are distributed over different countries and provinces where they live side by side with other peoples, the Great-Serbian propaganda may truly be described as fantastic, and the fiery Serbian temperament, which readily excites party passions, is very liable to lead to excesses. The Serb is highly patriotic, but is "anarchistically" inclined and gives himself up heart and soul to politics—that is to say, political debates and party strife. The party distribution has usually been based on conceptions of foreign policy—in other words, Serbia's relations with Austria-Hungary, Russia, and Turkey—or on the influence of leading personalities. This is the impression given by that very thorough student Dr. A. Jensen in his interesting work *Slavia* (1897). To his question whether Russia's help did not introduce an element of danger, thinking Serbians have given the same answer: "Our little State cannot be altogether self-dependent, and if we were to refuse the helping hand of Russia we should be thrown entirely *on the mercy of Austria-Hungary*." Moreover, the Russophil leanings of the Serbians cannot be wondered at when it is remembered that Russia has poured out rivers of blood and roubles for the liberation of their country.

That the Russian nationalists or Pan-Slavists have been the cause of the World War, as alleged in Germany and Austria, cannot be proved, even if it be admitted that they had some share in the Serbian unrest. It has also been widely assumed that the Russian Minister at Belgrade, von Hartwig, whose sudden death at the residence of the Austrian Minister may not have been a natural one,

took an active share in the Serbian agitation against Austria.

Russia has always competed with Austria for the ascendancy in the Balkans, mainly with the object of securing Constantinople ; but it must be said to her credit that Russia was the *only Great Power which in the name of humanity intervened against Turkey in 1877* and thus put an end to *Turkish oppression* and secured the *independent national existence* of several Balkan States.

Russia has looked upon the Great-Serbian agitation with approval and has perhaps gone so far as to support it in order to weaken her old antagonist, Austria-Hungary. But to say that this monarchy would collapse if Bosnia and Herzegovina were, with the aid of Russia, to become part of the Serbian monarchy, and that the whole Slavonic world would come under Russia, and further that “the position of the Germanic race would become untenable”—as has been said in leading circles in Germany, and, in fact, adduced as a cause of the war—is surely very much beside the mark. Austria-Hungary and her dependencies had existed long before Bosnia and Herzegovina were annexed, and these provinces were clearly not needed to strengthen the monarchy ; on the contrary, their annexation has been a *menace to its safety*, a cause of unrest and of Russian interference. This is so palpable that one could not well understand the short-sightedness of the Austro-Hungarian Government in ignoring this factor when deciding upon the annexation.

The Great-Serbian idea, which implies a union of all Serbian peoples, is, of course, fraught with great dangers to the Austrian State. For not only Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also the coastal region west of them, Dalmatia, is a purely Serbo-Croatian country, and Croatia and Slavonia in the north are inhabited by essentially the same nationality. The Serbo-Croatian tribes were a part of the great Slavonic family, and, according to V. Jagié, there is neither in the more modern development of the language nor in its older phases any sharp line of demarcation between them.

No doubt it is probable that Serbia, who has so long striven for an outlet on the Adriatic, hoped to attain this object through Herzegovina and by the absorption of Dalmatia into a Great-Serbian kingdom. If Croatia and Slavonia were to be joined to a Greater-Serbia, Austria would lose all her southern Slavonic provinces; and, maybe, this will be one of the results of Austria's war with Serbia.

The aspiration to form a Great-Serbia, which has always persisted in Serbia, may partly be attributed to the old wish of reaching the Adriatic in order to obtain a port on that seaboard and thus make the country commercially independent of Austria-Hungary, who has always availed herself of Serbia's land-locked position to obtain advantages at her expense. Serbia has, for instance, had to put up with extortionate duties and no end of chicanery in the Customs, and has been compelled to obtain nearly all her imports from Austria-Hungary, although she might have secured far better and cheaper articles elsewhere; moreover, when Serbia asked for a railway to the Adriatic, Austria vetoed all export from Serbia, who, however, contrived to escape the danger of total impoverishment by obtaining a market for her goods elsewhere by circuitous means and at appalling expense.

When at the beginning of the war with Turkey in 1912-13 Serbian troops, reinforced by Montenegrins, made for the coast of Albania, Austria-Hungary immediately tried to bar the way, and when threats proved of no avail she entered into negotiations with Bulgaria. It was Austria who, with Italy's assistance, enforced the principle of "Albania for the Albanians"—which gave rise to the ill-starred little principality of Albania—in order thus to frustrate Serbia's projects as regards a sea-port on the Adriatic.

It will easily be understood that these manœuvres on the part of Austria provoked passionate resentment among all Serbs and helped to fan the Great-Serbian agitation.

Professor J. Redlich, of Vienna, in *Die Friedenswarte*, a journal published by the Nobel Prize winner A. U. Fried,

gives an account of the Serbo-Austrian conflict, from which an extract may be of interest :

“ Centuries of foreign oppression have failed to stamp out the Serbian national consciousness ; in spite of all persecutions and sufferings the love of freedom and independence survived, and grew with the accession of the present King into an *imperialistic dream of a Greater Serbia* as the protector and mistress of all Southern Slavs. Russia is appearing more and more as Serbia’s supporter and as the promoter of her interests, and under M. Pashitch’s guidance the Russophil party may be expected to remain in power for a long time to come. How strong the new Serbian national feeling has become may be gathered from the *passionate resentment* which the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina evoked in Serbia. From that moment the undisguised dreams of conquest of a Greater Serbia have become a factor in European politics and a link in the chain of forces which have gathered against Austria and the Triple Alliance. It is true that the annexation crisis led to a diplomatic defeat for Serbia, but this was more than balanced by the knowledge that with Russia’s warm friendship she had also gained the sympathies of France. Thus there arose out of the annexation crisis the foundation of the Balkan Alliance under the ægis and guidance of Russia.

“ The *thrusting back of Turkey* was the first task. It will be remembered how Serbia, successfully and with comparatively small sacrifices, fought her way through the two Balkan wars. These successes were won by an army, a levy of the people which, from the highest to the lowest, regardless of internal party differences, was inspired by the same idea : the thought of *Serbia’s mission* to gather in all the South Slavonic peoples, to mould them into one nation with its place in the sun.

“ It is not to be wondered at that the Serbian rising and the *successes* of the Serbian army made the deepest impression on the whole South Slavonic world, of which the majority has from time immemorial inhabited Austro-

Hungarian territory. There were two contributory causes : first, the dream of union — originally academic and literary—in cultured cireles among the Austro-Hungarian southern Slavs ; and, secondly, the dissatisfaction of the Hungarian southern Slavs, especieially of the Croatians, with the political regime in the country. This regime, encouraged by Magyar chauvinism, must, together with the ruthless economic policy of the Austro-Hungarian agrarians, bear the main responsibility for the unfortunate sequel to Austria-Hungary's Balkan policy. Finally, the intellectuals, and by degrees, wider strata of the Croatian and Serbian population in Croatia combined against the brutal regime of the Magyars. The Hungarian Government replied with fresh reprisals, and by so doing revealed within its own boundaries a most receptive soil for a violent Great-Serbian propaganda."

Despite the progress which aecompanied Austrian administration in the annexed provinces, an implacable party fanaticism made itself felt. " Only on one point," says Redlich, " do the parties seem to have achieved unity, and that was in the matter of the hatred of the old regime, of all officials, teachers, and economic propagandists sent out from the Monarchy to both provinces, and of the thousands of Germans, Magyars, Czechs, and Poles who have carried out most of the important edueational work of the last thirty years. All of them were from the very first day regarded as strangers and replaced by natives, quite irrespective of whether the latter possessed the necessary qualifications. Kindness and consideration proved of no avail ; they were usually interpreted as weakness and submission, and only served to increase the dissatisfaction. In the meantime Serbian newspapers were proclaiming loudly that what the Dual Monarchy had done for Bosnia was but a sham, and was to be put down to the fear that the Dual Monarchy might collapse on the death of the Emperor Francis Joseph and that Bosnia and Herzegovina would then fall to Serbia."

In recent times a new agitation, which originated with

the Mohammedans in Mostar, has been organized against Kallay, Minister of Finance, and the malcontents demanded that the forcible Catholicization and the Croatian propaganda should cease, that the taxation should not be enforced with the customary severity, etc.

The Bosnian Diet presented in December 1911 a memorandum to the Austro-Hungarian Government demanding the right of decision concerning recruiting proposals and Budget grants, as the withdrawal of these rights from the country had placed it at the mercy of the Austrian and Hungarian Governments and gave Bosnia the character of a colony. These rights, it was claimed, could fairly be demanded by Bosnia, seeing that the expenditure on the Bosnian and Herzegovinian troops had risen from 213,000 kronen in 1883 to 7,167,708 kronen in 1912.

The Hungarian Home Secretary, J. Andrassy (son of the Premier of the same name), in a recently published book on the causes of the War of 1914,\* energetically champions Austria-Hungary's cause against Serbia in view of the Great-Serbian propaganda, etc.

His reasoning concerning the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Serbian question is particularly illustrative of the Austro-Hungarian official point of view, but is hardly likely to convince the impartial observer.

"I do not deny," he says, "that we, too, have made mistakes in our relations with Serbia, but there can be no doubt that it is not we, the larger State, who desire conquests to Serbia's detriment, but that it is the lesser State which harbours plans of expansion at our expense."

But the answer to this is that the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina was a conquest at the expense of Serbia, who thus lost all hope of reaching the Adriatic, to her lasting detriment.

"The annexation," says Andrassy, "was a direct result

\* J. Andrassy, *Wer hat den Krieg verbrochen?* (1915).

of the Serbian agitation, and was carried out under pressure of the conviction that the steadily growing Serbian propaganda could not be stamped out as long as the *legal status* of our monarchy was not internationally defined.

“The Bosnian local Government believed that the constantly growing South Slav agitation would be promoted by the false notion that Bosnia and Herzegovina were only temporarily placed under our charge and that the European mandate would soon be revoked, since it had ceased to have any purpose.

“The annexation decree was intended to put an end to these notions and agitations.”

Andrassy shows, however, that this Government measure brought about the opposite to what was intended by it. This decision aggravated the resentment. The whole Serbian nation, the official as well as the non-official classes, displayed an aggressiveness which perhaps is only met with among neighbours who live in peace with one another. The then Foreign Minister, Joanovitch, although the most peaceable among Serbian politicians, wrote (in *Die Serbische Frage*): “I declare, as the Minister responsible for Serbia’s foreign policy, that the Serbian national programme, in the situation created during the last few days, demands the *liberation* of Bosnia and Herzegovina. . . . Here Austria is a constant danger, a constant menace to us. By the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, by the closing of the Adriatic to Serbia, by preventing a union between us and Montenegro, Austria-Hungary forces upon us and all Serbians in a more or less distant future a titanic struggle, a fight of life and death.”

Andrassy admits that “there are and may be differences of opinion as to the *expediency* of the annexation, and the formalities employed in this measure may also be open to discussion.” Yet he emphasizes that “the direct purpose of our occupation was once and for all to *destroy Serbian hopes of expansion westward*.” He disputes the

contention of the Serbian Foreign Minister that Austria-Hungary's mandate of occupation had come to an end, and maintains that it was not subject to any limitations whatever. As a sort of proof in this respect he recalls what the elder Andrassy said on December 1, 1878, in the Austrian Delegation, in reply to a question how long the occupation would continue: "Until it has attained all its ends—that is to say, until the South Slavonic danger has disappeared, until the Western Balkans have reached a more settled state and the Eastern question has ceased to exist."

It was Austria's annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the violation of the law of nations and the will of the people which it involved, that brought into being the vehement agitation among the Serbians there and in Serbia. In societies and in the Press hatred and incitement to revenge were the order of the day. Foremost among these societies was the *Narodna Odbrana* of Belgrade, founded as a result of the popular agitation which surged up in Serbia on the annexation of the two provinces, and which had for its object the strengthening of the national sentiment, the formation of volunteer corps, the championing of the defence movement among the Serbian people, etc. The society had four departments: educational work, physical training, economics, and foreign affairs. With it were associated several other societies with a like aim.

Among them was the *Dusan Silni*,—a "Sokol" or training club. According to a speech of its president, in January 1914, the "Sokol" movement, which arose through the struggle *against Germanism*, is a purely Slavonic institution which has for its aim to unite, to inspire, and, by educational and physical training, to prepare for the contest with the enemies of Slavism.

Amongst the pronouncements in the Serbian Press I may mention articles in the *Politika* and *Mali Journal* of October 8, 1910, discussing the annexation of Bosnia and

Herzegovina. These articles contained vehement outbursts against Austria-Hungary, and warned Europe that the Serbian people were intent on revenge. The *Politika* on April 18, 1911, said : " By the incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina all chances of friendship between Serbia and Austria-Hungary have been destroyed for ever. That every Serbian knows."

*Piemont* on October 8, 1913, said : " It is five years to-day since, by an Imperial decree, the Habsburg sceptre was extended over Bosnia and Herzegovina. The people vow vengeance. Serbian soldiers vow this day that they will deal with the 'second Turkey' as they have, with God's help, dealt with Balkan Turkey." \*

Even though we must deeply deplore the assassination of the Austrian Heir Apparent, Francis Ferdinand, and his consort on June 28, 1914, carried out by the young Bosnian student Princep pursuant to the plans of a Serbian conspiracy, we should lack a true understanding of national psychology were we not to admit that the conspiracy was in a certain measure *brought about by Austria* and that it was founded on political and patriotic motives. In times of popular unrest and clamour we must reckon with young hot-heads whose acts follow too closely on the impulse of the moment but may nevertheless be an expression of universal and righteous resentment. Unhappily, in this case, entirely innocent people, whose murder served no end whatever, became the chance victims of circumstance.

The criminal psychology of our time demands a dispassionate scrutiny of all conceivable motives for crime, and often takes extenuating circumstances into account in passing judgment. This science does not, like the criminal judge, look to the penal code alone for guidance, and does not merely see in the accused person a potential criminal ; it studies him as a human being, seeking to elicit his inherited qualities, his temperament and character,

\* Cf. Austria-Hungary's *Red Book*, No. 19.

and, last but not least, the environment in which he has lived, the external circumstances, etc.

It seems to me evident that Princip was not a vulgar murderer, but an overstrung, nervous young man who, together with the other assailant, Cabrinovic, had been hypnotized into committing an act of folly by the passionate hatred of Austria.

The Belgrade newspaper *Balkan* said of the two assassins : \* “ Cabrinovic, a compositor, was full of anarchical ideas and known to be a restless spirit. Princip was a quiet, nervous, docile young man, inclined to Socialism. Both had grown up in Serajevo and were since childhood united by the bonds of the closest friendship.” Another Belgrade paper, the *Mali Journal*, said of the murder of the Heir Apparent : “ He was assassinated by a boy whom grief over the oppressed and stifled country of his birth had driven to hysteria.”

Austria-Hungary delivered on July 23 the notorious and fateful Note to Serbia, demanding a reply within forty-eight hours. This Note constituted an accusation against Serbia of complicity in the conspiracy which a number of Bosniaks had formed against the Austrian Heir Apparent, and opened with a reminder of the Serbian Government’s declaration of March 31, 1909, regarding the abandonment of all opposition to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then followed the indictment : “ The history of recent years, and more especially the painful events of June 28, have shown the existence in Serbia of a *subversive movement* with the object of *detaching certain parts of the territory of Austria-Hungary from the Monarchy*. The Serbian Government, far from carrying out the formal undertakings contained in the declaration of March 31, 1909, has done nothing to repress this movement. It has permitted the criminal machinations of various societies and associations directed against the Monarchy, and has tolerated unrestrained language on the part of the Press,

\* Cf. Austria-Hungary’s *Red Book*, suppl. 9, p. 94.

the glorification of the perpetrators of outrages. The depositions and confessions of the perpetrators of the deed of June 28 show that the Serajevo assassinations were planned in Belgrade, that the arms and explosives with which the murderers were provided had been given to them by Serbian officers and functionaries belonging to the *Narodna Odbrana*. . . . These results of the investigation impose on the Government the duty of putting an end to the intrigues which form a perpetual menace to the tranquillity of the Monarchy."

The Austrian Government accordingly demanded a formal assurance that the Serbian Government condemns this propaganda, and enjoined that it should publish in the *Official Journal* a specified declaration of ten points.

In its reply of July 25 to the Austro-Hungarian Note, the Serbian Government declared that it "could not be held responsible for manifestations of a private character, such as articles in the Press and the peaceable work of societies, manifestations which take place in nearly all countries," etc. ; but it is "prepared to hand over for trial any Serbian subject of whose complicity in the crime at Serajevo proofs are forthcoming . . . condemns and deplores all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary . . . regrets, that according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government certain Serbian officers and officials should have taken part in the propaganda . . . declares that it will take the most rigorous steps against all persons guilty of such acts," etc., all of which would be published.

The Government declared itself willing to carry out eight of the ten points of the Austrian Note which deal with the suppression and punishment of the agitation directed against the Monarchy, but stated that "it does not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand (Clause 5) that Serbia should *accept the collaboration of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government upon her own territory*, and cannot agree that (according to Clause 6) *agents or authorities appointed by the Imperial and Royal Government*

shall be entitled to participate in the inquiry into the plot of June 28, as this would be a *violation of the Constitution and of the law of criminal procedure.*"

The Serbian Government concluded its reply with the following words : " If the Imperial and Royal Government is not satisfied with this reply, the Royal Serbian Government, considering that it is not to the common interest to precipitate the solution of this question, will be ready always to accept a pacific understanding, either by referring the question to the decision of the *International Tribunal at The Hague* or to the *Great Powers* which took part in the drawing up of the declaration made by the Serbian Government on March 31, 1909."

Austria-Hungary's ultimatum, seeing that its rejection by Serbia was clearly expected and a warlike solution of the conflict was desired, was undoubtedly a precipitate and deplorable act. Its consequence has been a World War in which millions of human beings have been killed or mutilated, and which has been carried on with a barbarity to which the history of modern times knows no parallel.

## XII—*continued*

### THE WORLD WAR OF 1914

#### B. THE SERBIAN CONFLICT AND THE GREAT POWERS : AUSTRIA'S DETERMINATION TO SUBDUE SERBIA BY WAR : THE MEDIATION PROPOSALS OF GREAT BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND RUSSIA : AUSTRIA'S OPPOSITION : WHY DID AUSTRIA NOT WANT A CONFERENCE ? GERMANY SUPPORTS AUSTRIA : WAR DECLARATIONS OF THE POWERS.

COMPETENT judges throughout Europe have agreed that the conditions of points 5 and 6 were unacceptable by any independent State. Moreover, they *could not* have been complied with in the short respite of forty-eight hours allowed for the reply, as this would have necessitated an amendment of the Criminal Code, which would require a longer time.

The Governments of Russia, France, and Great Britain also expressed the view that these points were unacceptable, and that Serbia's reply in other respects tendered ample satisfaction—a fact which Austria-Hungary should recognize. Russia also advised Serbia to concede every possible point of the Austrian Note.

M. Viviani, the French Premier, declared in a letter to Paul Cambon in London on August 1 that “France has throughout, with England's concurrence, advised moderation in St. Petersburg; this advice has been followed. M. Sazonof has from the very beginning exercised pressure on Serbia to induce her to accept all the demands of Austria's ultimatum which were compatible with her sovereignty.”

When point 5 of Austria's demands for satisfaction from Serbia by assenting to the collaboration of Austrian functionaries in the suppression of the subversive movement in Serbia, was opposed by the Powers, who considered it to constitute an encroachment upon the sovereign rights of the Kingdom, and the Russian Foreign Minister called attention to this, Count Berchtold instructed the Austrian ambassador to inform Sazonof "in strict confidence" that the insistence on this point "was due altogether to practical considerations and was by no means intended to raise the question of Serbia's sovereignty. In speaking of 'collaboration' in point 5 we have in our mind the institution of a *secret 'bureau de sûreté'* in Belgrade which would operate in the same way as the analogous Russian institutions in Paris, and would collaborate with the *Serbian police and administrative authorities.*"

Sazonof allowed himself to be persuaded that Serbia's sovereignty was not threatened, but declared that the enforcement of this point would place Serbia in a position of *vassalage to Austria.*

Austria's *Red Book* and Serbia's *Blue Book* show the points of view of the two States respecting the Serbian agitation against Austria. In spite of all their efforts to clear themselves, the Serbian Government must undoubtedly bear a heavy burden of responsibility; for they had remained inactive during the propaganda against Austria and had been guilty of sundry evasions with regard to the evidence, and it is clear that Austria was entitled to demand guarantees for the future, and satisfaction for this toleration of the agitation.

The Austrian Note of July 23, however, not only asked for guarantees and satisfaction, but seemed calculated to *push the conflict to a point* from which there could be no receding except *by force of arms.*

In a Note of July 23 to the Austrian ambassador in London Count Berchtold stated that Austria *could not* subject her demands to *negotiation and compromise*, as they only contained what was *evident*, and that the

Monarchy, in view of its economic interests, could not run the risk of Serbia prolonging the crisis indefinitely.

The Austrian Government, on a proposal for mediation being put forward by Sir Edward Grey, insisted that the question at issue was one for settlement between Serbia and Austria alone—although knowing full well Russia's attitude—and must, therefore, have foreseen that a universal war would follow.

When Sir Edward Grey (July 24) objected to Austria's appending to the Serbian Note an ultimatum allowing but forty-eight hours for a reply, on the ground that it would be time enough to present an ultimatum after the reply had been received if it were found unsatisfactory, Count Berchtold explained that it was "not a formal ultimatum," only "eine befristete Demarche" (a *démarche* with a time-limit), which, if it were not accepted within the time given, would "for the time being only be followed by the rupture of diplomatic relations and the beginning of the necessary military preparations"—a diplomatic *jeu de mots*, in other words. That the Note bore the character of an ultimatum was evident from the added observation that Austria was "*irrevocably resolved*" to enforce her demands.

Austria's ambassador in Belgrade, Baron Giesl, summarized in a telegram of July 21 Serbia's recent attitude and referred to it as "nationalistic madness," at the same time dwelling on Serbia's hatred, nay, her contempt, for Austria. As this telegram was dispatched the day before Austria's Note to Serbia it will be seen that it could not have formed a basis for the latter. Moreover, the telegram contains nothing beyond general reflections on the inextirpable enmity of the Serbians, and Baron Giesl merely remarks that "a settlement with Serbia, a war to safeguard the Monarchy's position as a Great Power, nay, its very existence, *cannot in the long run be avoided*."

The Serbian Crown Prince Alexander telegraphed on July 24 to the Tsar acquainting him with the Austrian Note and the unacceptable points, and pointing out the

probability that Serbia would be attacked. "We are unable to defend ourselves," he wrote, "and we beseech your Majesty to come to our assistance as quickly as possible."

The Emperor Nicholas answered on July 27 that he hoped the Serbian Government would omit nothing which might obviate a war, as long as Serbia's dignity was not at stake, and that he was making efforts in the same direction. "If, in spite of our most earnest wish, we fail herein, your Royal Highness may rest assured that Russia will *under no circumstances remain indifferent to Serbia's fate.*"

When the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Berlin was instructed to ask the German Government to obtain from the Vienna Cabinet on July 25 an extension of the time-limit allowed in Austria's ultimatum, von Jagow did not receive him till late in the afternoon—that is to say, when the grace was about to expire. He pointed out that Austria's *communiqué* to the Powers took place so late as to make its effect illusory, seeing that *the time did not permit them to take cognizance* of the alleged facts, for which reason he must ask for an extension of time. Herr von Jagow answered that he considered that all these measures came *too late*. He said further that "it was not a question of war, merely of punishment in a local question"; and when the ambassador complained that "the German Government did not realize its responsibilities, as in the event of hostilities ensuing, *they might involve the rest of Europe*," Jagow answered that he could not believe in any such consequences.

This method of washing one's hands of the whole conflict and of the question of mediation by declaring that it was merely a matter of "punishment" in a local question is far too trivial a treatment of an appallingly serious contingency. It shows, in any case, Germany's determination to countenance no mediation.

On the same day the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Vienna

made similar representations to the Foreign Office, and pointed out to the Foreign Secretary that it was a breach of international courtesy to refer to the Powers causes for complaint based on absent documents without giving them time to acquaint themselves with the circumstances.

When the Russian Government requested Count Berchtold to grant an extension of the time-limit for Serbia's reply to the ultimatum, he directed Count Szapary, the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg, to answer (July 25) that "*we cannot allow an extension of the time-limit.*" The ambassador was, moreover, instructed to say that "*our Note to the Powers was not at all intended as an invitation to them to give their respective views,*" and was merely to be regarded as "*an intimation* which we thought it our duty to give as a matter of international courtesy."

Thus a categorical rejection of all mediation.

It was on the same day that Giesl advised Serbia that diplomatic relations had been broken off, and immediately left Belgrade.

That the Austrian Government, whilst declining all mediation of the Powers in the Serbian question, was aware that Russia, in case of war with Serbia, would become Serbia's ally, and that Germany would join Austria in the war, is plain from Count Berchtold's letter of July 25 to Austria's ambassador, Count Szapary : "*We realize, of course, the possibility that a conflict with Russia may develop out of the Serbian dispute. We could not, however, allow the prospect of such a conflict to sway us in regard to our attitude towards Serbia. Yet it is conceivable that if Serbia rejects our demands and armed intervention on our part becomes necessary, Russia may reflect before she acts and may even be willing to restrain the war party.*"

Count Berchtold also assumed that the ambassador would have arrived at a complete understanding with the German ambassador in Petersburg, "*who has no doubt been instructed by his Government to make it perfectly*

clear to the Russian Government that Austria-Hungary in case of conflict with Russia, *will not stand alone.*"

Austria's declaration of war against Serbia was made on July 28 by the following communication from the Foreign Minister: "The Royal Serbian Government not having answered in a satisfactory manner the Note which the Austro-Hungarian Minister delivered on July 23, the Imperial and Royal Government are compelled to *see to the safeguarding of their rights and interests*, and, with this object, *to have recourse to force of arms*. Austria-Hungary, therefore, considers herself henceforward in a *state of war* with Serbia."

Next day Belgrade was bombarded.

Even if Austria-Hungary's charges against Serbia respecting the aggressive agitation against the Monarchy caused by the Great-Serbian propaganda were well-founded, this did not constitute a sufficient reason for war until attempts had been made to settle the dispute raised by the assassination of the Heir Apparent, more especially as Serbia agreed to the proposal of mediation by neutral Great Powers and herself suggested referring the matter to The Hague Tribunal.

According to Austria's *Red Book*, the *Russian mobilization* was the cause of the rupture between Russia and Germany.

But it should be noted that the Russian Minister of War had declared to the German Military Attaché at St. Petersburg as early as July 26 that *if Austria crossed the Serbian frontier Russia would mobilize* four military districts against Austria. Thus, when Austria declared war on Serbia on July 28, she was aware of Russia's intention. It seems a naive move that Count Berchtold should now appeal to the German Government to point out to the Russian Government "in a friendly manner" that this mobilization constituted a threat against Austria and must be answered by "the most extensive military counter-measures in Austria and Germany." The ambassadors in

St. Petersburg and Paris were also “to declare in a friendly manner that a continuation of the Russian mobilization would lead to counter-measures in Germany and Austria, which must have serious consequences. This was a final attempt to avert a European war.”

It is of the highest importance to note, however, that Berchtold nevertheless declared that Austria “*clearly could not allow any interference in her military measures against Serbia*”!

It should be noted that Germany’s demand that Russia should cease mobilizing, at the risk of otherwise giving rise to a German mobilization and a declaration of war, was not presented until *after* Austria’s representations of July 28 and 29. Austria must thus bear a great part of the responsibility for Germany’s ultimatum of July 31, and the cause thereof lies in her obstinate insistence on a settlement of the Serbian conflict by force of arms and her refusal to accept the mediation suggested by Sir Edward Grey. When Count Berchtold on July 31 stated his willingness to accept a further English proposal for mediation, he laid down two conditions: that “our military action against Serbia shall continue,” and that the British Cabinet should prevail upon the Russian Government to “suspend the Russian mobilization directed against us.”

Berchtold had, however, declared the day before in a telegram to the Austrian ambassador in St. Petersburg that “*it has never been our intention to withdraw any part of the points of the Note.*”

Pursuant to an old tactical device—which by now should be considered out-of-date—Austria-Hungary made out at the beginning of the Serbian War that *Serbia was the aggressor!* Berchtold instructed his ambassador in London (July 28) to inform Sir Edward Grey that Serbia had ordered a general mobilization as early as 3 P.M. on July 25, whilst her answer to Austria’s Note was not delivered until 6 P.M., and that Austria “had up till then made no military preparations,” but “was compelled to

do so by the Serbian mobilization." The Austrian ambassador in Petersburg was told to make a similar statement.

How little this signified may be gathered from the fact that Berchtold instructed the Austrian ambassador in London as early as July 24 that "*military preparations*" *in Austria must ensue on expiration of the time-limit.*

When Austria-Hungary had presented her declaration of war to Serbia and immediately began warlike operations (July 29), although Russia had declared that she could not be indifferent to the fate of Serbia, Russia mobilized four of her military districts. The German Government had been made aware of the Russian measures by the statement that they were a *consequence of Austria's war preparations.* The Russian Foreign Office issued an official account of the incidents of the last few days preceding the outbreak of war, in which reference is made to "*the Russian Government's willingness, by means of direct negotiations with the Vienna Cabinet, or, in accordance with Great Britain's proposal,* by a conference between Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy, to continue the negotiations for a peaceful solution of the conflict. But Austria-Hungary declined all further negotiations with us, and the Berlin Cabinet refused to take part in the proposed Conference between the Powers. Russia still persisted in her efforts to arrive at a peaceful solution, but her proposal was declared by Germany to be unacceptable. At the same time news was received of general mobilization in Austria-Hungary, and warlike measures were being taken on Serbian territory, Belgrade being subjected to a fresh bombardment." \*

It has been unanimously attested from British, Russian, and French sources (*White and Yellow Books*) that *Austria did not only entirely conceal her intentions against Serbia during July*, but sought, on the contrary, to *lull the Entente Powers into the belief* that no warlike enterprise was contemplated, but that "*a peaceful settlement might*

\* Cf. Russian *Orange Book*, No. 77.

be anticipated," as reported on July 22 by M. Dumaine, French ambassador at Vienna.

Germany, moreover, assured the Entente Powers repeatedly that the German Government was *not cognizant* of Austria's Note to Serbia before it was delivered.

Herr von Jagow, the German Foreign Minister, declared on July 24, in answer to the inquiry of M. Jules Cambon, the French ambassador, that the Berlin Cabinet had been *ignorant of the Austrian demands* until they were presented at Belgrade, but that he *approved* them now that he had seen them. Cambon, however, was struck by the anxiety of Jagow and all his officials to convince everybody that they were unaware of the contents of the Austrian Note. To a representative of the British Legation Jagow also solemnly declared that he had no previous knowledge of the Note. Baron von Schoen, the German Ambassador in Paris, assured the Foreign Office (July 25) that Austria and Germany had not discussed the Austrian Note together and that the German Government were unacquainted with it, although they subsequently approved of it. M. Berthelot, sectional head in the department, said to him frankly that "Germany's attitude was unexplainable by any ordinary mode of reasoning, unless that country *contemplated war*. Was it likely that Germany would range herself by Austria's side in such an adventure *with her eyes shut?* Could it be supposed that Austria had taken up an attitude from which there was no going back, unless she had first *weighed with her Ally all the consequences* of her uncompromising attitude? Schoen once more affirmed that Germany had no knowledge of the tenor of the Austrian Note."

The Entente Powers had their reason for doubting this statement. M. Allizé, the French Minister at Munich, advised the Foreign Minister on July 23 that the Bavarian Premier "had spoken of the Note, *with which he was acquainted*," and the British ambassador at Vienna, Sir Maurice de Bunsen, informed Sir Edward Grey that he "had received information that *the German ambassador*

was acquainted with the tenor of Austria's ultimatum to Serbia before it was dispatched, and that he telegraphed it to the German Emperor. I know from the German ambassador himself that he endorses every line of it." \* All very strange. The German Emperor, like the Bavarian Premier, had been acquainted with the contents of the Note before it was dispatched, but the German Foreign Minister, von Jagow, and the German ambassador, von Schoen, knew nothing about it! Does that mean that the German Emperor, who is answerable for his actions to God alone, need not confer with his Ministers, or does it mean that he was ill on the fateful day when the Note was telegraphed to him and therefore could make no communication? Or is this merely *la haute politique*? If so, it is unfortunate that it should have been so completely exposed by the French and British ambassadors. It brings to mind one of Bismarck's favourite sayings: "He lies like a dispatch!" Are the new German Ministers eager to display the same ingenuity as Bismarck, when he forged the Ems telegram?

Judging from all reports, it is evident that the Entente Powers were completely taken aback by Austria's demands in the Note to Serbia, its suddenness and its form of an ultimatum, just at a moment when the French President and Premier were on their way from St. Petersburg to Stockholm and could therefore, in the short time of forty-eight hours, do nothing to contribute towards a peaceful solution of the conflict.

Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British ambassador in Vienna, telegraphed on July 27 to Sir Edward Grey that after conferring with other ambassadors of the Great Powers, the impression was left on his mind that "the Austro-Hungarian Note was so drawn up *as to make war inevitable*."

When Sir Edward Grey on July 26 submitted his pro-

\* Cf. French *Yellow Book*, No. 21, and the British *Blue Book*, No. 95.

posal, supported by France, for a *conference* between Germany, Great Britain, France, and Italy, with a view to averting hostilities between Austria and Russia, the German Foreign Minister, von Jagow (July 27), declared that this conference, politically regarded, would be tantamount to a *court of arbitration* and could not be summoned except at the request of the two States. He "was therefore *unable to agree to the proposal*, however gladly he would have co-operated to preserve peace." He declared, in spite of Cambon's earnest entreaties, that "he *could not intervene* in the Austro-Serbian conflict." In reply to the question whether he had undertaken to follow Austria blindly whatever she might do, and whether he had acquainted himself with Serbia's answer to Austria, he said that he "had not yet had time" ! \*

In a telegram to Sir Edward Grey of July 28 Sir Edward Goschen, the British ambassador in Berlin, declared: "The Imperial Chancellor wished me to tell you that he was most anxious that Germany should *work together with England* for the maintenance of general peace. . . . *He had not been able to accept your proposal for a conference* of representatives of the Great Powers because he did not think that it would be effective. . . . His Excellency said that he *did not wish to discuss the Serbian Note*, but that Austria's standpoint—and in this he agreed—was that her quarrel with Serbia was a *purely Austrian concern* with which Russia had nothing to do. . . . His last words were that a war between the Great Powers must be avoided."

On the following day Sir Edward Goschen telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: "The Imperial Chancellor regrets to say that the Austro-Hungarian Government, to whom he had at once communicated your opinion, had answered that *events had marched too rapidly* and that, therefore, it was *too late* to act upon your suggestion that the Serbian reply might form the basis of continued discussion."

When Serbia was unable to submit to Austrian police

\* Cf. French *Yellow Book*, No. 74.

supervision as demanded by Austria, and the latter State would not accept Serbia's promises without a guarantee that they would be fulfilled, Cambon suggested at Berlin that an *International Commission* should be appointed to supervise Serbia's inquiry into the conspiracy against Austria. But Berlin and Vienna deemed that there was no time to lose. When Cambon's suggestion was put forward (July 29) the conflict between Germany and Russia had come into the foreground.

The French and British official documents contain vehement reproaches against Germany on account of her having, through her ultimatum to Russia, destroyed the prospects of a peaceful solution of the Serbian conflict, of which hopes were held out when Count Berchtold permitted his ambassador in St. Petersburg to discuss the Serbian Note with the Russian Foreign Minister.

Whilst the Austrian Government regarded the Serbian reply to the Note as unsatisfactory, and considered the conciliatory attitude to be only apparent, the British ambassador in Vienna intimated that the Serbian reply seemed to furnish the possibility of a basis for an understanding. But with this Count Berchtold could not agree. Sir Edward Grey thereupon appealed to the German Government to prevail upon Vienna either to regard the Note from Serbia as satisfactory or to accept it as a basis for discussion between the Cabinets. But Berchtold was equally obdurate in declining the suggestions received from Germany, inasmuch as the negative portion of the Serbian reply referred to the very point which would furnish a guarantee for the attainment of the desired purpose.

The German ambassador in Vienna, Herr von Tschirscky, was represented both by the French and the British ambassador there as working for war, and the French ambassador in Berlin, M. Cambon, reported that Germany was preparing to "support Austria in a particularly effective manner."

When the German ambassador in St. Petersburg de-

manded on July 30 that Russia should cease her military preparations, affirming that Austria would not violate Serbia's territorial integrity, M. Sazonof replied: "It is not only Serbia's territorial integrity which we have to safeguard, but also her independence and her sovereignty. We cannot permit that Serbia should become the *vassal of Austria*. By intervening in Petersburg and declining to intervene in Vienna, *Germany is only seeking to gain time* so as to give Austria an opportunity of crushing the little Serbian kingdom *before Russia has time to come to its assistance*. But the Emperor Nicholas is so anxious to avert war that I am permitted in his name to make you a fresh proposal:

"If Austria, recognizing that her conflict with Serbia has assumed the character of a question of European interest, declares herself ready to *eliminate from her ultimatum those points which violate the principle of Serbian sovereignty*, Russia engages to *stop all military preparations.*" \*

According to the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's statement in the German *White Book*, *Germany meant to make common cause with Austria in the Serbian conflict*. This fact is of the utmost importance, as it implies that Germany approved the wrongs which Austria inflicted on Serbia and Austria's refusal to accept Serbia's proposals for an amicable settlement, and rejected Serbia's suggestion that the matter should be referred to The Hague Peace Tribunal, as well as Sir Edward Grey's proposals for a conference of four Great Powers with a view to composing the differences between Russia and Austria and thus averting war.

Everything goes to show—and there is no dearth of evidence in the published official correspondence between the Powers prior to the outbreak of war—that the German Government, whilst never failing to protest its pacific intentions and its wish to co-operate with the other

\* Cf. French *Yellow Book*, No. 103, and Russian *Orange Book*, No. 60.

Powers, by procrastination and evasions placed itself between them and Austria and brought all attempts at conciliation to naught and encouraged, if it did not actually exhort, Austria to take up an obdurate attitude.

How can one condone a policy like that of the German Chancellor, who professed that he was willing to co-operate with England, yet *did not wish to discuss the question at issue* ; or an attitude such as that of the German Foreign Minister, who, like the Austrian Government, found that the proposals for negotiation and mediation had come too late, as events had marched too rapidly, etc. ? During the last few days before war broke out many telegrams were exchanged between the Russian, British, and German monarchs, all of whom besought one another to work for peace and to defer mobilization ; Prince Henry of Prussia and King George also exchanged telegrams on the subject. But it all came to nothing, as all proposals for mediation or arbitration, the only means of averting war, were declined by Germany and Austria.

It is a curious fact that the telegram which the Tsar dispatched to the Emperor William on July 29, and which conveyed his desire for *arbitration*, is entirely omitted from the German *White Book* ! It has since been published in Russia's *Official Gazette* and contains the following passage : “ *It would be right to give over the Austro-Serbian problem to The Hague Tribunal. I trust in your wisdom and friendship.* ”

Commenting hereon, the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* points out that this proposal for arbitration “ could not be taken seriously *in view of Russia's military preparations against Austria-Hungary*, seeing that Russia on the same day, July 29, ordered the mobilization of thirteen army corps against Austria-Hungary.” It is worthy of note that mobilizations were constantly cited as causes for war, although, of course, every State, including Germany, must prepare to have recourse to arms *when negotiations prove of no avail.*

In his work *Wer hat den Krieg verbrochen?* Andrassy deals exhaustively with Russia's Balkan policy and endeavours to show that it is Russia who is mainly to blame for the Great-Serbian agitation, and that "*Russian aggressiveness and pretensions in the East were the primum mobile and the real cause of the World War*, and that this aggressive policy was only rendered possible by *her Allies*."

Austria-Hungary's share in bringing about the war can, says Andrassy, even in the eyes of the Entente, "only consist in our wish to prosecute our legitimate aim, to safeguard our existence and our most vital interests by *more radical means* than the Entente considered suitable or cared to endorse"—that is to say, in other words, castigation by force of arms in a *localized war*. For the conflict with Serbia, he says, was "a matter which did not concern anyone else in the least." Andrassy goes on to say that whilst the acts (*Daten*) of the Entente show that it made no *tangible offer* in the interest of the world's peace, these same acts show that we, the offended, the threatened party, agreed to *great sacrifices* in the cause of peace." He also praises Germany for having "honourably supported us in our endeavour to solve the Serbian question *without European complications* and with such guarantees as would obviate any renewal of the agitations which have been carried on up to the present."

It is surprising to note that Andrassy denies the Entente Powers the merit of having sought to settle the Serbian dispute in the interests of peace, whereas they demonstrably made the most strenuous efforts in this direction, and that, on the other hand, he does not shrink from asserting that Austria-Hungary made "great sacrifices." These sacrifices are quite unknown. It is clear that Austria-Hungary did not concede a single point of her ultimatum to Serbia, and Andrassy himself says that "more radical means" than those of the Entente would have to be used. As regards Germany's help, it was not of a kind to avert European complications, but exactly the reverse.

We have on record from an Austrian source a remarkable statement which is in clear contrast to Andrassy's view and shows that Germany really stood in Austria's way and exerted a determining influence on her attitude in the Serbian dispute. I refer to a communication in *La Gazette de Lausanne* of December 17, 1914, from an *Austrian diplomatist*, who had retired on account of differences of opinion with the leaders of Austro-Hungarian policy. He wrote, amongst other things, the following : "The Serbian answer to the Austrian Note after the Serajevo crime seemed *satisfactory enough* to justify us in claiming a real diplomatic victory. By consenting to a conference of the Great Powers we could have secured a partial surrender sufficient to prevent a recrudescence of the Great-Serbism which the Government at Belgrade has favoured to our detriment.

*Our diplomacy was spurred on to maintaining an obdurate attitude*, and at the moment when the question seemed, in spite of all, to be nearing a solution, the ultimatum to Russia was dispatched in order to cut off our retreat and *prevent any conciliatory efforts* on our part.

Ever since October 7, 1879, when we signed the treaties of alliance with Germany and Italy, we have been a *political tool in Prussia's hand*. Italy's rôle has been no more pleasing, but during the last few years she has managed to emancipate herself from the Prussian tyranny and safeguard her vital interests, and this at our expense. For thirty years the *Ballplatz has toed the line traced out by Berlin* ; we have forgotten Sadowa and turned our attention to the East, which Germany assigned to us as a suitable prey and at the same time prevented us from taking. We have served only to alarm Russia, to threaten the interests of the Mediterranean Powers, and thus to maintain the *political insecurity indispensable to the rulers of Germany in order that the Reichstag might be induced to pass the increasingly burdensome War Budget.*"

We have seen from the foregoing how first Serbia in her

reply and then the Emperor Nicholas proposed that the Serbian dispute should be referred to The Hague Conference, and that Great Britain and France suggested mediation through the Great Powers, but that Austria would have nothing to do with it.

Now, if ever, with the prospect of a general European war, surely the Powers should have been unanimous in referring the dispute to The Hague Tribunal. The parties to The Hague Conference of 1907 affirmed their inflexible desire to work for the maintenance of universal peace and to encourage by every means in their power an *amicable settlement* of international disputes. They also bound themselves, as far as circumstances would permit, to invite the co-operation of impartial Powers before having recourse to arms.

It is curious to note that Serbia had not pledged herself to The Hague Convention, but that Austria, on the other hand, was a party to it !

What can have been Austria's innermost motive in the dispute with Serbia in preferring the arbitrament of war to consenting to arbitration ?

This motive must have been a very serious one. I can find only one reason : the Austrian Government must have feared that the mandate of the Berlin Congress authorizing Austria to *occupy* Bosnia and Herzegovina, the occupation itself after a three months' war, and finally the formal *annexation* would be brought forward as throwing some light on the anti-Austrian agitation in Serbia and Bosnia.

It was impossible to tell beforehand how a conference would regard these matters. The mandate of the Berlin Congress authorizing Austria to occupy the provinces might be disapproved of—different times, new points of view, other men—or perhaps the conference would not endorse the Imperial rescript proclaiming the annexation and would declare it to be but a *worthless scrap of paper*—with far more reason than Bethmann-Hollweg had in so describing the Belgian Neutrality Treaty.

Austria has maintained, in view of the Great-Serbian aspirations, that it was impossible for Austria to concede any part of her territory to Serbia ; it would have been a dangerous precedent for other parts of the Monarchy.

But supposing that a conference were to decide that the part called Bosnia and Herzegovina was not a legitimately acquired territory ? Supposing it were to regard the annexation as a breach of international rights ?

These fears would have been well grounded, and Austria clearly did not wish to run the risk, and refused unconditionally to agree to the arbitration proposals. But she could not have acted as she did without Germany's help and without the hope that Germany would give her an effective backing.

Andrassy says so outright in his book *Wer hat den Krieg verbrochen ?* "Germany," he says, "did all in her power to localize the question, but when she saw that this could not be done and that Russia was willing to go to war for the sake of Serbia's prestige, Germany had but one aim : to conduct the negotiations in such a way as to bring about a *quick decision and enhance the prospects of victory*."

M. Ivanovitch, Serbian Minister at Vienna, wrote to the Premier, M. Pashitch, in a report on the situation, that Herr von Tschirscky, German ambassador in Vienna, had stated openly that *Russia would keep quiet whilst Austria-Hungary carried out her punitive expedition* against Serbia, and that Russia had no right to intervene.

Long before this it had been said and written in Vienna that there must be *war with Russia before she was ready* in a military sense.

The French ambassador in Vienna, M. Dumaine, wrote on July 28, 1914, to the Foreign Minister : "The most disquieting among the suspicions aroused by the sudden and violent resolve of Austria is that Germany may have urged her to aggression against Serbia so as to be able herself to enter the lists against France and Russia in circumstances which she supposes to be the most favourable for her."

The Italian Premier, Salandra, made a statement in the Chamber on December 4, 1914, concerning the outbreak of war, which also shows the opinion held in Austria with regard to Russia's attitude : " From the beginning of the war, after the Serajevo crime, when the relations between Austria and Serbia were at their worst, the then Foreign Minister, the Marquis di San Giuliano, deemed it his duty to advise Vienna to *show moderation and avoid Russian intervention* in Belgrade's favour. To this Austria replied that she did not think that *Russia was sufficiently prepared*, after the war with Japan, to undertake any military operations in aid of Serbia."

The German Government and General Staff were well aware of the *need for prompt action*, and certainly did not expect that Russia would be ready to fight Germany in 1914. And so Germany boldly challenged fate and placed herself without wavering by the side of Austria-Hungary when that monarchy declared war on Serbia.

Germany's plan, confident as she was in her superior preparedness for war, and believing that she would only have the Franco-Russian Alliance to deal with, was to hurl herself on France with lightning speed and force her to capitulate, or at all events to take Paris by a *coup de main*, and then with equal rapidity to throw the greater part of her armies across to Russia and bring her to her knees by a series of decisive victories. In Berlin officers boasted at the beginning of the war with the most unbounded confidence before persons whom I know that " in four weeks we shall be in Paris," and this seems to have been the general opinion.

As England in 1914 was menaced with civil war in Ireland and stood on the threshold of a social revolution, and Russia was also being threatened by a new vast upheaval, whilst in France the new Army Bill was still under discussion, it is all too probable that Germany and Austria deemed the moment propitious for a war with these countries and thought it inexpedient to delay any longer.

Although war might have been avoided if Austria had accepted the proposals for mediation in the Serbian conflict, it was represented that the *war was forced upon Austria*. Thus Francis Joseph wrote to Stürgkh, the Prime Minister (February 1915), an autograph letter in which the following passage occurred : “ When I look back upon the period of half a year, during which we have been involved in a *struggle forced upon us* by the hostile intentions of our enemies, I think with a grateful heart of the self-sacrificing bearing of my faithful peoples in this trying time.”

Andrassy speaks in a similar strain in his above-mentioned book on the causes of the war : “ The responsibility rests in the first place with Russia, and in a lesser degree with her Allies. *We have merely defended ourselves.*”

In his speech from the throne, with which the Emperor William opened the Extraordinary Session of the Reichstag on August 4, he expresses himself in the following terms : “ *Francis Joseph was compelled to have recourse to arms* in defence of the safety of his country from the dangerous plottings of a neighbouring State. . . . When the Monarchy with which we are allied asserted its rightful interests, *the Russian Empire placed itself in its path*. It is not only our duty as faithful Allies that calls us to the side of Austria ; we are also confronted with the tremendous task of *safe-guarding our own position* as well as the culture common to our two countries from the assault of the enemies’ forces. . . . The hostility which has so long been smouldering in East and West has now burst into flame. The present situation is the result of the accumulated resentment of many years at the *might and prosperity of the German Empire*. . . . From the documents which have been placed before you (the German *White Book*) you will see how my Government, and first and foremost my Chancellor, have to the very last striven to *avert a catastrophe*. In *self-defence*, with a clear conscience and with clean hands, do we take up the sword.”

The Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, explained

the situation on the outbreak of war in the German *White Book* (August 3). He described the conspiracy against the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and the Great-Serbian agitation, and spoke of Serbia's hope of obtaining Bosnia and Herzegovina with Russia's aid, but he said nothing of Austria's annexation of the provinces and their dissatisfaction with this step. He evidently considered that the Austrian Emperor was acting fully within his rights when he annexed them to his realm in 1908, and that every protest against this action was a criminal act. He wrote as follows : " It was plain to Austria that it could not be consistent with the dignity and spirit of self-preservation of the Monarchy to remain any longer an inactive witness of this movement on the other side of the frontier. The Imperial and Royal Government *appealed to Germany's righteous judgment* and asked us to state our opinion. We could not but *endorse with all our heart our Allies' view of the situation*. . . . We could not, when Austria-Hungary's vital interests were at stake, advise her to make concessions, the more so as our own interests were sensibly threatened by the Serbian agitation. If the Serbs, with Russia's and France's aid, had continued to *threaten the existence of Austria-Hungary*, this would by degrees have led to Austria's downfall and the subjection of all Slavs to the Russian sceptre, and the *position of the Germanic race* in Central Europe would have been made untenable."

It is truly surprising to witness this solicitude on Austria's behalf in a quarter from which that country had suffered the *cruellest blow* dealt it in modern times, when Prussia made war on Austria and vanquished her at Sadowa, shook her position as a Great Power, drove her out of the German Federation, and took Venetia from the Monarchy in order to present that province to Italy. No country was for a long time afterwards so hated in Austria as Prussia, to which the anti-Prussian policy of the Prime Minister Beust bore witness, when he plotted vengeance for 1866, sought a French alliance, promised Napoleon III Austria's

support in the war of 1870, and worked against Germany's reconstitution after 1871.

As a compensation for Venetia, Germany helped Austria to get Bosnia and Herzegovina ; but this brought her nothing but fresh difficulties. If her existence is threatened at the present moment, it is first and foremost due to that arbitrary annexation.

Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg sought to show how war had been made inevitable by Russia's intervention, and his main argument in this respect was the declaration which the German Government made to Russia :

*“Russia's preparatory military measures have compelled us to take counter-measures which must take the form of mobilization. But a mobilization means war.”*

To him the question of mobilization was the deciding factor, and he refers to mobilization in one country or the other twenty-four times in eleven pages in the *White Book* to show that “the Russian Government, by their mobilization, which imperilled the safety of the German Empire, frustrated the painstaking mediatory efforts of the European Cabinets.”

When Russia did not stop her mobilization on Austria's declaration of war against Serbia, the German Government declared that “we consider ourselves in a state of war since our demands have been rejected. Furthermore, Russian troops had crossed our frontiers and marched into German territory before the confirmation of the carrying out of the order had been received. *Russia thus began the war against us.*”

With regard to France, the Chancellor asserted that her Prime Minister, on Germany inquiring as to her attitude, gave “an unsatisfactory answer and declared that France intended to act as her interests dictated. A few hours later orders were sent out for the mobilization of the entire French Army and Navy. On the following morning *France commenced hostilities.*”

The Chancellor endeavoured to support this assertion, made in his Reichstag speech of August 4, by quoting the

German ambassador von Schoen's unconfirmed statement as to hostile acts on the part of the French.

It should, however, be pointed out that, as the French Government emphasized, *mobilization is not war*.

Of this Sweden is an example. Directly the war broke out the Government ordered general mobilization, but this was most certainly not done in order that we might take part in the war on one side or the other, but so as to place us in a position to defend our neutrality in case it should be violated.

The impartial, pragmatic historian, who depicts the sequence of events and traces them to their source, cannot admit that a mobilization shall be held up as reason for a declaration of war. The tactical device of thus denouncing the opponent as *the attacking party* is an old one, and might now be regarded as antiquated. This persistent production of proofs—real or apparent—as to *who was the first to mobilize* and as to *who was the first to cross the frontier* is a diplomatic trick which inspires little respect. The intention was to point to certain countries as the real instigators of the war, whilst others would seem to have done all in their power to preserve peace and to stand forth as the attacked party, forced into a war of self-defence. It is the old story. No impartial and thinking observer pays any heed to it. The *date of the mobilization* in one country or the other is a secondary matter, however important it is made to appear. The mobilizations did not settle the question of peace or war.

The war between Russia and Austria-Hungary was stated here to have come about as follows: The Austrian ambassador in Berlin telegraphed on August 2 to Count Berchtold: "Russian troops have crossed the German frontier at Schwiden. Russia has thus attacked Germany. Germany therefore considers herself at war with Russia." Thereupon Count Berchtold, in a Note to the Russian Foreign Minister on August 5, declared that "in consequence of *Russia's threatening attitude* in the conflict between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Serbia,"

and as Russia “ by reason of this conflict considers herself justified in *commencing hostilities against Germany*, and Germany is thus in a state of war with the said Great Power, Austria-Hungary likewise considers herself to be *at war with Russia.*”

Germany having declared that a state of war existed, the Tsar issued a manifesto containing the following passage : “ Austria-Hungary, having presented demands to Serbia which were intentionally of such a nature as *could not be accepted* by an independent State, and having, without considering the Serbian Government’s pacific and conciliatory answer, rejected Russia’s friendly intervention, *hastened to proceed to an armed attack* and began the bombardment of the defenceless city of Belgrade. . . . Russia’s duty is not only to protect a kindred State, which has been unrighteously affronted, but also to safeguard Russia’s honour, her dignity, her integrity, and her place amongst the Great Powers.”

Between France and Austria-Hungary the state of war began by the French Government intimating that “ since the Austro-Hungarian Government have declared war on Serbia, and have thus *taken the first step to hostilities* in Europe, they have without challenge from the Government of the French Republic *created a state of war with France* : (1) Germany having in turn declared war on Russia and France, the Austro-Hungarian Government has entered the conflict. (2) According to numerous trustworthy reports, Austria has dispatched troops to the German frontier under circumstances equivalent to a direct threat against France. In view of these facts the French Government are compelled to declare that they will take all steps which may be necessary to reply to these acts and threats.”

Great Britain entered a state of war with Austria by Sir Edward Grey’s declaration that “ as a rupture has taken place with France a state of war exists between Great Britain and Austria-Hungary.”

There is no doubt that the German Imperial Government

could have averted war had they wished to do so. A juxtaposition and impartial examination of all the Notes exchanged between the Powers—as taken from their official *White*, *Yellow*, and *Blue Books*, etc.—shows this with the utmost clearness. In this respect Germany has not been “maligned” by her opponents.

When M. Viviani in his speech in the Chamber of Deputies on December 22, 1914, said that Germany could have prevented the war as late as July 31, had she agreed to the proposal already accepted by Russia and France for *pourparlers* in London, and had she meanwhile suspended all military measures, Bethmann-Hollweg controverted this view—which is becoming more and more widely shared in neutral countries—in a long circular to the German diplomats abroad in which, as in all his previous utterances, he *merely denied everything* that had been said and proved by opponents as to Germany’s negative negotiations prior to the outbreak of war, and once more threw the blame on England, France, and Russia.

Italy’s neutrality during the early part of the war was significant, not only as a disappointment for Germany and Austria, as Italy had now left the Triple Alliance, but also as bearing on the question whether the war was one of attack or defence. Italy was tied to the Triple Alliance only in the event of the other members of the Alliance being attacked—that is to say, waging a *defensive war*—but not if they were the attacking parties. This is clearly evident from the statement which the Premier, Signor Salandra, made in the Italian Chamber on December 4, 1914, in the course of which he said: “*Without our having been consulted and without our approval*, the war suddenly broke out. After weighing with the utmost conscientiousness the *letter as well as the spirit* of the Treaty of Alliance, and after having made ourselves *thoroughly acquainted with the causes and the aims of the war*, we arrived at the conscientious and firm conviction that we were *not bound to take part in it*, and we accordingly at once proclaimed our *neutrality*.”

Thus the Italian Government were unable to share the view of the German Government, that Austria and Germany were *attacked* and were compelled to wage a defensive war, but considered, on the contrary, that they were themselves the attackers and that their war was a *war of aggression*.

## XII—*continued*

### THE WORLD WAR OF 1914

#### C. GERMANY'S VIOLATION OF THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM AND LUXEMBURG : GERMANY NEGOTIATES WITH GREAT BRITAIN : GERMANY'S HOSTILE MEASURES AGAINST FRANCE AND BELGIUM : PROTESTS : DECLARATION OF WAR : THE DEFENDERS OF THE VIOLATION OF NEUTRALITY : WHAT DROVE GREAT BRITAIN INTO PARTICIPATION IN THE WAR : SYNOPSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR.

AUSTRIA's ultimatum and declaration of war against Serbia drew Russia into the war between these countries, with the result that Germany, as Austria's ally, declared war on Russia. France, as Russia's ally, was bound to join in the war against Germany, whom she had not challenged, and Germany desired, in pursuance of her plan of campaign, to penetrate into France across her most vulnerable frontier, that in the north-east, for which reason she asked Belgium and Luxemburg to permit her armies to march through these countries, although their neutrality had been guaranteed by treaty (*cf.* pp. 82-84). M. Davignon, the Belgian Foreign Minister, on July 25, 1914, advised those Powers who had guaranteed her neutrality that, in the event of the realization of the menace of a Franco-German war, it was the Belgian Government's "*firm resolve to fulfil the international obligations imposed upon us by the treaties of 1839.*"

Nevertheless the German Chancellor on August 2 demanded that Belgium should "observe a benevolent

neutrality towards Germany" and permit a free passage through Belgian territory, threatening that if Belgium acted in a hostile manner towards the German troops—that is to say, *defended her neutrality*—she "would be regarded as *Germany's enemy*." The reason adduced was that the German Government "possessed reliable information as to an intended advance of French forces along the Meuse over the sector from Givet to Namur."

No evidence was offered in support of this assertion.

The Belgian Foreign Minister replied that "the intentions ascribed to France were contrary to the express declaration given us in the name of the Republic on August 1," and that "if Belgian neutrality were violated by France *Belgium should fulfil all her international obligations*." "The Belgian Government, were they to accept the proposals made, would sully the honour of the nation and at the same time *fail in their duties towards Europe*."

The German Government thereupon declared, on August 4, that in view of this negative answer they would be compelled to "take such *measures of precaution* as were deemed indispensable to countering the *French threats*."

Diplomatic relations were thereupon broken off.

On the same day the British Government informed the Belgian Government that they "expect that Belgium will resist by any means in her power, and that they are prepared, jointly with Russia and France, to offer common action for the purpose of resisting use of force by Germany against Belgium."

When the French Government were informed of Germany's ultimatum to Belgium concerning the breach of neutrality, they protested against it in the following terms: "The Government of the Republic *protest* to all civilized nations, and especially to the Governments signatory to the conventions and treaties [respecting Belgian neutrality], against the *violation by Germany of her international engagements*; they make all reservations as to

the *reprisals* which they may be led to use against an enemy so little heedful of a given word.” \*

When the fortress of Liège had been taken by the Germans, the German Government sought to induce the Belgian Government to become a party to the breach of neutrality: “Germany does not come as an enemy to Belgium.” When the Belgian army, by heroic resistance against overwhelming numbers, had upheld its military honour, the German Government asked the King of the Belgians and the Belgian Government “to spare Belgium the further horrors of war.”

When this appeal, which would have meant *unhampered operations in Belgium against France*, was rejected, it was said that “Belgium has committed suicide.” But Belgium, had she granted this request, would have betrayed her neutrality.

The German Government had nursed the hope of seeing Great Britain remain neutral in this war, and made strenuous efforts to achieve this end.

On July 29, 1914, Sir Edward Goschen, the British ambassador in Berlin, telegraphed to Sir Edward Grey: “The Chancellor said that if Austria were attacked by Russia a *European conflagration* might, he feared, become inevitable, owing to *Germany's obligations as Austria's ally*, in spite of his continued efforts to maintain peace. He then proceeded to make the following strong bid for *British neutrality*. He said that it was clear—so far as he was able to judge the main principle which governed British policy—that Great Britain would never stand by and allow France to be crushed in any conflict there might be. That, however, was not the object at which Germany aimed. Provided that the *neutrality of Great Britain* were certain, every assurance would be given to the British Government that the Imperial Government aimed at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France,

\* The Belgian *Grey Book*, Nos. 3, 12, 20, 22, 27, 28, 47, and French *Yellow Book*, No. 157.

should they prove victorious in any war that might ensue.

“I questioned his Excellency about the *French colonies*, and he said that he was *unable to give a similar undertaking* in that respect. . . . It depended on the action of *France* what operations Germany might be *forced to enter upon in Belgium*, but when the war was over Belgian integrity would be respected if she had not sided against Germany.”

Thus we find the German Chancellor, on the day following his statement as to the necessity of *avoiding war*, negotiating with Great Britain *as if war had already been planned*. He had also acquainted Sir Edward Goschen with the reply of the Austrian Government: *Too late for mediation*. “He ended,” says Sir Edward Goschen in the same telegram, “by saying that the object of his policy had been, ever since he became Chancellor, to bring about an *understanding with England*.”

On the same day, July 29, Sir Edward Grey informed Sir Edward Goschen by telegram that he had told the German ambassador in London that “if Germany became involved [in war] and then France, the issue might be so great that it would involve all European interests; and I did not wish him to be misled by the friendly tone of our conversation into thinking that we should *stand aside* . . . but that if the situation really became such that we thought British interests required us to intervene, *we must intervene at once*.”

On July 30 Sir Edward Grey replied to Sir Edward Goschen’s telegram of July 29: “His Majesty’s Government *cannot for a moment entertain* the Chancellor’s proposal that they should bind themselves to *neutrality* on such terms . . . to stand by while French colonies are being taken and *France is being crushed*, so long as Germany takes no French territory as distinct from the colonies. . . . It would be a *disgrace* for us to *make this bargain with Germany at the expense of France*. . . . The Chancellor asks us in effect to *bargain away* whatever obligation or

interest we have as regards the neutrality of Belgium. We could not entertain that bargain either. . . . We must preserve our full freedom to act as circumstances may seem to us to require."

This was the message which Sir Edward Goschen was instructed to deliver to the Chancellor, and he was to add : " If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavour will be to promote *some arrangement* to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that *no aggressive or hostile policy* would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately."

On July 31 Sir Edward Goschen replied to this telegram : " I read to the Chancellor your answer to his appeal for British neutrality in the event of war. His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier, referred to in my immediately preceding telegram, that he received your communication *without comment.*"

On July 31 Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to the British ambassadors at Paris and Berlin as follows : " In view of the prospect of mobilization in Germany, it becomes essential to his Majesty's Government, in view of *existing treaties*, to ask whether the French (German) Government are prepared to engage to *respect the neutrality of Belgium* so long as no other Power violates it." The ambassador at Paris replied the same day that he had received an answer from the French Foreign Minister in the following terms : " *The French Government are resolved to respect the neutrality of Belgium*, and it would only be in the event of some other Power violating this neutrality that France might find herself under the necessity, in order to ensure the defence of her own security, to act otherwise. This assurance has been given several times. The President of the Republic spoke of it to the King of the Belgians, and the French minister at Brussels has to-day spontaneously *renewed the assurance to the Belgian Minister for Foreign Affairs.*"

The German Government made *no response* to the request ; the British ambassador telegraphed on July 31 that “ the Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed me that he must consult the Emperor and the Chancellor before he could possibly answer. I gathered from what he said that he thought any reply they might give could not but disclose a certain amount of their plan of campaign in the event of war ensuing, and he was therefore very doubtful *whether they would return any answer at all*. . . . It appears from what he said that the German Government consider that *certain hostile acts have already been committed by Belgium*. As an instance of this he alleged that a consignment of corn for Germany *had been placed under an embargo already*.”

Germany’s intention was thus clear. But to “ consider ” that Belgium had committed a hostile act against Germany by acting as alleged is an utterly unjust charge ; for Belgium was bound, under The Hague Convention of 1907, to order this embargo after Germany’s ultimatum to Russia.

The Belgian Foreign Minister also made a statement on the subject to the effect that it was a matter of “ complying with the Royal Ordinance of July 30 prohibiting for the time being the export from Belgium of certain products,” and that when the German minister gave notice about the grain consignment the Belgian Customs authorities on August 2 “ received instructions which gave Germany full satisfaction.” \*

That Luxemburg would keep her neutrality inviolate was not to be expected. An attempt was made, however, when M. Eyschen, her Prime Minister, on July 31 demanded from the German minister an official declaration promising that the *neutralit y of the Grand Duchy should be respected*. The latter replied that this *went without saying*, but it was necessary that the *French Government should make a similar declaration*. On August 1 the *French Government telegraphed the desired undertaking*.

\* See Belgian *Grey Book*, No. 79.

On the following day *Luxemburg was occupied by German troops.*

The Prime Minister thereupon sent an energetic protest to the German Emperor. The Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, replied that the military measures taken in Luxemburg were solely intended to protect the German traffic on railways leased to Germany from *possible attack by the French army.* It was further alleged that *French troops had already crossed over into Luxemburg territory* and thence *threatened the German frontier.* This assertion is dealt with exhaustively in a *Yellow Book* published by Luxemburg. Of great importance is the Prime Minister's categorical *denial of the German assertion as to the violation of neutrality on the part of France.* "Before Europe," and with the approval of the Chamber, he called the entire Grand Duchy to witness that *nobody in Luxemburg had seen or heard of any such French measures.* Far from crossing the frontier of the Grand Duchy, the French had by *tearing up a part of the railway* deprived themselves of the means of moving troops into Luxemburg by rail.

M. Viviani, the Prime Minister, issued on July 30 a statement to be communicated to the British Foreign Minister in order to show the French and German military preparations respectively : "Although Germany has taken her covering precautions up to within a *few hundred metres of the frontier* along the whole front from Luxemburg to the Vosges, and has advanced her covering troops to their fighting positions, we have kept our troops at a distance of *ten kilometres from the frontier* and have forbidden them to advance further. . . . In France men on leave were only recalled after we were sure that Germany had taken this step *five days earlier.* . . . In Germany the garrison troops of Metz have not only been brought up to the frontier, they have also been reinforced. . . . The preparations to place the frontier fortresses on a war footing were begun in Germany on July 25 ; we in

France are now also about to take these steps. . . . In Germany reservists have been called up in tens of thousands by individual notices ; those residing abroad have been recalled, and reserve officers have been called up ; in the interior of the country the roads are barred, and motor-cars may only circulate with special permits. This is the last stage before mobilization. None of these steps have yet been taken in France. The German armies' advanced posts are at our frontier sign-posts. On two occasions yesterday German patrols invaded our territory. It is thus clear that France has taken no aggressive measures." M. Viviani next advised M. Cambon, the French ambassador at Berlin, on August 1, that France was up to the last endeavouring with the co-operation of Great Britain to realize Sir Edward Grey's last mediation proposals, but that Austria was placing obstacles in the way by her mobilization. "*Germany's attitude*," he went on, "has absolutely forced us to issue to-day a decree of mobilization. *Long before the Russian mobilization*, on July 29, Baron von Schoen announced to me the forthcoming proclamation of the *Kriegsgefahrzustand*. This step has now been taken by Germany ; under cover of this screen she began at once her real mobilization. Our decree of mobilization is therefore a *necessary measure of self-preservation*. The Government have accompanied it by a proclamation, signed by the President of the Republic and all the Ministers, in which they explain that *mobilization is not war*, that mobilization in the present moment is to France the best means of preserving peace."

The German ambassador at Brussels intimated to the Belgian Government on August 3 that German troops *had entered Belgium, and delivered an ultimatum to the effect that his Government, having learnt that the French were preparing for operations in the vicinity of Givet and Namur, saw themselves compelled to take certain measures of which the first was to call upon the Belgian Government to state within seven hours whether they were willing to facilitate in Belgium Germany's military operations against*

*France.* In case of refusal the matter would be settled by recourse to arms.

The Belgian Government replied that "they deemed the information as to French movements *unreliable* in view of the formal assurances which had just been given by France; that Belgium *solemnly protests* against all violation of her territory no matter from what quarter, and *will know how to defend with all energy her neutrality*, which has been guaranteed by the Great Powers, and more especially by the King of Prussia."

The assertion in Germany's ultimatum that the French contemplated military operations at Givet and the accusation of thus threatening Germany are absurd, as Givet is a *French town*.

After German troops had on August 2 crossed the *French frontier* in several places, M. Viviani lodged a protest with the German Government against what had thus taken place, which constituted an unprovoked violation of the frontier.

On August 3 the German ambassador, von Schoen, handed the Premier a communication intimating that a *state of war with France* existed and giving the following reasons: "German administrative authorities have had brought to their attention a number of unmistakably hostile acts committed by *French military aviators*. Several of these have plainly violated Belgian neutrality by *flying over the territory of that country* (!); one has sought to destroy buildings at Wesel; others have been seen in the neighbourhood of Eiffel; and yet another has thrown bombs on the railway at Carlsruhe and Nuremberg.

"I am empowered and have the honour to inform your Excellency that the German Empire, in the face of these attacks, *considers itself to be in a state of war with France by reason of the measures taken by that country*."

He accordingly asked for his passports.

So this was the reason which Germany elected to give for her war on France. One may well be astounded at this rupture, for which there was *no provocation whatever*

*on the part of France.* The German Government referred to France's "measures." What had France done but to work hand in hand with Great Britain and Russia to avert war? She had declared that she would respect the neutrality of Belgium and had not made, or even prepared to make, an attack on Germany through Belgium, the allegation of which is demonstrably a *pure invention*.

M. Viviani emphatically contradicted the German ambassador's statements, both to his face and in the speech in the Chamber of Deputies on August 4, in which he announced the state of war. He pointed out in his speech the absurd nature of these pretexts, and declared that "no French aviator has at any time flown over Belgium; no French aviator has either in Bavaria or in any other part of Germany committed any hostile act."

The Premier once more drew attention to Germany's acts of aggression against France, Luxemburg, and Belgium. The French frontier had been crossed at fifteen points; rifles had been discharged at French soldiers and custom-house officers, several being killed and injured; a German military aviator threw three bombs on Lunéville on August 3. He instructed the ambassador at Berlin to protest to the German Government against these hostile acts, since supplemented by others: two German patrols had crossed the frontier on August 2 and penetrated over ten kilometres into the interior, reaching the villages of Joncherey and Baron, where the officer in command shot a French soldier through the forehead, and where cavalrymen seized horses, etc.

France had demonstrably committed no hostile act and had conscientiously respected the zone of ten kilometres behind which she kept her troops even after mobilization.

It may be mentioned, by the way, that the German newspaper *Vorwärts* contradicted one of the statements that French aviators had been seen over Germany, and that the German Government admitted an attack on French soldiers by German patrols.

In his message to Parliament on August 4 President Poincaré declared that "France has been the victim of a brutal and premeditated attack which constitutes an insolent *challenge to the rights of humanity*. . . . France is entitled to claim most solemnly that up to the last moment she made supreme efforts to *avert* the war which has now broken out and for which *the German Empire must bear before history a most crushing responsibility*. . . . France represents to-day before the world the cause of liberty, of justice, and of reason."

King Albert of Belgium appealed on August 4 to Great Britain, France, and Russia, as guarantors of the neutrality of Belgium, to co-operate in the defence of her territory against German aggression. The appeal to Great Britain contained the following words : "The German Government have handed the Belgian Government a Note proposing a benevolent neutrality which will permit a *free passage through Belgian territory* and promising on the conclusion of peace to preserve the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions, but threatening *in the event of refusal to treat Belgium as an enemy*." An answer within twelve hours was demanded.

The Belgian Government categorically rejected this request as constituting a most flagrant violation of international law, and lodged a protest against this violation of a treaty (Treaty of London, 1839) to which Prussia, as well as Great Britain, France, and Russia, was a signatory. The British Government called upon the German Government (August 4) to withdraw their ultimatum to Belgium and to give their answer on the same day, and declared themselves prepared to come to the aid of Belgium in co-operation with France and Russia.

The German minister at Brussels informed the Belgian Foreign Minister on the same day that "the German Government, as the Belgian Government have rejected the friendly proposals made by the Imperial Government, will be *compelled to carry out by force of arms those measures which are necessitated by the French menaces*."

When, in view of the German threats to penetrate into Belgian territory by force of arms, the British ambassador presented the ultimatum of his Government and demanded that Belgium's neutrality, which had been guaranteed by treaty, should be respected, Bethmann-Hollweg expressed his surprise at Great Britain attaching so much importance to the "*scrap of paper*" of 1839! Seldom has the civilized world been so dumbfounded, seldom has its sense of right and wrong been so offended, as by these words uttered by a leading statesman, and the actions which followed them.

We are reminded by these incidents of what the upright and enlightened Swedish Chancellor, Axel Oxenstjärna, who, with Gustavus Adolphus and Richelieu, had so great a share in European politics during the Thirty Years War, wrote to his son Erik: "The world is made up of dissimulation and falseness; this we must recognize and bear in mind, that we may not be deceived"; and to his son Johan: "Are you not aware, my son, *with what little wisdom the world is governed?*"

Ever since Bismarck organized the diabolical Germanism and the brutal policy of might, in accordance with Machiavelli's teachings, international law has ceased to exist in the minds of certain leading statesmen and professors in Germany. Treitschke in his works on *Politik* (1874 and 1894) openly propounds this doctrine of might and violence, which unfortunately has brought him many admiring disciples.

"A State cannot pledge its own will for times to come in its relations with other States," he says. In other words, international treaties are not always binding on a State, but merely constitute a voluntary restriction as long as the State deems such restriction to be to its advantage.

Treitschke's disciple, General Bernhardi, also declares that there is no general international law, and that "every nation works out its own conception of what is right."

Thus it was in pursuance of a German-made policy of

might and violence that Germany's leading statesmen violated Belgium's neutrality.

One of the foremost exponents of the law of nations, the Frenchman Montesquieu—President of Parliament, historian, encyclopaedist—wrote in his famous work *L'esprit des Lois* (1748) on the subject of war: “Power of offence is regulated by international law, which is the political law of nations regarded in the light of their relations to one another. . . . Law in war is based on *necessity and on what is strictly just*. If those who guide the conscience of princes or are their advisers fail to abide thereby, all is lost; and if one be guided by such principles as honour, prosperity, and utility, rivers of blood will inundate the earth.”

It may also be apposite to recall what Frederick the Great wrote in his *Antimachiavel* on the *sanctity of treaties*: “I admit that there are deplorable necessities under which a prince must not recoil from breaking his treaties and alliances; but he should withdraw from them as an *honourable man* by giving notice of his intention in good time, and, above all, should not proceed to these extremities unless obliged to do so for the welfare of his people, or by a most urgent need. . . . Honour and wisdom demand of princes that they shall *religiously adhere to treaties and strictly observe their provisions*.”

Now, did the welfare of the German people demand that the German Government should violate the Belgian treaty of neutrality?

In his Reichstag speech of August 4 Bethmann-Hollweg declared that the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg was necessitated by Germany's “*extremity*,” that “necessity knows no law,” and that this is “*contrary to the dictates of the law of nations*,” but that “*we knew that France stood ready for attack*—for which reason we were obliged to ignore the protests of the Governments of Luxemburg and Belgium.”

But he adduced no proofs, no facts, no reports or intercepted documents, etc., to show France's intentions; it sufficed for him to say: “We knew.”

The Imperial Chancellor admitted, however, that the rights of the neutral States had been infringed when he remarked : “The wrong which we commit we shall endeavour to make good hereafter.”

Germany asked of Belgium a “benevolent neutrality” and a free passage for her armies through Belgian territory. Thus it was on strategical grounds, to the detriment of France, that Germany’s violation of the law of nations was committed.

Had Belgium consented, she would, as the German statesmen ought to know, herself have violated her neutrality and the Treaty of 1839, which *pledged Belgium not to grant any such privilege to any belligerent Power*. Had Belgium done so, she would thereby have *given France the right* to let her armies march through Belgium.

It cannot be made sufficiently clear that the violation of the guarantee of Belgian neutrality was thoroughly *premeditated* and formed part of Germany’s *strategical plan in case of war with France*. Lieut.-Colonel Frobenius, in his book on *Germany’s Fateful Hour*, published shortly before the war, speaks of the possibility that “German troops may, *by infringing Belgian neutrality*, make their invasion through that country, or else through Switzerland.” The invasion of Belgium and of Luxemburg had nothing whatever to do with the alleged knowledge that the French entertained a similar strategical plan, or that an agreement in the nature of an alliance between Belgium and Great Britain had been discovered. *No proofs* have been forthcoming in these respects, and these statements are nothing but assertions and misrepresentations.

In Germany they have sought to explain away Belgium’s neutrality and to show on the authority of certain Belgian documents that Belgium herself broke her neutrality, and that Germany was, therefore, fully entitled to treat her as an enemy. But all this has been in vain, as may be gathered from the following :

In its issue of November 26, 1914, the *Kölnische Zeitung*

wrote as follows : “ We were within our rights in invading Belgian territory, seeing that *Belgium did not observe her obligations as a neutral*. That this is so is clearly proved by two *unassailable documents*, one of which has been published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*. This document proves that there existed a *secret agreement* between Belgium and Great Britain for *co-operation* between the military forces of those two countries in a war against Germany.”

The Belgian Government published in this connexion a reply stating amongst other things that when Colonel Barnadiston, military attaché to the British Legation, one day in January 1906 asked General Ducarne, of the War Office, whether Belgium was prepared to defend her neutrality, the General answered that “ we are prepared to defend ourselves at *Liège against Germany*, at *Namur against France*, and at *Antwerp against Great Britain*.” Subsequently several conversations took place between the Chief of the General Staff and the military attaché regarding the measures which Great Britain should take for the performance of her duties *as guarantor*.

By devoting himself to the study of this question the Chief of the General Staff merely performed the duty of inquiring into the measures calculated to enable Belgium, either alone or with the aid of the guaranteeing Powers, to *repel a violation of her neutrality*.

On May 10, 1906, General Ducarne submitted to the War Office an account of his conversations with the British military attaché. In this report it is made clear in two separate passages that the dispatch of *British assistance* to Belgium would be *contingent upon the violation of her territory*. Besides, there is a marginal note—which the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* omits to translate, lest it should come to the knowledge of the majority of its readers—making it unmistakably clear that *British troops would not enter Belgium until after Germany had violated her neutrality*. The course of events has amply demonstrated the wisdom of this anticipation.

A document published in the *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung* on October 25, 1914, refers to a meeting between General Jungbluth and Colonel Bridges which shows that the conversation about the British guarantee, in 1912, led to no result. Was it necessary, then, to inform the Powers that Colonel Bridges had given a piece of advice which was approved neither by the British nor the Belgian Government and against which General Jungbluth immediately protested, his interlocutor not deeming it worth while to insist? That would have been absurd.

*Germany's intended justification thus recoils upon herself.*

In his speech before the Reichstag on August 4, 1914, and in his conversation with the British ambassador on the following day, the German Chancellor declared that the attack on Belgium was solely *dictated by strategic necessity*.

Germany cannot plead good faith, seeing that she only *discovered the documents* with which she pretended to justify her violation of Belgian neutrality *after she had deliberately broken her treaty obligations*. The documents to which Germany refers show plainly that a *violation of Belgium's neutrality by Germany was anticipated* and that no agreement had ever been concluded on this question.

A speech by M. de Broqueville, Belgian Premier and War Minister, at a secret sitting of the Parliament in 1913 with reference to the new National Service Act, shows plainly that all the German Chancellor's talk of a secret alliance between Belgium and France is the purest fiction. De Broqueville's speech contained the following passage: "The reason for the Government's Army Bill is the German Army Act of July 14, 1912. This Act implies the greatest strain which Germany has imposed upon herself since 1870. Last summer we learnt that it is intended to *let the German army advance through Belgium*. We owe this information to several foreign Powers. It is, therefore, incumbent on us to go to the root of the matter.

"I fear no violation of our neutrality on the part of France, but I am informed that the *French Government has been compelled to study the question of a French advance*

*through Belgium in the event that Germany should fail to respect our territory.* In order to prevent a breach of our neutrality we must speedily *prepare in both directions.* The greatest danger is that foreign Powers may take possession of our territory for the purpose of protecting us. This warning has been given us by several heads of States, and as late as July of the present year a friend of the King of the Belgians, the ruler of a State, remarked with emphasis to our King: ‘I give Belgium the friendly advice to proceed with vigour to *prepare for self-defence*, for the miracle of 1870, when Belgian territory remained inviolate between two hostile armies, will not be repeated.’” The personage in question was King Carol of Rumania.

De Broqueville also spoke of the French military measures which Belgium would have to take into account in considering the protection of her territory, although there was good reason for assuming that France would not infringe her neutrality except as a means of defence against a German attack through Belgium. This was what actually took place a year after the speech was made. Germany obviously stood to gain infinitely more by violating Belgian neutrality, because she had more rapid means of attaining a war footing. This was an eventuality which Belgium had to reckon with and was bound to prepare for.

King Albert, in speaking to a Swiss correspondent of the *Berner-Bund* at the end of March 1915, uttered the following words, which confirmed the sentiments which the Belgian Government had already expressed: “Neutrals are very sensitive to any attack or reflection on their attitude. That is quite natural. I can assure you that I and my country have always prior to the war *observed with the utmost conscientiousness the duties of neutrality prescribed by the Great Powers.*

“ Yet we are only doing what Swiss citizens would have done, had anyone sought to infringe the neutrality of their country. Our *passionate love of independence* seems to have surprised the enemy, and seems to have been made an excuse for the assertion that we ourselves, *by reason of a*

previous agreement with other Powers, were to blame for the infringement of our neutrality. Once more I say : There is no truth in this assertion."

With regard to the allegation that France was ready to attack Germany through Belgium, and that French regiments were there when the war broke out, it may be of interest to repeat what a Belgian lieutenant and artist, who took part in the war for several months, related to the writer Gustaf Hellström, who published his statement in *Dagens Nyheter* (November 1914). "The Germans," he said, "plead that if they had not broken the neutrality the French would have done so. Did the French do it? No, sir, when the war broke out *the French had one, I say one, miserable army corps eight kilometres from the Belgian frontier*. Had they had more, had they thought that the Germans would have marched through Belgium, they would have had ten army corps up there, and in that case Charleroi and Mons would not have looked as they look now, and Belgium would have had a great many towns safe in her hands, and our wretched countrymen would have had no need to tramp the roads and beg a crust of bread. But, as it was, *Joffre was suddenly obliged to transfer the whole of his main body from east to north. This took time*, and it was we poor devils who had to suffer for it, we and our country."

On the subject of the supposed agreement with England the Belgian said : "The Germans made the excuse that *we had secret treaties with England*. We have seen—all the world has seen—how much the English were able to help us. We well knew eight years ago that *England's army would not be created until war had broken out*, and that it takes six months before they can put an army worthy of the name into the field. And if we had a secret arrangement with England eight years ago, why did we not see to it that we had a proper army before a few months ago ?"

The German deputy Gothein wrote (in the *Berliner Tageblatt* in December 1914) : "That Belgium would be among the number of our opponents *we knew for a*

*fact years ago, although the details of the Franco-Anglo-Belgian agreements were unknown to us."*

But how did they *know* this? *Nothing, absolutely nothing* was known of any Belgian enmity towards Germany. Had it existed, doubtless Belgium's military organization would have been more efficient. The much advertised agreements with France and Great Britain amount in point of fact to nothing at all, as I have shown above.

No; there is no real ground for the German accusations against Belgium; they are merely desperate attempts to defend Germany's violation of the country's neutrality, which is, and ever will be, a shameful blot on her reputation—this is now realized in Germany—*unless means can be found of imputing to Belgium warlike designs against Germany.*

The German deputy Dr. F. Naumann, in a widely read and applauded address given in Berlin on January 10, 1915, made the following characteristic comments on Belgian neutrality (I quote from the *Berliner Boersen-Courier*):

"When one utters the word 'neutrality' one is neutral only in the sense that one awaits (*nur im Sinne Abwartens*) the shaping of events.

"Had not the *preposterous settlement of 1839* taken place, whereby a State was permitted to wage war, maintain armies, and build fortresses whilst itself remaining immune from attack, the course of action in regard to Belgium would now have been extraordinarily simple. We should merely have said, as Bismarck did in 1866 to Hanover: 'Will you, or won't you?' As it was, the British had an excellent excuse for upholding the validity of the 'paper' of 1839."

So Dr. Naumann, too, regards a treaty as a mere piece of paper; to him, in other words, there is no such thing as international law.

Some have maintained that Belgium had no valid neutrality treaty at all.

The German professor Dr. Dernburg and a pro-German

professor in America, Mr. Burgess, have thus attempted to prove that Belgium's neutrality, guaranteed by the Treaty of 1839, has ceased to be guaranteed by the Powers since the Guarantee Treaty of 1870, enacted in connexion with the Franco-German War, expired in 1872. "Since then neither France nor the German Empire has renewed the old Treaty of 1839, nor have they concluded a fresh one," says Burgess in attempting to prove that Belgium had no guaranteed neutrality at all.

The Treaty of 1870, however, provides that "after the expiration of this period [twelve months from the ratification of peace] *Belgium's independence and neutrality* shall continue, as heretofore, to be based on Art. 1 of the Treaty of the Five Powers of April 17-19, 1839."

Dernburg simply omitted this termination of the treaty and has thus been guilty of a palpable falsification. Such are the methods which have been employed in German quarters to seek to justify the outrageous violation of the neutrality of Belgium.

In a collection of essays on *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg* (from *Zeitschrift für Völkerrecht*, 1914) a number of German scientists have come forward to defend Germany's position in the war, and above all *her right to commit the wrong* which the Chancellor admitted in regard to Belgium.

Professor Kohler, in his essay on *Self-defence and Neutrality*, declared that the violation of Belgian neutrality was a typical example of an act of "justifiable self-defence," as France was ready to let her troops march through the country. He merely repeats what the Chancellor said on the subject, which is a demonstrable untruth, and on premisses such as these the proof of self-defence is of course easy.

Kohler contends that Belgium had no right to oppose the passage of the German troops, that, on the contrary, she *ought to have helped them* to ward off the premeditated breach of neutrality by France! Evidently he is not aware of Belgium's *obligation* to refuse such passage. He goes on to explain that Belgium had an understanding

with France, and repeats the unconfirmed or disproved assertions that French troops were taken to Belgium and crossed the German frontier before the declaration of war, etc.

The same is alleged by another author, Nelte, in an essay on *Die belgische Frage*, and he says that the town of Erquelinnes was occupied by French troops, which was not the case; it is also asserted that the late French War Minister Picquart made a journey through Belgium to inspect the fortresses on the Meuse and that French aviators had flown over Belgian territory—all sufficient reasons for annulling the treaty of neutrality (*cf.* declarations of French and Belgian Governments, pp. 215–220).

Nelte admits, however, that there are eminent experts on international law in Germany who have *privately* expressed their disapproval of the plea of self-defence.

When the great Dutch writer and thinker F. van Eeden in an open letter to his German friends criticized the attempts which have been made in German quarters to convince foreign countries of the legitimacy of German warfare in Belgium and of the reprisals against the opposition of Belgian civilians, and when he declared that “the curse of the evil deed is that it goes on creating evil,” meaning by the evil deed the violation of Belgian neutrality, W. von Blume, professor of jurisprudence at Tübingen, wrote in reply an article in *Das grösse Deutschland* (November 28, 1914) entitled *Die belgische Neutralität und wir*. He says, to begin with, that even Germany has her “well-intentioned men, who thoughtfully shook their heads over our march into Belgium,” and explains that “it is not the same to us how honest people regard us,” and that “we have always relied too much on our clear conscience and our trusty sword, and have not sufficiently taken into account that in international relations *a good reputation is an element of strength.*” But in this case, he says, “we are vainly struggling against calumny,” and he proceeds to show that Germany was entirely within her right when she allowed her armies to march into Belgium, and that the country itself violated its neutrality.

Seldom has a German professor used such an apparatus of learned advocacy to annihilate an opponent as Blume does in this article, by which he seeks to safeguard Germany's "good reputation." The reader may judge for himself from the following summary of his article :

The Germans occupied Belgium by force, he says, because they were refused a passage, although they were entitled to it by the *right of necessity*. "There exists among the nations a right of necessity, which *transforms treaties into scraps of paper* and rescinds them for the sake of a *higher right*. This and nothing else was meant by the German Imperial Chancellor when he spoke the famous word which our enemies have quoted with hypocritical indignation."

It will be seen from this that "scrap-of-paper" cynicism has now become part and parcel of German ethics !

"International law," says Blume, "rests on the fundamental conception of *international fellowship*. No neutrality can give anyone the right always and in all circumstances to be inviolable in the face of the neighbours' extremity in war. Just as the neutral State must give an asylum to troops who wish to fight no more, it *must* in certain circumstances permit fighting armies to march through its territory. *The right of necessity is the higher right*. But it is a *sine qua non*, however, that the State demanding the right of passage *must beyond doubt be engaged in a just defence against attack, and unable to ward off the attack except by setting foot on the foreign territory*."

This, of course, is the point at issue, but, in spite of the contentions of Blume and innumerable others that Germany was in this position, there exists—I repeat it once more—*no evidence whatever* of France's plan to attack Germany through Belgium, or of Belgium's secret alliance with France and England. This has become a fixed idea with the German defenders of the breach of neutrality, and is repeated quite mechanically. Blume's revelation of how Belgium infringed her own neutrality, how "in collusion with Germany's enemies she *prepared the war*

*against Germany*,” how in Berlin “this was suspected without possibility of absolute proof”—when the Chancellor exposed France’s assumed plan of marching through Belgium—“all this has now at length been brought to light through the archives of the Belgian General Staff.” He speaks of the celebrated papers concerning the conferences between the British military attaché and the Belgian General Staff in 1906, etc., which have been fully proved not to imply any preparations of war against Germany (see pp. 222–223). Blume proceeds: “I am quite prepared for the next retort, that Belgium *took precautions merely in the event of her being attacked by Germany*.” He must be well aware that this was the case, and *yet* he says that “we know that Belgium made every preparation for the operations of the allied armies.”

A spirit of utter fanaticism seems to have obscured the reasoning faculties and blighted all sense of justice in the mind of this eminent professor of jurisprudence.

But it is not enough that Belgium should herself have violated her neutrality; this culpable country has further offended against her obligations as a neutral *by not having armed sufficiently!* One can hardly believe one’s own eyes. The learned “Professor der Rechte” teaches as follows: “It is the duty of a neutral State to be *so well armed* that its neutrality does not become a *danger to its neighbours*. A State which has not performed this duty does not deserve to retain its neutrality. Its neutrality becomes a *worthless scrap of paper*, if the others *consider it obnoxious* (!) . . . That Belgium *was not sufficiently prepared* to ward off a hostile attack has now been proved to the consternation of that deluded country. . . . No, my neutral friends, neutrality is not a house which others have built for you, that you may reside in comfort therin, whilst others must purchase their existence daily with the sweat of their brow. . . . If a neutral State fails to secure its safety by its own efforts, whilst trusting to its neutrality, it becomes a danger to others, for it must, *by a policy of alliances*, make good what it lacks in defensive strength.

. . . When Belgium neglected her armaments she became dependent on the will of her neighbours. When she entered into negotiations with one neighbour concerning her attitude in case of war she failed grossly in her duties towards the others. When, in fine, she was allied to one she could not on the outbreak of war claim to occupy a neutral position. *She thereby forfeited her neutrality.*"

This reasoning compels the conclusion that *Belgium is responsible* for her war with Germany—and consequently for England's intervention, which so enlarged the sphere of war—*by neglecting to raise a sufficient army to prevent Germany from invading her territory and occupying the country!*

Belgium had, as a matter of fact, adopted a new system of national defence, but *had not had time* to carry it through in 1914. She had not been altogether neglectful, but she had delayed the reform.

That the war came so suddenly was hardly Belgium's fault ; it was Germany's will. But, supposing that the new Belgian scheme of national defence had been fully completed, does anyone think that Germany with her preparedness for war and her colossal armies would not have given Belgium short shrift when she had made up her mind to march through ? We saw how in the initial stages of the war the German armies smashed the resistance of the French and even threatened Paris, so that the French Government was compelled for a time to move to Bordeaux.

In refutation of the "reliable information" as to the projected French advance through Belgium along the Meuse via Givet-Namur, it is of the greatest interest to note what a distinguished Swedish military writer, Captain J. Hallgren, wrote in his series of articles on "The World War" in the review *Forum* on November 7, 1914. He points out that the Germans on August 19 began the attack on Namur, and on August 20 seemed prepared to begin the decisive operations, and that it was only about this time that the Franco-British army was ready along the eastern frontier. "That the Allies were not ready sooner

may well excite surprise. The French should, if the transport arrangements had from the beginning been directed towards Belgium, have been ready before the Germans. From this we may draw two conclusions : *That the French did not contemplate an advance through Belgium at the beginning of the war*, and that the main German onslaught through that country came as a surprise.”

But what is the use of all these sophistical arguments and unproved assertions about Belgium’s alleged breach of neutrality when Bethmann-Hollweg expressly declared that the violation of Belgium’s neutrality was a *wrong* and was a measure of “self-defence,” and when the Chancellor did not even hint that to his knowledge Belgium would figure as Germany’s enemy and had a secret alliance with England and France ?

We have besides, from a German source, an uncompromising explanation of why Germany is waging this war. It comes from Maximilian Harden, who in his review *Die Zukunft* (October 17, 1914) expressed his opinion in the following terms :

“ *It is not against our own will* that we have committed ourselves to this tremendous adventure. We have not been forced into it by surprise. *We willed it*—we had to will it. Mighty Germany does not propose to appear before the tribunal of Europe ; we recognize no such tribunal.

“ *Our growth in power will create new laws for Europe. It is Germany who strikes.*

“ Germany wages the war in the unshakable conviction that what she has accomplished entitles her to a *more prominent place in the world* and more elbow-room for her activities.

“ Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and Great Britain long ago took possession of and colonized enormous stretches of country, the richest in the world. Now Germany’s hour has struck, and she must take up her dominant position in the world ! ”

With regard to Belgium, Harden says that never was a juster war waged than that in which Belgium has been crushed, nor has a war ever been a source of greater blessing to the conquered people !

When Belgium expressly stated that she would not permit the passage of the German troops, and was *bound* to act thus under her treaty of neutrality, Germany's intervention with armed force became an act of barbarism. This method of *forcing* a nation into war, when it had done no wrong and shown no hostile intentions, and this deliberate violation of a treaty which had been held absolutely sacred and had been accepted by civilized nations as part and parcel of their code of ethics, have everywhere caused the greatest depression and indignation. The duty of observing *political neutrality* cannot tie down the neutral citizens of neutral countries to an *ethical neutrality*—that is, in other words, to indifference and nonchalance ; they have, on the contrary, expressed themselves strongly against this violation of the rights of others and the exaggerated and ruthless method of punishing the participation of the civil population in the defence of their country against the usurper. Germany's good name was indelibly tarnished by the assault on Belgium, and no appeal to Germanic kinship has been capable of propitiating other nations of Germanic stock. The sense of justice and humanity is stronger than the sentiment of kinship, and this latter disappears entirely when unjust and cruel acts are committed.

Righteousness will never tolerate injustice, wherever it may be committed. The voice of conscience must never be stifled or silenced. A solemnly enacted treaty has been trampled underfoot, and Germanic peoples outside Germany cannot, because they come of the same stock, endorse this policy of might, however much they may admire Germany's advanced culture. They grieve over this fall from the high place which German culture has occupied, but they are not altogether surprised, for in 1864 and 1878 Denmark was victimized by the same

policy of might, and the Sehleswigers are to this day groaning under its sinister dominance.

#### WHAT FORCED GREAT BRITAIN INTO THE WAR

The German Foreign Minister, Herr von Jagow, instructed his ambassador in London, Prince Liehnowsky, on August 4 to inform Sir Edward Grey that “the German army could not be exposed to a *French attack through Belgium*, as to the planning of which he had absolutely incontrovertible evidence. Germany was, therefore, compelled to *disregard Belgium's neutrality*, seeing that to Germany it was a *matter of life and death* to prevent the French advancee.”

On the same day Sir Edward Grey was advised that *German troops had entered Belgian territory* and that Liège had been *called upon to surrender* by a small German body, which, however, was repulsed.

In view of these events the British Government's request that Germany should respect Belgium's neutrality was changed into an *ultimatum*, which the British ambassador was to present to the Chancellor on August 4. This ultimatum drew attention to the German Government's threat to Belgium to resort to force of arms if Belgium did not grant a free passage to German troops, and to the fact that Belgian territory had been violated at Gemenich. “In these circumstances, and in view of the fact that Germany has declined to give the same assurance respecting Belgium as France gave last week in reply to our request made simultaneously at Berlin and Paris, we must repeat that request and ask that a satisfactory reply be made to-day. If this is not done, you are instructed to ask at once for your passports and to say that His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to *uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a treaty* to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves.”

Great Britain's policy *could not have been different* in

the face of the aggressive attitude of Germany and in view of all the persistent efforts which her Foreign Minister as well as those of France and Russia had made to prevent the Serbian conflict from developing into a general war. The Austrian and German ambassadors in London were certainly guilty of a piece of poor political judgment when, as reported by M. Paul Cambon on July 27, they firmly reckoned on England's neutrality, as did the German Government up to the last moment. To judge from Sir Edward Goschen's account of the impression which the British ultimatum created, it seems that Bethmann-Hollweg lost his head completely and suddenly realized the danger which now threatened Germany through her Government's bold but unwise policy. The dreamt-of war with France and Russia was now through Great Britain's intervention about to become a *world war* and Germany would no longer be able to bring her opponents to their knees and dictate terms of peace as quickly as she had hoped to do. This ought to have been foreseen by the Chancellor. Instead, he was taken by surprise and overwhelmed with anger, but he also showed how little he, in common with Treitschke and Bernhardi, respected the sanctity of treaties. When he could no longer hope for the advantage of keeping England neutral, he felt that he must at least hold *England responsible for the war*—a war which had already been declared to be the struggle of Germanism against Slavism and to have been created by the Serbo-Austrian conflict! In the Chancellor's speech before the Reichstag and throughout the Press it was the same story: "The German nation has been forced through Great Britain to fight for its life." This is the stock phrase which recurs time and again. In his speech in the Reichstag on December 2, 1914, Bethmann-Hollweg declared: "*Great Britain and Russia together bear before God and man the responsibility* for this catastrophe which has engulfed Europe and the human race."

When a German manifesto against England on account of her participation in the war had been sent out, signed

by the leading lights of the learned world of Germany, there was published in reply a manifesto signed by a large number of British men of science who defended Great Britain's policy. Its main points were to the following effect :

“ Up to the very last there was a widespread wish to preserve *Great Britain's neutrality*, provided that it could be done without dishonour. But *Germany herself made this impossible*. ”

“ Our strongest feelings and our most vital interests are alike bound up with the neutrality of Belgium. Its violation would not only destroy the independence of Belgium ; it would undermine the whole foundation which, on the whole, makes it possible for a State to be neutral. ”

“ When Germany prepared before our eyes to *break the treaty* to which we and Germany were joint signatories, and when we saw that she expected to find in England a cowardly accomplice, then hesitation became impossible even to the most peace-loving Englishman. Belgium appealed to the pledged word of England, and England kept her word. ”

“ We deeply deplore that under the sinister influence of a *military system and its lawless dreams of conquest* the country which we once honoured now stands revealed as the common enemy of Europe and of all nations who respect international law. We must continue the war we have begun. To us, as to Belgium, it is a defensive war, a *war for freedom and peace*. ”

The manifesto is signed by 116 English, Scotch, and Irish scientists, amongst whom are no fewer than four Nobel Prize winners, namely, Lord Rayleigh, Chancellor of the University of Cambridge, Sir W. Ramsay, professor of chemistry, Sir J. J. Thomson, professor of physics, and Sir Ronald Ross, professor of medicine.

Exactly the same opinion is expressed in a work by six members of the Oxford Faculty of Modern History entitled *Why We Are at War* (translated into Swedish), in which the authors, E. Barker, H. W. C. Davis, etc.,

declare that they are not themselves politicians and belong to different schools of thought. They proceed very systematically to describe the most important events preceding the war, the alliances and armaments which followed after 1871, the Serbian crisis, the negotiations between the Powers, the new German policy of might, etc.

“History,” say the authors, “will doubtless ascribe the outbreak of war between Great Britain and Germany to the development of the Belgian question, and, we are confident, will judge that, had it not been for the gratuitous attack made on a neutral country by Germany, war with Great Britain would not have ensued on August 4, 1914. We know now that there was no chance of the efforts at mediation proving successful, for Germany had made up her mind that they should not succeed. Nothing but a German invasion of Belgium could have convinced the British that German diplomacy had degenerated into robbery. England is not fighting the German people; she is fighting the political system which at the present time the German Empire represents.”

Although the immediate cause of Great Britain’s intervention in the War of 1914 was the *violation of the neutrality of Belgium* and the *threatened position of France*, she had another motive for participation in the war, that of *self-defence against Germany’s growing power*. This motive has not been repudiated in England, and hence it is unfair to speak of British hypocrisy. The *Times* wrote at the beginning of the war: “We are not going to war for the sake of Serbia, we are not going to war for the sake of Russia, we are going to war for the *sake of our own existence*.” The same paper on March 8, 1915, declared that “when England, to redeem her pledged word, intervened in defence of Belgium we knew very well, in keeping it, that self-interest has gone hand in hand with honour, with justice, and with pity. Why did we guarantee the neutrality of Belgium? For an imperious reason of self-interest, for the reason which has always made us resist

the establishment of any Great Power over against our east coast. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is quite right. Even if Germany had not invaded Belgium, honour and interest would have united us with France. We had refused, it is true, to give her or Russia any binding pledge up to the last moment. We had, however, for many years past led both to understand that, if they were unjustly attacked, they might rely upon our aid. To pillory us in such a position of infamous isolation has long been a darling dream of the Wilhelmstrasse. I would materially advance Germany's schemes of world-empire, to which, as she clearly sees, the destruction or the humiliation of England is an indispensable preliminary."

Great Britain had, with regard to France, good reason to participate in the war. Sir Edward Grey declared, in reply to the German neutrality proposals on July 30, that Great Britain could not stand aside whilst France was being crushed, and that, if France were involved without having shown an unreasonable spirit, Great Britain, too, would be drawn in. The British Government thereupon, on August 2, gave the French Government the assurance that "if the *German fleet* comes into the Channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against *French coasts* or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in its power."

This assurance was given because the French fleet, according to an agreement with Great Britain, had been transferred to the Mediterranean, so that it was not able to protect the coasts of France.

If Great Britain had remained neutral, Germany would in all probability soon have defeated France—a consummation relied upon in Germany pursuant to a preconceived strategic plan—but this Great Britain would not permit; hence the Franco-British Entente.

That Great Britain was bound to suit herself actively to the actions of France and Russia, both in the common European interest and in *her own*, was made clear by

Mr. Asquith as well as by Sir Edward Grey in their speeches of August 3-6 :

“ If France were beaten,” said Sir Edward Grey, “ if she lost her position as a Great Power and became subordinate to the will of a *Power greater* than herself, if Belgium fell under the same dominating influence and then Holland and then Denmark, would not Great Britain feel that there would be a common interest against the unmeasured aggrandizement of the Power which sought to bring about this result ? The country must realize the full magnitude of the dangers which were hanging over Western Europe. Great Britain could not wait, and at the end of such a war she could not prevent the whole of the West of Europe falling under the domination of a single Power.”

Mr. Asquith pointed out that Great Britain was fighting “ to vindicate principles of vital import to civilization : the sanctity of solemn international obligations, and the right of small nations not to be crushed by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power.”

Great Britain’s *whole position* was, moreover, threatened by Germany’s assault on France and Belgium, for this might lead to German mastery of the Channel, which Great Britain could never permit.

When Sir Edward Grey on July 30 gave his reply to Bethmann-Hollweg on the subject of the neutrality offer, intimating that Great Britain would act on the side of Belgium and France if these countries were attacked, the German Chancellor ought not to have been so surprised and angry as he was when Sir Edward Goschen submitted Great Britain’s ultimatum on August 4. The *guarantee of Belgium’s neutrality was to Great Britain the cornerstone not only of international law but also of the whole political fabric of Western Europe*, and was the result of a struggle which Great Britain had carried on for centuries to *prevent a military Great Power from dominating the Channel*.

Bethmann-Hollweg ought to have foreseen this, for it

was by no means a secret, especially as Germany had embarked on a colonial policy for her surplus population and had of late become a great naval Power.

He ought to have borne in mind Richelieu's words in his *Political Testament*: "By foresight one can readily avert many ills which can only be cured with difficulty once they have developed. . . . He who looks far ahead does naught with precipitation, because he has had ample time to weigh his acts, and one rarely does wrong when one has deliberated maturely beforehand."

To say that Great Britain *wanted* war with Germany to disarm this dangerous competitor is undoubtedly an unjust charge. Everything goes to prove the contrary.

That, on the other hand, when war seemed inevitable, she ranged herself by the side of France and Russia with an eye to her own interests, there can be no doubt, *for her whole existence would have been threatened by Germany's supremacy*. And this supremacy would prove a very great danger indeed were Germany, as was feared, to obtain a firm footing in Holland and Belgium or on the North Sea coasts opposite England. That Great Britain now intervened on account of the violation of the neutrality of Belgium cannot be set down as an act of duplicity. This intervention was thoroughly justified by her duties as guarantor, and she had two good reasons for going to war with Germany. On this point no German statesman ought to have been in doubt.

Certain well-known historical factors make England's policy perfectly obvious. Her aim has always been, as a matter of life and death to her, to prevent a Great Power from obtaining the mastery of this north-western corner of Europe. When Louis XIV made up his mind to conquer Belgium and subdue Holland, England joined Sweden and Holland in a Triple Alliance (1668) for the purpose of helping Spain to retain Belgium, a design which in the main proved successful. In the Austrian War of Succession (1741-48) England joined Austria in order, with the aid of Holland, to combat her enemy France

when that Power invaded Austrian Belgium, and by the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle England secured the restoration of Belgium. Later on, during the Great Revolution, England once more had to oppose France in Belgium, the Republic having occupied the country in 1792. France's indefatigable enemy, the younger Pitt, announced to the Government of the Republic that "Great Britain would never permit that France should arbitrarily arrogate to herself the right to break up the political system of Europe, and the British Government would never look on with indifference whilst France made herself the mistress of the Netherlands and the arbiter of Europe's rights and liberties."

Recently, however, a *real proof* has come to light in confirmation of the declaration of the British Government that it was Germany's violation of Belgium's neutrality which determined them in favour of war with Germany. This evidence is supplied by certain information published at the beginning of April 1915 in the *Labour Leader*, the organ of the *Independent English Labour Party*, to the following effect: "We think that we are right in saying that a week before Great Britain's ultimatum to Germany the majority of the members of the Cabinet were opposed to British intervention. We know on the highest possible authority that even when we stood on the threshold of war the Premier had in his hands the resignation of six members of the Government. Mr. Asquith, Sir Edward Grey, and what we may call the Imperialist group in the Government favoured Great Britain's intervention on account of the Entente with France and Russia and the secret pledges of the Foreign Office. The other group was opposed to such intervention. *If Germany had not marched into Belgium it is probable that a large group within the Cabinet would have resigned*, and that a Coalition Government would have been formed, for letters from Lord Lansdowne and Mr. Bonar Law to Mr. Asquith showed that the Imperialists could reckon on their support. *The German invasion of Belgium converted four out of the six recalcitrants into supporters of the war party*. Lord Morley

and Mr. John Burns persisted in their attitude and resigned, and they were joined by a member of the Ministry, Mr. C. P. Trevelyan."

Mr. Lloyd George, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, declared in an interview published in *Pearson's Magazine* that he would not have cared to share the responsibility of a declaration of war *had not Belgium been attacked*, and he thought he might say the same on behalf of most, if not all, of his colleagues.

This shows that, by the *breach of neutrality*, Germany drove another enemy into arms against her, and, in the circumstances, the most dangerous of them all. Moreover, it was this breach of faith which consolidated British opinion in favour of the war.

There is no ground for the suggestion that Great Britain deliberately brought about the war ; on the contrary, her attitude in the Austro-Serbian crisis showed that she was anxious to secure a peaceful solution.

In spite of the trade rivalry with Germany there was an excellent chance of composing all differences in a friendly spirit and of satisfying the mercantile interests both of Great Britain and Germany ; the British colonies were not menaced by Germany any more than the German colonies were menaced by Great Britain.

#### SYNOPSIS OF THE CAUSES OF THE WORLD WAR

##### *I. Causæ remotæ*

If we look back upon the principal happenings in Europe during the past century, we find the following antecedent, remote, or predisposing causes of the World War :

(1) *Germanism*, originally a necessary reaction after Germany's defeats in the Napoleonic wars, *became a chauvinistic obsession*, bringing with it a false racial policy based on Germanistic megalomania.

(2) *Prussia* established under Bismarck's guidance her *hegemony of Germany* by the Danish War of 1864 and the German War of 1866.

(3) Bismarck provoked the Franco-German War of 1870, by which he aimed at and paved the way for Germany's hegemony in Europe under the leadership of the military State of Prussia.

(4) *Germany's annexation of Alsace-Lorraine in 1871*, consequent upon which Germany, out of fear of a war of revenge on the part of France, continuously increased her military strength, forced France into corresponding armaments, threatened her with a new war, created the *Triple Alliance* and gave rise to the *Franco-Russian Alliance*.

(5) After the *Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78*, which made an end of Turkish oppression in the Balkan peninsula and gave rise to *independent Balkan States*, the Berlin Congress of 1878 gave *Austria advantages at Russia's expense*, with the result that Russia began to make overtures to France.

(6) Austria's mandate from the Berlin Congress to *occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina* and the arbitrary annexation of the provinces in 1908, violating the spirit of nationality and adding fuel to the Serbian agitation against Austria.

(7) *Germany's over-population and colonial policy* gave rise to the creation of a powerful fleet and the growth of an aggressive policy which operated as a threat against other Powers.

## II. *Causæ proximæ*

The events which may be set down as proximate causes of the World War were :

(1) *Austria's refusal, supported by Germany*, after the assassination of the Heir Apparent, Francis Ferdinand, had brought about the *Serbian conflict*, to refer the dispute to a *conference*, as proposed by Great Britain, France, Russia, and Serbia, and Austria's *ultimatum* to Serbia.

(2) *Germany's violation of Belgian neutrality*.

These events took place during the historic days of July 28-August 4, 1914, and may therefore be regarded as the prelude to the most appalling catastrophe that Europe has ever known, a military "halt" in the advance

of civilization, which has brought about the barbaric destruction of the lives, health, and happiness of millions of human beings.

The *responsibility* for the World War must, therefore, if these proximate causes have been correctly stated, be laid to the charge of the last-named Powers, both of which, by two annexations—of Alsace-Lorraine and Bosnia-Herzegovina—gave rise to the fatal conflicts which precipitated the war.

## XII—*continued*

### THE WORLD WAR OF 1914

#### D. GERMANY'S MILITARISM AND PREPAREDNESS FOR WAR : EUROPE'S FEAR OF GERMANY : THE GERMAN VIEW OF THE WAR : "WE HAVE BEEN ATTACKED ; GERMANY IS WAGING A DEFENSIVE WAR" : A HYPNOTIZED NATION.

A SURVEY of the wars which have visited Western and Central Europe in the last half century—those of 1864, 1866, and 1870—will reveal Prussia as the attacking party, moulding Germany into the most powerful military State in the world. Ever since the Franco-German War Germany has never ceased to arm, and has developed her military strength at an abnormal rate, and the peace, which lasted forty-three years, was but an armed peace, a sinister truce prolonged under the shadow of impending strife.

All other States have been compelled to arm and to develop their military resources to a preposterous degree because Germany, through her colossal military power and her ruthless disregard for international agreements, has been a *constant menace to peace*. Pacific assurances from leading men in Germany have never quite succeeded in reassuring other nations. This is, I think, an acknowledged fact.

When we speak of the monstrous spread of *militarism*, due to the growth of German military strength, we mean primarily the development of military power *per se*. But this term also has another meaning, which, applied to Germany, is significant.

By militarism in the narrower sense we mean colloquially the predominance and encouragement of the martial spirit, of military domination or the ascendancy of the military over the civil element.

In small countries, which have long been spared the trials of war and which have had no cause for embroilments, such as may be brought about, for instance, through alliances, a tendency to oppose all measures of national defence is apt to spring up amongst the so-called "pacifists," who think that nothing need be done to earn the privilege of living in peace, and that it is wrong to encourage armaments, because a neighbouring State might regard them as indicative of hostile intentions, or because it would be impossible in any case to protect oneself from attack by a larger Power. These people do not distinguish between militarism and national defence, and any marked interest in the latter cause is stigmatized as "militarist propaganda," which calls for counter-organization in the shape of "anti-militarist propaganda."

To some extent this opposition to military propaganda also makes itself felt among the Great Powers, as when the German workmen agitated for *Abüstung* (disarmament), but by this was only meant a reduction of the preposterous armaments to moderate proportions by mutual agreement between the States.

Although the whole world has long regarded Germany as a typical example of militarism, there are Germans who will not admit that there is any ground for this view. Thus, for instance, Dr. K. L. Walter van der Bleek \* writes as follows: "Our enemies connect the word Germany with the term 'militarism.' This is more than a mere phrase, more than a mere shibboleth. Germany's militarism is also meant to imply a principle, and the term has by malicious innuendo been given a repulsive significance.

\* See *Die Vernichtung der englischen Weltmacht und des russischen Zarismus durch den Dreibund und den Islam* ("The Destruction of English World-Power and Russian Tsarism by the Triple Alliance and Islam"), by K. L. Walter van der Bleek, 1915.

“Germany is supposed to be a State built up on a foundation of sabre-rattling and high-explosive shells, whose ideal is war, whose morality is soldierly brutality, whose system is military despotism. But those who, *sine ira et studio*, reflect on the real meaning of the word will find that the much abused militarism of the Germans is their superb organization, the *subordination of egoistical interests* to the great and ever-present aim : the freest conceivable development of *cultural aspirations* is made possible only by all-powerful order and discipline, the intelligent fitting of a part into the whole, and army and armaments merely serve for the protection of the most diligent and the most assiduous labours. “The definition of Germany’s militarism is, therefore, *love of order*, which, carried to its logical conclusion, means an *ideally organized military system*. This explains to the whole of Europe and to the inner conscience of the whole of the inhabited globe the true import of *Germany* and hence also of the *Germanic race* as embodied in the one, albeit misunderstood, expression.”

We recognize in this dazzling picture of the “maligned” German militarism the Germanistic dreams of greatness of the beginning of the nineteenth century, but they are now organically welded to the military might which Germany attained through Bismarck, whilst the spokesmen of popular enlightenment and liberal policy in the sixties of last century, such as Virchow, E. Richter, and other members of the Progressive Party, have vainly sought to stem the growth of Germanistic chauvinism into military rule, or, in other words, militarism in the spirit of the “Blood” and “Iron” Chancellor (*cf. p. 45*).

Van der Bleek reaches his apotheosis of German militarism when he says : “By Imperialism Germany does not mean military dictatorship, but merely a spiritual and moral cultural mission backed by great military and naval strength.”

On the World War he makes the following observations : “The aim of Germany and her allies is not conquest ; it is *education in morality, in culture*. . . . The *well-being of*

*the world* is bound up with *Germany's victory*; . . . the nations must be finally liberated from the *British world-yoke*. . . . It is incumbent upon us to preserve Europe's civilization through the Germanic peoples of Germany and of the North, and the nations bound to them by ties of kinship and alliance."

According to van der Bleek, "the Emperor William's Imperialism is not a craving for power, but a *craving for peace*," but he "is not deterred from chastising with a heavy hand all acts inimical to culture, and thus, when the law of nations was infringed in China, he did not hesitate to strike with his *mailed fist*."

If Germany was justified in that case—the murder of a couple of missionaries in a riot (*cf. p. 131*)—surely England had as great, if not a greater, right, in view of Germany's violation of the law of nations by her attack on Belgium, to chastise Germany with *her mailed fist*.

Nowhere has militarism attained such a growth as in Germany, and especially in Prussia. The idea of the superiority and importance of the military, as compared with the civilian element, is encouraged by the ruling class; to don the Emperor's uniform is to achieve a higher status, and no one is given a commission in the army who belongs to the lower classes, so that one may truly speak of a *military caste*. *Implicit obedience* to one's superiors is the duty of all, and this duty is impressed with the utmost rigour on recruits. William II once said in a speech to the recruits of his Guards, some years ago, that they must blindly obey their superiors, even were it a question of shooting their father or mother!

This subordination is an exact parallel to that enforced in the Order of the *Jesuits*: the supreme head is the sole arbiter of the conscience of the members, and is entitled to blind obedience, according to the rule *Eris sicut cadaver*. It is obvious that such discipline must have an injurious effect on the character and must cramp the individual initiative, with the result that the men become

*geknechtet* (cowed). That real brutality is often practised we know from the newspapers and from the parliamentary debates, which constantly testify to maltreatment of soldiers by officers and non-commissioned officers ; suicide sometimes results from this cause.

We saw not long ago an instance of military high-handedness at Zabern (Alsace), when a young lieutenant, to compel respect for the uniform, attacked " in self-defence," with the sword, a lame and crippled cobbler who happened to stand in his way and was thereupon seized by two soldiers. Blind obedience and respect for the uniform have the effect of turning numberless men almost into automatons who act altogether without reflection.\*

It is greatly to be feared that German culture, which we have hitherto valued so highly, will long remain tainted by the policy of violence which, introduced by Bismarck and evolved in the Bismarckian spirit, led to such violations of accepted law as the assault on Belgium, the massacres of Louvain and other towns, etc.

The cold-blooded manner in which General Bernhardi has elaborated the policy of might, founded on Germanistic dreams of greatness, has made a deep impression on all outside Germany who have read his fiendish book, and has aroused universal amazement and horror. It can quite

\* In this connexion I may recall the famous exploit of the cobbler Vogt at Köpenick (suburb of Berlin) in 1906. He took a great interest in matters of military command and well knew the power of the uniform ; hence one day, when he was out of work, he decided to put his knowledge of human nature to practical use and bought a captain's second-hand uniform at an old clothes shop. Attired in this, he ordered a corporal and a few men whom he met to accompany him ; they obeyed without a moment's hesitation and followed him out to Köpenick. Here they marched up to the town-hall, where the mayor, who was an old reservist officer, made a deep obeisance before the " captain," but the latter sternly ordered that the mayor should be arrested and taken to Berlin. This was done, and he was taken by the soldiers to the guard-room at the Brandenburg Gate. Meanwhile the " captain " seized 20,000 marks out of the treasury of the town and disappeared for a time. In no other European country would this military exploit have been possible.

confidently be asserted that such a book could in our time have been written in no other country in the world. That he dared to publish it, and that he, a Prussian general, was allowed to publish it, is a terrible and melancholy token of the spirit which reigns at all events in the military caste of Prussia, and which means, not progress in culture, but retrogression. That this and similar works, as well as the Bismarckian policy, are disapproved by many Germans there can be no doubt.

That Germany did not go to war over Morocco in 1911 was due, according to Bernhardi, to a "false humanity" which gave birth to the peace movement. Hence he wanted to show that war is a duty not only for self-defence but for the purpose of extending the power of the State, for conquest.

Bismarck is dead, but he founded a school and his disciples have pursued his policy. The Bismarckian or Machiavellian principles are still applied and approved by many admirers of the "Blood-and-Iron Chancellor." There are many who endorse the principle that *might* is everything and who consider that it is better to be feared than to be loved.

Germany has become through Bismarck, in spite of all cultural effort, primarily a *military State*, and her people have been systematically educated to this view. Germany's warrior caste has devoted its greatest efforts to the furtherance of armaments in anticipation of a war which it has long deemed inevitable and which military authors welcome as a means of stiffening the fibre of the people and promoting culture! Its sole preoccupation is to find pretexts for war, and it deplores peace as a debilitating factor.

In a manifesto to the army and navy on the outbreak of the War of 1914—characteristic, by the way, of a military State—the Emperor William gave vent to the following sentiments: "I put my faith in the old *warlike spirit* still living in the German people, this *mighty warlike*

*spirit* which assaults the enemy where it finds him, cost what it may, the *warlike spirit* which from the remotest ages has been the *terror* and *scourge* of our enemies. Remember our great and glorious history, remember that ye are Germans ! God with us ! ”

Thus the Germanistic faith in Germany’s superiority over all other countries has been gradually suggested to the consciousness of the people, who seem to have not the remotest notion that German policy has ever been at fault in important matters, that Germany, especially Prussia, has ever violated international law and trampled the rights of nations under foot, causing *enemies to arise* all round her and creating throughout the world antagonism to her military policy. *Germany’s lofty intellectual culture and industrial efficiency are acknowledged everywhere*, but the nations do not admire her policy ; they *feel apprehensive of this warrior State*.

It seems, indeed, as if the military caste actually desired to create *fear of Germany*.

How different were the sentiments of Frederick the Great ! “ To make enemies,” he said, “ in order to vanquish them is equivalent to breeding wild beasts in order to fight against them. It is far more natural, far more sensible, and far more human to make friends.”

In a reply to the pamphlet *Why do the Nations Hate Us ?* recently published by a well-known Berlin physician, Dr. M. Hirschfeld, the Dutchman Dr. Treub observed that the reason why the Germans generally are not liked lies in their arrogance, their spirit of flunkeydom, and their coarseness, and that the nations hate Germany on account of her militarism and her eagerness to subdue all other peoples.

No country in the world has ever been so *perpetually prepared for war* as Germany, the military State *par excellence*. Germany has no need to speak of mobilization in the ordinary sense when war threatens ; she is *permanently mobilized* in a sufficient degree and is therefore

ready when a state of war is declared to exist. The Minister of War has but to press a few buttons—*eins, zwei, drei*—and at the word of command the armies stand at the frontier ready to strike within a couple of days.

With their eyes steadfastly fixed on the goal before them the military authorities have anticipated every want with the most admirable minuteness: colossal depots everywhere, containing food, clothes, boots, and other articles of equipment, hospital requirements, etc., for untold millions of soldiers of every age-class, whilst guns, rifles, and other war material have been piled up sky-high in arsenals and factories in preparation for the war of wars. Every need which may arise in waging war with other Great Powers has been foreseen and the industrial life of the nation has been organized accordingly.

Germany, therefore, has never any cause to worry over the mobilizations of other States. She was always ready for war and always ready to strike.

Although the majority of the German nation—that is to say, the workmen, farmers, small manufacturers, merchants, etc.—are friends of peace—and, accordingly, have been taken to task by Bernhardi—the agitation organized by Bernhardi and other chauvinistic leaders has succeeded in working upon public opinion to such an extent that the Morocco Treaty of November 4, 1911, was actually received with disappointment by millions of people in all classes of society in Germany, and rendered possible the new military law of 1912 which vastly augmented the strength of the army. The sequel in France was the proposed re-introduction of three years' military service, which was sanctioned after considerable opposition. This was followed in Germany by proposals for a further increase, and the celebration of the centenary of the great War of Liberation against France in 1813 was exploited to spur the nation to fresh effort. The result was the great extraordinary *defence tax* of 1913, which amounted to 1000 million marks and was accompanied by increased annual taxes for the army. When the Government began to fear that the

people might murmur under these burdens, they sought, as often before when increased military estimates were impending, to show that the safety of the Empire was in jeopardy.

M. Etienne, the French War Minister, succeeded in March 1913 in obtaining possession of a *German official and secret report* concerning the new military laws and the aims of German policy, etc. This remarkable document of March 19, 1913, contains the following illuminating observations : "It is our sacred duty to sharpen the sword which has been placed in our hand and to hold it ready for defence as well as to strike down our enemy. *The view that our armaments are a reply to the armaments and policy of the French must be fostered amongst the people.* The people must be accustomed to the thought that *an offensive war on our part is a necessity* if we are to make an end of our adversaries' provocations. We must *proceed with caution* so as not to arouse suspicions. . . . The war must be prepared from the financial point of view. . . . *Disturbances must be provoked in Northern Africa and Russia* as a means of diverting the forces of the adversary. Therefore it is necessary that we should through well-chosen intermediaries get into contact with influential persons in Egypt, Tunis, Algeria, and Morocco in order to prepare the measures which will become necessary in case of a European war. . . . We must be strong in order that we may be able to strike down our enemies in the East and West. But in the next European War *the small States must also be forced to join us* or must be subjugated. In the North we have nothing to fear from Denmark or the Scandinavian countries. . . . But we cannot contemplate with the same confidence the situation on our North-Western frontier, where we have the two small States of Belgium and Holland. Here we are confronted with a most vital problem, and our plan must be to *take the offensive at the very beginning* and with great superiority. . . . An ultimatum with brief time-limit, followed immediately by *invasion*, would justify our action sufficiently from the point

of view of international law. . . . We must remember that the *provinces of the old German Empire*, the County of Burgundy, and a great part of Lorraine, are still in the hands of the French, that thousands of our German brethren in the Baltic provinces groan under the yoke of the Slav. It will be a patriotic act to *restore to Germany what she formerly possessed.*" \*

So here we have a complete plan for a *war of aggression and conquest!*

This report was, of course, repudiated in official German quarters. But it bears the impress of undoubted genuineness, and all its details correspond entirely with other utterances of German military authors and politicians, so that there is no cause to doubt it, especially when we have seen what General Bernhardi wrote two years previously in *Germany and the Next War*. But, of course, it must be very annoying to the German Government that an official and secret report of this kind should become known to the French Government; hence the official *démenti* which is always to be expected in such cases.†

M. Cambon, the French ambassador in Berlin, wrote in his dispatch of May 6, 1913, to the French Foreign Minister that he had obtained cognizance of an utterance by General Moltke as to the plan of the General Staff in case of war, which consisted in taking the enemy by surprise. "The *banal* view of the *responsibility of the attacker*," said Moltke, "must be *swept aside*. When war becomes necessary all chances of success must be seized. *Success alone can justify it*. *Germany neither can nor must give Russia time to mobilize*, for in that case

\* See French *Yellow Book*, No. 2, p. 16.

† It has been sought to discredit the genuineness of this report by pointing out that the "County of Burgundy" was stated to be a part of the old German Empire, a mistake "which a responsible German author would never have made." On this point I should like to say that not only the old kingdom of Burgundy, but also the Duchy of Burgundy, or the present province of Bourgogne, was formerly at times in a condition of vassalage to the old German Empire, as was Franche Comté, or "Freigrafschaft Burgund."

Germany would be compelled to keep on her Eastern frontier an army of such strength that she would be *reduced to equality with, if not inferiority to, France*. Thus we must forestall our principal opponent as soon as there are nine chances against ten that war will ensue, and we must *begin without a moment's delay*, so that we can remorselessly crush all resistance."

Germany's militarism, by the psychological effect which its severe discipline and its insistence on implicit obedience have produced on the mind, has been one of the factors in the unanimity which the German nation has displayed in its conception of the cause of Germany's action in the War of 1914. The idea has been instilled into the national mind, by suggestion, that Germany has been attacked, and this view has been kept alive by constant iteration. The method is an old one, and we have a celebrated example of it in the device of the elder Cato, who ended all his speeches in the Roman senate with the words : "Ceterum censeo Carthaginem esse delendam." This view in time became the ruling opinion in Rome, with the result that in the end the hostile city fell before the repeated assaults of the Romans.

By *suggestion* is meant an act by which an idea is implanted in the brain and becomes rooted there, an induced view which may deepen into a strong conviction. The process may take place either in a waking or in an hypnotic state, and for such suggestion to take effect it is only necessary that the individual shall believe or be predisposed to believe.

Preachers, advocates, orators, statesmen, etc., are all suggestionists and seek with all their power to impress certain mental pictures on others, and political fanaticism, like religious fanaticism, obtains its adherents by suggestion or hypnosis, as it is also called, when it has the same effect as hypnotism.

The universal patriotic devotion shown by the Germans in this war, in the suggested belief that the Fatherland

has been attacked, is the most remarkable instance of collective hypnotism on a colossal scale witnessed in modern times. It reminds us, viewed psychically, of the emotion which took possession of the people when Pope Urban II at the Council of Clermont in 1095 exhorted the multitude to set out on the First Crusade against the "unbelievers" in Palestine: the great assembly was seized with ecstasy, and suddenly the cry broke forth: "Deus vult! Deus vult!" The throng outside took up the cry, and all fastened a red cross on their right shoulder.

The French were then "God's chosen people." When the pilgrims set out on the First Crusade the rallying cry "*God wills it!*" was ever on their lips; all objections from the cautious were met with "*God wills it!*" And when at last the crusaders stood before Jerusalem the joy was boundless; all fell on their knees and cried: "*God wills it!*"

We witnessed a similar religious and patriotic fervour in Germany when the war was in the air: from the most exalted quarter it was proclaimed: *Germany has been attacked by her enemies—The war has been brought upon us to destroy us—The Government has done all in its power to avert war—Onward with God—Let your hearts beat for God and let your fists strike down the enemy—To us it means to be or not to be—God with us!*

All this was repeated in the churches and in the Press many thousand times and the suggestion took root in all minds. From the highest to the lowest all were penetrated by this conviction and displayed the greatest devotion and self-sacrifice in the defence of the Fatherland, which was thought by all to have been attacked by treacherous enemies. The blind faith in the word of the supreme authority of the State permitted no doubt; the rejoinders of other States, the negotiations between the Governments, were in the main unknown, and that which was made public had been tinged with the colouring which the Government thought suitable. The whole

nation was united in a single thought : *Germany has been attacked, Germany's existence is threatened.* Among people usually self-possessed, among thinkers and savants, the exultation was as great as in the military caste, and all were penetrated with the certainty of victory, for “Germany’s cause was sacred and just.” “Germany cannot be destroyed,” this home of the world’s noblest race, God’s chosen people which is destined to march at the head of civilization and to found the Germanic world-power : *God wills it !*

In his war manifesto to the German people the Emperor William declared : “Our enemies begrudge us the reward for our labours. We have hitherto borne with patience all open and secret enmity from east and west and across the sea. *But now they seek to humiliate us.* We are expected to look on with folded arms whilst our enemies prepare for a *treacherous assault on us.* . . . *In the midst of peace the enemy assails us;* therefore, to arms ! . . . It is a fight to determine whether German strength and German spirit is *to be or not to be.* Onward with God, who will be with us as he was with our ancestors ! ”

In the course of a Christmas speech in France the Emperor said : “God has willed that the enemy should force us to celebrate this festival here. *We have been attacked and we are defending ourselves.* We stand on the enemy’s soil with the enemy at the point of our sword. With our hearts bowed before our Lord we say, as did the Great Elector : ‘To the dust with all Germany’s enemies ! ’ Amen.”

Like the German official proclamations, the Austrian manifestos also spoke of the war as a defensive war. An official *communiqué* of April 17, 1915, announcing that all capable of bearing arms between the ages of eighteen and fifty shall be liable to service in the Landsturm says : “The gigantic struggle which has been *forced upon us* by an enemy superior in population compels us to use all our strength,” etc.

The German Chancellor declared in the Reichstag that

Serbia had evaded Austria-Hungary's just demands and that the German Government shared with its ally the view that the position of the Germanic race was menaced, that Russia had prevented Germany's efforts at mediation and wanted war. "Our troops were content at first to act on the *defensive*. We stand with our backs to the wall. . . . It is with a clear conscience that Germany marches out to battle." That Germany has been attacked and is therefore waging a defensive war was also averred by General von Falkenhayn, Chief of the General Staff, when he was interviewed in January 1915 by Mr. Conger, representative of the Associated Press, in Berlin.

"This is no offensive war on our part," he said. "It has not been brought into being by any military caste or a military party; it is a war waged in self-defence, forced upon us by the Russian mobilization. Russia had been warned by the Emperor and his ambassador and had been told that if she mobilized we should be compelled in self-defence to proclaim a general mobilization and to take all steps to safeguard our national existence."

When the German Government in March 1915 asked the Reichstag for another 10,000 million marks to continue the war, Dr. Helfferich, Minister of Finance, said: "We must absolutely insist that *our enemies shall be held responsible* for the material loss which they have brought upon us by this *criminal attack*."

In the German Upper House its President, after the passing of the Budget on March 16, 1915, said: "The *old envy of our neighbours* has united the Entente Powers against us. *France wants the provinces which she lost in 1871, Russia wants the province of Prussia, and England contemplates the destruction of German trade and shipping.* What have they attained? The loss of most of our colonies is not decisive. On the other hand, Germany's territory has been cleared of enemies, and Poland, Belgium, and a great part of France are in our possession. The *plan of our enemies to crush Germany* has thus been foiled. If we did not aspire to more than beating back the enemy,

it would not be difficult to secure a speedy peace ; but Germany cannot rest content with this consummation. (Loud cheers from all sides.) We shall not sheathe our sword until we are assured that our neighbours *will not renew the attack.*"

Gothein, a political economist and member of the Reichstag, declared (in the *Berliner Tageblatt* in December 1914) that "it could be proved most conclusively that Germany did all she could to *avert war*, that the Russian mobilization and the declaration of France as to her attitude *forced us to defend ourselves*, and that, even though the formal declaration of war came from Germany, this step was only taken that we might avail ourselves of our superior organization for swift action in the war thus forced upon us." He further observed that *had it been in the power of the German Government to prevent this war, the 111 Social Democrats in the Reichstag would not have voted for the war credit.*

One may well ask : How were these Social Democrats or other representatives then and there, at the raging speed at which events were moving, to examine the Government's attitude and actions in relation to the conflict and its ability to prevent the war ? It must be remembered that everything was secret.

On the occasion of a German All Souls' festival held in Bapaume parish church on November 1, 1914, in commemoration of the fallen soldiers, a sermon was preached in which the following passage occurred : "To our enemies these graves are a gigantic reproach, but to us they will be a sacred memorial in times to come. Those who have sown the wind shall reap the whirlwind. *Led astray by petty motives and by small groups of selfish partisans, 'they have sown in the flesh and they shall reap destruction.'* We make bold to swear before God that *we have sown in the spirit of righteousness and peace.* To us the war is a monumental *spiritual matter* that touches the innermost heart of a nation which has risen in unity, which has been outraged in

its most sacred sentiments and has been forced into *self-defence*.

Dr. Schepp, school inspector, embodied in an article entitled "School and War," which appeared in *Die Woche* on March 20, 1915, several items of advice on points connected with the war, which the youthful pupils should take to heart. He said *inter alia* : "The pupils must understand that we are carrying on the fight of *truth and right* against *falsehood and deceit* and against British perfidy ; that *good faith* with us has not become an empty phrase, but that we stand firm and resolute beside our ally, and that to be a *German* means to be true to the bottom of one's soul. They must know that we are fighting for *peace*, and not out of a pure *lust of conquest* as Russia does, nor out of *vengefulness* as France does, nor out of *sordid greed* as England does." Yet at the same time he explains—and in so doing contradicts the above—that "the children must above all understand to what Germany owes her growth. In 1866 we fought for *Prussia's hegemony in Germany* ; in 1870-71 we attained our unity and *Germany's position in Europe as a Great Power* ; in the present war it is our duty to secure and to extend *this position as a world-Power*. . . . They are further to understand that we must have *elbow-room* in the world, and particularly on the seas for our trade."

At a meeting of teachers and mothers held at the Berlin Town Hall in November 1914 to discuss the subject, "How are we to talk to the children about the war ?" it was agreed to teach certain humane principles, as, for instance, that hatred of others must not be inculcated in the childish mind and that one must cultivate the sentiment of compassion and brotherhood, etc. But it was also resolved that the children were to be told that "Germany is engaged, through *no fault of her own*, in a *fight for her existence, a fight of life and death*, wherefore Germans must suffer and bear all and must submit to every sacrifice."

So we see that the rising generation is systematically to be drilled into the belief that *Germany bears no blame*

*in the bringing about of the war and that she was the attacked party.* This will become to the growing generation an unassailable truth, for there are probably very few that will study the origin of the war from other than German sources. How, in such circumstances, will it be possible to avoid hating other nations who “have attacked Germany and forced her into a life-and-death struggle for her existence?”

The same line is taken in a work entitled *The Truth about the War*, being a statement from official sources compiled in August 1914 by ten well-known authors, of whom a couple are members of the Reichstag, and who include Dr. Naumann, Count Oppersdorff, Dr. Erzberger, Dr. Rohrbach, and others. The blame for the war is first and foremost placed on Russia’s shoulders. “*The Tsar bears before God and posterity the responsibility* for having allowed himself to be terrorized by an unscrupulous war party. . . . It was not until France and Belgium *had themselves violated Belgian neutrality* that our troops entered the country. France and Russia have combined to *destroy us*. . . . The German Emperor sought to induce the Tsar to preserve peace, but he was *cruelly disappointed*,” etc.

This work was translated into Swedish in order to influence Swedish opinion in favour of Germany, and is prefaced by “A Word to the Swedish People.” I give a few extracts: “*Our love of peace* is part of our national spirit. . . . But we are compelled to be a nation of soldiers so that we may remain free. . . . *We put our trust in God* and from amidst the din of battle we appeal to you not to believe the malevolent lies spread abroad by our enemies. . . . We believe that *Germany cannot be effaced* from the surface of the globe. You know that our people has given birth to great thinkers and poets, whose aim above all was to further the cause of humanity. The names of Goethe and Kant are revered all the world over, and there is no culture without these giants of genius,” etc.

It will be gathered from the foregoing how public opinion in Germany had been led astray when the war broke out, and how the Germans were hypnotized by the official declarations. Not a word of the untiring efforts of Great Britain, France, and Russia to avoid the war by mediation ; the Emperor William was “ cruelly disappointed ” in his appeal to the Tsar, although we know that the Tsar proposed to him that the dispute should be referred to The Hague Tribunal. No outsider can conceive in what way Germany was threatened by her neighbours ; no State has ever thought of “ effacing Germany ” or depriving the Germans of their freedom.

All these fancies have been suggested by political hypnotists who want a nation of self-denying patriots and ever so much money from the Reichstag. And well have they done their work.

But to speak, in conjunction with the war, of the German thinkers who have guided humanity, as was done in the above appeal to the Swedish people and on many other occasions, and to bring in the names of Goethe and Kant—this is a little too extravagant. I have already spoken of these great men (p. 50), but I showed that they were diametrically opposed to the self-seeking world-policy which has come to the fore in Prussia since Bismarek’s time. Goethe and Kant would have execrated a Bethmann-Hollweg, a Bernhardi, and the like, had they lived in this accursed time.

In the compilation entitled *Die Vernichtung der englischen Weltmacht* (“ The Destruction of British World-Power ”) (1915) we find an article by Dr. S. Hedin headed “ Germany and the Northern States.” I give the following quotations :

“ All Germans know that their country is the victim of an *attack by a league, the leading member of which is England* whose one idea is to *annihilate Germany*. Germany is fighting for her existence, whilst the English have taken up arms to *destroy the prosperity* which their German kinsmen have won by hard and honourable toil.

“A fresh wind is blowing on the German front, but how do matters stand at home up in the North? In Germany they act; *in the North they simply talk*. They applaud a *delusive peace* which in reality is a *death sleep*.

“If our people do not now, *when freedom and perpetual peace beckon to the whole world, realize their duty and their proper place in the Germanic life-struggle*, then truly the days of our nation are numbered. If the hour has not struck when we should *pass on to action*, then surely it will never strike, and it will be all up with us. He who is content to remain a spectator at a time of such colossal happenings as this is *not worthy to live!*”

This nonsense is accepted with the greatest delight as a valuable contribution to the above-mentioned work, and Hedin’s name heads the list of collaborators on the cover!

Has Hedin taken leave of his senses? Does he not know that Germany has never been attacked by any Power, but went into the war to make common cause with Austria and has herself attacked Belgium, an act which made England her enemy? Truly the time has come to put an end to the exploits of this German Doctor, his revilement both of England and of Sweden. This flunkeydom and toadyism towards Germany, which is as unblushing as it is lacking in tact and political judgment, may do harm to Sweden in the eyes of other Powers, especially if it be not realized that his psychical equilibrium has been affected and that there is a growing opinion in Sweden which denounces his views on the war, on Germany and on Germanism, etc. To his assertion, made before the German public, that “every real Swede feels ‘Germanically,’” by which term he implies sympathy for German military Germanism, I reply emphatically that this movement meets with no response in Sweden, and I may remind the reader of the antipathy towards Germany, and especially towards Prussia, which was felt in Sweden for many years on account of the Dano-German War of 1864 and the Franco-German War of 1870. We felt like

Scandinavians should feel in the former, and entertained the liveliest sympathies for France in the latter, although we are not united by any ties of blood with the French nation. At the present time most Swedes are animated with the deepest sympathy for the Belgians. As regards the alleged struggle of the Germanic race, I contend that if the Swedes should side with any nation on account of bonds of Germanic kinship, it should be with the British, who are a purer Germanic race than the Germans, seeing that the latter contain many foreign, and particularly Slav, elements.

Although it seems as if it had become the prevailing notion in Germany that the country has been attacked and is therefore carrying on a defensive war, we find here and there a German who does not share this view, as, for instance, Maximilian Harden, whom I have quoted to the effect that Germany *wanted the war* and was *not forced into it*.

The diplomatic papers published by the belligerent nations in their *White, Blue, Red, Yellow, and Grey Books*, together with the speeches of their Premiers and Foreign Ministers and other official communications brought to light after the books were published, furnish us with the chief material for elucidating the origin of the World War and passing judgment on the attitudes and actions of the various States.

A comparative and critical study of all these data ought to enable us to find the truth about the origin of the war. Everything one-sided or which has been unfairly stated should be ignored. Although the published papers of each State naturally support its point of view, it should nevertheless be possible, from incontrovertible facts and positive statements acknowledged by both sides to be authentic, to draw conclusions devoid of bias.

To an impartial observer unconnected with Germany and the other belligerent countries, it is clearly evident

from these official publications and other reports and information held to be of weight and importance :

(1) That *Austria was the attacking party* in the war against Serbia, which gave rise to the World War, and that *Germany supported* Austria in her action.

(2) That *Germany was not attacked* by Russia, France, and Great Britain.

(3) That *the war could have been avoided* had Austria and Germany agreed to the mediation proposals of the Entente Powers in the Serbian conflict.

(4) That *Germany attacked Belgium*, in violation of her guaranteed neutrality, thereby forcing Belgium into a defensive war.

(5) That *no proofs exist that Belgium failed in her duties as a neutral*, and that the documents found in her War Office, by which it was sought to establish this charge, *reveal no plan of attack on Germany*, but merely point to certain precautionary measures in the event of attack by that Power—amply justified in the light of Germany's action on the outbreak of war.

## XII—*continued*

### THE WORLD WAR OF 1914

#### E. THE BARBARITY OF THE WAR : NO WAR BETWEEN CIVILIZED NATIONS HAS EVER BEEN MARKED BY SO MUCH CRUELTY AND SAVAGERY.

THE present World War unhappily marks a return to the more bestial warfare of former times. Many wars have been comparatively free from deliberate destructiveness and cruelty in its real sense, but the present struggle has in numberless instances been waged with a barbarous brutality which constitutes a shameful blot on Christian Europe, a civilized continent, the home of philosophy and science.

The Greeks and Romans of antiquity, who stood highest in culture among the peoples then known to history, called other races *barbarians* because they lacked their civilization and refinement. Ever since, the term “barbarians” has been applied to uncivilized and cruel peoples, races which lacked feelings of humanity.

But civilized nations cannot always be sure that they have subdued their brutal and barbarous instincts, and in great upheavals, violent and bloody revolutions, ferocious individuals are found who are guilty of cruel and savage acts. The same applies to many wars waged by civilized nations, and more than ever to the World War which has now been raging for nine months.\*

War generally has a *barbarizing* influence and *brutalizes* even the most highly civilized. It places the warrior on a

\* This work was written in March 1915.—*Translator.*

level with the *beast of prey* and reduces him to the condition and the instincts of primitive man. *Brutal* also means bestial, ferocious.

Predatory beasts regard their live prey merely as an article of food which they have appropriated, and are quite indifferent to its agony. Man also acquires the general character of beasts of prey, and their indifference to the sufferings of animals and human beings when these are the object of his attack in the chase and in war. All primitive and barbarous peoples have shown the greatest callousness and cruelty towards their enemies, and civilized nations have often been no whit better. They have oppressed and ill-treated conquered races in a most revolting manner, as, for instance, the Portuguese in Africa, the Spaniards in America, and the English in India, etc.

*War itself dehumanizes* ; the combatants have to think of themselves, of their defence, of salvation from ever-threatening death, and they are apt to be worked up into a state of fury which turns them into wild beasts, impelled by the lust of murder and destruction.

The instincts of the beast of prey are latent in numberless human beings, their brutality being largely due to *atavism* or the hereditary transmission of qualities which distinguished their forefathers in earlier phases.

By incidental causes, such as fear of danger, insult, etc., many people who are otherwise kind and peaceable may be driven into committing violent and senseless acts, assaults on persons, etc. The ordinary citizen, who in peace-time regards other nations with sympathy and fellow-feeling, considers, when he has been called out in war to fight against them, that they are contemptible creatures who deserve no mercy and whom it is his duty to destroy.

Far from marking progress in humanity and mutual understanding, the nations now confront one another as deadly enemies, all through the fault of certain statesmen, and barbarity and cruelty now flourish in the midst of a continent regarded as the centre of civilization—just as if

war were raging between tribes of primitive savages. In fact, it is a horrible *atavistic* phenomenon that we are now called upon to witness.

Bernhardi and other war politicians have sought systematically to bring out the fighting instincts of the Germans by reminding them of their "original warlike propensities."

Mankind is being stunted in its development, the earth is becoming a hell, the sun no longer shines as of yore, and there is darkness in the souls of the people. Might has usurped the place of right, but has in a truly Satanic manner been "sicklied o'er" with attractive names, such as patriotism, statecraft, self-defence, fate, interest; aggressive war is exalted and peace strivings are derided on the pretext that a loftier culture is being promulgated.

What appalling degeneracy !

It is very difficult to form a general judgment of a whole nation. The majority of people in a civilized country are gentle and peaceable beings, but there is always a leaven of vicious individuals. The Germans have in their newspapers and other writings which they have scattered abroad to meet accusations of atrocities committed during the war, declared that "we are no barbarians," and have pointed out what Germany has done for universal culture. That, however, is *one* thing and nobody denies it. But quite another matter is the policy of the leading statesmen, the war, the violation of the neutrality of other countries, and certain barbarous acts committed in the war by Germans as well as by others, and which cannot be reasoned away by those at home declaring: "Es ist nicht wahr."

Nobody can say of his own nation: "We are no barbarians"; nobody can say in war-time that it is only the enemy who is cruel, that one's own nation is not guilty of such things, and that all stories to this effect are lies disseminated by the enemy. The Germans have been all

too eager to resort to this latter device during the great World War. Here, for instance, is an appeal distributed very widely in neutral countries by a group of distinguished German ladies; it is addressed "An die Frauen des Auslandes," and contains, *inter alia*, the following passage: "We mothers, wives, and sisters would feel that we, too, were guilty if German men had really in this war offended against the dictates of culture and humanity. But *we know* that our husbands and sons, our brothers and friends *have not ceased to be the representatives of German culture* when they have given their lives for the defence of the Fatherland. No one knowing Germany, the morality of her people, her advanced popular education, the discipline and order in her public life, can seriously believe that the war has overthrown these monuments of German culture and suddenly completely *transformed her people.*" Whilst the appeal protests against "the revolting atrocities which the misguided Belgian population have perpetrated on our troops," the latter are exonerated because they "were *forced into taking measures* necessitated by all the manifestations of *franc-tireur* warfare."

No one can answer for what is done in war in the heat of a sanguinary engagement. Yet it strikes one as peculiar that in the above appeal the German people are made out to be so moral, so lofty in their conceptions, that there are no bad individuals. All countries, unfortunately, have a fairly large sprinkling of rough, uneducated, and dangerous individuals who in normal circumstances commit criminal acts. But this is no reason for calling the whole nation coarse or barbarous, and most of its units are honourable individuals. The Swedes are undoubtedly a cultured and moral nation, yet statistics show that in 1907 close on 2000 were sentenced for serious crimes (three to the death penalty), and nearly 11,000 were convicted of lesser crimes.

If we turn to Germany, we find in the *Statistik des deutschen Reiches* (1907), *Justizwesen*, for the five-year period 1898-1902, the following criminal statistics:

Nature of crime	Convic-tions	Yearly average
Murder . . . .	92	18
Manslaughter . . . .	167	33
Robbery with violenee . . . .	511	102
Severe bodily injury . . . .	94,810	18,962
Slight bodily injury . . . .	26,798	5,359
Violation of domicile . . . .	22,667	4,533
Petty theft . . . .	85,330	17,067
Serious theft . . . .	12,749	2,549

It is thus evident that there are always thousands of Germans who will commit brutal and criminal acts and cannot be regarded as representatives of German culture. Many such primitive individuals have probably taken part in the present war and committed atrocities on enemy soil without having been compelled to do so by *franc-tireur* warfare. Proofs are not lacking.

It is really hardly to be wondered at that cruelties have been perpetrated by German soldiers, seeing that German military writers never tire of declaring that war must be waged with frightfulness. Thus General J. von Hartmann wrote in his work *The Necessity and Humanity of War* (1877) as follows :

“ The enemy nation must not be spared the *distress and horrors of war*. That *private individuals* should be hard hit thereby, that they should have to serve as a warning example, is very regrettable on their account ; but to the people this severity is a *useful and merciful blessing*. When a war breaks out between nations *terrorism* becomes, from a military point of view, an indispensable principle.”

The pamphlet of the German Great General Staff entitled *Kriegsgebrauch im Landkriege* (1902) says that “ every means of waging war, the abstention from which would cause the failure of the object of the war, may be regarded as justified.”

A *German manifesto to the civilized nations* in answer to the reports of German atrocities in the invasion of Belgium was sent out some time ago by ninety-three of Germany’s

most famous men, including Brentano, Deissmann, Eucken, Haeckel, Harnak, Gerhardt Hauptmann, Max Klinger, Lamprecht, Liszt, Ostwald, Schmoller, Sudermann, and S. Wagner. Here is an excerpt :

“ We, the undersigned German representatives of science and art, do hereby solemnly *protest* before the civilized world against the *lies* and calumnies by which our enemies have sought to besmirch the righteousness of the German cause. . . .

“ *It is not true* that in waging war we are *contemptuous of the law of nations*. Our soldiers commit no undisciplined acts and *no cruelties*. . . .

“ *It is not true* that our soldiers have taken the lives of civilian citizens *unless they have been compelled to do so*, driven by the *law of necessity*. . . .

“ *It is not true* that our troops have *wantonly destroyed Louvain*, etc. . . .

“ *Believe us!* Believe us that in this struggle we shall march onward to the end as a civilized people, a people to which the heritage of a Goethe, a Beethoven, a Kant is as sacred as its own hearth and home. Let our names and our honour be our pledge ! ”

Besides this protest from the German intellectuals, another collective *protest of the German universities* (twenty-two in number) was sent out, in which they appealed to the professors of all other universities abroad to protest against the allegations of cruelty which have been brought against the German method of warfare. They plead that every university teacher must be familiar with German *culture* and German *science and research*, and ask how it can be believed that a national army which contains a large proportion of the teachers and students of German universities *can be thought to be guilty of barbarous acts* or of destroying the monuments of culture except under the stern necessity of war. The appeal concludes as follows :

“ If in the course of this monstrous war, in which *our people are forced to fight* not only for their power but for their very existence and culture, the work of destruction

would seem to be greater than in other wars, and albeit many valuable treasures of culture have been sacrificed, the *responsibility therefor* must rest wholly on the shoulders of those who were not content to *loose this infamous war* upon the world but have not shrunk from forcing murderous weapons into the hands of a peaceful population *spurred on treacherously to assail our troops* whilst they were trusting to the observance of the acknowledged usages of war of all civilized nations. *With the allies must rest the blame* for all that is now taking place. On them will rest the curse of history for all the irreparable injury thus done to civilization."

This appeal shows that practically all representatives of German learning have in the same measure as the German nation as a body, been hypnotized into believing that Germany was "forced" to wage war for her existence and that the whole responsibility must therefore be borne by the Entente Powers. They did not realize that history can already prove the part which Germany played in the origin of the war; they believed blindly in Germany's right to violate Belgium's neutrality, and they forgot that, even if Germany's academical citizens cannot be thought guilty of barbarous acts, there must be many others of little education in the colossal German army who might perpetrate acts of violence and cruelty.

We have seen what the German intellectuals at home had to *say*. Meanwhile the German soldiers *acted* the direct opposite, as can be proved by their diaries found in France. The following extracts may serve as illustrations :

"Dorf durch die 11 Pioniere zerstört, 3 Frauen an den Bäumen erhängt." ("Village destroyed by the 11th Pioneers, three women hanged on trees.") Longeville, August 24, 1914.

"In der Nacht sind unglaubliche Sachen passiert : Laden ausgeplündert, Geld gestohlen, Vergewaltigungen. Einfach haarsträubend!" ("During the night incredible things have happened : shops looted, money stolen, acts of brutality. Enough to make one's hair stand on end.") Cirey, August 24.


“ Das wunderschöne Dorf Gué d’Hossus soll ganz unschuldig in Flammen aufgegangen sein. Ein Radfahrer soll gestürzt sein und dabei sein Gewehr losgegangen ; gleich ist auf ihn geschossen worden. Man hat männliche Einwohner einfach in die Flammen geworfen ! ” (“ The beautiful village of Gué d’Hossus, though quite innocent, said to have been burnt down. A cyclist said to have fallen from his machine, accidentally discharging his rifle ; he was immediately fired on. Male inhabitants have simply been thrown into the flames.”) From the diary of an officer of the 178th Infantry Regiment, First Corps of the Saxon Army, August 26.

The last page of the note-book of a soldier contains the following : “ So haben wir 8 Häuser mit den Einwohnern vernichtet. Aus einem Hause wurden allein 2 Männer mit ihren Frauen und ein 18-jähriges Mädchen erstochen. Das Mädel konnte mir Leid tun denn Sie machte solch unschuldigen Blick, aber man konnte gegen die aufgeregte Menge nichts ausrichten, denn dann sind es keine Menschen sondern Tiere. Wir sind jetzt auf dem Wege nach Sedan.” (“ And so we destroyed eight houses with inhabitants. In one house alone two men with their wives and a girl of eighteen were run through. I felt sorry for the girl, she had such an innocent look, but one could do nothing against the excited mob, for at such times they are not men, but beasts. We are now on the way to Sedan.”)

These diary jottings are taken from a collection of some forty in all published by J. Bédier, the celebrated French philologist, professor at the Collège de France, under the title *The German Crimes according to German Testimony*.\* Most of them are reproduced in photographic facsimile so that anyone can see for himself what German soldiers have written about the atrocities they have witnessed. Bédier comments as follows : “ Anyone opening this pamphlet will find nought but documents whose genuineness must

\* *Les Crimes allemands d’après des témoignages allemands* (January 1915).

Facsimile of the last page from a diary of an officer of the 178th Infantry Regiment, First Corps of the Saxon Army



at once strike his eye, if he has eyes to see with, just as the atrocities must strike his heart, if he has a heart."

So it is not worth while to deny that brutality is practised by some nations in the World War now raging ; it occurs amongst them all, even though many individuals better favoured by circumstances are more humane.

Dr. S. Hedin, after having seen the war at close quarters, writes : " People talk of modern warfare having been humanized. What a deplorable error ! War as now raging between civilized nations is worse than ever. It is waged on both sides with a *frenzy* and a *ferocity* which baffle all description. One can tell that it is a war of life and death."

Sometimes we come across statements by highly placed officers at the front which testify that war is barbarism. Thus General Hindenburg remarked to a correspondent of the *Neue Freie Presse* in November, when he had learnt that the Russians were *starving* and that even the country itself (Poland) was suffering from famine : " This is regrettable, but it is *just as well that it should be so*. We cannot make war sentimentally. The more ruthlessly war is waged, the more humane does it really become, for that is the best way to bring it to a rapid conclusion."

This reasoning has unfortunately proved false : the war has lasted since August, 1914, and will probably be of very long duration. But there must be no mercy shown ! Nothing but death, distress, destruction !

*Franc-tireurs*, or persons who in their own country and on their own initiative seek to stay the progress of an invading enemy are proscribed by modern military usage, and it has been sought by international agreements to prevent such defensive aid, inasmuch as the regular armies are held to be the sole belligerents in war. If such volunteer fighters, formed into a body, are to be permitted to fight, it is deemed necessary that they should be recognized by a military authority, that they should have *written instructions* and should wear some sort of *uniform*, so that they

can be identified as soldiers. But the force of circumstances often makes this impossible, and as in reality it is unreasonable that the citizens of a country ravaged by an enemy, when urged by the unhappy state of their country and their *patriotic resentment* and *despair* to injure the enemy as *franc-tireurs*, should be treated differently from soldiers and be shot like vermin if caught. For instance, a *franc-tireur* may not have had time to procure a uniform, or there may, through some delay in the working of a Conscription Act, not have been time to register him as a combatant.

We know, however, that in the Franco-German War of 1870-71 the German General Staff did not insist that all combatant Frenchmen should wear a uniform. The *franc-tireurs* who fought in that war in the national blue blouse were practically unrecognizable as combatants, and they were, in fact, encouraged in a circular sent out by the Prefect of the Côte d'Or (November 1870) to form little pickets of three or four men and shoot down Prussians when it could be done without risk.

War is war, war is brutality, whether organized or extemporized. To hide in ambush and employ ruses of war is very common among regular troops ; they do not fight with arms alone, they use pits and mines and seek to deceive the enemy by piling up logs and barrels to resemble guns, etc.

As regards the Belgians, it is clearly unreasonable to reproach them for crimes against the *laws of war* and the *laws of nations*, seeing that they were drawn into the fight against the German invasion through the crime which Germany committed against international law by infringing Belgium's neutrality. In the face of this revolting crime, to which the Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg pleaded guilty before the Reichstag, it is natural that many Belgians should cast aside all scruples.

Germany's crime loomed large before their eyes and they felt that they must avenge it.

How the Belgians felt when the Germans invaded and devastated their land may be gathered from the account

which a combatant in the war, a Belgian artist, to whom I have already referred (p. 226), gave Mr. Gustaf Hellström, who passed it on to the *Dagens Nyheter* : “ We know that it is all no use, but we cannot help thinking of all *they have burnt and destroyed* ; we cannot help thinking that they have made us a people without a home, that our *wives and children and parents and brothers and sisters* are this very night toiling like tramps along the roads leading to Holland and France. . . . When we think of all this our brains almost give way. When we think that we have let them in as merchants, as hotel-keepers, and that they have returned all this with treachery, we feel that it is almost more than we can bear.

“ And to-day I see in the papers that they call us *bandits* ! I myself am an artist by profession. . . .

“ Do you think we did not know what it would cost us ? And do you think that such *overwhelming unity* could have been brought about through some Government or other—which half the population does not care a rap about—having made a *secreat* treaty with another Power ? Does any sane person believe this ? Say we were fools *when we stood up as one man*, but don’t call us *traitors and bandits* ! There are moments when from the King down to the navvy we simply feel like this : Sooner death and devastation than to sit sleek and comfortable by the fireside. To us the problem simply resolves itself into that. The King need not have spoken, we would have acted as we did anyhow.”

During the early stages of the war in Belgium, the German newspapers circulated many stories of atrocities committed on German soldiers by Belgian civilians, women as well as men : mutilation, gouging-out of eyes, etc. Two official commissions, one civilian and one military, were appointed by the War Office at Berlin to investigate the charges, and after exhaustive inquiries they came to the conclusion that in the state of confusion and excitement which prevailed it was quite natural that acts of brutality and cruelty should be committed here and there

by all parties, but that on the whole these acts had been greatly exaggerated. The particularly revolting stories of the gouging-out of eyes were formally contradicted.

That many of Belgium's civil population turned out as *franc-tireurs* against the German usurpers is explained by the fact that universal military service had not been introduced, with the result that the able-bodied men, filled with patriotic fervour on seeing the enemy on their soil, threw themselves upon him, often doubtless without knowing that the international law governing warfare forbids such volunteer efforts.

But to punish *others* than those caught in the act as *franc-tireurs*, and to make entire villages and towns suffer for such attacks, is surely contrary to all accepted tenets of warfare between civilized nations.

The envoy R. Kleen says in his great work on *The Laws of War*: “To put to death a *large number* for the sake of one undiscovered culprit, or to pick out at random or by drawing lots one or more victims to atone for an act of which, in many cases, they have *no knowledge whatever*, is a procedure which brands the belligerent as unworthy to be reckoned amongst civilized nations.”

Article 50 of the War Regulations adopted by The Hague Conference of 1899 contains the following passage: “*Collective punishment* in the form of fines or otherwise must not be inflicted on the population by reason of *individual acts* for which it *cannot be held collectively responsible*.”

Professor Meurer, in an article entitled “*The Judgment on Louvain*,” which appeared in *Deutschland und der Weltkrieg 1914* has, like many other German war writers, Neukamp, etc., drawn attention to the newspaper accounts of atrocities committed by Belgians on German soldiers, which may possibly be partially true, but have also been partially disproved. The rumour that *franc-tireurs* had put out the eyes of wounded German soldiers has, after a careful investigation in which the German newspaper *Vorwärts* took part, proved to be unfounded.

But the title alone of Meurer's article, "The Judgment on Louvain," shows that the German commanders directed that certain atrocities should be committed on civilian Belgians, atrocities of which the author approves: the shooting not only of those who had fired on the Germans, but of numerous women and children as well; and the deliberate setting fire to the town—in the course of which 1074 dwelling-houses were burnt down as a *punishment*—is an atrocious act of barbarism which is not in accordance with the rules of war in regard to reprisals.

The Hague Conference of 1899 adopted certain rules against the participation of civilians in war, amongst them a clause formulated by Martens in which it was decreed that "in unforeseen cases the population and the combatants shall remain under the protection and safeguard of the laws of nations as established by the *usages in operation between civilized nations, the dictates of humanity, and the principles of ethics in general.*"

That this clause was transgressed by German soldiers, actually by the order of their commanders, both at Louvain and at many other places, has been amply demonstrated. When cruel reprisals are admitted from German quarters they are excused on the plea of the necessity of protecting the German troops. The burning of Louvain was thus an appropriate punitive measure!

The non-combatants who have suffered most terribly in the war are the Belgians, although they thought that they were safeguarded by their neutrality guaranteed by the Great Powers. Germany having violated this neutrality and Belgium having sought by the force of arms to defend it, the country has been crushed, towns have been bombarded, commerce and industry have ceased, supplies and cattle have been taken away, the crops have been destroyed, enormous war contributions have been levied, and a great part of the utterly destitute population have been forced by want to flee to Holland—the *Courrier Belge* computes the number at about a million, including 20,000 orphaned

children. This enormous number of people consists mainly of old men, women, and children. Almost daily, at the time of the invasion, one heard of women who had gone mad or committed suicide. Most had lost their husbands, many their children. The future is to the majority utterly without hope. Everything has crumbled ; most of them neither dare nor can return to their country, where their homes have been laid waste or have disappeared altogether. Distress has also overtaken those who have remained at home—we are witnessing the starvation of a nation. Seldom has history had to record such limitless suffering of a whole people ; for a parallel we must go back to the times when Carthage and Jerusalem were destroyed. The gaunt spectre of want hangs over Belgium, and it is as if an overwhelming natural catastrophe, an all-engulfing earthquake or a gigantic tidal wave, had visited the country—not a friendly Power which had guaranteed its neutrality. Some help is being given to the unhappy Belgians through the collections of compassionate fellow-creatures in other countries, but their sufferings are none the less terrible and in numberless cases impossible to relieve.

The whole unhappy country is utterly paralysed and the inhabitants who are left are leading a pitiable existence. In the middle of December the German newspaper *Vorwärts* gave an account of the appalling economic situation in Belgium, written by a person familiar with the state of things there. Any sort of recovery from this plight was not to be thought of. Communications had practically ceased ; raw materials for the industries were altogether lacking ; the glass and metal industries were dead, the quarries could not work, the building trade was at a standstill. About 90 per cent. of the persons otherwise engaged in industry were out of work, and existed only with the aid of communal support ; the coffers of the trade-unions were empty. Even persons of the civil service class were in want, and most of them received no salary. Over 50,000 persons in Brussels were compelled daily to fetch

their soup at the public kitchens, where representatives of all classes foregathered.

In April 1915 the following telegram on the situation in Belgium was made public: "The War Aid Committee formed by the *Rockefeller Trust* to inquire into the condition of the Belgian population in the invaded territory has now published its report, which constitutes a crushing indictment of German rule in Belgium. In the smallest villages, as well as in the large towns laid waste by fire, *the German army has looted all houses* which remained standing, and all objects which could not be removed had been deliberately given over to the flames. In the half-burnt villages the unhappy families linger on in the most pitiable and insanitary state."

On May 3 the following telegraphic message was dispatched from Belgium: "Germans continue their *methodical sack of Belgium*."

The newspaper *Vaderland* publishes a telegram from Aix-la-Chapelle of the following tenor: "During the last few days trains loaded with all kinds of articles from Belgium have passed through Aix-la-Chapelle. Your correspondent counted over ten trains laden with beet, tools, furniture, and carts, all of which will probably be sold in Germany."

An important *dossier* of the German atrocities in Belgium has been published in the *Revue des deux Mondes* of January 1915; it is contained in a contribution by P. Nothomb, a prominent member of the Belgian Parliament, entitled "La Belgique Martyre."

In France the Germans acted with most appalling brutality and cruelty in the departments occupied at the beginning of the war. This is evidenced by the *Rapport* issued on December 17, 1914, by the Commission appointed by the Government to investigate the enemy's violation of international law.\* This Commission was composed of

\* *Rapport par la Commission instituée en vue de constater les actes commis par l'ennemi en violation du droit des gens : Journal officiel*, January, 8, 1915.

M. Payelle, President of the High Court, M. Mollard, ambassador, M. Maringer, Conseiller d'État, and M. Paillot, Councillor of Justice. They went to work with the most scrupulous thoroughness and accepted no accounts which had not been amply proved, so that they can vouch that the report contains nothing but facts which have been *fully substantiated* and which can therefore be taken as incontestable evidence of the crimes committed. Statements whose authenticity has not been demonstrated beyond all doubt have been admitted. Every case dealt with is accompanied by the most absolute proofs based not only on personal observations on the part of the members of the Commission, but also on photographic evidence and numerous sworn statements.

The atrocities set forth in the report surpass in extent and horror anything that the imagination can conceive. Entire villages have been destroyed by gun and rifle fire. *Whole towns are completely deserted* and nothing but ruins remain. In some places, where the incendiaries of the invader have been at work, one might think that one had been transplanted to the ruins of some ancient town destroyed by a great cataclysm of nature. The report goes on to show that never has a war between civilized nations been marked by such savage ferocity as that now waged in Western Europe by a merciless enemy. Facts prove indisputably that the German army is animated by an absolute and entire *contempt for human life*. The officer, no less than the soldier, kills the wounded and murders without mercy the defenceless inhabitants of occupied territories, sparing neither women, old men, nor children. The officers themselves take part in these massacres. The contention of the Germans that the *civil population began the attack on them* is a lie. Those who have spread abroad these reports have been unable to give them any semblance of veracity. The members of the Commission in many cases have collected evidence to show that the *Germans themselves*, to make believe that they had been attacked, have *discharged rifles* from the vicinity of dwellings. In

almost every town and village citizens have been dragged away from their homes and thrown into prison. Many have died or been killed on the way. The enemy, says the report of the Commission, has practised incendiaryism partly in order to cow the population and partly in pursuance of a system of deliberate destruction. The *incendiary fury* of the Germans has been vented first and foremost on churches and historical monuments. Thousands of houses have been burnt to the ground, but the members of the Commission have concerned themselves only with fires started with solely criminal intent, and have taken no notice of those caused by shell fire in the course of the fighting. On the subject of thefts, it has been demonstrated that the Germans, in the presence of their officers and often in collusion with them, have carried on *methodically organized looting*. This abominable practice of the Germans is particularly noticeable at Lunéville and throws a strange light on the mentality of the usurpers. After having indiscriminately looted and gutted seventy houses, they proceeded to massacre peaceful inhabitants. The German authorities posted up a proclamation bringing the most ridiculous charges in order to justify the levying, under threats of the death penalty, of a contribution of 650,000 francs.

The report concludes by saying that these acts are as many violations of the rights of man. The *murder of wounded and prisoners* is forbidden by international conventions, as are attacks on the Red Cross staff, doctors, and stretcher-bearers, of which numerous instances are cited.

*Old men* of seventy and eighty and over have been shot.

*Criminal assaults* on young girls, nuns, and ladies whose husbands were fighting have been extraordinarily numerous and many cases have been proved to the hilt. Frequently several, as many as nine, soldiers have committed rape on one and the same woman, often under the muzzle of the revolver.

This ghastly report, which fills sixteen three-column

pages of folio size, in which every case cited is accompanied by a statement of the locality, date, name, etc., can be read by no one without the deepest horror, and makes one sick in soul and body. This at least is the impression it made on me, and I could not read it without pausing now and then, just as when I read the history of the Inquisition and its terrors.

On the subject of the destruction of the town of Senlis, on September 2, also referred to in the report, Mr. Gustaf Hellström has given the *Dagens Nyheter* an account of his personal investigation. There were no French or British soldiers in the town, only a few Zouaves, and there was no fighting. The town was bombarded for three hours and shells were dropped on the cathedral, after the Germans had heard rifle firing from the Zouaves. The mayor had drawn up a proclamation, which was found at his domicile, but which he had no time to post in a public place. He was nevertheless dragged away as a hostage together with several others, all of whom were shot; even boys were shot down. The German soldiers began by looting an hotel and stealing food and wine, then they got drunk and began to dance; they went from cabaret to cabaret and became more and more intoxicated, after which they set fire to the town with hand-grenades and petrol. According to the Commission of Investigation, five hundred houses were reduced to ashes. Although it was the Zouaves who had fired the shots heard by the Germans, the latter persisted in their pretext that they came from civilians, which was not the case.

Whilst the Germans in the first month of the war pursued their triumphal progress through Belgium and France with "good results," the people at home were beside themselves with exultant joy; flags and bunting were universal, and everywhere the people sang with patriotic fervour "Deutschland, Deutschland über Alles in der Welt." The churches resounded with the swelling tones of "Nun danket alle Gott," and the German people were exalted as the worthy descendants of Goethe, Kant,

and Beethoven. Meanwhile thousands of civilian Belgians and Frenchmen were fleeing from their burning homes, hundreds of them wounded or *in extremis*, whilst hundreds again lay murdered and many hundred raped women were suffering agonies of despair and humiliation brought upon them by these worthy sons of Goethe, Kant, and Beethoven.

It is not difficult to understand that the French, who for the last decades have felt no rancour against the Germans and whose desire for revenge had died away, have by the German exploits in this war been filled with unextinguishable hatred, and are resolved, Government and people alike, to fight to the last man and not to make peace until the enemy is beaten ; nor can one wonder that the women of France declined to join in the Women's Peace Congress at The Hague at the end of April 1915. "So long as the soil of France is not freed from the enemy, her women cannot think of peace"—that was their message to the Congress.

The Emperor William's message to his army on the outbreak of war, to the effect that he placed his trust in the "unconquerable martial spirit which from days of old has filled our enemies with *fear and terror*," and General Hartmann's doctrine that "the enemy States must not be spared the *distress and horrors of war*," have had had an appalling sequel. This may well remind us of the Germanic barbarians of antiquity, when they burst into the Roman Empire and ravaged Gaul, Greece, and the East, sacking towns and putting the population to the sword, or of the Huns, whose savage lust of destruction spread terror over Europe (*cf. p. 28*).

The Emperor William threatened China some twenty years ago with Germany's "mailed fist," and his orders to the China troops of Field-Marshal Waldersee were : "Go ye forth as Huns !" The Germans have shown that they can obey : they have not forgotten the command, and even in this European World War they have obeyed it with Prussian thoroughness.

When General Hindenburg had defeated the Russians in East Prussia, the Germans penetrated into Poland and Lithuania, and although these countries are not inhabited by Russians, they have been treated in the most appalling manner by the victorious Germans. According to data published by the "Lithuanian Information Bureau" in Paris,\* some fifty communes, the names of which are given, were badly ravaged by the German invasion. The looting has been systematic; the soldiers took food, cattle, and horses without giving the receipts prescribed for such requisitions, and when the inhabitants in some places asked for these vouchers, they received pieces of paper on which was written: "Whoever produces this shall be hanged or shall receive 100 strokes of the cat." In all the localities mentioned the Germans have destroyed or requisitioned property representing tens of millions, and have taken a toll of thousands of lives.

A report was sent to Pope Benedict (January 28, 1915) appealing for his intervention with the German Government and his protest against the way in which the Germans treated priests and churches in Lithuania. In this report it is stated that seven churches in the districts of Vilna and Seina have been bombarded and that three of them are in ruins, several hundred persons—women, children, and old men—who took refuge within having been killed or wounded. A couple of priests who refused to incite the population to rebellion against the Russian administration were shot.

The devastation in the Polish theatre of war has been described by the Polish Countess Ledochowska in two addresses given at Stockholm in April 1915, in the course of which she gave the following details: About 200 towns and 9000 villages have been affected by the war, and 5000 villages have been levelled to the ground absolutely. The churches are in ruins, the granaries are empty, and agriculture is completely paralysed for want of cattle and seed.

\* Cf. *Pro Lithuanie, bulletin mensuel du bureau d'informations de Lithuanie*, mars 1915.

Many towns, such as Lodz with its 450,000 inhabitants, twice conquered, are *completely ruined*. The factories are closed, reducing some 400,000 workmen to *destitution*. *Thousands of inhabitants are wandering about in the forests homeless*, and mothers have no food to give their starving children. *Terrible epidemics*—famine, spotted typhus, dysentery, etc.—have broken out, especially among the children, who have suffered from a total lack of milk. Hundreds, nay, thousands are stretching out imploring hands for a crust of bread, but there is none to give. Mothers turn their faces from their children to be spared the sight of their wan faces, pinched by famine. The soldier, who has gone out to fight, but treasures in his innermost heart the picture of the home he left behind him, returns to find the corpses of wife and children, starved to death.

A race who have suffered cruelly through the war are the Jews. What has made the war particularly terrible for them to bear is the devastation which has swept over those countries of Eastern Europe where they lived in large communities, as in Russian Poland with its 2,000,000, and Galicia with its 1,000,000 Jews. We know now that these countries are nothing but an immense cemetery, a huge waste of ruins, where *all industrial life has ceased* and in the midst of which the remaining inhabitants are threatened with complete annihilation, whilst millions have had to flee from their native soil and have neither home nor bread.

The Jews, like the other subjects of a State, are required to serve in the army, and it is reckoned that about a million have been in arms, of whom some 200,000 have been killed or seriously wounded. Scattered as they are over the countries at war, these co-religionists and kinsmen have everywhere been made to fight against one another.

In Palestine a Jewish culture which has sprung up in recent decades is now threatened with extinction owing to broken communications and the resultant impossibility of making agriculture productive. For the Jews, therefore,

the war is a catastrophe, perhaps the greatest that has befallen them in our era since the destruction of Jerusalem.

Professor Reiss, of Lausanne, after investigating the *Austrian atrocities in Serbia*, has furnished the following details. At Sjabatz—the investigation only covers this district—4000 civilians, mainly of the peasant class and females of ages varying between two and ninety-two, have been massacred. Most of them were taken as hostages, but as it was impossible to get them sent to Austria at once, they were put to death. At Letchnitz the Austrians compelled 109 citizens of the civil population between the ages of eight and ninety, who had been taken as hostages, to dig trenches. They were thereupon ranged up alongside these trenches and shot, their bodies falling into the pit behind them. Many of them, however, were not killed outright, and a number, in fact, were not even touched, but nevertheless the trenches were filled in over dead and living. Professor Reiss adds that in some of the smaller towns which he has visited 1148 civilians have been killed.

In the Austrian Press these atrocities are excused on the plea that the Serbian civilian population attacked the Austrian troops !

An official summary of the *Russian atrocities* in East Prussia has been published by the German Government (April 1915), all data given being taken from official reports and sworn declarations. Here we read the following : “ It is now a fact familiar to all that the formerly flourishing region of East Prussia now presents, as a result of the barbarous Russian methods of warfare, a picture of the most hopeless desolation, that entire towns have been burnt down and destroyed, and that the peaceful inhabitants have had to fly from the regime of sack and murder and leave all that they possessed behind. Official details now to hand show that in the course of the two Russian invasions of East Prussia thousands of men, women, and children were dragged away, whilst thousands of others were murdered and 20,000 buildings were destroyed or burnt ; in the second invasion 80,000 dwelling-houses were

looted and destroyed. The last Russian raid on Memel also proved to be a savage looting expedition punctuated by every conceivable horror. The certified statements annexed to the report bear ghastly witness to the cruelties and acts of savagery inflicted on the population.

“In every conceivable way the Russian troops have stolen, plundered, sacked, and wantonly destroyed the movables of rich and poor. Cattle and supplies have been taken away without payment and without leaving requisition receipts. Men and women were forced to hand over their last pfennigs to the rapacious soldiery. Houses were ransacked from top to bottom and everything that appealed to the greed of the rank and file was carried away. To crown their infamy, they deliberately and wantonly burnt and destroyed homesteads, farm buildings, and supplies.

“The population, amongst them women and children, were maltreated under all sorts of pretexts and without rhyme or reason, although they did all in their power to please the Russian soldiers as regards food and lodging. These cruelties include many acts of deliberate torture ; thus in one case all the male inhabitants of a whole village, including the judge, were flogged and threatened with death. A very common occurrence was the murder of peaceable citizens without the slightest cause, often with refined torture and before the eyes of their family. Rape of women was frequent. In many cases the unhappy victims were assaulted by several soldiers in succession and many were infected with venereal diseases. Women in an advanced stage of pregnancy fell victims to these lascivious beasts in human form, and even old women of over seventy were not spared. A little girl of eight was raped by *two* Russian soldiers in succession. Officers were also to be found amongst the guilty.”

Germany has now surprised her enemies with giant mortars of 42 centimetres, with which the most appalling execution has been done and by the aid of which the

strongest fortresses have been taken—consummate infernal machines which Frau Bertha Krupp has contributed to German warfare, a token, by the way, of woman's share in modern culture. These guns have been playfully called “Dicke Bertha” (“Fat Bertha”) after her.\*

Besides many highly perfected types of gun, howitzer, etc., hitting their target with incredible precision at an enormous range determined by scientific calculations, and in addition to improved shells and shrapnel, this war has also witnessed the introduction of machine-guns of the very highest efficiency, capable of dealing death wholesale. A German officer wrote in a war letter from Belgium, after his men had been decimated by British machine-gun fire: “These machine-guns are the invention of the devil himself !”

This war has been very fertile in new methods of fighting and engines of destruction hitherto undreamt of. To aerial bombardment has been added the use of hand-grenades and mines, and now we have the “spraying with corrosive liquids.” This diabolical invention is German, and was first used in February 1915 in the forest of Malancourt between the Ardennes and the Meuse, where the Germans sprayed the French in their trenches with a corrosive liquid which burnt them badly and compelled them to evacuate their position.

Another hellish device adopted by the Germans (in March 1915) was the *spraying of the enemy with petroleum* ignited by hand-bombs and burning torches. The soldiers’

\* Equally large, if not larger, guns were used in 1453 and sealed the fate of Constantinople at the hands of Mohammed II. He had managed to cajole into his service a clever (Danish or Hungarian) gun-founder named Urban, who became his Krupp. At the ordnance works at Adrianople he set to work to make guns of incredible size. The stone projectile of the largest weighed 600 lb. ; the transport of these monster guns required thirty wagons fastened together and drawn by sixty oxen. The gun could not be fired more than seven times a day, and Urban sought to prevent its bursting (an accident which eventually happened) by pouring in oil after every round.

clothes were saturated by the oil, whereupon they became wreathed in flames and resembled living torches ; yet they went on fighting until their rifles dropped from their hands.

At the beginning of April the Germans introduced at Ypres the use of *bombs containing asphyxiating gases*, the efficiency of which was loudly praised in their *communiqués*.

British and French doctors have reported on these bombs and have found that the medium used is the very noxious and corrosive *chlorine gas*. Those who are exposed to its effect first feel a burning pain accompanied by intolerable irritation in throat and eyes ; these symptoms are succeeded by severe attacks of suffocation and terrible pain in the chest, accompanied by an incessant cough. *Many fell*, never to rise again ; others reeled about in dreadful agony, began to choke, and had to withdraw from the firing line. A great number of those who escaped lay sick for many days and *died* in spite of the most lavish care.

It has been the intention of the Germans to bring methods of this kind into general use, and they have had them up their sleeve for a considerable time. In fact, *the whole plant had been organized beforehand*. It has been stated by a prisoner that cylinders containing gas had been served out over a great stretch of front, twenty cylinders to every fifty metres. A sub-lieutenant who had been taken prisoner has declared that he considers the asphyxiating gases a useful weapon in Germany's service. That the organization has long been in preparation is demonstrated by the fact that the German troops on April 22 carried an outfit to protect them from asphyxiation.

Finally, the Germans have attempted to *poison the wells* for their enemies in South-west Africa. The British Colonial Secretary issued on May 5, 1915, a statement on the subject giving the following details : On the occupation of Swakopmund by the Union troops it was discovered that six wells had been poisoned with some *arsenical*

*substance. In some cases bags containing this poison were discovered in the well.* General Botha sent a letter to Colonel Francke commanding the German forces, in which he pointed out that such action was contrary to Article 23 of The Hague Convention.

Francke admitted that the Germans had tried the substance in question and had found that by its use any enemy would be compelled for some time ahead to procure water from elsewhere. Francke added that in order not to injure the health of the enemy he had given orders that wells thus treated should have warnings posted beside them.

Botha declared, however, that no such warnings were found. Three weeks later, moreover, a letter was intercepted from a Captain Krüger, of the German Protectorate troops, to an advanced post at Pforte. In this letter it was said that "the patrol at Gabib has received instructions *thoroughly to infect the Ida Mine with virus.* Please, therefore, approach Swakop and Ida Mine with greatest caution and never water there again."

After evacuating Aus, Warmbad, and other places, *the German troops systematically poisoned all wells along the railway lines during their retreat.*

Article 23 of The Hague Convention of 1897, signed by Germany, provides: "It is particularly prohibited: (a) To use poison or poisoned weapons."

Many other appalling things have been reported from the war. Bayonet fighting is described as being particularly sanguinary: the men fight hand to hand in unbridled passion and aim their thrusts at the most vulnerable parts of the body—the head, the chest, and the stomach. They throw their whole strength into the one purpose of killing, not of wounding only, and no one escapes death if he does not succeed in killing his adversary. As a rule there are few survivors after a bayonet fight.

*Aerial warfare* by means of aeroplanes and airships has become a really diabolical method of taking the life of human beings who form no part of the fighting armies,

of attacking unfortified towns, and of destroying monumental works of art, private property, etc., and is one against which the whole civilized world should have lodged the most emphatic protests. This dropping of bombs otherwise than on fortifications and armies is absolute barbarism, a new invention which has brought shame and dishonour on the belligerents and which has been more particularly exploited by Germany with her Zeppelins.

Even though the rules for aerial warfare, to the effect that only *reconnaissances* and attacks on *fighting forces* and *fortifications* are allowed, have not been codified, let alone ratified by an international conference, they are surely self-evident and belong to the most elementary principles of international law, being an expression of the sense of justice of the nations.

According to the international agreements on the rules of war, the aerial bombardment of unfortified towns should be regarded as a *crime* pure and simple, and those guilty of such ill-deeds should be hanged like vulgar malefactors when their aircraft happens to be shot down. Russia has found it necessary to issue a notice to the effect that such bombardment from the air will be regarded as piracy, since documents have been found on dead German officers showing that the Emperor William had ordered them to treat the Cossacks as robbers.

*Mines at sea* as used in this war are one of the most barbarous weapons, which injure not only the belligerent parties, but also the citizens and ships of neutral countries.

By sowing mines in the North Sea, with a total disregard for international traffic, whereby a number of fishing-vessels and merchant-ships of neutral countries have been lost and numberless people drowned, Germany has shown once again that to her there is no such thing as international law, and that, as the Imperial Chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, said about the violation of Belgian neutrality, "Necessity knows no law." Everything, apparently, may be done for the sake of Germany's

“necessity,” and Germany is doing naught but defending herself.

It should be put on record that Germany, although a signatory to The Hague Convention of 1907, has been guilty of violating it in the following ways :

(1) Mines have not been laid in such a way as to make them harmless if torn adrift.

(2) Germany has not taken steps to provide for the safety of peaceful navigators, mines have not been systematically watched, and nothing has been done to indicate the dangerous areas to neutral shipping.

Germany not having scored a decisive victory, the war has now begun to be conducted by that country in a more and more barbarous manner and with open disregard for the principles of the laws of nations and the accepted rules of warfare. As instances of this I may cite the German airship bombardment of unfortified English towns and villages and, what is even worse, the appalling havoc which German floating *mines* and *submarines* have wrought not only amongst the British but also amongst neutral merchant-ships, fishing-vessels, and emigrant-ships. One's reason is almost numbed by these misdeeds, which have already taken a toll of hundreds of lives and resulted in enormous material loss. It looks as if the Germans had gone raving mad and wanted to show the world what the *furor Teutonicus* really is. Or have certain submarine commanders taken leave of their senses ? German submarines seem to torpedo vessels indiscriminately without warning and without knowing whether the ships are neutral vessels or carry neutral passengers. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and Holland have already lost a large number of ships and lives.

Intense indignation was felt everywhere when the steamer *Falaba* with its 140 passengers and crew of 100 was torpedoed in April 1915 ; only five minutes were allowed in which to get passengers and crew into the boats ; when the torpedo was launched some of the

latter were still suspended from their davits and only one boat had reached the water, with the result that about 100 people were drowned.

The atrocities committed by means of German submarines seemed to reach a climax when, with the most ghastly callousness, placing other similar exploits completely in the shade, one of the world's largest passenger-steamers, the Cunarder *Lusitania*, with 2160 people on board, was sunk off the Irish coast on May 7 by torpedoes discharged from a German submarine. The vessel sank after eighteen minutes. The number of lives lost was 1396, and only 764 were rescued.

There was a word here and there in the German papers expressing regret at the loss of life, but in others there was a note of the most unmistakable *triumph*. "By the vigilance of one of our U-boats," chortles the *Berliner Boersen Courier*, "we have been able to sink this titan of the seas; by a single blow a vessel worth tens of millions of marks has been annihilated." Not a word about the innocent victims, not a line suggesting compassion for the sorrow of thousands. "There is," telegraphed a Berlin correspondent of the *Stockholms Dagblad*, "a certain feeling of *satisfaction and pride* that the Germans, despite the patrols of the British Fleet, have been able to justify their warning."

But from all corners of the earth came the *unanimous verdict* which the rest of the world, with its sense of decency and justice unwarped, has given on the German crime.

The Germans in due course came forward with the proofs supposed to show that they *acted correctly*. The arguments have been weighed and have been found wanting. We know what they are. Count Bernstorff, it is said, in an *open warning* urged the public in America not to travel by the *Lusitania*, and went so far as to have personal warnings sent to individual passengers. But, apart from the fact that the warnings *could not reach all whose lives were forfeited*, nobody could have taken the notice of the projected crime for anything but an

empty threat, a piece of bluff. *Who could possibly imagine that the German Admiralty intended in cold blood to commit an act which, revolting as German warfare has been, surpassed in cynicism everything that had gone before?*

The German plea that a *warning* had been given must be *dismissed categorically* on the ground that the *crime remains a crime even if notified beforehand*; just as pre-meditated murder is judged more severely than manslaughter, Germany's moral responsibility became *greater* when it was brought to light that the deed had been *planned and prepared long beforehand*.

It has been alleged that the *Lusitania* was an auxiliary cruiser, but the fact that the ship was on the list of vessels which in certain circumstances *might* be used as ships of war is, of course, no proof that she made her last voyage in that capacity; the British Admiralty has, in fact, indignantly repudiated the German allegation.

It has also been asserted that the *Lusitania* carried large quantities of *ammunition* and *war material* in her holds, but this contention has *not been proved* and does not sound particularly convincing.

But even if this was the case, and even if we accept the preposterous *German attitude* that the Germans are entitled in their submarine warfare to *override all rules of international law* regarding seizure and capture, and even assuming that the Germans were thus justified in sinking the vessel, *the German crime remains nevertheless in all its naked iniquity*.

During the first month of the submarine war the passengers and crews of the doomed steamers were given a *chance of saving their lives*; they were *allowed the number of minutes necessary* to lower the boats. But in the case of the *Lusitania* the first torpedo was discharged *without any warning whatever*.

Instead of allowing the life-saving operations to proceed unhampered, by which means perhaps the majority of the passengers might have been rescued, *another torpedo was discharged at the ship*; this time she received a heavy list,

the lowering of the boats was made more difficult, if not impossible, and a few minutes later the *Lusitania* went to the bottom. The firing of this second torpedo was a piece of utter and perverse bloodthirstiness, which could have no other object than to kill for the sake of killing. The above account, by the way, is taken from *Dagens Nyheter*—editor: O. v. Zweigbergk, M.P.—and I agree in every respect with that paper's view of the crime, and its verdict is shared by the greater part of the Swedish Press.

The whole of Sweden has been deeply stirred by this policy of lawlessness and murder, which, if German statesmen and leading organs defend the *Lusitania* crime, places Germany outside the pale of humanity. We have to observe a strict political neutrality in the war, but this should not prevent us from loudly protesting against this horrible degeneration of Germanic megalomania.

*Karlstadstidningen*—editor: Mr. M. Hellberg, M.P.—commented as follows: “There is something utterly insen-sate, something utterly mad, in such conduct, which reveals a total lack of a sense of proportion. It looks as if the Germans thought nothing of flaunting their contempt in the face of humanity and ranging the two remaining Great Powers beside their enemies. But such ruthless arrogance must not remain unpunished. *It must of necessity rouse the enmity of nations*, and everything in their natures that is proud and free, everything that speaks for culture and humanity, must revolt at such principles. Like the Russian despotism—persisting as it does in the constant struggle with the best elements of the Russian nation—the insolent *German Cæsarism*, that faithful champion of reaction, stands forth as the defiant challenger of humanity.”

A *Swedish protest against the “Lusitania” crime* testifying to the opinion held there amongst sane people, and signed by a large number of persons representing Swedish science and art, was addressed to the English newspapers a few days after the catastrophe. It took the form of

the following telegram : “ You in England know that the Swedish nation, practically speaking, stands united round its Government in the demand for the maintenance of the strictest political neutrality. But this by no means prevents a great part of our people—whether a majority or not we cannot say—from being *anything but neutral in their feelings regarding the methods of warfare adopted in this horrible war*, and which have now culminated in the *sinking of the “Lusitania.”* The misconception that *war suspends all laws of humanity* will surely prove fatal not only to future civilization, but above all to the *sentiment of human solidarity* which is so vital to the smaller nations.” The telegram was signed by a large number of prominent people the names of many of whom are household words in Sweden.

As an excuse for their inhuman aerial and submarine warfare against England, the Germans plead that *Great Britain began to wage a barbarous war* against Germany by seeking to reduce her by *starvation*.

But it does not seem to have been realized that in all wars it has been a matter of course that if a decision is not quickly reached by force of arms, shortage of food may be relied upon to bring about capitulation. Much privation may have to be endured in this way, but it can be brought to an end at any time by laying down arms and abandoning the hope of victory. Besides, the nameless suffering and loss of life and property caused by active warfare may be avoided by this consummation. The so-called starvation method need, therefore, be no worse than the butchery method.

But it is obvious that a State which engages in war must regard it as one of its primary duties to make provision for a sufficiency of food for a long time ahead.

It is quite certain, on the other hand, that those in charge of Germany’s destinies did not contemplate that *the war would last as long as it has done*, for that part of their plan of mobilization which concerns the food supply of the population has not received adequate attention.

It is peculiar to note that the Germans are now accusing England of barbarism by seeking to starve out Germany, seeing that we know that they *starved out Paris in 1871*, the city capitulating only when its two million inhabitants were no longer able to withstand the ravages of famine.

How the Germans, whilst believing themselves to be "God's chosen people," can yet defend the *Lusitania* crime has been demonstrated in an amazing manner by a German clergyman, Pastor Günther, whose sermon to the German congregation at Christiania on May 9 (as reported by *Stockholms Tidningen*) contained the following observations :

"The Germans do not trouble themselves about the opinions of others. The *voice of conscience* is their only standard. In the World War its conscience has been the German people's comfort and strength. The sinking of the *Lusitania* leaves the German conscience untarnished. England, and England alone, must bear the responsibility for this terrible tragedy. The torpedoing of the *Lusitania* was the right answer to *England's brutal and illegal policy of attempting to starve out Germany*. If England's will were paramount, thousands of innocent women and children in Germany would be tortured to death. Why should the lives of the *Lusitania's* passengers be held more precious than those of German women and children? *Might is might*, and the accountability to God for this dreadful happening *rests on England*."

Apart from the denial of the British Admiralty, the chief custom-house officer of the port of New York has declared officially that the *Lusitania* did not carry a single gun.

The Germans, on the other hand, say that the ship "demonstrably" carried ammunition—5400 cases—and this is claimed by them in justification of the crime. But *no proofs* have been produced, nothing but empty assertions.

Truly the Germans have not forgotten the Imperial command : "Go ye forth as Huns!"

It cannot be too clearly emphasized that even if the *Lusitania* had been armed with guns and had carried ammunition on board, and even though the German ambassador at Washington issued warnings against travelling by the vessel, the sinking of her remains a monstrous crime for the reason that *no time was allowed for saving the passengers and crew*, with the result that the majority perished miserably.

As regards the German ambassador's warning, we find that his newspaper advertisement did not caution people against travelling by the *Lusitania*, but merely in a general way against travelling by English vessels.

We cannot but feel the deepest compassion for all the *victims of the war*, those thousands of grievously wounded who have lain helpless on the battlefields and there died a lingering death, or who have been carried off to the hospitals mutilated, with horrible gaping wounds, suffering from gangrene, with amputated limbs, sightless, etc., or those countless thousands stricken down by malignant diseases brought on by hardships and inclement weather—the many victims of the “trench disease,” with feet and legs blackened by a kind of mortification, and those unhappy creatures whose nervous system is for ever wrecked by the horrors of never-ending slaughter, or those, again, who are worn out by nightmares, collapsing into a state of apathy, listlessness, aberration, madness. In the trenches the soldiers suffer horribly from nightmares, to which the French military surgeon, Dr. H. Bourget, has devoted much time and which he considers to lie at the root of psychic afflictions amongst the combatant forces. Worn out by incessant duty, the soldiers drop off to sleep, but their slumbers are soon disturbed by phantasms of what they have seen—enemy soldiers without heads or arms, or otherwise terribly mutilated, the bursting of shells, etc.—and many start up and shriek in terror, attacking their comrades in their sleep, or wandering about like sleep-walkers. These nightmares

give them no rest and frighten them out of their senses, often turning the trenches into the semblance of mad-houses.

The war brings suffering not only upon those who take part in it, upon the wounded and those who undergo hardships on the battlefield, but also on numberless *non-combatants*, the wives, mothers, sisters, and daughters at home who have lost their male supporters and are reduced to penury, as well as those who owing to the war are expelled from a country because their own people are at war with it. Here in Stockholm we have had many opportunities of seeing and hearing thousands of Russians who had been expelled from Germany, and thousands of Germans who have been deported from Russia—all proceeding homeward via Sweden. They have had much to endure and have had to leave everything behind, and many, probably for ever, have been deprived of their livelihood, their factories and businesses, at which they have toiled and laboured for many a year. Horses have been taken for war service without compensation, banks have withheld invested funds, factories have been closed ; in fact, we have seen here in Sweden thousands of persons who are totally ruined and will find nothing to do in the home country to which they are returning.

Besides, all men of military age have been retained as prisoners of war and taken to internment camps, where they lead an idle and pitiful existence, and are prevented from supporting wives and children who have been driven out of the country.

Again, let us think of the loss to civilization which this war has entailed : the killing of thousands of eminent, intelligent men representing learning and research, and who might have rendered their countries, nay, the whole world, the most invaluable services.

All common ideals have disappeared, all *international cultural effort has been rendered impossible*, for the nations hate one another and will not co-operate.

What credence will henceforth be attached to *international treaties*?

To study *international law* is now to waste one's time. At the Copenhagen University, for instance, the subject of international law has been provisionally *deleted from the law examinations*. Professor Jörgensen notified his students that they would not have to prepare for an examination on this subject, seeing that the provisions of international law were no longer being observed. This applies in particular to the Declaration of London, which, as stated by Professor Jörgensen in his address, has been suspended, more especially with regard to the rights of neutral Powers.

Europeans, who have hitherto looked down on the Asiatics from the eminence of their lofty civilization, must now hide their heads in shame.

The miserable condition of Europe revealed by the World War: the burning hatred between the nations, the destruction of life and property on a scale never previously witnessed; all this has destroyed the respect in which European civilization has been held. Professor Erik Nyström, who has laboured with so much success at the Shansi University in China, had intended on his return in 1914 to begin a series of addresses on European civilization; but, as he said on leaving Stockholm, this scheme must be dropped, for the Chinese now realize to the full what a pitiful sham European culture has become.

I sometimes wish that certain authors would cease, in attempting to explain the nameless misery of this war, to introduce religion and philosophy, that they would abstain from talking of God's providence and His designs, of the laws of history, of the soul of the people in this country or that, of the revelation of the cosmic mind, of the portent of the world-spirit, etc., all of which are empty and meaningless phrases. Away with all philosophy, all moralizing musings! What we see is chaos, nothing else.

Life on earth in those countries where the war is raging has become so dreadful, so hellish, that men are forced to flee from their homes, to wander about no better than

beggars, and often to seek shelter underground to escape the fury of their enemy.

We are almost tempted by these dismal thoughts to hark back to the demonology of ancient and mediæval times and to the old belief that evil spirits do exist, who influence men. All ancient peoples had a conception of supernatural powers for good and evil, and Western civilization has in no small degree been influenced by Zoroaster's teaching of Ormuzd and Ahriman, the personifications of good and evil. It has always been an unsolvable riddle why God permitted the devil to exist, and why He did not destroy his power when he appeared. The devil was created, we are told, but we do not know that he will be destroyed, unless perhaps it be on the disappearance of the human race. Celebrated demonologists of the Middle Ages wrote a number of works on the devil and his disciples, describing the origin of his powers; they told us how his realm was governed and that he had a court with a number of dignitaries and officials: a high chancellor, grand dukes and kings—Satan, Baal, Beelzebub, Leviathan, Lucifer, Moloch, etc.—and that they all had innumerable ministering spirits under them. It was hardly to be wondered at that villainy, war, and destruction dogged the footsteps of man; all his crimes were then ascribed to demoniacal influence, for the demons pervaded everything and circled through the air from one end of the earth to the other. God, instead of keeping them chained up in hell, gave them full freedom to tempt and plague men, and permitted the Prince of Hell to demand human blood for his altar sacrifices.

I recall these horrible notions of bygone ages because unhappily they fit our own time, because there are bad as well as good qualities in man, which assert themselves in troublous and warlike times and turn him into a savage beast, brutalizing him and endowing him with devilish qualities.

It is truly pitiful to note how in Russia as well as in

Germany, on the outbreak of this devastating World War, the people were wont to appeal to God as their protector. “Onward with God, who will be with us !” “God with us !” With this war-cry the armies marched forth to their butchery and destruction, blindly obeying the doctrine : “*woe to the vanquished !*”

We are living in a time when one has good cause to doubt the existence of honour and faith, human kindness and goodwill, when warlike passions have stifled reason. There has never been a time when pessimism was so justified as now, for the World War, the greatest and cruellest in history, has come upon us and we have fallen from our boasted civilization to the barbaric level of ancient times, when international law was still undreamt of, when there had been no Grotius, no Puffendorf, no Thomasius, no Wolff, no Leibnitz, no Kant—indeed, for aught we have learnt, we might have had no great thinkers and enlightened statesmen to guide us.

It is as if all the powers of hell had been let loose, as if the earth had become an inferno with Satan as King. It is not to be wondered at if, to many, the thought has occurred that Satan, not God, rules the universe. No wonder that in many troubled minds this doubt has arisen : How can a good and almighty God permit this horrible war, with its sacrifice of the lives of hundreds of thousands and of the well-being of many millions ?

One thing is certain : after ten months of the most unsparing exertions and the sacrifice of millions of human lives, God has not made Germany victorious, in spite of all imploring prayers offered up in churches and palaces.

In spite of the Emperor’s faith in the “tremendous warlike spirit” of the Germans ; in spite of his appeal to the German soldiers’ “indomitable will to conquer” ; in spite of Hindenburg’s “glorious victories” and the “joy of battle” which he and other German generals and soldiers have displayed, as placed on record in the Imperial telegrams of congratulation ; in spite of all this, Germany

would still seem to have no prospect of dictating peace with God's help, when the hour has come.

Germany's leading men, when they committed their country to the war, had grossly overrated its ability, in spite of many years of preparation, to make short work of its enemies and dictate peace terms in Paris.

France has shown herself to be stronger than had been supposed, and the invasion of that country was arrested long ago. Great Britain is sending a constant stream of fresh troops to France and contributing strongly towards an effective resistance.

Not only did Italy refuse to range herself by the side of Germany and Austria on the outbreak of war, for her Government was of the opinion that those countries, far from waging a defensive war, were themselves the aggressors — but the Austrian treaty concerning the Triple Alliance was formally denounced by Italy on May 4, 1915, and war was declared against Austria on May 23.

The Italian Foreign Minister, Sonnino, sent the Governments of the neutral States a detailed *communiqué* on the rupture with Austria-Hungary, which shows that the tension between the two countries had existed since the very beginning of the war and that the old grievances respecting Austria's oppression of Italian subjects had not been abated.

“ By bringing about the European War,” he says, “ by rejecting Serbia’s most conciliatory answer which gave all the satisfaction that could reasonably be demanded, and by rejecting all proposals for mediation put forward by Italy and other Powers in order to save Europe from a terrible conflagration, Austria-Hungary has with her own hands torn up the Treaty of Alliance with Italy. Moreover, by her action against Serbia, Austria-Hungary has deliberately disregarded Italy’s general interests in the Balkan Peninsula.”

After all these iniquities, sufferings, and losses among the belligerents, after the miscalculations connected with the bringing about of the war, after the disappointments which

must have followed when no decisive victories were forthcoming in spite of months of sanguinary fighting, and with the prospect that the war will end, as it began, with murder on an unexampled scale, but with no decided advantage for either side, whilst the resultant economic losses will cripple the nations for generations, and considering further that the war might actually have been averted, it is indeed surprising that none of those capable of bringing such calamities upon the world have, like Judas Iscariot, felt impelled to atone for it all with their lives.

### XIII

#### DANGERS OF OVER-POPULATION : WHAT STATISTICS TEACH : GERMANY'S OVER-POPULATION A CONSTANT MENACE TO PEACE.

THERE have been times when it was necessary to promote the growth of the population or when war was the almost normal state, as in antiquity, the Middle Ages, and after the Thirty Years War, when a great part of the population had succumbed on the battlefields or through the pestilences which followed in the wake of war. At such times the Governments were compelled to try to make good such losses, and to this end often doled out land to the poor.

In our time the situation is reversed in many countries.

The leading civilized countries are already over-populated, and every dislocation of trade and industry brings about great hardships and sufferings owing to the difficulty which members of all classes have in obtaining a livelihood.

But even under normal conditions, when wars are not raging and crops are satisfactory, the majority find more difficulty than should be the case in making ends meet, and this usually gives rise to dissatisfaction and to an indifference to the loftier aspects of life which is not hard to understand.

Reproduction is still to countless numbers a purely instinctive act, as in the epoch of the cave-dwellers and in the Stone Age, and now, in the twentieth century, in the great majority of cases, no attempt is made to regulate it. Yet it ought to be the aim of an enlightened age to civilize this primitive condition, to bring reflection and the feeling

of responsibility to bear on the sexual instinct with an eye to the improvement of the race and the duty to combat poverty and distress through over-population with its attendant evils : a perpetual struggle for existence and devastating barbarous wars.

That many countries of the globe are already over-populated, is certain ; and although there are numerous tracts, as in Africa, South America, and Siberia, where there is still room for millions, it is nevertheless a fact that most countries are now so densely populated that many millions find life a hard struggle and suffer want, and a constant increase of the population of the globe *must thus soon become a very grave danger*. Although exact figures are lacking with regard to the population of many countries, reliable statisticians have considered themselves justified in computing the population of the globe as under :

In 1870 about 1400 millions  
,, 1914 ,, 1700 ,,

that is to say an increase of 300 millions in forty-four years, or about *seven millions per annum*.

Whilst on the subject of the menace to the world's peace through over-population, I may, among extra-European States, instance Japan, a Power which has already adopted a policy of expansion made necessary by its colossal growth of population. Here are some figures on Japan's population :

1880 . . . . .	38 millions
1900 . . . . .	45 ,,
1912 . . . . .	53 ,,

To make room for and feed her growing population Japan made war on China and Russia, and her prize was Korea. Now, in the World War, Japan, as Britain's ally, has attacked the German possession (the so-called ninety-nine years lease) of Kiao-chau, which fell after an energetic defence.

This was followed by protracted negotiations between China and Japan in regard to certain demands of the latter, and a settlement has now been reached which ensures a durable peace in the East and has promoted the friendly relations between Japan and China.

The Japanese Government issued at the beginning of May 1915 a *communiqué* respecting the whole string of questions which formed the subject of her negotiations with China, accompanied by an account of their progress, China's concessions and objections, and the final basis of settlement.

The net result of the Japanese demands for privileged treatment in certain Chinese provinces is that China has been compelled to abandon her undivided sovereign rights over the provinces of Shantung, Fu-kien, and Southern Manchuria. All rights held by Germany in Shantung are thus made over by China to Japan.

In Southern Manchuria Japan now enjoys an altogether privileged position ; this Chinese province may henceforth be regarded as a *Japanese Protectorate*. The Japanese hold the right to own land, to carry on industry and trade, yet are not obliged to pay other taxes to the Chinese authorities than are approved by the Japanese consuls. As regards administration of justice, China agrees to accept Japanese jurisdiction, although under the nominal co-operation of the Chinese authorities.

The Imperial Government is to be consulted before *advisers* or *instructors* are appointed in political, financial, and military matters.

In Eastern Mongolia Japan will also enjoy extensive privileges. “Joint enterprise” between Japanese and Chinese is permitted in the domain of agriculture and auxiliary industries.

The central administration must appoint influential Japanese as political, financial, and military advisers. The Chinese Government shall acknowledge the right of the Japanese to own real property for the erection of Japanese hospitals, temples, and schools in the interior of China. The

police in the districts where such institutions are required shall be placed under joint Japanese and Chinese control, or alternatively Japanese may be appointed for the policing of these districts. China must import from Japan a certain quantity of *armaments* or must establish in China an *arsenal* under joint Japanese and Chinese administration, the materials for which shall be furnished from Japan.

The eminent English eugenist Havelock Ellis has pointed out on the subject of the population of Japan, on the authority of that country's foremost expert, Professor Tokano, how colossal is the infant mortality in Japan—in 1907 no less than 25·7 per cent.—and that the birth-rate, which in 1902 was high, 26 per thousand, has fallen somewhat in the last decade. This *declining birth-rate*, combined with the *rising death-rate*, is, if this tendency continues, a serious problem for Japan's social reformers, but should comfort those who speak in Europe of the “yellow peril” from Japan.

From China, for the same reason, there is little cause to fear a “yellow peril.” It is true that the birth-rate is high, but the infant mortality is enormous.

Professor F. A. Ross, who knows China well and bases his figures on the evidence of thirty-three doctors practising in that country, estimates that out of ten children born in China three die at a tender age, and probably five besides. Others place the infant mortality at 90 per cent.

Reverting to the conditions in our own continent, we find the following statistics on *Europe's population*:

In 1870 . . . . .	305	millions
„ 1890 . . . . .	363	„
„ 1911 . . . . .	452	„

The growth from 1890 to 1911 was thus 89 millions, or 4·2 millions per annum.

At the same ratio of increase the population of Europe would amount:

In 1930 to 532 millions	
„ 1940 to 574	„
„ 1950 to 616	„

One shudders at these figures and at the thought of what they portend—not wealth or prosperity, but dire distress, starvation, and misery, which result in war, which again is followed by demoralization and decay of all civilization ! And to think that this may come about within a few decades !

France contributes relatively little to this regrettable state of things, for her birth-rate has long since been checked. Her population amounted :

In 1821 to 30½ millions	
„ 1872 to 36	„
„ 1911 to 39½	„

After the population for a long series of years had shown a hardly perceptible increase, there occurred, for the first time in 1911, an actual diminution ; the number of births was in that year 742,114 and of deaths 776,683, equal to a decrease of 34,569.

In Russia and Germany, on the other hand, the population has been growing steadily, and the question naturally arises whether either of these countries thereby becomes a menace to the world's peace. *Russia's* population was :

In 1815	.	.	.	.	45 millions
„ 1867	.	.	.	.	71 „
„ 1897	.	.	.	.	129 „
„ 1912	.	.	.	.	171 „

In spite of the enormous growth of Russia's population, we may conclude that Europe is not threatened by any westward pressure on the part of the Russians, for they have in Siberia a colonizing territory which it will take very long to fill.

During the three hundred years preceding 1896 there

emigrated from Russia to Siberia about 3,000,000 persons, and in the nine years from 1896 to 1905 about 1,350,000, whilst from 1905 to 1913 no fewer than 3,000,000 Russian settlers took up their abode in that province. Thus in eight years as many Russian emigrants have settled in Siberia as in the whole of the three hundred years preceding 1896! When the emigration figures were at their highest, in 1908, 759,000 emigrants arrived in the territories east of the Ural; in recent years the figure has been from 250,000 to 325,000. It was more especially after the Russian Board of Agriculture had instituted a systematic distribution and colonization of the immense steppe and forest lands in Western Siberia, and in the Amur country on the shores of the Pacific, that the emigration assumed the colossal dimensions above-mentioned.

The Russian Government is now spending considerable sums on the creation of a new Russia in Siberia, and committees have been formed in all the provinces which supply all requisite information and assist the emigrants.

Frithiof Nansen, who in the course of a long journey through Siberia in 1913 took careful stock of that country, realized that it presented a colossal field for emigration if certain vast and fertile areas were cultivated and river navigation were introduced. In his opinion Russia's tendency towards expansion is now directed *eastward* in the direction of her colony of Siberia. His observations are recorded in his recently published book *Gjennem Siberien* ("Through Siberia").

As regards the fear of over-population in Russia, it is important to note that, although the birth-rate is very high, this factor is counterbalanced by the enormous mortality. Havelock Ellis states that, although the infant mortality in Russia has been reduced in the course of about thirty years from 31 to 26 per cent. (1896-1900), it is nevertheless greater than in any other European country. Statistics show, he says, that out of 1000 persons 15 more die in Russia than in England, which is, taking the whole people, equal to an annual loss of 1,650,000 lives.

In Germany, where the population after the end of the Thirty Years War, about the middle of the seventeenth century, had dropped to about 5,000,000, there was room during the next two centuries for a considerable increase. Germany's growth of population may be seen from the following figures :

Population in 1820	.	.	.	.	27 millions
„ 1871	.	.	.	.	41 „
„ 1890	.	.	.	.	49½ „
„ 1914	.	.	.	.	68 „

For many years Germany's population has been growing at the rate of about 860,000 per annum, or about 4,250,000 in five years—that is, *8,500,000 in ten years*. Statistics show that the increase in the decade 1904–13 was 8,352,000.

Taking this increase as a basis for an approximate calculation of future growth, we find that Germany's population will amount

In 20 years, or 1934, to about	85 millions
„ 40 „ 1954 „ 102 „	
„ 60 „ 1974 „ 119 „	
„ 80 „ 1994 „ 136 „	

In other words, in about eighty years the population will be doubled.

The danger, within but a few decades, of a real over-population which will constitute a menace to Germany and the rest of the world alike, is obvious. One cannot conceive how Germany will be able, within her present boundaries, to accommodate her (calculated) population in forty years from now, let alone in sixty or eighty years.

In all countries enjoying an advanced civilization, it is now becoming general for married people to realize the necessity of *limiting the number of children* according to their material circumstances, the higher cost of education, of study, of medical care, etc.

That the French have given this aspect their consideration we know, for in that country the so-called two-children

system has long been popular in almost all classes of the community. In England, too, the system has obtained a great vogue among the enlightened middle-classes and also in an increasing measure in the working classes.

In Germany, where the population has hitherto grown with such appalling rapidity, and where in certain circles this has been looked upon with satisfaction as adding to the military security of the country, the people have nevertheless begun of late to limit the increase of their families. Thus Professor Max Flesch (in his *Prostitution u. Frauenkrankheiten*, 1898), writes as follows : "In all strata of the community it is difficult nowadays to bring up a large family. The women of the poorer classes fear not only the accouchement but also the domestic troubles brought about by the suspension of their earnings during pregnancy. In the more well-to-do classes the worries in connexion with the children's education, and the troubles of providing for their daughters and for the studies of their sons, have lessened the desire for large families."

During the last few decades many physicians and social reformers have come forward with emphatic warnings against the heedless rate of reproduction in Germany, mainly with the object of checking poverty and disease.

Dr. Mensinga (Flensburg) was the first (1885) to write on this subject in Germany ; he was followed by Dr. L. Löwenfeld, Professor A. Hegar, A. Meyerhof (writing under the pseudonym of H. Ferdy), Professor M. Gruber, and others.\* All these writers pointed out the justification of the new Malthusianism both in regard to marriage and to the population as a whole, and the necessity of checking the rate of reproduction, seeing that giving birth to too many children often affects the health of the mother and the offspring ; they, therefore, recommend the use of preven-

\* See C. Hasse (*Mensinga*), *Ueber fakultative Sterilität*, 1885 ; L. Löwenfeld, *Sexualleben und Nervenleiden*, 1891 ; A. Hegar, *Der Geschlechtstrieb*, 1894 ; H. Ferdy, *Die Mittel zur Verhütung der Conception*, 1895 ; M. Gruber, *Hygiene des Geschlechtslebens*, 1905.

tive measures in order to alleviate distress among the lower classes and reduce the mortality among infants, etc.

On the other hand, out of fear of a reduced birth-rate or eventual diminution of the population, Bills to combat the new Malthusianism have at frequent intervals been presented to Parliament both in Germany and in France. The Bill introduced by M. Gauthier in the French Chamber in 1909 was prefaced by the plea that "if the population is still further reduced, we shall not be able to fill the cadres of the Army or to meet the requirements of our international industry." In Germany Professor Flesch criticized the movement very thoroughly in the periodical *Sexual-Probleme* (1910), and pointed out that it would militate against the poorer classes "if they were to do what is customary amongst the upper classes." He also showed that, although Germany's population has increased so enormously (by 862,000 in 1905), the shortage of agricultural labour is nowhere so severely felt, and that the most important work can often only be coped with by the aid of foreigners, instanceing the employment of Italians on the railways and of Poles in the mines, and he pointed out that most of the men found unfit for military service belong to the towns and industrial communities.

When the Imperial German Government in 1911 introduced a Bill in the Reichstag for legislation against New Malthusian practices, Dr. Max Marcuse wrote an exhaustive protest in *Sexual-Probleme* (1911). He pointed out that "whilst in Germany, as in all Western States, the rate of reproduction amongst the upper classes is relatively low, large families are the rule in the working-class communities. The economic and sexual misery in our proletariat is in a large measure traceable to the fact that they do not sufficiently resort to the new Malthusian methods. *There are conditions which are stronger than all laws*, and if the Reichstag were to pass this Bill, the new law would quite certainly be found inadequate for attaining the real object aimed at, namely, the raising of the birth-rate."

Marcuse quoted one of the foremost German population

politicians, G. Rümelin, who has declared that "if Germany continues yearly to add 800,000 to 900,000 souls to her population, she *must inevitably seek an overseas expansion* of her territory, which England more especially *cannot* admit. And in that case, in a not too distant future, Germany's increased population must lead to the *overflowing of our boundaries.*"

When the question of the diminished German birth-rate was before the Prussian Lower House in April 1913, Dr. Mugdan refuted the contention that it was due to decadence and showed that such diminution is more often due to a stricter conception of the *duties of parenthood*, pointing out at the same time that it is an international phenomenon.

This subject is discussed every year in many well-known journals, more especially *Sexual-Probleme*, edited by Dr. Max Marcuse (Berlin), and *Die neue Generation*, edited by Dr. Helene Stöcher (Berlin). Moreover, a society has recently been formed with the title "Gesellschaft zur Bekämpfung der Überbevölkerung Deutschlands" ("Society for Combating Germany's Over-population"), with Dr. F. Goldstein (Berlin) as president. The birth question, "birth polities," etc., have during the last two years engaged the attention of a Society for the Protection of Mothers ("Deutscher Bund für Mutterschutz").

It should be mentioned that during the great Hygienic Exhibition at Dresden in 1911 the scientific and social congresses held there included an international "New Malthusian Congress" (September 24-27), at which, besides the deliberations in private, public addresses were given which aroused the greatest interest. Professor K. Wicksell gave some very valuable lectures in the course of which he uttered warnings against German over-population, and I also contributed papers to the transactions of the Congress.

The will and resolution to escape poverty and to live in circumstances worthy of human civilization have for many years induced numberless families of all classes, especially

in the towns, to keep the number of children within certain bounds, and statistics show that Germany has also experienced an appreciable *diminution of the birth-rate*.

This result ought not to worry Germany. Statistics have shown that a reduced birth-rate is now experienced in *all European countries* and also in all civilized States outside Europe. Rumania alone shows an increase. In the German Empire the yearly birth-rate per 10,000 inhabitants has been as follows :

During the decade 1871–1880.	.	391
,,        ,,       1901.	.	369
,,        ,,       1910.	.	307
,,        ,,       1911.	.	295

This, it is true, shows a diminution of 56,000 in the number of births in 1911. But it does not convey by any means that an actual decrease in the growth of population has taken place. On the contrary, it has for many years been enormous and practically constant. In the German Empire 38,303 fewer children were born in 1909 than in 1908; yet the increase of population was about the same as before, or 884,061. In 1904 it was 862,664.

This is explained by the considerable reduction of the death-rate, this reduction exceeding that of the birth-rate. Thus the number of deaths per 10,000 inhabitants has been as follows :

In 1870	.	.	.	.	290	deaths
,, 1890	.	.	.	.	250	,,
,, 1910	.	.	.	.	171	,,

The danger of over-population in Germany has become particularly menacing for the reason that the *emigration*, which formerly was very considerable, has in the last twenty years dwindled to comparatively small dimensions owing to the colossal economic advance which has given opportunities of profit to the workers.

The overseas emigration from Germany amounted in 1881–90 to an average of 136,000 and fell in 1893 to 87,000;

in 1894 there was a still further drop to roughly 40,000  
The average has since been as follows :

1901-5	.	.	.	29,308	annually
1906-10	.	.	.	26,449	,
1911	.	.	.	22,592	,
1912	.	.	.	18,445	,
1913	.	.	.	25,775	,

The conditions for emigration not being favourable everywhere owing to inadequate opportunities for earning a livelihood, immigration prohibitions, etc., Germany must have *suitable colonies*, which, moreover, are needed for the country's trade and for the export of its industrial products and the import of raw materials, etc.

Germany, with her sixty-eight millions, has now clearly reached the practicable maximum of population if she is to harbour a prosperous and contented people ; and yet, even now, a certain part of her people have to seek their sustenance outside the country's boundaries or in its colonies.

The stupendous growth of Germany's population finally, at the beginning of the twentieth century, led to *overcrowding in many trades*. Dr. Goldstein, in a *Denkschrift* published in 1911 on the subject of over-population, pointed out that doctors, lawyers, engineers, musicians, painters, sculptors, singers, and actors all complained of overcrowding in their professions. Shop assistants are also too numerous, and many small shopkeepers complain of poor trade, whilst handicrafts are also going back.

It is true that at that time the demand for labour in the big industries was very great, yet many men were often out of work—6 to 8 per cent. of the trade-union members in 1904-1907—and in 1908-1909 the unemployed amounted to 10 per cent.

Subsequently unemployment among industrial workers seems to have grown still more and to have menaced the existence of many thousands, and the problem has been

the subject of earnest discussion in the widest circles. In September 1913 the question of unemployment was dealt with exhaustively by the Social Democratic Congress in Berlin. All the speakers drew attention to the appalling *increase of unemployment*, which the coming winter was bound to intensify. It was deemed absolutely necessary that the Empire, the States of the Confederation as well as the local communes, should do something to lessen the unemployment.

During the taxation debate a resolution was adopted demanding that those out of work should, as far as possible, be exempted from all taxation.

The reduced birth-rate has, especially with the example of France before them, created considerable anxiety amongst the Germans, particularly among those who consider that the paramount need of the State is a continual increase of military recruiting material.

Brentano, writing in 1909, sounded a warning against this danger in an article in a review, and he was followed in 1911 by Oldenburg, who wrote a treatise on *Der Rückgang der Geburten*, recorded in the *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft*.

The Emperor William took a peculiar step intended to stimulate the birth-rate, and which was announced in the newspapers in October 1909 in the following terms: "Notice is given by circular from the Home Office that the Emperor is willing for the future to be *godfather to the eighth child* in every German family, whether rich or poor."

Another circular empowered the authorities to pay a *State bounty of sixty marks to families in poor circumstances on the birth of the eighth child*. "The Emperor hopes by this means to assist to bring about an increase of the German birth-rate, which plays an important part in the *strengthening of German military power*. Recent years have shown signs of a diminution in the percentage of births, a circumstance which not only the Emperor, but

many eminent statesmen besides, regard as a *grave national danger.*"

What has been the result of this Imperial decision? Doubtless it has been very disappointing, for there cannot be many German parents who, with seven children, are anxious to add an eighth for the sake of the above reward. To most of them seven children have been a sufficient source of trouble.

That this anxiety regarding a reduced birth-rate is unfounded may be gathered from what I have said above.

Since the war broke out, and in connexion with it, Herr Seelmann, insurance actuary (Oldenburg), has dealt with the subject of the reduced German birth-rate in an article in the *Berliner Börsen-Courier* (January 10, 1915) in which he sounded a note of warning and hoped that something would be done to counteract it.

"Among the blessings which will follow upon the war, I count," he says, "the circumstance that the bulk of the population will take a more intelligent interest than hitherto in a factor which in time to come will exercise a decisive influence on Germany's fortunes, the *lowered birth-rate*. . . . Shall we really, after we have spent, so to speak, our last drop of blood in safeguarding our existence, announce our *will to commit suicide*? For if the present tendency continues, Germany will have to face the danger of *ending in national suicide*."

Seelmann admits, however, that Germany's population goes on growing, and is of opinion that it will continue to do so for a few decades to come. But he has fears for the future and is afraid that if the birth-rate goes on diminishing, and the two-children system is generally adopted, Germany will by the end of this century be reduced below the level of France. He therefore considers that "at the end of the war one of the foremost tasks to grapple with will be to introduce counter-measures in this connexion."

Professor A. Schlossmann has also dealt with the question

of the diminished German birth-rate and its causes, but finds himself face to face with an insolvable dilemma, being confronted on the one hand with what he regards as the interest of the State, and on the other with the private citizen's motives for limiting his family. He is anxious that the educated classes should set a good example in this respect and realize that the country's economic condition and political situation demand absolutely a *continued increase of the population*. He points out how Germany in the last few decades has developed from an agricultural into an industrial country, and remarks that "for the sake of our future we must remain a *growing people*."

Whilst maintaining that "the interests of the State need an increased population, taxpayers, soldiers, workers—the more, the better for the State," he points out that "to the private individual few children are an advantage, whilst a large family nowadays *spells ruin*." "Here," he exclaims, "we reach an impasse," and proceeds to put the pertinent question: "Can we ask of the private citizen that he, individually, shall make sacrifices for the good of the State and take upon himself all the worries of providing for the country's needs?" "To the bread-winner every child means added worries."\*

Dr. Julian Marcuse, in his work on *Die Beschränkung der Geburtenzahl—ein Kulturproblem* (1913), takes up arms against those who voice the opinion that a reduced birth-rate is a sign of national decadence or a "diseased State organization," and regards it as a phenomenon due to the interplay of a number of factors of our modern civilization. Amongst other reasons he points to the increased practical activity of women and the heightened feeling of responsibility amongst parents who seek to give their children a better training for suitable occupations, who are anxious to promote their health and strength, etc.

In a remarkable work entitled *Fruchtabtreibung und Präventivverkehr im Zusammenhang mit dem Geburten-*

\* See *Sexual-Probleme*, 1914, p. 352.

rückgang (1914) Dr. Max Hirsch (Berlin) makes the following statement : "Undoubtedly preventive intercourse is the chief cause of the lower birth-rate. Its enormous spread is patent. . . . The *deliberate limitation of the number of children* is attributable to the experience that the *economic welfare of the family* and the maintenance of the degree of comfort indispensable for the health of the family and the education of the children are only possible by preventing too numerous a progeny.

"This view and this feeling of *responsibility* are signs of an *advanced civilization* and presuppose a certain measure of moral maturity, spiritual culture, and enlightenment in physical science.

"Under modern conditions the limitation of progeny is a weapon in the economic struggle, an act of self-protection."

Besides preventive intercourse, the measures taken to procure abortion are in Hirsch's opinion a general contributory cause of the reduced birth-rate in Germany, and he has found that whilst the former method is more in vogue among the upper classes, the latter prevails among the masses.

This limitation in the number of children reveals, according to Hirsch, a parental *forethought* towards the progeny, and is a sign of the *spread of culture*.

Hirsch also points out that the measures taken to procure abortion (usually during the very first months) are discussed with perfect frankness amongst the married women, who often advise one another on the subject, and that the provisions of the law do not exercise a deterrent effect. Such are the horror and fear of illness and distress.

Many other German doctors, Dr. A. Bernstein, Dr. Moses, Dr. Max Marcuse, and others, have expressed themselves to the same effect as a result of their personal observations among the working classes of Berlin.\*

A Social Democratic author, Joh. Ferch, has also

\* See *Sexual-Probleme*, 1913, pp. 733 and 752.

recently drawn attention to the *improved education of the working classes*, which he considers the leading factor in their now more general limitation of families. "To a thinking workman a thinking wife must be an indispensable necessity," and consequently the working class are crying out aloud for the emancipation of women and men from the crushing economic worries and for a few leisure hours for intellectual recreation. In working-class homes the idea is now gaining ground that this goal can be reached by limiting the number of children.\*

This preoccupation as to the limitation of families now engages the attention of all classes of German society, and according to Max Marcuse it has, in recent years, increasingly manifested itself among the working classes, especially in the big towns. In this matter, however, the leaders of the Social Democrats are by no means united, and some—that is to say, those who represent the older revolutionary standpoint, that of class feuds—do not wish to see any improvement in the condition of the working classes until they themselves have created a new era after overthrowing the present foundations of society. This view was brought to light more especially at two large Social Democratic Congresses held at Berlin in August 1913,† when Frau Klara Zetkin (Stuttgart) spoke against "*birth strikes*" and accused the New Malthusian Social Democrats, the Revisionists, of what practically amounts to treason against the cause of the working class. Workmen who limit the number of their children to one or two, she said, were simply aping the bourgeoisie, and the business of the working class was not to let the individual try to improve his conditions of life on the lines of the bourgeoisie, but to *carry on the class struggle*. The working class must not forget that *numbers* are a decisive factor in the fight for freedom. If we have fewer children, she contended, this means that the working-class families will breed fewer *soldiers for the revolution*.

\* See *Sexual-Probleme*, 1914, p. 354.

† See report in *Sexual-Probleme*, 1913, p. 728.

The majority of those who attended the Congress showed unmistakably that they did not share Frau Zetkin's point of view, and two doctors belonging to the Revisionists of the Social Democratic Party, Dr. Bernstein and Dr. Moses, set forth the causes which primarily determine the reduced birth-rate: deteriorated health and illnesses amongst mothers, of which tuberculosis is the chief, the great infant mortality in working-class homes, the poverty which often drives the daughters to prostitution, the housing difficulty, the procuring of abortion universally practised by poor mothers, etc. They pointed out, moreover, that Social Democratic workmen now very generally limit the number of children in their families.

German chauvinists have long regarded the colossal growth of Germany's population as a gratifying phenomenon, something particularly meritorious, which points to fibre and vitality in a nation destined to rule over others which do not augment in the same proportion.

But this is demonstrably not due to deficient vitality, but to deliberate limitation of reproduction brought about by a growing sense of responsibility towards the progeny or the wish to escape poverty by not having too many children to provide for.

Is it really true that a large population means greatness and strength for all time? No doubt this factor is of great importance when war is waged with less populous countries. But this numerical inferiority can be counterbalanced by *alliances*, as seen by France's alliance with Russia and Great Britain in the present war.

*In the long run* the unchecked increase of its population must undoubtedly become a danger to a nation as well as to the world's peace.

Germany's *military and colonial policy* has been founded on the calculation that her enormous growth of population will continue. But a policy based on these premises, and which presupposes a certain future increase of population,

must also reckon with the possibility of world-wide conflicts.

In Germany, as we have seen, many thinkers have warned the nation against this eventuality, though in vain.

I have pointed out in the foregoing (pp. 134-142) how the huge growth of Germany's population has been one of the reasons of her colonial policy, which in turn has become one of the predisposing causes of the War of 1914. The eminent political economist G. Schmoller disputed in 1882 the old dogma as to the blessing of the greatest possible number of children, and considered that it belonged rightly to a semi-civilized age; but in the end he had to take the line of least resistance, and declared in 1900 that Germany's existence would be threatened if she were not a Power to be reckoned with at sea.

In view of the colossal growth of the German nation and the policy of expansion to which it has given rise, it may not be out of place to remind the reader that the dissemination of the nations, and not least of the Germanic peoples, was mostly due, in earlier stages, to the same cause. The home country became over-populated, and it grew difficult for many to support themselves and find room at home, resulting in a periodical exodus either to uninhabited regions—in the earlier periods—or to richer countries, when war often resulted between their inhabitants and the invaders.

The struggle for existence has often made war a "*biological necessity*," as Bernhardi says, but this law applies to the more primitive stages, to savages and barbarians, just as it applies to certain animals.\*

\* I may instance the Norwegian lemming, a rodent, which periodically migrates in immense numbers right across Sweden, ultimately to drown in the waters of the Gulf of Bothnia. These animals are compelled to undertake these migrations through lack of food when, owing to their colossal fertility, they become too numerous.

Another example from the animal world is supplied by the rabbits in Australia and New Zealand, whose fertility has made them a positive plague. Everything edible is consumed by these millions

Civilized nations ought no longer to permit unregulated, irresponsible propagation.

The over-population of Germany is due to the fact that the overwhelming majority have needlessly gone on breeding children, and this in its turn has been a *causa remota* of the war. If the reproduction continues on the same scale as heretofore, it will become a *causa proxima*, the direct and immediate cause of a new war. Over-population becomes a *causa efficiens*, or a mechanically acting cause of war in the animal world, but to the Germans, who do not realize that they are not entitled to such sexual life in the heart of Europe, it becomes a *causa justa*, for they hold that they have a right to anything; unfortunately, therefore, it becomes an ominous *causa justa litigandi*—that is to say, they will regard the struggle for and claim to more and more territory to be fully justified, as being a necessity *to them*. They *must*, they say, struggle for their existence, and have as much right to live as others.

That may be—but only as rational beings who will not spoil life for themselves and others by *thoughtlessness and lack of foresight*!

*Vere scire est per causas scire*—“To understand rightly is to understand through causes”—said Francis Bacon three hundred years ago.

A glance at the statistics of the stupendous growth of Germany’s population shows us that it was *one of the causes of the World War*, for it gave rise to the colonial policy, which gave the impetus to Germany’s fleet, which in turn made Great Britain apprehensive of German sea-power, etc.

The Germans must as individuals and as a State—Government and Reichstag—comprehend this and must of rabbits to the detriment of all other animals and of human beings. Sustained efforts have been made to exterminate the rabbits—in New South Wales alone over £750,000 has been spent annually—but it is only lately that the plague has been arrested—by exceptional drought—causing the rabbits to perish in immense numbers.

not seek to throw the blame on other nations supposed to be actuated by envy, etc. It is waste of energy to plead their "just cause," that it is their only wish to live in peace and enjoy their prosperity, and shout "Death to the English!" England has not prevented Germany's acquisition of colonies, nor has she been able to check German reproductiveness, Germany's gravest danger.

That the German Government would, were France to be conquered, demand some of her most valuable *colonies* is beyond doubt. This may be gathered from the reply which the German Chancellor made to Sir Edward Goschen, the British ambassador, on July 29 (see British *Blue Book*, No. 85): "Every assurance will be given that the Imperial Government aims at no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France . . . but he could not give a similar undertaking with regard to the French colonies."

The Germans have never been such capable colonizers as the British and French, and that is one of the chief reasons why they have not profited much by their colonies. But this is no reason why they should seek to *take colonies away from others* who have acquired them at the cost of great sacrifices.

It has been one of the aims of the German chauvinists that as soon as Germany has secured the hegemony of Europe she shall gain the hegemony of the whole world with the aid of a vast colonial empire, and they are by no means content to pursue a peaceful existence in the enjoyment of their hard-earned prosperity. The belief in Germany's ability to achieve all this and the faith in her mission to save the world by means of her "culture" have long been dominant amongst the Germans, thanks to the Germanistic doctrine and the successes of German arms.

One hears too much in Germany of Germany's greatness and cultural importance, of her call to guide the world. I must once again point out that a growing population is by no means synonymous with growing civilizatory worth. *Outward greatness* is not the same as *cultural greatness*.

In reality there are in every country but relatively few intelligent and noble minds who represent the higher culture. The great majority of the people enjoy its benefits without themselves contributing to it; every country has innumerable mediocrities and innumerable unintelligent and useless individuals, parasites who are but a burden to the community. Of Germany's colossal population the latter form a considerable part, and when the country claims the need of an expansion policy for its sixty-eight millions, it cannot be too clearly realized that it is not for the sake of the representatives of the higher culture, but on behalf of many millions of inferior and relatively useless beings.

## XIV

### FOUNDATIONS OF PEACE AFTER THE WAR

EVERY nation, every individual has now for many months been longing for the horrible war to stop, so that a real peace may be concluded. But now, at the end of May 1915, after the war has lasted ten months, peace is as far off as ever and the outcome of the conflict is very uncertain. What, then, it may be asked, is the use of outsiders discussing the question of peace when they have not the slightest influence over the course of the war and over the belligerent Powers ?

Although such discussion may serve no direct purpose, it may nevertheless be fruitful as preparing the groundwork for the views which it is hoped that the nations will hold when peace approaches and they come to discuss the conditions which are to preclude the possibility of fresh wars. For that is a *sine qua non* amongst all the nations.

It is from Holland that the first general appeal in this respect has come since the war began, the " Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad " having been formed with the object of preparing for the coming peace. At a discussion at The Hague between representatives both of the belligerent and of neutral Powers (April 1915) certain fundamental conditions were agreed upon which were to form the groundwork for peace propaganda among the nations. This programme, which has recently been accepted by the Swedish Peace League, contains the following points :

(1) *Annexation or cession of territory* must not take place in opposition to the *interests and wishes of the population*.

(2) The States shall agree to introduce *full freedom of commerce* in their colonies, protectorates, and spheres of interest.

(3) The work of *The Hague Conferences* for the promotion of international laws shall be continued.

These Conferences shall have a *permanent organization* and must meet at regular intervals.

The States shall agree to refer all disputes to *judicial settlement* or to investigation and to tentative arbitration. With this object it will be necessary to institute, besides the existing Arbitration Tribunal at The Hague: (a) *A permanent international tribunal*; (b) *a permanent commission of investigation* which may contingently submit proposals for an amicable settlement.

The *States shall bind themselves* by mutual consent to take diplomatic, economic, or military steps *if a country should resort to arms* instead of submitting the dispute to a *tribunal* or to the investigation of the *commission of investigation*.

(4) The States shall seek to come to an agreement with a view to mutual *limitation of armaments*. *The right of capture shall be abrogated*, and the principle of the freedom of the seas shall be established.

(5) *Foreign policy* shall be subject to effective *Parliamentary control*, so that secret treaties withheld from the Parliaments may not be binding on the nations.

These demands, which contain the main points of all previous proposals of the last two hundred years for the preservation of durable peace, must be endorsed by all enlightened men and women so that they may take common action for the prevention of war and the safeguarding of permanent peace. The programme was duly accepted by the great Women's Peace Congress held at The Hague in May 1915.

In order that durable peace may be ensured for the future it is necessary that the *Congress* which will take place between the belligerent Governments, after an armistice has been agreed upon, shall express the *will of all*

*the nations drawn into the war* and shall include national representatives elected by the Parliaments. Where the latter are not sitting they should be convened without loss of time.

At a Congress thus constituted the *nations themselves* will be able to decide as to their fate, and resolve that foreign territory may not be annexed in opposition to the will of the population. It shall and must have power to decree relative disarmament and the settlement of disputes by mediation and arbitration through a commission investigation and a peace tribunal.

The incidents leading up to the World War have clearly shown how unsatisfactorily the foreign policy of the State has been conducted, being, as it is, in the hands of a small oligarchy of a few statesmen who conduct secret negotiations and at a given moment, without notice to or control by the national representatives, decide upon warlike action.

Yet other Powers, and more particularly a disinterested Great Power, Great Britain, came forward with proposals for mediation, which, if accepted, might have prevented the war. Instead of entertaining these proposals, these leading statesmen exchanged notes on incidental matters, mobilization, etc., which were made out to be decisive reasons for war, and settled everything with watch and almanac in hand, in accordance with an unacceptable ultimatum. It was the purest *parody* of enlightened policy between civilized countries.

Are the nations to put up with this sort of thing for ever ? The answer must be no ! Can it be tolerated that a handful of men shall continue to be allowed to decree the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of human beings and the unhappiness of millions ? No, a thousand times no !

The nations must rise against this mad system of despotic conduct of State affairs, and must insist at once, everywhere, on constitutional laws which will safeguard the peaceable intercourse of nations and preclude craftily engineered warlike conflicts.

In most countries the Government alone is responsible for the foreign policy and need not consult Parliament. Germany and Russia are typical examples of the absolute authority of the Government, or, rather, of the monarch, in this respect.

In countries with constitutional government and an advanced parliamentary system the Government is always in contact with Parliament on matters of foreign policy, although usually having the power to decide in the last resort.

In the United States and Norway, however, foreign policy is under constitutional control. The President of the United States and the Government deliberate with the Committee of the Congress in foreign affairs before coming to a decision as to their policy in matters of importance.

In Sweden it is customary, when serious political complications appear to threaten the country's neutrality and pacific attitude, for the King to "invite special deputies of the Riksdag to deliberate with him on matters which should in his view be kept secret," pursuant to Article 54 of the Constitution. These Deputies have, however, no power of decision.

If wars are in future to be averted between European States—a *necessary consummation*—it is first and foremost imperative :

(1) That a *state of war* shall not be decreed merely as a result of negotiations or an exchange of notes between a couple of statesmen or between a *monarch* and a *Foreign Minister* or *Chancellor*, essentially in accordance with the old regime of autocracy, but that the *representatives of the people* shall, in pursuance of the principles of enlightened democracy, be consulted in some form or other, either collectively or by delegation.

(2) That all States must unconditionally, before a declaration of war is issued, *submit the matters in dispute to mediation* either through delegates of a number of other States or through the Peace Tribunal at The Hague.

(3) That *war must not be declared* by ultimatum allowing an insufficient time—such as twenty-four or forty-eight hours—for a reply, as is usually done, and that a *longer time, at least a month*, must be allowed, so as to avoid precipitate judgment and give time for mature reflection.

These three cardinal conditions, the justice of which must be as clear as daylight to every thinking person, were ignored in the negotiations between the Powers on the eve of the World War.

*It must not be tolerated*, at the end of this stupendous World War, that, as happened after the Franco-German War of 1870-71, the States shall be allowed to renew their efforts in the direction of *fresh armaments*, to prepare for fresh wars. *There must be an end* to this era of wars, which is contrary to all tenets of civilization. Every enlightened person in the whole world demands it.

All States *must agree*, if not to disarmament, then at least to a *considerable reduction of the military establishment*, let us say to one-tenth thereof, so that only *militia troops* remain.

The *stupendous expenditure* for warlike purposes such as this World War has witnessed, and which gives rise to terrible losses whilst leaving the contending parties at the same relative strength, *must not be incurred again*.

So long as the States are not able to agree upon a *general reduction of armies and navies*, it will be useless to hope for peace. Peace in such circumstances will be but a truce.

It will be necessary, first of all, to reduce the military establishment in the military country *par excellence*: Germany. So long as this military Power is not restricted, there can be no peace.

The coming Peace Congress will have no task more urgent. For how can it serve the world if the Congress decides with an overwhelming majority upon a reduction of the military establishments, upon mediation and arbitration, etc., *if Germany is not a party to these measures?*

But even if she consents, this means nothing if her military establishment is not reduced, for in that case

Germany, with her military organization, her five to ten million men in arms, can defy the rulings of the Congress and the rights of nations.

And Russia ? Is not this colossal Empire as dangerous a military Power as Germany, and is she not as great a menace to the peace of the world ?

No. Russia disseminates her surplus population over Siberia (*see p. 311*) and is not in the same sense as Germany a military Power ; she is not, as Germany, organized in every detail of her social life for military purposes, nor is she, like Germany, permanently on a semi-war footing. The Russian people are not, like the Germans, inspired with warlike ideals and have had no great wars, no apostles of war to inculcate its glories. Such a work as Bernhardi's could not have been written in Russia. If we except a certain war party, those who have studied the Russian nation will admit that the educated Russian is as much a European as the Frenchman, the German, the Swede, and so forth, and has no yearning for war and conquest ; the national temper is on the whole gentle and sensitive, accessible to good impulses. Sweeping and much needed reforms will come in due course, and one of the most important has already been introduced during the war : the abolition of vodka.

Russia will in a not far distant future probably cease altogether to be ruled by an autocratic Tsar, and it is not unlikely that several autonomous States, in Poland, Ukraine, etc., will be created and give rise to a Russian confederacy.

It may still be of interest to say a few words about the address which Professor W. Ostwald delivered at Stockholm in October 1914, when he visited Sweden as an "intellectual war volunteer" at the instigation of the newly formed "Kulturbund," whose principles and aims he propounded, although he added a few personal opinions of his own. The following is a statement which he issued to several newspapers. "People talk of *German militarism*, and the

dislike which Germany has created in the world may perhaps be due to its growth. But this very "militarism" is one of the most powerful expressions of *Germany's organizing power*. I say frankly that I consider that Germany through her organization talent, has reached a *higher stage of civilization* than the other nations, and that the war will be the means of *admitting them to a higher civilization* on this basis.

"What does Germany want? Germany wants to organize Europe! For hitherto Europe has by no means been organized. Germany wants to strike out in a new direction in order to realize the *idea of united effort*. I will explain to you *Germany's great secret*. We, or perhaps *the Germanic race*, have discovered the *fact of organization*. The other nations still live in the epoch of *individualism*. We live in that of *organization*. With us the whole strives to develop every part to its highest possible efficiency, but at the same time to guide it into the path where it will be *most useful to the community*. That is our liberty, the highest form of liberty, in which all forces are preserved and co-operate."

This pronouncement by the eminent scientist and pacifist, who in his cultural mission to Sweden had behind him a large body of representatives of German culture, shows us more plainly than anything how the Germanistic dreams of greatness, blended with the all-conquering militarism, has perverted the vision of even the best men in Germany. All seem to have had the same train of reasoning drilled into them: German military power is synonymous with a higher civilization, and Europe must be organized on the *foundations of militarism*. Such peculiar ideas as that, for instance, the Germans or the Germanic race have "discovered the *fact of organization*" can thrive only in a confused mind. There is no sense in this phrase, viewed as an abstract conception.

The Germans may have shown great organizing power in developing their military system, but Napoleon may also be regarded as one of the greatest military organizers

known to history. And it will surely be conceded that the English are singularly capable organizers in regard both to their colonies and to their navy.

Germany's ambition to "organize Europe" means that when Germany has won and has dictated the terms of peace German Imperialism is to rule Europe and re-model the map of the world to suit her own ideas.

The States which are to be organized so that they may co-operate with the conquering German Empire are no doubt to be allotted the rôle of *vassals*, but this prospect tempts no one—quite the contrary.

Every State must inevitably cherish its independence, none willingly forfeits its liberty, and Prussia's treatment of Poles and Danes in annexed provinces has furnished us with a forbidding example of the German method of organization.

Professor Franz von Liszt, the famous criminologist, has come forward since the war began (October 1914) with proposals concerning Germany's future and her international position: his scheme is a Central European Confederation, and his plan of organization coincides on essential points with that propounded by Ostwald. In common with all other Germans he holds that Germany is menaced primarily by England, but also by Russia. He takes up the standpoint that Germany cannot even after a successful war attain a degree of material strength which will secure her against the world-Powers of Great Britain and Russia. Hence her remedy lies in a confederation of States.

Germany, as a result of this war, must aspire to the following ends: she must satisfy the need of *colonies* indispensable to an industrial State, she must *reconstitute the German States* internally, and she must organize the *Central European Confederation*.

Sweden, Norway, and Denmark are tempted with the added security against Great Britain and Russia and with the prospect that they may become a Scandinavian

subdivision of the Great Confederation, possibly with the addition of Finland, which should henceforth be free, like Poland and Ukraine.

All the members of the Confederation are to retain their independence. But the union between them must be "riveted" by their constitutions and cemented by a military convention. In other words, there must be a sort of common Parliament with delegations.

A delicate point of the programme is, of course, that which concerns Germany's position. Liszt rejects the term "hegemony," but accepts the formula *primus inter pares*, and emphasizes that the post of leadership must preferably be based on a willingness to bear the burdens of others (!). He also holds out hopes of the Germans becoming more amiable and refined in their manner, less intractable and overbearing, once they feel safe and unassailable and are consequently able to bestow more care on the choicer blooms of culture.

In spite of many good ideas and a moderation which is in marked contrast to most other German proposals and appeals to neutral nations, Liszt nevertheless shows that he is under the influence of the same hypnosis as all other Germans in regard to the origin and outcome of the war, the charges against Belgium, England's culpability, etc. He endorses the view which Dr. G. Irmer, Legation Counsellor, advances in his pamphlet on England's "world yoke" and her rôle as instigator of the World War, as unbalanced and one-sided an exposition as one can well imagine. He blames in the first place Edward VII for the anti-German policy of England, and says that Sir Edward Grey is merely the executor of his political testament: "English policy stands arraigned for all time before the tribunal of history as the unscrupulous instigator of this conspiracy against the German Empire, and England must bear the burden of having launched this European war against us."

Curiously enough, Liszt and Irmer, together with Professor Lamprecht, in their joint preface to these

pamphlets, which form part of a series entitled '*Twixt War and Peace*', gave vent to their joy over the war, clearly in the unshakable conviction that Germany will win. They quote Treitschke's words about war as a "fountain of health for the people" and declare that it has now "come into its own," and they acknowledge that Germany herself took the offensive. They deplore "the distressing era of political decline, which filled the stoutest hearts with anxiety for the future," and rejoice that "*the valiant energy of leading strategists* has evoked in the hour of crisis throughout the land the unanimous cry: 'At last the hour has come for action and deliverance!'" It may be opportune in this connexion to recall Bernhardi's words in the preface to his book *Germany and the Next War*, which I have already quoted (p. 147); it is curious to note his concordance with the sentiments of these authors.

They declare that "sword and pen must not rest until Germany with rejuvenated strength rises from this new ordeal as a *guarantor of a peaceful future* and as a *staunchn protector against the arrogance and contumely of bygone days.*" No suggestion, it is to be noted, that Germany has ever been guilty of arrogance and contumely.

As will be seen, Liszt proposes to found the coming peace on a *Central European Confederation* which is to keep in check the two menacing world-Powers of *Great Britain* and *Russia*. As the backbone of this Confederation—Germany and Austria-Hungary—is not considered strong enough to combat these two Powers it is proposed that other European States, primarily those who have been neutral in this war, should enter the Confederation.

This brings us face to face with the "if" of the German scheme: will the neutral States of Europe agree to become not only allied to, but organically and constitutionally bound up with, Germany as the leading State, with the object—the paramount task—of *opposing Great Britain and Russia in anticipation of coming wars?*

Surely there is *not a single country* to which this plan appeals.

None of the States who have remained neutral in the World War will have any cause for hostility towards Great Britain and Russia ; on the contrary, all of them will be anxious to remain on friendly terms with these Powers. Least of all should Sweden, Norway, and Denmark desire to pick a quarrel with them, and this they have amply shown by the neutrality which their Governments, with clear-sighted resolution, proclaimed at the outset of the war.

A curious example of the German notion that it has been reserved for Germany to organize that creative culture which, as Ostwald says, is to supersede "a single nation's brutal mastery and become the paramount factor in the realm of justice and order," has been furnished by Dr. F. Naumann, a cleric, in an article in his paper *Die Hilfe* (October 1914). Pastor Naumann is a member of the German Reichstag, belongs to the "Fortschrittliche Volkspartei" (Progressive Democratic Party) and took part in the inter-parliamentary congress of German and French delegates held at Bâle in the spring of 1914.

He considers that the most important result of this war will be the formation of stronger confederacies of States than have hitherto existed, and, cleric withal, he seems to discern in the sanguinary carnage a higher reason or a divine interposition and guidance.

To him the interests of peace are best served by promoting the formation of large States by the amalgamation of smaller ones, and he condemns as doing poor service to the cause of peace those who uphold a system of small States maintained by the principle of neutrality. Dr. Naumann goes so far as to deny the "moral right" of neutrality. It is the duty of nationalities as well as of individuals to take sides when called upon to do so. Neither must stand apart ; they must take up their post in the struggle ; and must argue that he who seeks isolation in reality violates the natural law which directs that no

one must shirk participation in the fight for larger confederacies—the road to peace and happiness.

The Belgian devotion to neutrality was egotistical and selfish. For, according to Dr. Naumann, one cannot admit the unconditional right of the individual State to oppose "a universal reconstitution." Wars are, nowadays, a "process of organizatory transpositions in the evolution of humanity."

"The leadership of mankind is now being fought for. Individually one can understand the wishes of the neutrals, but in point of principle one cannot acknowledge their right to evade the progressive centralization of the leadership of mankind."

This means, in other words, that Belgium ought to have subordinated herself to Germany's leadership by virtue of the universal reconstitution which that country is destined to carry out. We recognize here the doctrine and aims of Germanism as proclaimed for the last century.

Sweden's duty, according to Naumann, under this doctrine, is clear. But Sweden has nevertheless adhered to her independence and her neutrality.

The first thing to be done is to *impress public opinion in all civilized nations with the absolute necessity of realizing the idea of arbitration*, which has long been consistently fostered by a large number of philosophers, jurists, and statesmen. This must be done by international treaties, under which disputes between States must be settled by arbitration. It is very essential, however, that such arbitration must not be subject to any optional consent of either party; it must be founded on the acknowledgment of the principle of arbitration as a *permanent factor*—that is to say, of a *previously ratified agreement between the States*.

In discussing international treaties respecting arbitration tribunals, it cannot be made too clear that the first and foremost condition is that they shall be *permanent*, that they shall be *established and organized beforehand*—in other

words, they must be resorted to in *every* dispute that may arise. It is too late to talk about arbitration *once the dispute has arisen*. There can be no doubt that once the dissension exists, proposals to refer it to arbitration are very unlikely to succeed when the subject of discord is a *really serious one*, for in that case it will already have roused the passions of the peoples and given rise to minatory expressions of opinion. In most cases tribunals of arbitration can only hope to settle disputes of a minor nature and which in any case would not have brought on war, and this will remain so until general treaties stipulating that *unconditional arbitration shall be applied to every kind of dispute* have been concluded *beforehand*.

By this means the discussion of a dispute will become vastly different, much calmer, much more peaceable than when both sides know that, failing an agreement, they are certain to resort, according to militarist tradition, to the arbitrament of brute force, or, to begin with, to armaments and mobilizations which are seized upon by the newspapers and forthwith acquire the weight of *arguments* in the discussion.

It is quite possible that peace congresses may by a resolute attitude avert many a war, and compel through the pressure of public opinion a pacific solution of many new disputes between the States. But this is far from enough so long as old wounds remain unhealed, so long as a feeling of injustice still rankles. Crimes against humanity still besmirch many a throne, and in many countries certain parties hold warlike and chauvinistic notions which perpetually impede normal, peaceable, and humane advancement.

It is clear nowadays that the peace congresses in the different countries and the international peace conferences with their humanistic or humanitarian programmes, the "*abc*" of the peace movement which nobody disputes, must concern themselves with *live political questions*—that is to say, with the *causes of*

*international discord*—if they are to attain any real importance.

No durable peace can be brought about by the official peace conferences until the remnants of the old policy of conquest which survive in existing treaties have been extirpated by permitting every nationality *incorporated with another by force, to work out its own destiny*. Not until then will national hatred cease to pollute the currents of thought, and not until then can there be any idea of limiting armaments, for so long as such nations are under bondage, the States ruling and oppressing them will fear “rebellious” movements among the smaller nationalities whom they have subdued by violence.

For over three decades—as witnessed by the Berlin Treaty of 1878 and the abrogation of Article 5 of the Treaty of Prague of 1866, which took place in the same year—questions of nationality have been kept in the background in the policy of the Great Powers. But it is obvious that sooner or later they are bound to appear on the agenda of international politics. For they are questions of life and death to many nationalities in Europe, and the interest which they arouse is as lively as ever. All that these nationalities are waiting for is an opportunity to present their national demands.

Unfortunately it has not been customary in European communities to recognize, and as far as possible to repair, official errors and blunders or acts of injustice on the part of the State.

Let us hope that a new era will witness the introduction of such expressions of a new public morality, and that injustices and faults committed by public departments will be righted as far as possible by reparation to the victims.

When The Hague Peace Conference was created in 1898 a negative principle was adopted which, if it continues to be applied to peace conferences, must inevitably prevent any radical changes. It was resolved that “*no deliberations regarding the political conditions in a State or*

*questions defined by treaties* shall take place.” This was proposed by the Dutch Foreign Minister after consultation with the Russian Government, and several Great Powers only accepted the invitation subject to this condition.

But to achieve a real peace it is necessary to *probe to the bottom* all factors of the international policies of the Great Powers and their relations with other States and with conquered or annexed territories, to approach all disputes with an open mind, and to remove known causes of dissatisfaction. It is necessary, therefore, to discuss not only possible future causes of discord, but to go into *grievances of old standing*, questions of *legalized brutality*, which, again, make it necessary to examine certain treaties forced upon unwilling nationalities and to *revise* them. Otherwise a peace conference becomes illusory and useless as a means of averting fresh wars.

Nothing in politics is irrevocable, least of all the ruthless conquest and annexation of countries and provinces against the wish and the will of the population.

There are many black spots on the map of Europe which denote crimes against the law of nations and usurpation of the rights of nationality, to the enduring shame of European civilization. To establish the freedom of nations and their right to work out their own destiny must be one of the chief duties of the Peace Congress which will follow this war; otherwise there can be no peace.

This is no place for going into these questions deeply, and I will merely cite the provinces which should be allowed to be the masters of their own fate: Schleswig, Finland, Lithuania, Poland, Posen, Galicia, Ukraine, Alsace-Lorraine, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Austria’s Italian provinces.

The position of the Jews must also be made secure in the countries where they have lived under harsh conditions, as in Poland, Russia, and Rumania.

Belgium has now become a country occupied by Germany and placed under German administration.

The coming peace will have no meaning whatever if the

Congress which settles its terms does not decide absolutely that Belgium must remain an independent country as before, must be liberated—immediately—from the German occupation, and must receive full compensation, so far as compensation can be given, for all the losses which that unhappy country has suffered through the war. Belgium was attacked by Germany in violation of the law of nations and of treaties of neutrality, and it is therefore for Germany in the first place to give her compensation. But the Entente Powers must also be held liable, for they undertook to safeguard Belgium's neutrality, and her resistance against the German invasion arrested in a great measure the invasion of France and gave that country and Great Britain time to gather strength, unprepared as they were for the war. Belgium's integrity is of vital importance both to France and Great Britain.

The utterly false conception took root in Germany at the beginning of the war that *the whole country was threatened* and that it was a matter of fighting for the *existence of the German nation* and for its civilization, which the Germans were bound to defend as one man. We are witnessing here a psychological phenomenon which is easily explained. The most elementary of the psychic factors is: Germany is engaged in a war with redoubtable Powers, the Fatherland is threatened; so thinking, the whole nation is seized with patriotic defensive fervour, the citizen does not trouble about the cause, but accepts the reason suggested to his mind by the Government: "We have been attacked." Then comes the notion that the enemy may invade the country if the hope of victory does not materialize, and this is followed by an increasing anxiety for his material existence, and he thinks with trepidation of the impending devastation of the country and the set-back to culture by distress and famine.

But *no Power has threatened Germany*, no one has wanted to *destroy her culture*. Germany's culture is greatly valued by the whole world, even by her present enemies, and

nothing could destroy it. But the whole world, not her present enemies alone, deplores that this exalted culture has been thrust into the background in certain circles and that *another tendency*, that of *militarism* and of *aspiration to material domination* involving a threat to other nations, has obtained the upper hand. *No one says that the German is a barbarian*, but surely it is the universal opinion of Europe that *some Germans* have conducted themselves as barbarians, nay, as Huns, in this war, and that the Chief High Command has given voice to sentiments which, coupled with the ever-demoralizing war frenzy, have brutalized many German soldiers.

Can peace endure? It can if the Germans cease exclaiming: "We are the sons of Goethe, Schiller, Kant, and Fichte," and instead seek to call forth the spirit of these giants of German thought, to vivify their ideas in a new epoch, to banish military Germanism and thus honour their own country and free the world from the fear of Germany and pave the way for renewed sympathy for the good that lives in Germany.

Otherwise there can be no peace in Europe.

Europe will not be safe until the German bellicose spirit has lost its influence and until the German States prevent absolutely, by prohibition and confiscation, the dissemination of the kind of literature which military writers and other chauvinistic authors have published of late to arouse warlike tendencies among the people and to glorify war, and until a wave of German opinion has risen up against them and the people realize that, far from having learnt sound common sense, they have surrendered their minds to the counsels of utter madness.

When so celebrated a man as Thomas Mann can say that *culture and militarism are brothers*, that their ideals are identical, that they are founded on the same principle and have the same enemy, peace, then surely it is time for a new German race to emerge and to exclaim with pity: "Poor Mann, his senses had deserted him!"

To Maximilian Harden—who deemed the German

apologies for the violation of Belgian neutrality unnecessary and who said : “ Why all this talk ? *It is brute force that dictates our laws.* Has the stronger ever yielded to the impudent pretensions of the weaker ? ”—this new German race will say : “ Fie on you, outlaw ! We despise your brutality, your cynicism ! ”

Bernhardi’s teaching of “ the *necessity of war, its blessings and its idealism* ”—that it constitutes an indispensable and beneficent evolutionary law—and his exclamation that “ *war is of God’s making* ” and as necessary and useful to the world as eating and drinking,” and that the striving for perpetual peace is an unsound “ *utopian dream*, ” will be stigmatized, like the rest of his barbarous doctrines, by this new German opinion as unworthy of a civilized nation.

If this does not come about there will be no peace in Europe.

No durable peace can be expected as long as the *Bismarck cult* endures in Germany, for it is an insurmountable obstacle to a sound public outlook on questions of international polities. Until this cult is reduced to a minimum and restricted to a handful of chauvinists without political influence, one cannot hope for a real peaceable growth of German culture. Until then Bismarck will be worshipped as a god in spite of the commandment : “ Thou shalt have none other gods but Me.” Every large town in Germany has its Bismarck monument ; the largest of all is in Hamburg, a colossal statue visible at an immense distance and measuring seven metres in height \*—an imperator arrayed in armour, his expression as hard as the stone of which it is fashioned, the hands resting on a colossal sword. He is Germany’s War God, and one can read his thought of thoughts : *ich bin das Schwert*. There he stands, a graven image, hypnotizing his worshipping people like the gods of antiquity. Their cult is dead, most of their chief monuments have been destroyed, and the time will come when

\* Four times the height of a man or cubically sixty-four times the size of a human being. The plinth is over seven metres high.

the god Bismarck will suffer the same fate. Then peace will reign in the world.

It is truly astounding to hear the Germans complain that *the world will not make room* for their enterprise, that England stands in their way first and last. Yet in a short time Germany has acquired very considerable colonies and now stands third amongst colonial Powers.

The German colonies occupy no fewer than 2,658,548 square kilometres or five times the area of the German Empire in Europe.

But the remarkable thing is that so few Germans have settled in these colonies. In 1913 their population numbered 12,064,992, but of these 12,040,603 were natives and only 24,389 were *Germans*, a large percentage of the latter being officials and soldiers.

Here, surely, there is room for *German emigration on a large scale*, a movement which Germany's over-population renders absolutely necessary. Germany *must*, whatever the upshot of the war, *be allowed to retain her colonies*—for her own benefit and for the salvation of other nations from fresh wars to which otherwise the preposterous rate of reproduction in Germany must give rise.

Germany will more than ever be menaced in the near future with the danger of *over-population* and will, at the present almost constant rate of increase of 860,000 per annum—even if we allow for the death of 1,000,000 in the war—have a population of about 75,000,000 in ten years and about 83,000,000 in twenty years, and there are but two ways to avert this catastrophe :

- (1) *Emigration on a large scale*, and
- (2) *A considerable reduction of the birth-rate*.

If these ends are not achieved there will be no peace in Europe. In that case a fresh war cannot fail to follow in a not very distant future, perhaps in a decade, for the overcrowded country will then have many millions of unemployed, destitute, and famished inhabitants who must in one way or another be provided for.

Failing war with other Powers, there must be a devastating *revolution* with *civil war* in Germany, when the workers, reduced to desperation, will find themselves disappointed in their expectation of German power and prosperity. In this revolution, which will be the work of the Socialists, the Government will no longer be able to count on the present universal discipline amongst its soldiers, for millions of them are Socialists and Republicans, and millions will rise to fight under the stress of starvation. There will be a horrible slaughter of millions—an appalling reaction from the state which has hitherto obtained.

Unhappy German people, what is to be your fate ?

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